KOHEN AVOCATS FIRM · PARIS 16
Trump Signed the Graham Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act on September 18: Secondary Tariffs, Expiring EU Sanctions and What French Banks Must Do

Hassan KOHEN acts in urgent matters, from the police station to the assize court. Initial strategic analysis: €80 incl. VAT, personal reply within 24 hours.

100% confidential · Legal professional privilege · No obligation

Article generated by artificial intelligence, through a process designed and supervised by the firm

Source: French Court of Cassation – Judilibre and Légifrance open data

Paris Bar Police custody, investigation, assize court CNB listing avocat.fr
Maître Hassan KOHEN, avocat au Barreau de Paris
Hassan KOHEN
Attorney at the Paris Bar

Trump Signed the Graham Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act on September 18: Secondary Tariffs, Expiring EU Sanctions and What French Banks Must Do

Speak to a lawyer 06 89 11 34 45

On September 18, 2026, President Donald Trump signed the Lindsey O. Graham Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act of 2026, a statute that arms Washington with tariff weapons of up to 500 percent on Russian goods and up to 100 percent on goods from the countries that buy the most Russian oil and gas. The House had passed the text two days earlier by a vote of 262 to 159. India, the largest seaborne buyer of Russian crude, immediately said it would protect its trade interests, and China rejected what it called unilateral sanctions lacking any international-law basis. The shockwave crossed the Atlantic at the worst possible moment for Brussels: on September 22, today, the European Union’s Russia sanctions listings, covering approximately 3,000 individuals and entities, expire unless all member states unanimously agree to prolong them for another six months, after France and Slovakia pushed at the last minute for the delisting of Uzbek-Russian billionaire Alisher Usmanov. Six days earlier, on September 16, the General Court of the European Union annulled the 2025 sanctions acts against Russian singer Polina Gagarina while upholding her 2024 listing, a split decision that shows exactly how European judges review listings and where they strike. And on September 17, China and Russia vetoed the renewal of the United Nations Iran sanctions-monitoring panel. If you are a bank, a trading house, a carrier, an insurer or an energy-exposed company operating through Paris, you now sit between an American tariff machine, a European freeze regime that must be renewed unanimously every six months, and French criminal and administrative courts that punish any attempt to dodge the freeze. This analysis explains what the new American law says word for word, why the European deadline matters, and how French procedure decides who pays and who walks free.

I. The Graham Act signed on September 18 and the European sanctions expiring on September 22: what really changed for French operators

Two legal earthquakes hit the same week. Washington created a secondary-tariff weapon aimed at the buyers of Russian hydrocarbons. Brussels, meanwhile, must decide unanimously whether its own sanctions survive the day. A French operator with dollar flows, Russian counterparties or listed shareholders cannot treat these as distant geopolitics: American duties change the price of every cargo, and a European lapse or relisting changes overnight whether a Paris bank account is frozen.

A. How Washington taxes Russian goods up to 500 percent and punishes the top buyers of Russian oil up to 100 percent

The enrolled text states its short title plainly: it may be cited as the Lindsey O. Graham Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act of 2026. The enrolled text (H.R. 5334, 119th Congress) runs over a thousand pages of operative sections that leave little room for interpretation. Originally introduced in April 2025, the Act gained momentum after the President signaled support in November 2025, conditioned on new tariff authorities and flexibility over the imposition of sanctions, and the House passed it on September 16 by 262 votes to 159 before the President signed it on September 18.

Section 112 targets Russia directly. It requires the President to raise the duty rate on all goods imported into the United States from the Russian Federation, expressly including oil, natural gas, liquefied natural gas, petroleum, petroleum products, petrochemical products, coal and coal products, to as much as 500 percent ad valorem. The section specifies that this rate applies on top of every other applicable duty, fee, tax, exaction or charge, which means the 500 percent stacks on existing antidumping duties, section 232 duties and section 301 duties. For a French exporter whose supply chain touches Russian-origin inputs re-exported to the United States, the arithmetic of every contract signed before September must be redone.

Section 113 is the provision that reaches furthest into Paris, Geneva, Mumbai and Beijing. Not later than 30 days after enactment, the President must raise the duty rate to as much as 100 percent ad valorem on all goods imported from a listed country, and only from a listed country. A country is listed if it knowingly makes new purchases of Russian-origin crude oil or natural gas from 30 days after enactment while ranking among the five largest importers by volume of Russian-origin oil or gas over the most recent twelve-month period, or if it ranks among the top five facilitators of Russian oil sanctions evasion over the twelve months before enactment. The statute therefore creates a public ranking of buyers and facilitators, reviewed every 180 days, with duties adjustable upward or downward depending on whether the country increases or decreases its Russian purchases. A narrow exception protects gas buyers whose Russian imports were less than 15 percent of total Russian gas exports and who have taken significant steps to reduce them.

The reactions came within 48 hours. On September 17, 2026, India reportedly said it would protect its trade and economic interests while safeguarding energy security through diversified supplies, as its status as Russia’s largest buyer of seaborne crude could expose it to potential United States tariffs. On September 19, 2026, China rejected unilateral sanctions lacking United Nations authorization or an international-law basis, opposed secondary measures against third countries and reserved the right to take necessary action to protect its sovereignty, development interests and companies. Both governments called for dialogue and stable trade relations, while Beijing also emphasized the security of global industrial and supply chains. For a French trading house, the message is concrete: cargoes, counterparties and financing structures involving Indian refiners or Chinese intermediaries now carry a tariff risk that must be priced, disclosed to lenders and documented for customs.

One safety valve exists, and it is political rather than judicial. Section 115 provides that the President may, under its conditions and after submitting a written certification to Congress, waive any sanctions provision as to a foreign person, any restriction as to a person, or any duty imposed by the title. Waivers have already been used as currency: since the start of the second Trump administration, the United States has repeatedly used sanctions waivers on Belarusian businesses to secure prisoner releases, lifting sanctions on Belarusian potash production in December 2025 in exchange for the release of 123 prisoners and dropping sanctions on two Belarusian banks and the finance ministry in March 2026 after 250 more prisoners were freed. Any French group negotiating in a sanctioned environment must therefore track not only the statute but the waiver practice, because relief can arrive as suddenly as designation.

B. Why 3,000 European listings can lapse overnight and what the Gagarina annulment teaches every listed person

While Washington legislates, Brussels must vote, and the vote must be unanimous. Each European sanctions package must be renewed unanimously every six months, and on September 14 member states were forced to delay a vote on prolonging Russia-related sanctions by a week after France and Slovakia pushed at the last minute for the delisting of Uzbek-Russian billionaire Alisher Usmanov, as reported on September 14. According to media reports, Usmanov’s delisting was part of an indirect deal to release a French-British businessman from an Azerbaijani prison, where he was arrested on espionage charges in 2023 and sentenced in March 2026 to 10 years. The rule is brutal: without a unanimous vote to prolong the measures for another six months, the roughly 3,000 listings of individuals and entities lapse automatically. France risks straining European cohesion by exploiting this leverage to obtain a prisoner release, and Russia could exploit these political delisting debates by offering individualized delisting deals to a few member states every time sanctions are up for renewal. For holders of frozen funds in Paris, today is therefore a double deadline: either the Council renews and the freezes continue, or the listings lapse and banks must decide within hours whether to release funds, a decision no compliance officer wants to take without written guidance from the French Treasury.

The same week gave listed persons a judicial roadmap. On September 16, 2026, the General Court of the European Union delivered its judgment in Case T-460/24 concerning an action brought by the Russian singer Polina Gagarina seeking annulment of the 2024 and 2025 Council acts that included and maintained her name on the European Union Russia asset freeze list. The Court upheld the initial June 2024 listing and the September 2024 renewal, holding that the Council had established, to the requisite legal standard, that Ms. Gagarina satisfied the criterion set out in Article 3(1)(a) of Council Regulation (EU) 269/2014, which targets individuals supporting actions or policies which undermine or threaten the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine. The Council’s evidence was that she regularly performed in the framework of State propaganda events, for example to celebrate the illegal annexation of four Ukrainian regions or the anniversary of the annexation of Crimea, and that she had been able to generate significant revenue through her frequent participation in state-sponsored propaganda events. But the Court drew a line at the relistings: it annulled Council Decision (CFSP) 2025/528 of 14 March 2025, Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/527, Council Decision (CFSP) 2025/1895 of 12 September 2025 and Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/1894, in so far as they concern Ms. Polina Sergeevna Gagarina, dismissed the action as to the remainder, and ordered the Council and Ms. Gagarina each to bear their own costs.

The lesson for any person or company listed in the Official Journal is precise. Judges in Luxembourg accept listings supported by dated, specific evidence of conduct matching the criterion, including artistic performances at propaganda events, and they accept that revenue derived from such events can satisfy the benefit criterion. But they annul renewals when the Council merely rolls the file over without fresh verification, and they split costs when each side wins half the case. A challenge must therefore attack each listing act separately, demand the evidence file behind every renewal, and contest the statement of reasons act by act, because a victory on the 2025 acts does not erase the 2024 listing. French courts already feed this Luxembourg pipeline: on July 10, 2020, the Assemblée plénière of the Court of Cassation, in case number 18-18.542, referred to the Court of Justice of the European Union detailed questions on whether the Iranian asset-freeze regulations, namely Council Regulation (EC) number 423/2007, Council Regulation (EU) number 961/2010 and Council Regulation (EU) number 267/2012, preclude enforcement measures over frozen assets without prior authorization from the national competent authority, as recorded in the Court’s decision 18-18.542. The same decision holds that the freezing of a person’s assets does not constitute force majeure for that person, for want of exteriority, so that statutory interest keeps running on a sum the frozen debtor cannot pay. If your funds are frozen in Paris, the interest meter does not stop, and only a targeted authorization or a Luxembourg annulment restarts the clock.

II. Frozen account, seized cargo or listed partner in France: the procedure that decides everything

American tariffs change prices, but French procedure decides freedom, money and reputation. In France, the freeze is ordered by ministers, reported by banks, investigated by customs officers with judicial-police powers, punished by criminal courts with imprisonment, fines and confiscation, and challenged before administrative and European judges. Each step has its own deadline, its own judge and its own trap, and the file is usually lost at the first step, long before Luxembourg is ever reached.

A. Who freezes, who reports and who punishes: the French chain from ministerial order to criminal court

The national freeze starts at the top of the executive. Under Article L. 562-2 of the Monetary and Financial Code, “Le ministre chargé de l’économie et le ministre de l’intérieur peuvent décider, conjointement, pour une durée de six mois, renouvelable, le gel des fonds et ressources économiques” belonging to persons who commit, attempt, facilitate or finance terrorism, or to entities owned, controlled or knowingly acting for them. The European and international channel runs through Article L. 562-3 of the same Code, under which “Le ministre chargé de l’économie peut décider, pour une durée de six mois, renouvelable, le gel des fonds et ressources économiques” belonging to persons designated under Chapter VII resolutions of the United Nations Charter or acts adopted under Article 29 of the Treaty on European Union or Article 75 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. Both freezes last six months and are renewable, which means every file must be re-examined twice a year and every challenge must target the current renewal, not a repealed order. The scope of the chapter is set by Article L. 562-1, which defines terrorism by reference to point 4 of Article 1 of Council Regulation (EU) number 2580/2001 of December 27, 2001, and now also covers foreign interference and drug trafficking as defined by Articles 222-34 to 222-38 of the Criminal Code and Articles 414 and 415 of the Customs Code.

Banks, notaries, accountants, auditors and traders do not have the right to stay silent. Article L. 561-15 of the Monetary and Financial Code provides that the persons subject to anti-money-laundering duties must declare to the national financial intelligence unit the sums on their books or the transactions involving sums “dont elles savent, soupçonnent ou ont de bonnes raisons de soupçonner qu’elles proviennent d’une infraction passible d’une peine privative de liberté supérieure à un an ou sont liées au financement du terrorisme.” That unit is Tracfin, and Article L. 561-23 states that “Une cellule de renseignement financier nationale exerce les attributions prévues au présent chapitre” and is composed of agents specially authorized by the Minister for the economy. In practice, the moment a Paris bank detects a listed name, a dollar payment linked to Russian oil, or an opaque intermediary, it files a suspicious-transaction report, freezes without warning, and answers no questions. Any attempt to move the funds the day before the freeze becomes a separate criminal case.

The criminal exposure is severe and cumulative. Article 324-1 of the Criminal Code defines money laundering as “le fait de faciliter, par tout moyen, la justification mensongère de l’origine des biens ou des revenus de l’auteur d’un crime ou d’un délit ayant procuré à celui-ci un profit direct ou indirect”, and adds that assisting in the placement, concealment or conversion of criminal proceeds is also laundering, punished by “cinq ans d’emprisonnement et de 375 000 euros d’amende.” Terrorism financing is punished separately: Article 421-2-2 of the Criminal Code provides that financing a terrorist enterprise by supplying, collecting or managing funds, securities or property of any kind, or by giving advice to that end, with the intent or knowledge that they will be used to commit terrorism, constitutes terrorism “indépendamment de la survenance éventuelle d’un tel acte”, even if no attack ever occurs. Sanctions evasion through layered payments, false end-user certificates or ship-to-ship transfers therefore risks qualification as laundering, and where the nexus touches terrorism, as terrorism financing, each with its own prison term.

The courts have already drawn the enforcement map. On November 29, 2023, the Criminal Chamber of the Court of Cassation, in case number 22-85.867, ruled on convictions for evading asset-freezing measures in counter-terrorism: the Douai Court of Appeal had sentenced a first defendant to three months’ imprisonment with a probationary suspended sentence, a customs fine and confiscation, and a second to two months’ suspended imprisonment, a customs fine and confiscation, “pour soustraction aux mesures de gel des avoirs dans le cadre de la lutte contre le terrorisme”, as recorded in decision 22-85.867. The published holding states that since the procedures for establishing, prosecuting and punishing the offence of evading asset-freeze measures are laid down by the Customs Code, that offence constitutes an offence provided for by the Customs Code within the meaning of Article 28-1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which gives customs judicial-police officers their powers. In plain terms, the customs service investigates sanctions cases with full judicial-police authority, and the fine it seeks is a customs fine on top of imprisonment. On confiscation, the Criminal Chamber held on September 7, 2022, in case number 21-85.236, that the confiscation ordered by the criminal court under Article 414 of the Customs Code for smuggling and undeclared import or export of prohibited goods is governed by the specific Article 369 of the Customs Code and escapes the sentencing rules of the Criminal Code, as recorded in decision 21-85.236. Goods that violate an embargo are therefore confiscated under a special customs regime that the ordinary mitigation rules of criminal sentencing cannot soften.

B. How to challenge a listing or a freeze from Paris without losing the company in the process

The first question a Paris lawyer asks is not whether the sanction is fair but which act, which date and which judge. A European listing is challenged by an action for annulment before the General Court in Luxembourg within two months of publication, act by act, as Gagarina demonstrates: the 2024 listing survived on dated evidence of propaganda concerts, while the March 2025 and September 2025 renewals were annulled. The pleas that work are the infringement of the duty to state reasons, manifest error of assessment, and breach of the rights of the defence, including access to the evidence file. A French ministerial freeze under Articles L. 562-2 or L. 562-3 is challenged before the French administrative judge, with an application for interim relief where the freeze threatens the survival of the company, and each six-month renewal restarts the clock, so counsel must diary every renewal and strike the current one. Where the freeze implements a European regulation, the administrative judge can refer the validity question to Luxembourg, exactly as the Assemblée plénière did for the Iranian regulations in decision 18-18.542. Running both tracks in parallel, Luxembourg for the European act and Paris for the national implementing measure, is standard practice, not duplication.

The second question is money: how to keep operating while listed or frozen. European regulations and French orders both provide for authorizations to release funds for basic needs, legal fees, routine administration and, crucially, payments under contracts concluded before the listing. The request goes to the Directorate General of the Treasury in Paris, with bank statements, contracts, invoices and proof that no frozen value leaks to a listed person. The Gagarina split shows why precision matters: funds frozen under the surviving 2024 listing stay frozen even though the 2025 acts were annulled, so the authorization request must identify the exact legal basis still in force. And the Assemblee pleniere’s warning stands: the freeze is not force majeure, interest keeps accruing on debts the frozen person cannot pay, and creditors may seek protective measures, which is why the debtor must proactively seek authorizations and negotiate standstills instead of waiting for the freeze to lift. Every payment made without authorization is a fresh offence of evasion of the type punished in the Douai case.

The third question is evidence, and it must be handled from day one in Paris and the Ile-de-France. Preserve the complete contractual chain: purchase orders, certificates of origin, bills of lading, AIS tracks, insurance slips, payment messages and compliance screenings, because the Council’s file in Luxembourg and the customs file in criminal court are both built on documents, and Gagarina was lost on concerts the Council could date and prove. Map every counterparty against the consolidated European list and the American secondary-sanctions perimeter, since the Graham Act now makes the nationality of your buyer’s oil a tariff factor in the United States. Brief the bank before it files with Tracfin, through counsel, with a coherent narrative and supporting documents, because a spontaneous, well-documented explanation can prevent a report from becoming a prosecution. If officers of the customs judicial service arrive, say nothing substantive without counsel, produce only what is lawfully required, and log every seizure, because confiscation under the customs regime, as decision 21-85.236 confirms, follows its own rules. Companies based in Paris and the Ile-de-France have one practical advantage: the Treasury, the specialized interregional judicial authorities and experienced sanctions counsel are all within the same jurisdiction, so authorizations, challenges and criminal defence can be coordinated in days rather than weeks, provided the file is complete before the freeze lands.

Conclusion

The week of September 15, 2026 rewrote the sanctions map on both sides of the Atlantic. Washington now holds a statute that can tax Russian goods at up to 500 percent and goods from the largest buyers of Russian oil at up to 100 percent, with a presidential waiver as the only exit. Brussels decides today whether 3,000 European listings survive another six months or lapse at midnight, with France’s last-minute push over one oligarch’s delisting showing how transactional each renewal has become. Luxembourg, in the Gagarina judgment of September 16, confirmed the method judges use: dated evidence sustains a listing, copy-paste renewals do not. And the United Nations lost, on September 17, its Iran monitoring panel to a Sino-Russian veto. For French operators, the strategy that follows is procedural, not political: verify every counterparty, document every cargo, brief the bank before Tracfin moves, challenge each listing act before its own judge within its own deadline, and seek Treasury authorizations for every vital payment. In sanctions law, the file that wins is the file that was ready before the freeze, and the week to prepare it is this one.

📄 Official circular