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Wanted in The Hague, Welcomed in New York: Netanyahu at the UN and What France Would Do at Roissy

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Wanted in The Hague, Welcomed in New York: Netanyahu at the UN and What France Would Do at Roissy

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Next week in New York, the General Assembly of the United Nations will give its podium to a man under a standing International Criminal Court arrest warrant, while the Palestinian leader who was supposed to answer him is expected to speak by video link because Washington has again refused him a visa. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, wanted since 21 November 2024 together with former Defence Minister Yoav Gallant for war crimes and crimes against humanity in the Gaza Strip, is preparing to address the Assembly as he did last year, when dozens of diplomats walked out of the chamber and demonstrators filled Times Square. New York Mayor Zohran Mamdani has said his legal department is holding an active conversation about whether city authorities could arrest the Israeli leader, telling reporters that whatever the law allows him to do in New York City, that is what he will do, while repeating that in his view Netanyahu belongs in The Hague. The White House has answered that Netanyahu will not be arrested in the United States in any way, shape or form, and the governor of New York has said the mayor lacks the authority to order such an arrest. Behind the slogans sits a hard legal map that every cross-border defence lawyer should be able to read: the United States is not a party to the Rome Statute and does not recognise the Court, so no American hand will close on the warrant in Manhattan, whereas France, a founding State Party, would be under a binding duty to arrest and surrender if the same aircraft ever touched Roissy. This article explains first why New York cannot deliver the arrest some are demanding, then what Paris would be legally required to do if the fugitive landed on French soil.

I. Can Netanyahu Be Arrested in New York During the UN General Assembly?

No arrest is coming out of New York, and understanding why matters more than the headlines suggest. The obstacle is not political sympathy or diplomatic courtesy. It is the architecture of international criminal law itself: an ICC warrant binds only those who accepted it, and the United States never did. The Mayor of New York, however willing, commands no legal tool capable of executing it, and the federal government that does command coercive power has announced it will not act. The warrant remains real, but on American soil it is a piece of paper without a hand to serve it.

A. Why the ICC warrant cannot bite on American soil: non-party status, no implementing law and a mayor without powers

The starting point is the simplest and the most misunderstood. The International Criminal Court derives its coercive authority from the Rome Statute, a treaty that obliges each State Party to cooperate fully with the Court in its investigation and prosecution of crimes within its jurisdiction. The United States signed that treaty in 2000 and then unsigned it in 2002; it never ratified it, it recognises neither the jurisdiction of the Court over its nationals nor, in its stated position, over the nationals of allied states in these circumstances, and Congress has enacted no legislation that would allow an American police officer, marshal or city administration to arrest a person on the sole basis of an ICC warrant. New York City is not a sovereign subject of international law. Its mayor cannot create an arrest power by press release, and any attempt to invent one would collide immediately with federal supremacy over foreign affairs and immigration. That is exactly what the governor of New York meant when she said the mayor lacks the authority, and what the White House meant when it promised that no arrest would happen in any way, shape or form. Mamdani himself conceded the point when he added that his administration would not be writing its own laws to that end: the active conversation with the city legal department can only end where the law already stands, which is nowhere.

The second layer is the status of the visit itself. A head of government travelling to UN headquarters in New York enters under the 1947 Agreement between the United Nations and the United States regarding the Headquarters of the United Nations. Under that agreement, the United States is required to allow the transit to and from headquarters of representatives of Member States and of certain observers, whatever visa quarrels surround the delegation. The same host-country machinery that Washington is accused of abusing when it denies visas to the Palestinian delegation for the second consecutive year, after the precedent of Yasser Arafat in 1988, operates in reverse for Netanyahu: the United States controls the door, and it has opened it. Add the federal protective apparatus that surrounds a visiting head of government, Secret Service protection, airspace restrictions, a reported landing at Newark Airport in New Jersey rather than in the city itself, and the picture is complete. Between the absence of domestic legal basis, the absence of treaty obligation and the presence of an active federal shield, there is no seam in which a municipal arrest could lodge. Lawyers who advise persons under international warrants draw the general lesson from this configuration: safety of travel depends less on the gravity of the charge than on the precise treaty position of the territory overflown or entered, and New York in September 2026 is, for this warrant, neutral ground by design of American non-membership.

None of this makes the warrant symbolic. On 21 November 2024, Pre-Trial Chamber I of the Court issued the warrants against Netanyahu and Gallant, and its docket, including the record ICC-01/18-374 and the later ruling rejecting jurisdictional challenges by the State of Israel, remains public on the Court official defendant page for Netanyahu and in the warrant decision of 21 November 2024. The charges allege responsibility for war crimes and crimes against humanity in Gaza, described in the proceedings as including the use of starvation as a method of warfare and deliberate attacks against civilians. The Pre-Trial Chamber later rejected the challenges brought by Israel against the proceedings, which means the warrants stand as fully valid judicial acts of an international court. A valid warrant that one state will not execute is not a dead warrant: it waits, it restricts movement, and it binds every State Party whose territory the wanted person enters. That is where France enters the story.

B. What the warrant still changes: 120 States Parties bound, narrowing skies and the Turkish Red Notice initiative

A warrant the host country ignores still redraws the map around the wanted man. More than 120 states are parties to the Rome Statute, and for each of them the warrant is not a foreign curiosity but a domestic legal obligation to arrest and surrender. Every flight plan becomes a legal exercise: which airspaces will the aircraft cross, which airports are available for a technical stop, which governments have given assurances and what those assurances are worth before a judge. When Netanyahu flew to Washington, his aircraft reportedly crossed the airspace of Rome Statute parties including France, Italy and Greece without incident, a fact that provoked sharp criticism from civil society organisations such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, which have repeatedly called for the arrest of the ICC fugitive. Overflight without landing rarely triggers an interception in practice, yet each such transit tests the credibility of the State Party and exposes it to litigation before its own courts and to proceedings before the Assembly of States Parties for non-cooperation. Hungary drew the cleaner, if more brutal, conclusion in April 2025: rather than risk the test, the government of Viktor Orban received Netanyahu with an explicit guarantee that he would not be arrested, and shortly afterwards set its withdrawal from the Court in motion. Guarantees of that kind are political statements, not legal defences, but they reveal how seriously governments take the underlying obligation.

The net is also tightening from a second direction. Alongside the ICC proceedings, Türkiye has taken concrete steps toward having an Interpol Red Notice issued for Netanyahu and other officials over Gaza, a move reported in September 2026 that would, if the notice were published, expose the wanted man to provisional arrest procedures across the 196 member countries of Interpol and restrict his usable routes to itineraries covered by specific diplomatic assurances. A Red Notice is not an international arrest warrant in itself: it is a request to locate and provisionally arrest pending extradition or surrender, and each requested state applies its own law before any judge. But practitioners know its practical weight. Our analysis of the 9 September 2026 French Cour de cassation ruling on rearrest after release on a Turkish Red Notice shows how a notice can follow a person into a French airport, produce an arrest, a release, then a second arrest, and force the Versailles courts to decide who truly controls the extradition. The same machinery, fed with a different name, would apply at Roissy to anyone flagged in the system: border police see the hit, the prosecutor general is notified, and the chambre de l’instruction takes over. The difference with an ICC warrant is that surrender to The Hague runs through a dedicated, streamlined cooperation title of the French Code of Criminal Procedure rather than through classic extradition, with even less room for political discretion. Before examining that French procedure in detail, one asymmetry of the New York week deserves a final underline, because it explains the anger in the General Assembly hall. While the ICC fugitive takes the podium, Mahmoud Abbas is expected to address the Assembly by video link, Washington having denied his delegation visas for the second year running, a practice whose lineage runs back to the Arafat refusal of 1988 and which several delegations describe as a breach of the Headquarters Agreement. Last September, dozens of diplomats walked out during Netanyahu speech, leaving the chamber half empty, and similar boycotts plus mass street protests are expected this year. The walkouts do not execute warrants. They signal, however, that a growing number of states consider the enforcement gap a wound in the rules-based order, and France, unlike the United States, has placed itself on the side that claims to close it.

II. What France Would Do If the Same Plane Landed at Roissy

Move the scene from Newark to Roissy-Charles de Gaulle and the entire legal equation inverts. France signed the Rome Statute on 18 July 1998, ratified it, and wrote its cooperation duty directly into domestic criminal procedure, so that an ICC warrant landing in Paris meets a prosecutor, a judge and a detention centre rather than a press conference. No mayor needs to improvise powers the city does not have; the powers already exist, they belong to named magistrates, and their exercise is reviewable by the chambre de l’instruction and the Cour de cassation. What follows is the procedure France would be bound to apply, step by step, to any ICC fugitive setting foot on French soil, and the defences that would actually be available.

A. France binding duty to arrest and surrender: the cooperation title, the antiterrorism prosecutor and universal jurisdiction

The foundation is a single sentence of the Code of Criminal Procedure that French courts quote as the gateway to the whole cooperation regime. Article 627 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides, and the words matter because they leave no discretion: Pour l’application du statut de la Cour pénale internationale signé le 18 juillet 1998, la France participe à la répression des infractions et coopère avec cette juridiction dans les conditions fixées par le présent titre, and the same article extends these provisions to any person prosecuted before the International Criminal Court or convicted by it for acts constituting, within the meaning of articles 6 to 8 and 25 of the Statute, genocide, crimes against humanity or war crimes. Cooperation is therefore not a diplomatic favour the executive grants case by case. It is a standing statutory command addressed to prosecutors and judges, covering exactly the categories of the Netanyahu and Gallant warrants. The Rome Statute completes the frame from the international side: cooperation duties run through articles 86 to 89, official capacity is irrelevant to criminal responsibility, and a State Party that fails to arrest a person present on its territory when the Court has requested surrender exposes itself to a judicial finding of non-compliance and referral to the Assembly of States Parties. France has never contested this reading; on the contrary, it presents itself as one of the Courts most consistent supporters.

Operationally, the file would go first to a specialised magistrate. Article 627-3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure entrusts the execution on French territory of the protective measures of the Statute to the Paris antiterrorism prosecutor: L’exécution sur le territoire français des mesures conservatoires mentionnées au k du paragraphe 1 de l’article 93 du statut est ordonnée, aux frais avancés du Trésor et selon les modalités prévues par le présent code, par le procureur de la République antiterroriste, with a maximum duration of two years renewable at the request of the Court. In plain terms, the moment the wanted person is located at Roissy, the border police report up, the Paris prosecutor takes charge of securing the person and any assets or evidence, and the surrender machinery starts. France also keeps a second string to its bow for atrocity crimes. Article 689-11 of the Code of Criminal Procedure establishes a form of universal jurisdiction under which peut être poursuivie et jugée par les juridictions françaises toute personne soupçonnée d’avoir commis à l’étranger l’une des infractions suivantes, namely genocide, other crimes against humanity, and war crimes, while article 628 confirms that Les crimes contre l’humanité et les crimes et délits de guerre, ainsi que les infractions qui leur sont connexes, sont poursuivis, instruits et jugés selon les règles du présent code. Surrender to The Hague would take priority as the treaty obligation, but the existence of domestic jurisdiction means France could also open its own file if surrender were somehow delayed, a configuration Paris prosecutors have used before in universal-jurisdiction cases. Our analysis of the Dela Rosa ICC warrant and what France would do at Roissy walks through the same airport scenario for another ICC fugitive and reaches the same conclusion: on French tarmac, the warrant meets handcuffs, not cameras.

B. The French courtroom path: detention, the chambre de l’instruction and the Cour de cassation safety net

Once arrested, the fugitive would follow a judicial path French extradition lawyers know intimately, because surrender to an international court borrows the guarantees of classic extradition while narrowing the grounds for refusal. The general framework is set by article 696 of the Code of Criminal Procedure: En l’absence de convention internationale en stipulant autrement, les conditions, la procédure et les effets de l’extradition sont déterminés par les dispositions du présent chapitre. Here the governing convention is the Rome Statute itself, implemented by the cooperation title, but the reflexes of the French judge remain those forged in extradition: verify identity, verify the papers, verify that the facts qualify, and protect fundamental rights. The Cour de cassation drew that map with unusual clarity in a surrender case that remains the reference. Ruling on a request from the Mechanism for International Criminal Tribunals, the criminal chamber held on 30 September 2020, case number 20-83.181, that le contrôle de la chambre de l’instruction consiste seulement, en cette matière, à vérifier si les conditions de remise sont remplies quant à l’identité de la personne, la production des titres en vertu desquels la demande est formée, l’existence de faits entrant dans la définition posée à l’article 1er de cette loi, et l’absence d’une erreur évidente, adding immediately that Ce contrôle inclut par ailleurs, si sa violation est invoquée, le respect des garanties fondamentales accordées à la personne réclamée. Identity, papers, legal characterisation, no manifest error, plus fundamental rights when raised: that is the entire checklist, and for an ICC warrant whose papers emanate from Pre-Trial Chamber I itself, the first three boxes check themselves.

Detention starts at once. In extradition the mechanism is explicit: article 696-11 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides that after notification of the request, if the prosecutor general decides not to leave the person at liberty, he brings him before the first president of the court of appeal, who orders detention under an extradition committal order at the remand prison of the court seat, unless representation at every step of the proceedings is sufficiently guaranteed. At Paris that means the Fleury-Mérogis or La Santé remand wings within hours of the Roissy arrest, with release under judicial supervision available only if the defence demonstrates that the person will appear at every hearing, a difficult submission for a foreign dignitary with a government aircraft waiting. The adversarial examination then belongs to the chambre de l’instruction of the Paris Court of Appeal. Article 696-15 of the Code of Criminal Procedure commands speed: Lorsque la personne réclamée a déclaré au procureur général ne pas consentir à son extradition, la chambre de l’instruction est saisie, sans délai, de la procédure, the person appears within ten working days, and if he maintains his refusal la chambre de l’instruction donne son avis motivé sur la demande d’extradition. For surrender to the ICC the executive stage that follows a favourable opinion in classic extradition, the Prime Minister decree, has no equivalent discretion: the treaty duty to surrender leaves the government no lawful option to refuse, which is precisely why the judicial control upstream is so rigorous.

What defences could actually be pleaded in that Paris hearing room. The statutory bars of article 696-4 of the Code of Criminal Procedure would be reviewed one by one: Lorsque la personne réclamée a la nationalité française, inapplicable to an Israeli national; Lorsque le crime ou le délit a un caractère politique ou lorsqu’il résulte des circonstances que l’extradition est demandée dans un but politique, a plea the chambre consistently rejects for atrocity crimes, which by nature cannot shelter behind the political-offence exception; commission of the facts on French territory, or a prior final French judgment for the same facts, both absent here. The serious fight would be fought on fundamental rights, and recent Cour de cassation case law sets the bar very high. On 6 May 2025, case number 24-85.773, the criminal chamber recalled that l’extradition doit être refusée lorsque la personne concernée démontre qu’elle est exposée à un risque réel de voir prononcer contre elle une peine manifestement disproportionnée dans l’Etat requérant, while stressing that cette notion devant faire l’objet d’une interprétation stricte et ne pouvant être retenue que dans des cas très exceptionnels. Transposed to surrender, the test bites even less: The Hague offers defence rights, public trial, sentence review and detention standards that no chambre de l’instruction has ever found to breach article 3 of the European Convention. Procedural defences would face an equally strict filter. On 14 April 2026, case number 25-86.772, the Court approved a chamber that had split its examination across two sittings, holding that chaque moyen, même de fond, aurait-il précédemment fait l’objet d’un complément d’information ordonné dans une autre composition, doit être examiné au fond, plaidé devant la chambre de l’instruction, et jugé par celle-ci dans une composition identique, and on 27 May 2026, case number 25-84.904, it confirmed a partially favourable opinion issued after successive rulings on the applicable convention, the non-political character of the facts and inhuman-treatment risks. The message to defence teams is consistent: every plea will be heard, each in the correct formation, but none will succeed without hard proof. Against an ICC surrender file, that proof does not exist, and the Paris chambre would give its favourable opinion within weeks of the Roissy arrest.

Conclusion

The two cities tell the two truths of international criminal justice in 2026. In New York, a valid ICC warrant meets a host state that never joined the Court, a mayor with no arrest power and a federal government that promises non-enforcement, so the fugitive speaks and flies home, minus the narrowing corridor of States Parties he must henceforth navigate, now potentially tightened further by a Turkish Interpol initiative. In Paris, the same warrant would meet article 627 cooperation duty, the antiterrorism prosecutor, detention under judicial control, a reasoned opinion of the chambre de l’instruction within days, and a Cour de cassation that checks identity, papers, characterisation and fundamental rights before letting surrender proceed. France already applies this machinery to others, from ICC fugitives to Red Notice cases out of Versailles, and nothing in the Netanyahu file would jam it. That contrast is the real story of the General Assembly week: not whether one mayor can rewrite the law of nations from City Hall, but whether the states that wrote that law still enforce it when the aircraft door opens on their own tarmac. For anyone travelling under the shadow of an international warrant, the practical conclusion is the one Paris defence lawyers give every week: check the treaty position of every state on your route before boarding, because the difference between a podium and a prison cell is drawn on that map long before takeoff.

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