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Netanyahu at the UN on 24 September 2026 Despite the ICC Warrant: Who Can Arrest Him in New York and What France Would Have to Do

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Netanyahu at the UN on 24 September 2026 Despite the ICC Warrant: Who Can Arrest Him in New York and What France Would Have to Do

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On 17 September 2026, the Associated Press reported that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu will make a whirlwind 24-hour trip to New York to address the United Nations General Assembly, arriving late on 23 September, speaking on the afternoon of 24 September and flying straight back to Israel that same night. Israel’s Ambassador to the UN, Danny Danon, is quoted as saying that after New York Mayor Zohran Mamdani called the prime minister a war criminal and urged his arrest, there was no option but for Netanyahu to come in person and answer from the podium. The mayor’s call for an arrest had to be withdrawn, because New York City has no legal authority to execute an International Criminal Court warrant, and Mamdani has instead encouraged the federal government to act. The United States, like Israel, is not a party to the Rome Statute. On the very same day, the US State Department extended the visa ban barring Palestinian Authority and Palestine Liberation Organisation officials, including President Mahmoud Abbas, from travelling to the General Assembly. So the coming week offers an extraordinary split screen: a sitting prime minister under a public ICC arrest warrant since 21 November 2024 will take the UN podium, while the unindicted president he is accused of starving into submission cannot get a visa. For an international audience, and especially for anyone exposed to French or European proceedings, the legal questions are precise: who, if anyone, could lawfully arrest Netanyahu in New York, and what would France be obliged to do if a fugitive of the same kind ever landed at Roissy instead of JFK? This analysis answers both, from the French lawyer’s side of the table.

I. Can Benjamin Netanyahu Be Arrested in New York During the UN General Assembly?

A. Why the ICC Arrest Warrant Cannot Be Executed on American Soil

The warrant itself is beyond dispute. In a press release dated 21 November 2024, Pre-Trial Chamber I of the International Criminal Court announced: Today, on 21 November 2024, Pre-Trial Chamber I of the International Criminal Court (‘Court’), in its composition for the Situation in the State of Palestine, unanimously issued two decisions rejecting challenges by the State of Israel (‘Israel’) brought under articles 18 and 19 of the Rome Statute (the ‘Statute’). It also issued warrants of arrest for Mr Benjamin Netanyahu and Mr Yoav Gallant. The Chamber added: The Chamber issued warrants of arrest for two individuals, Mr Benjamin Netanyahu and Mr Yoav Gallant, for crimes against humanity and war crimes committed from at least 8 October 2023 until at least 20 May 2024, the day the Prosecution filed the applications for warrants of arrest. On the substance, the judges found reasonable grounds to believe that both men bore criminal responsibility as co-perpetrators for the war crime of starvation as a method of warfare; and the crimes against humanity of murder, persecution, and other inhumane acts, and that both individuals intentionally and knowingly deprived the civilian population in Gaza of objects indispensable to their survival, including food, water, and medicine and medical supplies, as well as fuel and electricity, from at least 8 October 2023 to 20 May 2024. The Court’s public page for the defendant confirms that the arrest warrant for Netanyahu was issued on 21 November 2024 and remains outstanding. Israel challenged the Court’s jurisdiction over the Situation in the State of Palestine and over Israeli nationals, and asked for a fresh notification of the investigation and a halt to the proceedings; the Chamber rejected both challenges. On jurisdiction the reasoning was blunt: the acceptance by Israel of the Court’s jurisdiction is not required, as the Court can exercise its jurisdiction on the basis of territorial jurisdiction of Palestine. That territorial anchor was built years earlier: On 1 January 2015, The State of Palestine lodged a declaration under article 12(3) of the Rome Statute accepting jurisdiction of the Court since 13 June 2014, followed by accession on 2 January 2015, entry into force on 1 April 2015, a referral of the Situation since 13 June 2014, and the opening of the investigation on 3 March 2021. Whatever Washington or Jerusalem says about the wisdom of the case, the warrant is a valid judicial act of a permanent international court, and it binds every State Party to arrest and surrender.

The United States is not one of them. The Associated Press report states plainly that the US and Israel are not members of the Court, which is why the mayor’s demand had to be redirected to the federal government as a political appeal rather than a judicial request. The ICC has no police force of its own; it depends entirely on states. A State Party that receives a person under warrant must arrest and surrender him under Part 9 of the Rome Statute, and a refusal can be referred by the Court to the Assembly of States Parties or to the Security Council. A non-party has no such duty, and nothing in American domestic law transforms an ICC warrant into an arrestable federal charge. The trip has therefore been engineered, quite deliberately, to minimise even theoretical exposure: a late arrival on 23 September, an address on the afternoon of 24 September, and departure the same night, with movements concentrated in and around the UN headquarters district, where visiting heads of delegation travel under the special transit regime of the host-country arrangement rather than under ordinary immigration and policing. The Chamber classified the warrants as secret to protect witnesses and the investigation, but disclosed their existence precisely because, in its words, conduct similar to that addressed in the warrant appeared to be ongoing and it was in the interest of victims and their families to know the warrants existed. Publicity is the enforcement mechanism here: more than 120 States Parties, in the words of the coverage of the story, carry a binding obligation, so every foreign trip of a fugitive becomes a legal risk assessment, route by route and stopover by stopover. New York in September 2026 is simply the rare destination where that assessment comes back clear. The same logic explains why ICC fugitives in other files have learned to map their travel the same way, a pattern this desk has followed in the Court’s Libya docket, where the long road of suspects toward The Hague shows that warrants do not expire with the news cycle.

Two objections are commonly raised at this point, and both fail on the law as it stands. The first is complementarity: Israel argues its own system should handle the allegations. But the admissibility fight already happened, under articles 18 and 19, and Israel lost it unanimously in November 2024; the Prosecutor had notified Israel of the investigation back in 2021, Israel elected at the time not to seek deferral, and the Chamber found the parameters of the investigation unchanged. A press statement repeating the objection does not suspend a warrant. The second objection is immunity: a sitting prime minister, it is said, cannot be arrested abroad. Before national courts, sitting heads of state and government do enjoy personal immunity, as the French Cour de cassation recalled as recently as 25 July 2025. But that immunity is a bar before foreign domestic courts, not before the international court that issued the warrant, whose statute sets aside official capacity. That is exactly why the coming arrest debate in New York is political rather than judicial: no American judge has a warrant to execute, because the United States never joined the treaty that creates the duty to execute it.

B. The Mamdani Arrest Call and the Abbas Visa Ban: Two Gestures American Law Cannot Carry

The New York side of the story deserves a close legal reading, because it shows precisely where municipal politics stops and international obligation begins. Mayor Mamdani called Netanyahu a war criminal and urged his arrest, then had to walk the demand back once it became clear that the city possessed no authority to execute an ICC warrant, and he now encourages the federal government to do what the city cannot. That sequence is legally exact. An American mayor commands municipal police whose arrest powers derive from state and federal law; an ICC warrant is neither, and the United States has enacted no statute that would allow a local officer, or even a federal agent acting alone, to deprive a visiting head of government of liberty on the sole basis of a Hague warrant. The federal government could, in theory, surrender a person to the ICC only through a dedicated legal channel that does not exist for this case, and the executive has shown no intention of creating one. The mayor’s statements therefore belong to politics and to the symbolic register of the General Assembly week, not to criminal procedure. Ambassador Danon’s response belongs to the same register: predicting, after last year’s mass walkout during Netanyahu’s speech, that this year will bring something like another show, he frames the 24-hour visit as a demonstration that the warrant changes nothing. Legally, he is half right: the warrant changes nothing in New York. It changes a great deal almost everywhere else the prime minister might fly, which is why the itinerary is so tightly drawn.

The mirror image is the treatment of the Palestinian leadership. On 17 September 2026, the US State Department extended the measures barring visas for Palestinian Authority and PLO officials, including Mahmoud Abbas, ahead of the General Assembly, officially on grounds of failure to reform. Whatever the stated motive, the procedural effect is stark and worth stating without adornment: the leader under ICC warrant gets the podium, while the leader of the observer state whose territory the ICC found to anchor its jurisdiction cannot physically reach it. American visa policy is discretionary sovereign territory; no rule of the Rome Statute compels Washington to admit anyone, just as no rule compels it to arrest anyone. But the contrast matters for the cases France and other States Parties will have to handle, because it feeds directly into the persecution analysis and the political context in which European judges assess risk, credibility and the need for protective measures for victims and witnesses on their soil. It also matters for the General Assembly itself: the annual gathering of world leaders is the one week when the gap between the ICC’s universal claim and its state-dependent enforcement becomes visible to every delegation at once. A fugitive addressing the Assembly from the rostrum while 124 States Parties sit in the hall is not a sign that the warrant failed; it is a sign that enforcement was designed, by treaty, to happen the day the fugitive lands somewhere the treaty binds. France is one of those places, and French law leaves no discretion at all.

Before turning to France, one practical consequence for travellers should be spelled out, because it is the question this firm’s international clients actually ask. An ICC suspect who limits himself to non-party airspace and a hours-long, ring-fenced UN visit runs little judicial risk that week. The risk concentrates on everything around it: refuelling stops, medical diversions, overflight emergencies, connecting flights through States Parties, and any future private travel once office is left behind. Warrants of this kind do not lapse; the Chamber’s decision to publicise them means border police across the States Parties work from nominal lists, and airlines file passenger data in advance. Defence teams for high-profile travellers now plan routes the way sanctions lawyers plan transactions: with a matrix of jurisdictions, obligations and failure points. The French matrix, set out below, is among the strictest in Europe, and it is worth understanding in detail even for readers who will never set foot in a Paris courtroom, because it is the template of what awaits in every European State Party capital.

II. What France Would Have to Do if an ICC Fugitive Landed in Paris

A. Arrest, Judge Within 24 Hours, Surrender: the French Cooperation Machine Under Articles 627-1 to 627-11

France wrote ICC cooperation directly into its Code of Criminal Procedure, and the mechanism is far more rigid than ordinary extradition. Article 627-1 provides: Les demandes d’entraide émanant de la Cour pénale internationale sont adressées aux autorités compétentes en vertu de l’article 87 du statut en original ou en copie certifiée conforme accompagnées de toutes pièces justificatives. Ces documents sont transmis au procureur de la République antiterroriste qui leur donne toutes suites utiles. En cas d’urgence, ces documents peuvent être transmis directement et par tout moyen à ce magistrat. Three features already distinguish this from extradition: the channel runs through the Paris anti-terrorism prosecutor, urgency transmission by any means is expressly authorised, and the magistrate is instructed to give the request every useful follow-up, not to second-guess it. Conservatory measures follow the same logic: Article 627-3 states that L’exécution sur le territoire français des mesures conservatoires mentionnées au k du paragraphe 1 de l’article 93 du statut est ordonnée, aux frais avancés du Trésor et selon les modalités prévues par le présent code, par le procureur de la République antiterroriste. La durée maximale de ces mesures est limitée à deux ans. Elles peuvent être renouvelées dans les mêmes conditions avant l’expiration de ce délai à la demande de la Cour pénale internationale. Freezing, seizure and preservation of assets and evidence at the Court’s request are therefore ordered by a single prosecutor, at Treasury expense, renewable at the Court’s request, with difficulties channelled back to the ICC through the consultations provided for in the Statute.

The arrest procedure itself is a countdown with almost no exits. Article 627-5 requires: Toute personne appréhendée en vertu d’une demande d’arrestation aux fins de remise doit être déférée dans les vingt-quatre heures au procureur de la République territorialement compétent. Within that time the safeguards of police custody apply; after verifying identity, the prosecutor must inform the person, in a language she understands, that an arrest-for-surrender request targets her and that she will appear within a maximum of five days before the prosecutor general at the Paris Court of Appeal; she must be told she may be assisted by counsel of her choice or court-appointed counsel, and may confer with that lawyer immediately, with every notice recorded and transmitted at once to the prosecutor general in Paris. If release is not granted, the liberty and custody judge orders remand, unless representation at every step of the proceedings is sufficiently guaranteed. The decision on surrender then belongs to the investigating chamber of the Paris Court of Appeal, and Article 627-8 frames its review in strikingly narrow terms: Lorsque la chambre de l’instruction constate qu’il n’y a pas d’erreur évidente, elle ordonne la remise de la personne réclamée et, si celle-ci est libre, son incarcération à cette fin. Toute autre question soumise à la chambre de l’instruction est renvoyée à la Cour pénale internationale qui lui donne les suites utiles. La chambre de l’instruction statue dans les quinze jours de la comparution devant elle de la personne réclamée. En cas de pourvoi, la chambre criminelle de la Cour de cassation statue dans un délai de deux mois suivant la réception du dossier à la Cour de cassation. No double-criminality debate, no political-offence exception, no proportionality review of the foreign case: manifest error or surrender, fifteen days to decide, two months on cassation appeal. Even concurrence with French proceedings does not stop the machine: Article 627-11 makes the surrender provisions applicable where the person is also prosecuted or convicted in France on other counts, while La procédure suivie devant la Cour pénale internationale suspend, à l’égard de cette personne, la prescription de l’action publique et de la peine. Transposed to the present case, the conclusion is mechanical: had the 24 September flight landed at Roissy rather than JFK, French border police working from the ICC nominal list would arrest, the Paris prosecutor would be seised within hours, and the investigating chamber would order surrender to The Hague unless counsel could demonstrate a manifest error such as mistaken identity. No minister, no mayor and no diplomatic choreography could lawfully intervene.

Two comparisons sharpen the point for practitioners. First, against extradition to a non-party state: there, the investigating chamber gives a reasoned opinion, the government decides by decree, and refusal is available for political offences, nationality, limitation and fundamental-rights risks. ICC surrender inverts the burden: the chamber orders transfer, and every other argument is referred to The Hague. Second, against the European Arrest Warrant: both are judicialised surrenders, but the EAW retains refusal grounds and fundamental-rights review by the executing judge, whereas ICC surrender concentrates review on identity and manifest error, because the issuing authority is itself an international criminal court whose procedure France has accepted wholesale. Defence strategy in a 627-5 file therefore looks nothing like extradition litigation: it focuses on identity, on the regularity of the French arrest, on language and counsel rights in the first 24 hours, on detention review, and on assisting the ICC proceedings themselves, since Paris will not retry the merits. For victims and witnesses present in France, the same articles open the opposite door: conservatory measures, evidence preservation and cooperation requests can be triggered through the anti-terrorism prosecutor, and the two-year renewable freeze window of Article 627-3 gives asset-tracing work a concrete procedural home. The Gaza context has already generated exactly this kind of satellite litigation in Europe, and the week of the General Assembly, with its visa bans and podium politics, is when diaspora communities and counsel test whether the cooperation machine can be set in motion from French soil, a dynamic examined in the parallel debate over ICC jurisdiction and French universal jurisdiction after the September 2026 strike on Doha.

B. No Immunity Before the ICC, and a French Universal-Jurisdiction Net Behind It

The immunity objection, which will inevitably be raised around the New York visit, has just been settled in France at the highest possible level, and the settlement cuts in favour of the Court. On 25 July 2025, the Assemblée plénière of the Cour de cassation, ruling on an arrest warrant issued by French judges in a crimes-against-humanity and war-crimes investigation, restated the architecture of head-of-state immunity in terms that map exactly onto the Netanyahu case. The Court begins from sovereignty: L’immunité pénale de juridiction procède de l’égalité souveraine des États. It then draws the decisive line between fora: Elle s’applique devant les juridictions nationales. Le principe de l’immunité ne peut être opposé devant les juridictions internationales, dont les statuts écartent expressément toute immunité, et qui agissent au nom de la communauté internationale. Personal immunity, the Court continues, est reconnue aux seuls chef d’État, chef du gouvernement et ministre des affaires étrangères, en exercice. Elle concerne tous les actes accomplis, tant à titre privé qu’à titre officiel, and because it is un obstacle procédural manifeste à l’exercice de sa compétence par une juridiction nationale, l’immunité personnelle doit être examinée d’office par le juge, its purpose being de permettre l’exercice des fonctions régaliennes de représentation internationale et de préserver un État souverain de toute ingérence étrangère. Read together, these holdings give the complete answer to the UNGA-week debate, in Assemblée plénière, 25 July 2025, No. 24-84.393. A sitting prime minister can invoke personal immunity to block prosecution before a foreign domestic court; he cannot invoke it before the international court whose statute expressly excludes it, nor can the executing State Party invoke it as a reason to refuse surrender to that court. The immunity that protects the New York trip is not legal immunity at all, it is the factual consequence of the host state’s non-membership. In Paris, where the treaty binds, the same immunity argument would collapse on contact with the warrant.

Behind the surrender machine sits a second French net that matters even where no ICC warrant exists: universal jurisdiction over the very crimes charged at The Hague. Article 689 of the Code of Criminal Procedure opens the door in general terms: Les auteurs ou complices d’infractions commises hors du territoire de la République peuvent être poursuivis et jugés par les juridictions françaises soit lorsque, conformément aux dispositions du livre Ier du code pénal ou d’un autre texte législatif, la loi française est applicable, soit lorsqu’une convention internationale ou un acte pris en application du traité instituant les Communautés européennes donne compétence aux juridictions françaises pour connaître de l’infraction. The ICC-specific provision, Article 689-11, then authorises French courts to try any person suspected of genocide, other crimes against humanity or war crimes committed abroad, provided the suspect has her habitual residence in France, prosecution is brought solely at the request of the anti-terrorism prosecutor, and no international court or state seeks surrender or extradition: le ministère public s’assure de l’absence de poursuite diligentée par la Cour pénale internationale et vérifie qu’aucune autre juridiction internationale compétente pour juger la personne n’a demandé sa remise et qu’aucun autre Etat n’a demandé son extradition. The provision is therefore explicitly subsidiary to the ICC, which is precisely why it cannot help an ICC fugitive: where the Court seeks the person, France surrenders rather than trying. On 12 May 2023, the Assemblée plénière gave Article 689-11 its authoritative reading in No. 22-82.468, holding that habitual residence calls for a bundle-of-indices assessment of a sufficient connecting link, and explaining the legislative purpose in words worth quoting: Les débats parlementaires révèlent que le législateur, d’une part, était soucieux d’empêcher que l’auteur de crimes contre l’humanité ou de crimes de guerre puisse trouver asile sur le territoire national, d’autre part, visait à garantir l’existence d’un lien de rattachement suffisant avec la France, de nature à légitimer les poursuites. France is not, and does not intend to be, a haven, and a short transit stay does not create the habitual residence that provision requires. The substantive definitions behind both the ICC charges and any French prosecution are written in the same language: Article 211-1 of the Criminal Code defines genocide to include, under a concerted plan to destroy a protected group in whole or in part, atteinte volontaire à la vie, grave harm to physical or mental integrity, and soumission à des conditions d’existence de nature à entraîner la destruction totale ou partielle du groupe; Article 212-1 punishes with life imprisonment any of a listed series of acts commis en exécution d’un plan concerté à l’encontre d’un groupe de population civile dans le cadre d’une attaque généralisée ou systématique, from wilful killing and extermination to persecution; and Article 461-1 covers as war crimes offences committed lors d’un conflit armé international ou non international et en relation avec ce conflit, en violation des lois et coutumes de la guerre ou des conventions internationales applicables aux conflits armés. Starvation as a method of warfare, the centrepiece of the Hague warrants, sits squarely within that vocabulary.

The practical consequences for people in France are concrete and immediate. Victims, witnesses and diaspora associations can file criminal complaints with the Paris anti-terrorism prosecutor, whose office alone decides whether to open a universal-jurisdiction investigation and must first verify that the ICC is not already seised; where the ICC is seised, the complaint feeds the cooperation channel rather than a parallel trial. Persons who fear being listed, stopped or questioned at the French border on the basis of ICC nominal data should have counsel verify their status before travelling, prepare identity and mandate documentation, and understand that French police will apply Article 627-5 to the letter, including the 24-hour referral and immediate access to counsel. And anyone tempted to read the New York images as proof that ICC warrants are paper should look instead at The Hague’s actual docket: suspects from Libya to Darfur have discovered that warrants outlast governments, travel habits and news cycles, and the Court’s Libya cases show how yesterday’s untouchables become today’s defendants, a trajectory this desk traced in the Court’s scheduling of the El Hishri trial for May 2027. The lesson of UNGA week is not that the law failed; it is that the law waits at the next border.

Conclusion

The split screen of 24 September 2026 will mislead anyone who reads it as a verdict on international justice. In New York, a fugitive under a valid ICC warrant will speak because the host state never accepted the treaty, the host city never had the power, and the itinerary never leaves the ring-fenced district; in Paris, the same man would be arrested at the airport, brought before a prosecutor within 24 hours with counsel and an interpreter, and surrendered to The Hague by the investigating chamber unless his lawyers could show a manifest error, with cassation review inside two months. The French Cour de cassation has closed the two theoretical escape routes in advance: personal immunity stops at the door of the international court, and France refuses to be a haven for the perpetrators of the very crimes charged. Add the Abbas visa ban, and the week becomes a perfect illustration of the system’s design flaw and its design strength at once: enforcement depends on where the fugitive stands, and the map of bound states grows less forgiving every year. Counsel for travellers, victims and states should plan accordingly, route by route, complaint by complaint, border by border. The warrant of 21 November 2024 is not going anywhere; only the fugitive still can, and each year his choice of destinations narrows.

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