On 11 September 2026, Belgium’s Council of State annulled the Treasury’s refusal to release frozen assets belonging to Russia’s BCS Bank and held inside Brussels-based Euroclear. The court did not find that the freeze itself was unlawful. It found something narrower and, for practitioners, far more useful: the official who signed the refusal had no properly defined legal authority to do so. Powers designated by the finance minister had been passed down to the administrator-general of the Treasury by a ministerial decree of 13 December 2023, and the court held that this further delegation was too broad and insufficiently defined. The assets therefore stay frozen, yet every other refusal issued through the same channel is now exposed to the same challenge. For anyone dealing with frozen funds in France, the lesson travels directly across the border. France runs its own release-authorization system through the Bertrand Dumont, its own courts punish any attempt to touch frozen money without permission, and its highest courts have already drawn the lines that decide who may sign, who may ask, and who goes to prison or pays when the rules are bypassed. This article explains first what Brussels decided and why the money did not move, then how Paris handles the same questions step by step.
I. The Belgian Council of State Annulled the Treasury Refusal But Freed Nothing
A. How BCS Bank Asked Belgium to Release Assets Frozen at Euroclear
BCS Bank held securities and funds at Euroclear through Russia’s National Settlement Depository, the central securities depository of the Russian market. When the European Union placed that depository under an asset freeze in June 2022, under Council Implementing Regulation 2022/878, the holdings immobilised inside the European financial system included the securities and funds that BCS kept there. The bank itself was caught by ricochet: its property became unavailable not because it was individually listed, but because the channel through which it held that property was sanctioned. This indirect-freeze pattern is the daily reality of modern sanctions practice, and it explains why release-authorization procedures matter as much as the listings themselves. Thousands of holders across Europe sit in comparable positions, with assets frozen inside Euroclear, which alone holds roughly 200 billion euros of immobilised Russian property, the largest single concentration on the continent.
In July 2024, BCS asked the Belgian authorities to authorise the release of its holdings. The Treasury refused. The bank then challenged that refusal before the Council of State in October 2024, opening a case that would take nearly two years to reach judgment. Under the European sanctions regulations, each Member State must designate a competent authority to decide on requests for the release of frozen assets. Belgium had designated its finance minister for that role. The minister, in turn, had delegated the decision-making powers to the administrator-general of the Treasury through the ministerial decree adopted on 13 December 2023. On paper, the chain looked complete: European regulation, national designation, administrative delegation, individual decision. The Council of State examined that chain link by link and broke it at the last one. Its judgment of 11 September, first reported on 16 September by the Belgian newspaper De Tijd and confirmed the same day by Reuters, annulled the Treasury’s refusal because the delegation conferred on the administrator-general was framed in terms too general to satisfy the legality requirement for decisions restricting property rights.
The figures surrounding the case show why a seemingly technical ruling made international headlines within hours. Euroclear holds about 200 billion euros in frozen Russian assets, worth roughly 230 billion dollars at current rates. The European Commission had proposed using those assets to back a large loan for Ukraine, but Belgium opposed the plan, arguing that it received insufficient guarantees that it would not be left alone to face Russian lawsuits and damages claims, and European leaders dropped the idea when they agreed a 90-billion-euro financing package without touching the frozen stock. Several Member States asked in late August 2026 to reopen that debate. In parallel, a Moscow arbitration ruling of 15 May ordered Euroclear to pay around 220 billion euros in connection with the frozen assets, and Euroclear has filed suit in Brussels to block enforcement of that award on European soil, while the Russian central bank pursues its own claims against the Belgian depository before the Moscow courts. The BCS judgment therefore lands in the middle of a three-front legal war over the same pool of money: Belgian administrative courts controlling who may refuse a release, Russian courts ordering payment of staggering damages, and European institutions hesitating over whether the assets themselves can be mobilised for Ukraine.
B. Why an Annulment for Lack of Authority Leaves the Freeze Intact
The most misunderstood point of the 11 September judgment is also the most important for asset holders to grasp. Annulment of the refusal is not an order to release. The Council of State removed the unlawful decision from the legal order; it did not command Euroclear to transfer one security or one euro to BCS. The distinction flows from the separation of powers built into administrative justice: the judge controls the legality of the administration’s answer, but the administration remains competent to give a new answer, this time through a lawfully empowered official and under the sanctions rules currently in force. Belgian authorities can therefore repair the decision-making framework, for example by clarifying the delegation or by having the minister decide directly, and then reconsider the application on its merits. The Finance Ministry has said it is studying the ruling and its possible consequences. Until a fresh, lawful decision grants a release, the freeze continues to bite with full force, and any movement of the funds would itself constitute a sanctions violation.
The wider danger for Belgium lies in the reasoning rather than the outcome. The court attacked the delegation mechanism itself, not the assessment of the BCS file. If the administrator-general lacked properly framed authority to refuse this application, the same defect logically affects the other refusals issued under the same 13 December 2023 arrangement. Parties with pending proceedings can now invite the court to review those decisions through the same lens, and holders whose past applications were rejected may examine whether their own files were decided by the same vulnerable channel. The ruling of last Friday, as Reuters described it, therefore functions as a template objection available to every litigant in the Belgian sanctions pipeline. It also sends a warning to the other Member States: European regulations demand a designated competent authority, and national shortcuts in transmitting that competence downwards will be tested by specialised counsel wherever significant money is at stake. France, which concentrates these powers in the Bertrand Dumont under close judicial supervision, offers a useful contrast, and French practice shows both how a release request should be framed and how severely courts react when frozen funds are touched without the required green light.
Three practical consequences follow for holders, creditors, and intermediaries watching from Paris. First, a successful challenge to the authority behind a refusal buys time and leverage, not cash: use the window to file a fresh, fully documented release application rather than treating the judgment as a victory parade. Second, map every delegation in the chain before litigating, because the Belgian case proves that the signature block can matter more than the substantive reasoning when property rights and European regulations intersect. Third, keep the political and retaliatory fronts in view at all times: the Moscow award against Euroclear and the reopened European debate over mobilisation mean that even a lawfully granted release could face enforcement obstacles, counterclaims, or legislative change before the money actually moves. None of this makes the freeze permanent or the release impossible. It makes the procedure the decisive battlefield, which is exactly where French law has built its most detailed arsenal.
II. How to Challenge an Asset Freeze or Obtain a Release in France
A. Where and How to File a Release Request With the French Treasury
European sanctions law starts from a simple prohibition and builds a system of supervised exceptions around it. Council Regulation 269 of 2014, the central text of the Ukraine-related individual sanctions, freezes all funds and economic resources belonging to listed persons and then provides that, and I quote the operative French language, “Par dérogation à l’article 2, les autorités compétentes des États membres peuvent autoriser le déblocage ou la mise à disposition de certains fonds ou ressources économiques gelés, aux conditions qu’elles jugent appropriées, après avoir établi que ces fonds ou ressources économiques sont” four categories of expenditure: basic needs, legal fees, routine custody charges, or extraordinary expenses. The basic-needs branch covers funds “nécessaires pour répondre aux besoins essentiels des personnes physiques ou morales”, the legal-services branch covers sums “destinés exclusivement au règlement d’honoraires d’un montant raisonnable”, and the extraordinary-expenses route requires that the authority has “notifié aux autorités compétentes des autres États membres et à la Commission, au moins deux semaines avant l’octroi de l’autorisation, les raisons pour lesquelles elle considère qu’une autorisation spéciale devrait être accordée.” The full text of Council Regulation 269 of 2014 sets out these derogations alongside the listing criteria, while Council Implementing Regulation 2022/878 illustrates how entities such as the Russian National Settlement Depository are added to the freeze lists. Every release application in France lives inside this European frame, and counsel who ignore the basic-needs, legal-fees, maintenance, and extraordinary-expenses categories plead below the standard the system expects.
The decisive French question is who counts as the competent authority, and the Court of Cassation answered it in the clearest possible terms on 5 February 2026. In a dispute over Libyan funds frozen under Council Regulation 2016/44, the Second Civil Chamber stated, and I quote, “L’autorité compétente pour la France est la Direction générale du Trésor, tel que le prévoit le site internet référencé à l’annexe IV du règlement n° 2016/44.” The same judgment added the rule that governs every creditor tempted to move first and ask later: “ne peut être diligentée, sur des fonds ou des ressources économiques gelés, aucune mesure d’exécution qui aurait pour effet, non seulement de les faire sortir du patrimoine du débiteur, mais aussi de conférer au créancier poursuivant un simple droit de préférence, sans une autorisation préalable du directeur du Trésor, autorité nationale désignée en application de l’article 11, § 2, du règlement.” Read the full reasoning in Cour de cassation, deuxième chambre civile, 5 février 2026, n° 23-15.936. For practitioners, the message is operational: no enforcement measure on frozen funds, not even one that merely creates a preference without transferring ownership, may proceed without the prior green light of the Treasury’s director, and the Sapin 2 law on sovereign-immunity authorisation did not remove that administrative prerequisite. The Belgian litigation shows what happens when the designation chain is defective; the French case shows where the valid chain ends.
French domestic law mirrors the European mechanism and adds its own release procedure, which many foreign holders overlook. Article L. 562-3 of the Monetary and Financial Code provides, and I quote, “Le ministre chargé de l’économie peut décider, pour une durée de six mois, renouvelable, le gel des fonds et ressources économiques : 1° Qui appartiennent à, sont possédés, détenus ou contrôlés par des personnes physiques ou morales, ou toute autre entité qui commettent, tentent de commettre, facilitent ou financent des actions sanctionnées ou prohibées par les résolutions adoptées dans le cadre du chapitre VII de la charte des Nations unies ou les actes pris en application de l’article 29 du traité sur l’Union européenne ou de l’article 75 du traité sur le fonctionnement de l’Union européenne, y participent ou qui sont désignées sur le fondement de ces résolutions ou ces actes” (article L. 562-3 du code monétaire et financier). The companion provision for terrorist financing, article L. 562-2 du code monétaire et financier, and the foreign-interference freeze created by article L. 562-2-1 du code monétaire et financier complete a system in which every freeze is time-limited, renewable, and tied to a precise legal basis. Banks, custodians, and central securities depositories operating in France must then, in the words of article L. 562-4 du code monétaire et financier, apply the freeze “sans délai”, meaning without delay, and immediately inform the economy minister, which is why a French intermediary that receives frozen funds has no discretion to negotiate or wait.
The release valve sits in article L. 562-11, and its wording deserves close attention because it defines both who may ask and what must be proved. The text states, and I quote, “Le ministre chargé de l’économie peut autoriser le déblocage et la mise à disposition d’une partie des fonds ou ressources économiques faisant l’objet d’une mesure de gel en vertu des articles L. 562-3 , L. 562-3-1 , L. 712-4 ou L. 712-10 ou d’un acte pris en application de l’article 29 du traité sur l’Union européenne ou de l’article 75 du traité sur le fonctionnement de l’Union européenne, si leur utilisation est compatible avec la sauvegarde de l’ordre public et avec les décisions et les actes à l’origine de la décision de gel.” It continues: “Ces autorisations peuvent être accordées par les ministres compétents à leur initiative ou à la demande de toute personne physique ou morale ou autre entité visée par cette décision ou de tout tiers pouvant exciper d’un droit sur les fonds et ressources économiques ayant fait l’objet d’une décision de gel.” Read the complete provision in article L. 562-11 du code monétaire et financier. Two features stand out for cross-border files. First, standing is broad: not only the listed person but any third party able to show a right over the frozen funds may apply, which covers banks holding collateral, buyers with retention-of-title clauses, and custodians such as Euroclear-type intermediaries. Second, the applicant must demonstrate either specific material needs of personal or family life, a business activity compatible with public order, or decisions capable of preserving the estate, as completed by article L. 562-3-1 du code monétaire et financier for United Nations-based designations. A refusal can be challenged before the administrative courts, starting with the administrative tribunal of Paris against a ministerial decision, then the administrative court of appeal and the Council of State, while a European Union listing itself must be attacked by an annulment action before the General Court in Luxembourg within the two-month period extended by the standard ten-day distance allowance, as our analysis of the related Hungarian windfall-profits ruling and its French consequences explains for the parallel front of immobilised Russian state assets.
B. What French Courts Do When Frozen Money Is Touched Without Permission
French criminal justice treats the bypassing of a freeze as a customs offence with confiscation attached, and the Court of Cassation confirmed the architecture on 29 November 2023. In a case arising from withdrawals made during freeze periods on an account held with a German bank, the Criminal Chamber recalled, and I quote, that “l’article 459 du code des douanes réprime l’infraction de soustraction à une mesure de gel des avoirs de la confiscation du produit du délit et d’une amende douanière égale au minimum au montant et au maximum au double de la somme sur laquelle a porté l’infraction ou la tentative d’infraction.” The same judgment partially quashed the Douai appeal ruling because the confiscation and the fine had been computed on contradictory reasoning: the court had found debits of 6,357.20 euros during the freeze periods yet confiscated 12,185.61 euros as the proceeds of the offence, and the Criminal Chamber restated the discipline that governs all French criminal reasoning when it held that “L’insuffisance ou la contradiction des motifs équivaut à leur absence.” Consult Cour de cassation, chambre criminelle, 29 novembre 2023, n° 22-85.867. The lesson for holders is symmetrical: the state must motivate its penalties with arithmetic precision, but the holder who moves frozen money faces confiscation of the proceeds plus a customs fine of up to twice the amount, alongside imprisonment. Self-help is the most expensive strategy available.
Civil creditors fare no better when they attempt to outflank the Treasury, as the most authoritative French decision on frozen assets demonstrates. The Assemblée plénière of the Court of Cassation ruled on 10 July 2020 in the Bank Sepah litigation, a case in which an Iranian bank sanctioned over the nuclear proliferation programmes argued that the freeze of its property excused its failure to pay a four-million-dollar judgment debt with interest. The Court rejected the force-majeure defence in terms that now govern every comparable plea: “Ne constitue pas un cas de force majeure pour celle qui le subit, faute d’extériorité, le gel des avoirs d’une personne ou d’une entité qui est frappée par cette mesure en raison de ses activités.” Because the bank was frozen on account of its own support for the aerospace industries organisation, the freeze lacked the exteriority that force majeure requires, and interest continued to run. Read the full judgment in Cour de cassation, assemblée plénière, 10 juillet 2020, n° 18-18.542. The same ruling referred two questions to the Court of Justice of the European Union, asking whether non-translative protective measures such as judicial securities or conservatory seizures under French enforcement law may be taken on frozen assets without prior authorisation from the national competent authority, and whether the age or origin of the underlying claim changes the answer. Those questions confirm that even measures which do not transfer ownership sit inside the authorisation requirement, a position the 2026 Second Civil Chamber judgment then applied without hesitation to seizure-allocation measures.
Two final provisions complete the French protective wall around frozen funds. Ministerial freeze decisions, the law states, and I quote, “sont publiées par extrait au Journal officiel et sont exécutoires à compter de leur date de publication” (article L. 562-9 du code monétaire et financier), which means holders cannot plead ignorance once publication has occurred, and limitation periods for challenge start running from that public notice. Even more strikingly for transactional lawyers, article L. 562-10 du code monétaire et financier provides that “Les mesures prises en vertu du présent chapitre sont opposables à tout tiers qui peut invoquer un droit sur les fonds ou ressources économiques faisant l’objet d’une mesure de gel, y compris lorsque ce droit est né antérieurement auxdites mesures.” A security interest, a retention-of-title clause, or a pledge created before the freeze does not defeat the measure; it merely gives its holder standing to request a release authorisation under article L. 562-11. Put together with the Belgian ruling, the picture is coherent across both jurisdictions: the freeze binds everyone including prior right-holders, only the designated authority may lift it in whole or in part, and any defect in that authority’s empowerment annuls its decisions without moving the money. Holders who understand this triangle, freeze, authority, authorisation, can plan; those who try to route around it finance the other side’s costs order.
Conclusion
The Council of State in Brussels did not free Russian money on 11 September 2026. It taught every sanctions litigator in Europe that the competence to refuse a release is itself a ground of annulment when the delegation behind the signature is too vague. Belgium must now rebuild the legal footing of its Treasury decisions while the assets stay frozen at Euroclear, fending off parallel pressure from Moscow courts and from Member States pressing to mobilise the stock for Ukraine. France already operates the model the Belgian judgment implicitly demands: a clearly designated competent authority in the Bertrand Dumont, a statutory release procedure open to listed persons and third-party right-holders, immediate and published freeze decisions binding even prior creditors, criminal confiscation and fines for evasion, and civil case law that denies both the force-majeure excuse and the shortcut of unauthorised enforcement. For holders, creditors, and intermediaries, the operational checklist is therefore short and strict: verify exactly who signed every refusal, file a documented release request matching one of the European derogation categories, challenge listings in Luxembourg and national refusals in Paris within the deadlines, and never move frozen funds on the assumption that a favourable judgment elsewhere has lifted the prohibition. In sanctions law, the procedure is the substance, and the file that respects it is the only one that can eventually unlock the account.