On the morning of 19 August 2026, Croatian police walked into a tourist facility in the Adriatic city of Pula and arrested a Ukrainian scuba diver wanted by Germany for the most spectacular act of infrastructure sabotage in modern European history: the September 2022 blasts that tore open the Nord Stream 1 and Nord Stream 2 gas pipelines at the bottom of the Baltic Sea. The man, identified by Germany’s Federal Prosecutor General only as Vladimir Z., is now sitting in Croatian custody while a court in Pula decides whether he will be handed over to Karlsruhe under a European arrest warrant. His Polish lawyer immediately told the Polish press agency PAP that this is the same Vladimir Z. whom a Warsaw court refused to surrender to Germany less than a year ago, in October 2025. The same suspect, the same German warrant logic, two different European courts, and potentially two opposite answers. For anyone facing a European arrest warrant in France — or advising someone who is — this case is a live masterclass in how surrender proceedings really work: what double criminality means when the alleged crime is an act of war, whether courts can refuse to extradite for a political act, who decides jurisdiction over sabotage committed in international waters, and how narrow the door to refusal actually is once the Cour de cassation has spoken. A Paris extradition lawyer reads this file very differently from a television commentator, and this article explains why, step by step, with the exact French legal tests that would apply if Vladimir Z. had been arrested in Marseille instead of Pula.
I. Will Croatia hand Vladimir Z. to Germany for the Nord Stream sabotage?
A. How a German European arrest warrant caught a diver in Pula
The facts as alleged by the German Federal Prosecutor General are straightforward and extraordinary. In September 2022, a group of Ukrainian nationals chartered a sailing yacht, sailed into the Baltic Sea, and planted explosive devices on the Nord Stream 1 and Nord Stream 2 pipelines. Several underwater explosions damaged both pipelines so severely that no gas could any longer flow from Russia to Europe. The German federal prosecution service, which handles cases of particular importance for the internal security of the Federal Republic, opened investigations against seven Ukrainian suspects. The charges under consideration are among the heaviest in the German Criminal Code: anti-constitutional sabotage committed together with causing an explosion and with the destruction of buildings and structures, under Sections 88, 305 and 308 of the Strafgesetzbuch. According to the prosecutors, the aim of the attack was to halt gas deliveries through the pipelines permanently and thereby stop Russia from using natural gas revenues to finance its war effort. Reporting by Reuters on 19 August 2026 confirms that Vladimir Z., described as a trained scuba diver, belonged to the group led by a former Ukrainian army officer, Serhii K., that allegedly fixed the explosives to the pipelines on the seabed.
Serhii K. is the first suspect in the file, and his trajectory shows where the Croatian case may be heading. After a legal battle in Italy that ran through the autumn of 2025, K. was surrendered to Germany on 27 November 2025, and on 2 July 2026 the German federal prosecutors charged him with orchestrating the blasts while acting on behalf of Ukrainian state entities. On 15 January 2026, the German Federal Court of Justice dismissed his challenge to the arrest order, confirming both the strong suspicion of an offence within the Federal Prosecutor General’s jurisdiction and the risk of flight. Three points in that ruling matter enormously for Vladimir Z. First, the court rejected the arguments of immunity and of a so-called combatant privilege that would have justified the act as a lawful operation of war. Second, it affirmed that Germany has territorial jurisdiction, because the result of the offence — the pipelines being rendered permanently inoperable — also occurred on German territory, where the pipelines end. Third, it kept the suspect in pre-trial detention. In other words, the highest German criminal court has already closed two of the escape doors — immunity and jurisdiction — that defence teams across Europe have been trying to push open.
The second arrest followed the textbook European arrest warrant circuit. Germany issued a European arrest warrant, Croatian police executed it in Pula, and the file now sits before the local court. The Croatian justice ministry publicly confirmed the mechanics of the system: under European Union law, judicial authorities communicate directly with each other on extradition matters, and it is for the Pula court to decide on surrender. That is the essence of the instrument created by Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA of 13 June 2002 on the European arrest warrant and the surrender procedures between Member States: a judicial decision issued in one Member State, executed in another, with deliberately narrow grounds for refusal and strict time limits. French law expresses the same idea in Article 695-11 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which states that “Le mandat d’arrêt européen est une décision judiciaire émise par un Etat membre de l’Union européenne, appelé Etat membre d’émission, en vue de l’arrestation et de la remise par un autre Etat membre, appelé Etat membre d’exécution, d’une personne recherchée pour l’exercice de poursuites pénales ou pour l’exécution d’une peine ou d’une mesure de sûreté privative de liberté.” An arrest in Pula on a Karlsruhe warrant, with a Pula judge deciding, is exactly the procedure the text describes. The question is what that judge is allowed to examine — and the Polish and Italian precedents give opposite signals.
B. Can blowing up a gas pipeline be a political act that blocks extradition?
The Warsaw answer, delivered on 17 October 2025 by the Regional Court, was a flat refusal. The Polish judges lifted the pre-trial detention of the 46-year-old Ukrainian Volodymyr Z. — the same man his lawyer says was just arrested in Pula — on two principal grounds. First, any action he took would have fallen within the framework of a just defensive war waged on behalf of Ukraine, so the suspect had committed no crime under Polish law, and double criminality was therefore not established within the meaning of Article 607r §1(1) of the Polish Code of Criminal Procedure. Second, the German state had no jurisdiction to prosecute anyone for blowing up the pipelines; in the Polish court’s view, jurisdiction belonged to an international tribunal dealing with armed conflicts at sea, or to an ad hoc tribunal appointed by the United Nations. The political resonance was immediate: Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk publicly declared that the case was closed and that it was not in his country’s interest to prosecute or extradite the man. For the defence, Warsaw is the dream precedent: sabotage recast as a lawful act of a defensive war, double criminality collapsing, jurisdiction denied.
The Italian answer went the other way, but only after a bruising procedural fight that defence lawyers across Europe have studied line by line. The Bologna Court of Appeal had authorised the surrender of Serhii K., suspected of masterminding the operation. On 15 October 2025, the Italian Supreme Court overturned that decision — not on the substance of the war-justification argument, but because the Bologna court had reclassified the offence in the German warrant in a way that triggered the tighter procedural rules applicable to terrorism cases in extradition proceedings. After the case was sent back, the Bologna court ordered K.’s surrender again on 23 October 2025, this time curing the procedural defect but without substantively revisiting the defence’s core objections: functional immunity, ne bis in idem, and the risk of violations of Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights. A second appeal was dismissed by the Italian Supreme Court on 19 November 2025, confirming the surrender, and K. was effectively handed over on 27 November 2025. The lesson of the Italian branch is sobering for fugitives: executing courts police procedure rigorously, but they are reluctant to second-guess the issuing state’s criminal characterisation of the facts or to turn fundamental-rights arguments into a general veto on surrender.
This is where a French lawyer’s reading becomes decisive, because France has settled the question that Warsaw and Bologna circled around: an executing judge cannot invent new grounds for refusal. In a landmark ruling of 6 August 2025 (Cass. crim., No. 01132, pourvoi No. S 25-84.847), the Criminal Chamber of the Cour de cassation quashed a Paris decision that had refused to surrender a man to Romania under a European arrest warrant on broad proportionality, health, age and fairness grounds. The Court held that a European arrest warrant may be refused only on grounds provided by the Framework Decision and its implementing instruments. On proportionality, it added that judging whether issuance was proportionate belongs to the issuing authority alone, since that review features in none of the mandatory or optional non-execution cases. A Croatian judge minded to follow the French logic would therefore ask only the questions the Framework Decision authorises — double criminality where it still applies, ne bis in idem, amnesty, age, discrimination — and would leave Germany’s characterisation of pipeline sabotage as sabotage to the German courts. The Warsaw reasoning, however morally powerful, has no room inside that closed list. And the German Federal Court of Justice has already supplied the counter-narrative on jurisdiction and immunity that an executing court inclined to surrender would gratefully adopt.
II. What France would test before surrendering a Nord Stream suspect
A. How the Paris chambre de l’instruction checks double criminality and closed refusal grounds
Suppose Vladimir Z. had been arrested in Marseille rather than Pula. The first hearing would follow a ritual every French extradition practitioner knows by heart. Presented to the public prosecutor, then brought before the chambre de l’instruction of the court of appeal, the requested person is asked whether he consents to surrender. Article 695-31 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides that “Si, lors de sa comparution, la personne recherchée déclare consentir à sa remise, la chambre de l’instruction l’informe des conséquences juridiques de son consentement et de son caractère irrévocable.” Consent, once maintained, leads to a surrender order; refusal opens the adversarial examination. Every ruling of the chambre de l’instruction must then satisfy a strict standard of reasoning, restated by the Cour de cassation in its 6 August 2025 ruling, which requires every decision to state its own reasons and answer the parties’ essential arguments, treating thin or contradictory reasoning as no reasoning at all. That standard is the defence’s best friend and the prosecution’s warning at once: any refusal or authorisation must be reasoned ground by ground, or it will be quashed.
The substantive examination then runs through two closed lists. Article 695-22 of the Code of Criminal Procedure states that “L’exécution d’un mandat d’arrêt européen est refusée dans les cas suivants : 1° Si les faits pour lesquels il a été émis pouvaient être poursuivis et jugés par les juridictions françaises et que l’action publique est éteinte par l’amnistie ; 2° Si la personne recherchée a fait l’objet, par les autorités judiciaires françaises ou par celles d’un autre Etat membre que l’Etat d’émission, d’une décision définitive pour les mêmes faits que ceux faisant l’objet du mandat d’arrêt européen à condition, en cas de condamnation, que la peine ait été exécutée ou soit en cours d’exécution ou ne puisse plus être ramenée à exécution selon les lois de l’Etat de condamnation ; 3° Si la personne recherchée était âgée de moins de treize ans au moment des faits faisant l’objet du mandat d’arrêt européen”, with an additional paragraph refusing warrants issued for discriminatory purposes based on sex, race, religion, ethnic origin, nationality, language, political opinions or sexual orientation and gender identity. None of these boxes fits a pipeline sabotage file naturally — and that is precisely the point the Cour de cassation hammered home in August 2025: outside these lists, refusal is forbidden.
Double criminality is the optional ground, and it is the whole battlefield. Article 695-23 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides that “L’exécution d’un mandat d’arrêt européen peut également être refusée si le fait faisant l’objet dudit mandat d’arrêt ne constitue pas une infraction au regard de la loi française. Par dérogation au premier alinéa, un mandat d’arrêt européen est exécuté sans contrôle de la double incrimination des faits reprochés lorsque les agissements considérés sont, aux termes de la loi de l’Etat membre d’émission, punis d’une peine privative de liberté d’une durée égale ou supérieure à trois ans d’emprisonnement ou d’une mesure de sûreté privative de liberté d’une durée similaire et entrent dans l’une des catégories d’infractions prévues par l’article 694-32.” Those categories, listed in Article 694-32 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, include “1° Participation à une organisation criminelle ; 2° Terrorisme”, as well as “6° Trafic d’armes, de munitions et d’explosifs”. Germany would argue that underwater bombing of energy infrastructure punishable by up to many years’ imprisonment falls squarely within the terrorism and explosives categories, wiping out the double-criminality check entirely. The defence would counter that anti-constitutional sabotage of a foreign-owned pipeline in the context of an international armed conflict is not terrorism within the French meaning, forcing the chambre de l’instruction back to a full comparison with French offences of destruction by explosive means.
Here the Cour de cassation has set a trap for sloppy reasoning that both sides must respect. On 29 May 2024 (Cass. crim., No. 00843, pourvoi No. P 24-82.747), the Criminal Chamber held that a court applying the Article 694-32 exemption must verify both cumulative conditions — listed category and a custodial penalty of at least three years under the issuing state’s law — because both requirements apply cumulatively before the double-criminality exemption can operate. An executing judge cannot simply wave the file through under the terrorism label; it must check the penalty threshold in German law. Conversely — and this is the sting in the same ruling — where the requested person has not actually raised the optional double-criminality ground, the judges are not required to investigate it on their own motion. Defence teams take note: in France, as in Croatia, silence on double criminality at the hearing can mean losing it forever.
One more contrast sharpens the French picture, and it is the one most foreign observers miss. Outside the European arrest warrant system, classic extradition to a non-EU state remains governed by Article 696-4 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which declares that “L’extradition n’est pas accordée : 1° Lorsque la personne réclamée a la nationalité française, cette dernière étant appréciée à l’époque de l’infraction pour laquelle l’extradition est requise ; 2° Lorsque le crime ou le délit à un caractère politique ou lorsqu’il résulte des circonstances que l’extradition est demandée dans un but politique”. The political-offence exception is alive and well in classic extradition — and the procedure before the chambre de l’instruction, seized without delay when the person does not consent, produces a reasoned opinion under Article 696-15 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which states that “Lorsque la personne réclamée a déclaré au procureur général ne pas consentir à son extradition, la chambre de l’instruction est saisie, sans délai, de la procédure.” But inside the European arrest warrant, that political-offence shield does not exist: the Framework Decision abolished it between Member States, and the Cour de cassation’s closed-list doctrine enforces that abolition. A Nord Stream suspect wanted by Germany could plead the justice of the Ukrainian cause in Warsaw with some success; in Paris, the same speech would be legally inaudible unless translated into one of the authorised boxes — discrimination in the issuing state, ne bis in idem, or a fundamental-rights risk proven with objective, precise and current evidence about German detention conditions, which no lawyer can seriously assemble against Germany.
B. Detention, specialty and remedies when defending a European arrest warrant in France
Arrest under a European warrant in France means custody first and argument later. The requested person is detained, brought promptly before the judiciary, and remains under judicial control while the chambre de l’instruction examines the file. Release pending the surrender decision is possible but never routine in serious cases: the German Federal Court of Justice itself justified Serhii K.’s continued detention by the risk of flight, and French courts apply the same realistic calculus when the alternative is a suspect with foreign networks disappearing before the surrender hearing. The defence must therefore prepare two battles at once — liberty now, surrender later — and the liberty battle is usually fought with guarantees of representation: a fixed address in France, surrender of travel documents, regular reporting to a police station, and electronic monitoring where available. None of this appears in the closed refusal lists, but it determines whether the client waits for the hearing at home or in a remand prison.
The second line of defence is the specialty principle: a surrendered person may only be prosecuted, sentenced or re-surrendered for the offences covered by the warrant, unless the executing authority consents to an extension. The 29 May 2024 ruling grew out of exactly such an extension request by a Polish regional court, and it confirms that the chambre de l’instruction examines each additional offence against the same refusal grounds. For a Nord Stream file, specialty matters concretely: if Germany obtained surrender for sabotage and later wanted to add charges of acting for a foreign state apparatus or related terrorism counts, it would need fresh French consent. Defence counsel in Paris routinely builds this into strategy from day one, demanding a precise description of the facts in the warrant and reserving specialty in the consent phase, because Article 695-31 of the Code of Criminal Procedure makes both consent to surrender and waiver of specialty irrevocable once given before the chambre de l’instruction. An ill-informed consent can close doors that careful silence would have kept open.
The third element is remedies, and here the Nord Stream saga itself supplies the map. Every surrender decision of a chambre de l’instruction can be challenged by pourvoi in cassation — the two Cour de cassation rulings dissected in this article are both pourvois against surrender and extension rulings, one ending in rejection, the other in cassation with remand to differently-composed judges. Beyond cassation, the European route exists: the executing court may — and sometimes must — refer questions to the Court of Justice of the European Union on the interpretation of the Framework Decision, as the Paris chambre de l’instruction was invited to do in the August 2025 case. The Cour de cassation declined to transmit the proposed questions there, finding no reasonable doubt about the interpretation of EU law, but the tool remains live for genuinely novel points — and the Nord Stream constellation, with its clash between international humanitarian law concepts and the mutual-recognition machinery, is precisely the kind of file where a well-drafted preliminary reference could suspend a surrender for months. Add the executing state’s duty to request supplementary information from the issuing authority when the warrant is too thin — a duty the 29 May 2024 ruling discusses at length — and the defence has a full procedural toolkit even inside a system designed for speed.
Back in Pula, then, what happens next? If the Croatian court follows the Italian-German line, it will verify identity, check the warrant’s formal validity, confirm that pipeline sabotage punishable by heavy imprisonment is covered without a double-criminality inquiry, reject immunity and war-justification arguments as matters for the trial court in Karlsruhe, and order surrender — with the suspect’s lawyers then fighting delaying actions on detention and supplementary information. If it follows the Warsaw line, it will declare the acts a lawful operation of a defensive war, deny German jurisdiction over explosions in international waters, and set Vladimir Z. free, daring Germany to try again elsewhere. Both outcomes are legally reasoned; only one of them matches the direction the Cour de cassation, the German Federal Court of Justice and the Italian Supreme Court have all been pushing. And that divergence is the real story of 19 August 2026: fourteen years after the Framework Decision promised near-automatic surrender, the fate of Europe’s most famous pipeline suspects still depends on which border town the police happen to walk into.
Conclusion
The arrest of Vladimir Z. in Pula is not an epilogue to the Nord Stream sabotage but the opening of its most instructive legal chapter. Germany has the suspect, the charges and the jurisdiction theory affirmed by its highest criminal court; Croatia has the decision, with a Polish refusal pulling one way and an Italian surrender pulling the other. France, watching from the sidelines, has already given its answer in principle: the Cour de cassation’s 6 August 2025 ruling leaves executing judges no power to refuse surrender on grounds outside the Framework Decision’s closed lists, and its 29 May 2024 ruling disciplines the double-criminality shortcut with cumulative conditions that must be checked, not assumed. Anyone subject to a European arrest warrant in France should understand what that means in practice: no political-offence exception between Member States, no proportionality review of the issuing state’s choice, no anticipatory findings about foreign prisons without hard and current evidence — but a demanding standard of reasoning, a specialty shield that must be actively preserved, and cassation review that punishes unreasoned decisions on either side. Whether the Pula court surrenders Vladimir Z. or sets him free, the file will continue its journey through European courtrooms for years. The wise move for any person named in such a warrant is to build the defence early, in the executing state, ground by ground, before the police knock on the door of a tourist facility in the morning.