On 20 September 2026, Reuters reported that the Trump administration has prepared sanctions against the entire International Criminal Court and could announce them within days, possibly during the United Nations General Assembly meeting in New York. Two months earlier, on 13 July, Washington had already unveiled what the International Federation for Human Rights calls a coordinated whole-of-government campaign to dismantle the Court, including open pressure on States Parties to withdraw from the Rome Statute. And on 24 July 2026, Venezuela actually did it: it notified the United Nations Secretary-General of its withdrawal, starting a one-year countdown that the Court documented in a public question-and-answer paper dated 13 August 2026.
For readers in France, these three events combine into one urgent question that our Paris office has started hearing from companies, associations, journalists and individuals with cases touching The Hague: can France be forced out of the Court, can it choose to leave, and what would a withdrawal actually change for an arrest, a trial file or a frozen bank account handled in Paris? This analysis answers that question step by step, using only the treaty text, the French codes and the official statements published in the last sixty days. The short version is reassuring but demanding: leaving the Court takes a year, it does not erase pending cases or unpaid bills, and in the meantime every ICC file on French soil keeps running under French judges and French deadlines.
I. Washington Is Pressing ICC Member States to Quit: How a Withdrawal Really Works
A. What the United States Is Demanding From the Court and Its Member States
The Reuters exclusive of 20 September, reported by Humeyra Pamuk, Anthony Deutsch and Stephanie van den Berg, states as its core fact that sanctions against the entire Court have been prepared while the exact timing of an announcement remains unclear. The same reporting adds, citing the Wall Street Journal, that the decision could be finalized as soon as this week during the United Nations General Assembly meeting. The State Department did not respond to the request for comment, which means practitioners must prepare on the basis of the prepared package, not wait for the press release.
The context matters because Washington has climbed an escalation ladder for eighteen months. The same Reuters reporting recalls that Washington has already sanctioned a number of ICC judges and prosecutors while holding off, until now, from sanctioning the Court itself, an option long kept on the table. Secretary of State Marco Rubio announced in July a campaign calling on other countries to withdraw from the tribunal. American officials want the Court to drop its arrest warrants against Israeli leaders as well as a past probe into American troops in Afghanistan. In other words, the sequence runs from listed individuals to the institution itself, and from financial pressure to an explicit exit campaign aimed at member states including France.
The legal instrument behind any such move is the Executive Order of 6 February 2025 on the International Criminal Court, published by the White House, which can be read at the White House order imposing sanctions on the International Criminal Court. The order finds that the Court’s actions constitute an unusual and extraordinary threat and provides that all property and interests in property in the United States, or held by American persons, are blocked and may not be transferred, paid, exported, withdrawn or otherwise dealt in. Designating the Court itself would extend that blocking language from named judges and prosecutors to the institution, its organs, its payroll, its vendors and potentially the organisations that cooperate with it.
Reuters spells out the practical consequence: any Treasury entity-wide sanctions would bar American citizens and companies from providing funds, goods or services to the Court without a license from the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC). That license regime is the whole game for practitioners. A general or specific OFAC license can authorise otherwise prohibited transactions such as winding down contracts, paying salaries or maintaining software, but each license has a scope, a validity period and reporting conditions, and operating outside them exposes American persons to enforcement. Banks, for their part, routinely over-comply with American sanctions because they depend on access to the American financial system, which is exactly how a measure decided in Washington freezes a transfer ordered in Paris.
The human-rights federation FIDH, writing from The Hague and Paris on 20 July 2026, describes the same dynamic from the victims’ side. It condemns the 13 July announcement of a coordinated whole-of-government campaign whose measures under consideration include, and I quote from its statement, pressure on States Parties to withdraw from the Rome Statute, expanded sanctions against the Court and organisations that cooperate with it, and additional sanctions against ICC officials. FIDH recalls that the Court was created by 125 sovereign states, and it documents that sanctions over the past eighteen months have disrupted banking services, cut funding for human rights organisations and spread a chilling effect well beyond the persons formally designated. Yet despite these pressures, the federation notes, the ICC has continued its work. That resilience is the starting point of the legal analysis: pressure is real, money channels are disturbed, but the treaty has not moved.
B. The Only Exit Door: Article 127, One Year, and the Venezuelan Precedent of July 2026
International law provides exactly one exit door from the Rome Statute, and it is slow by design. Article 127 of the Rome Statute, as published in the official treaty text, provides in its first paragraph that a State Party may withdraw by written notification to the United Nations Secretary-General, with effect one year after receipt unless the notification names a later date. No vote, no negotiation, no American authorisation is involved. A sovereign state sends a letter to New York and waits twelve months. But during those twelve months it remains a full member, and after them it keeps the baggage described in the second paragraph, which adds that withdrawal does not discharge obligations that arose while the state was a party, including accrued financial ones, does not affect cooperation in investigations and proceedings commenced before the effective date where a duty to cooperate existed, and does not prejudice matters already under consideration by the Court.
That second paragraph does three things that every headline about quitting the Court tends to skip. First, it keeps the money owed: assessed contributions that accrued while the state was a party remain due. Second, it keeps the cooperation files: investigations and proceedings commenced before the effective date, for which the state had a duty to cooperate, continue to bind it. Third, it keeps the Court’s docket: any matter already under consideration stays under consideration. Withdrawal changes the future; it does not rewrite the past.
Venezuela turned that theory into a live precedent eight weeks ago. In its public question-and-answer paper on Venezuela’s withdrawal dated 13 August 2026, the Court confirms that on 24 July 2026, the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela notified its decision to withdraw. The paper explains that withdrawal takes effect one year after the notification reaches the Secretary-General, and that the withdrawing state remains a full party throughout that year. Venezuela therefore stays a State Party until late July 2027, bound by the Statute every day until then.
Above all, the Venezuela paper answers the question our clients ask first: does leaving stop the case against you? The Court’s answer is no. It states that withdrawal leaves untouched the continued consideration of any investigation or proceedings already before the Court when the withdrawal takes effect. Applied to the file registered as ICC-02/18, the paper confirms that the Prosecutor’s investigation into crimes against humanity allegedly committed in Venezuela since 2014 has not been halted, confirming that the Prosecutor’s investigation into crimes against humanity allegedly committed in Venezuela since 2014 continues. The paper adds that crimes committed on the withdrawing state’s territory or by its nationals while it was a party remain within the Court’s jurisdiction even after the withdrawal takes effect. A state can walk out of the building; it cannot take its past with it.
Where does France stand in this architecture? France is a State Party whose cooperation duty is written directly into domestic legislation. Article 627 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides, and I quote: “Pour l’application du statut de la Cour pénale internationale signé le 18 juillet 1998, la France participe à la répression des infractions et coopère avec cette juridiction dans les conditions fixées par le présent titre.” Participation in punishment and cooperation with the Court are therefore a standing legislative command, implemented by a full procedural title that runs from arrest for surrender through sentence enforcement. An American listing of the Court changes nothing in that title, and a withdrawal notification, if Paris ever sent one, would trigger the one-year clock of Article 127 without suspending a single pending file.
The constitutional frame confirms that the treaty sits above day-to-day politics. The Constitution of 4 October 1958 provides in its Article 52 that the President of the Republic negotiates and ratifies treaties. It provides in Article 53 that treaties concerning international organisation, state finances or matters of legislative nature, and reserves such treaties to ratification or approval pursuant to statute. And Article 55 gives duly ratified or approved treaties authority superior to statutes upon publication, subject to reciprocal application by the other party. A ratified treaty outranks statutes in the domestic hierarchy. That is why French prosecutors and judges apply the ICC cooperation title as ordinary law, regardless of foreign sanctions lists, until and unless France completes the Article 127 exit route, waits out the year, and settles its surviving obligations.
II. Paris During the Storm: ICC Cases, Frozen Money and Defence Before French Judges
A. How an ICC Arrest, Surrender or Evidence Request Still Moves Through Paris
Start with what changes nothing. Mutual assistance requests from the Court arrive through a channel that French law names precisely. Article 627-1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides, and I quote: “Les demandes d’entraide émanant de la Cour pénale internationale sont adressées aux autorités compétentes en vertu de l’article 87 du statut en original ou en copie certifiée conforme accompagnées de toutes pièces justificatives. Ces documents sont transmis au procureur de la République antiterroriste qui leur donne toutes suites utiles.” In urgent cases the documents may go directly and by any means to that prosecutor. Article 627-2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure then provides, and I quote: “Les demandes d’entraide sont exécutées, selon les cas, par le procureur de la République antiterroriste ou par le juge d’instruction de Paris qui agissent sur l’ensemble du territoire national en présence, le cas échéant, du procureur près la Cour pénale internationale ou de son représentant, ou de toute autre personne mentionnée dans la demande de la Cour pénale internationale.” Paris executes, nationwide, with the ICC Prosecutor potentially present. No OFAC license is required for a French investigating judge to act, because the authority flows from the Code, not from Washington.
The surrender track, the one that decides whether a person arrested in France boards a plane to The Hague, is equally written down with hard deadlines. Article 627-8 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides, and I quote: “Lorsque la chambre de l’instruction constate qu’il n’y a pas d’erreur évidente, elle ordonne la remise de la personne réclamée et, si celle-ci est libre, son incarcération à cette fin. Toute autre question soumise à la chambre de l’instruction est renvoyée à la Cour pénale internationale qui lui donne les suites utiles. La chambre de l’instruction statue dans les quinze jours de la comparution devant elle de la personne réclamée. En cas de pourvoi, la chambre criminelle de la Cour de cassation statue dans un délai de deux mois suivant la réception du dossier à la Cour de cassation.” Fifteen days before the Paris investigating chamber, two months before the criminal chamber of the Court of Cassation on appeal: defence work in these files consists of policing identity, language, counsel access and detention conditions within those windows, and of sending every substantive dispute back to The Hague, exactly as the text commands. Our office has already analysed the Duterte surrender sequence, the first sitting-head-of-state-style transfer of 2026, in our analysis of the Duterte ICC surrender and what France would do with such a file, and the same Paris deadlines would frame any future ICC surrender litigated here.
Detention is not automatic while the file moves. Article 627-9 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides, and I quote: “La mise en liberté ou la mainlevée ou la modification du contrôle judiciaire ou de l’assignation à résidence sous surveillance électronique peut être demandée à tout moment à la chambre de l’instruction de la cour d’appel de Paris qui procède conformément à l’article 59 du statut et à la procédure prévue aux articles 148-1 et suivants du présent code.” Release, lifting or adjustment of judicial supervision or electronic monitoring can be requested at any time, and the chamber rules in a public reasoned decision by reference to paragraph 4 of Article 59 of the Statute. And once surrender is ordered, Article 627-10 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides, and I quote: “La personne réclamée est remise dans un délai d’un mois à compter du jour où cette décision est devenue définitive, faute de quoi elle est immédiatement libérée sur décision du président de la chambre de l’instruction, à moins que sa remise ait été retardée par des circonstances insurmontables.” One month to hand over, failing which immediate release, unless insurmountable circumstances delayed the transfer. These are the levers a Paris lawyer actually pulls; none of them depends on the state of American sanctions.
Do not confuse this surrender with extradition to a foreign state, because the bars are different. Article 696-4 of the Code of Criminal Procedure lists eight cases where extradition is refused, and I quote its opening: “L’extradition n’est pas accordée : 1° Lorsque la personne réclamée a la nationalité française, cette dernière étant appréciée à l’époque de l’infraction pour laquelle l’extradition est requise ; 2° Lorsque le crime ou le délit à un caractère politique ou lorsqu’il résulte des circonstances que l’extradition est demandée dans un but politique”, continuing through offences committed on French territory, res judicata in France, limitation periods, penalties contrary to French public policy, courts without fundamental defence guarantees, and purely military offences. Those eight bars govern state-to-state extradition. Surrender to the ICC follows its own title, its own chamber and its own fifteen-day clock, which is precisely why ICC files need counsel who know the difference instead of recycling extradition reflexes.
Finally, France does not need The Hague to punish the gravest crimes, because its own criminal code mirrors them. Article 211-1 of the Criminal Code provides, and I quote: “Constitue un génocide le fait, en exécution d’un plan concerté tendant à la destruction totale ou partielle d’un groupe national, ethnique, racial ou religieux, ou d’un groupe déterminé à partir de tout autre critère arbitraire, de commettre ou de faire commettre, à l’encontre de membres de ce groupe, l’un des actes suivants”, followed by wilful killing, serious bodily or mental harm, destructive living conditions, measures against births and forced transfer of children, punished by life imprisonment. Article 212-1 of the Criminal Code provides, and I quote: “Constitue également un crime contre l’humanité et est puni de la réclusion criminelle à perpétuité l’un des actes ci-après commis en exécution d’un plan concerté à l’encontre d’un groupe de population civile dans le cadre d’une attaque généralisée ou systématique”, followed by murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, imprisonment in violation of international law, torture, sexual violence and persecution. Complementarity, the principle the Venezuela paper recalls, means national courts come first. Even in the most extreme scenario, a French prosecutor keeps every tool to charge genocide and crimes against humanity in Paris.
B. When the Money Freezes: Funds, Banks and the First Steps to Take in Paris
If cases run on rails, money runs on wires, and wires are where American sanctions bite first. The mechanism is the one Reuters and FIDH both describe: an OFAC designation blocks property within American reach, American persons must stop providing funds, goods or services without a license, and banks worldwide over-comply because they need the American financial system. For a Paris association collecting donations for ICC-related victim work, a company paying a lawyer who also acts in The Hague, or an individual receiving an ICC-ordered reparation, the symptom is brutally concrete: a transfer rejected, an account frozen, a compliance questionnaire asking about any link to the Court. FIDH has documented exactly this pattern, with banking services disrupted and funding reduced far beyond the persons formally designated.
French law gives the money track its own judge and its own clock. Article 627-3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides, and I quote: “L’exécution sur le territoire français des mesures conservatoires mentionnées au k du paragraphe 1 de l’article 93 du statut est ordonnée, aux frais avancés du Trésor et selon les modalités prévues par le présent code, par le procureur de la République antiterroriste. La durée maximale de ces mesures est limitée à deux ans. Elles peuvent être renouvelées dans les mêmes conditions avant l’expiration de ce délai à la demande de la Cour pénale internationale.” Conservatory measures requested by the Court, ordered by the Paris antiterrorism prosecutor, capped at two years and renewable at the Court’s request: that is the lawful freezing channel in France. A freeze that comes from this channel can be challenged before the French judge who ordered or supervises it. A freeze that comes from a bank’s private over-compliance is a different dispute, against the bank, under French banking and liability law, and it starts with a written demand, a complete paper trail and counsel within days, not weeks.
Our office applies to ICC-linked freezes the same method we use for European Union sanctions files, described in our analysis of challenging an EU listing and frozen assets from France: identify the exact legal basis of the freeze, separate a judicial measure from a compliance decision, quantify the harm day by day, and attack the right target in the right forum. In ICC-linked cases the checklist for the first seventy-two hours is short. First, freeze the facts: keep every rejection notice, every compliance letter, every timestamp, and stop issuing payment instructions that could aggravate the file. Second, identify the basis: ICC conservatory measure under Article 627-3, American designation implemented by the bank, or pure over-compliance with no designation at all. Third, map the American side: is the counterparty an American person needing an OFAC license, and does a general license already cover winding-down or legal-fee payments. Fourth, seize the French judge where one exists: the Paris prosecutor, the investigating judge or the investigating chamber depending on the measure. Fifth, put the bank on formal notice where the freeze has no judicial basis, because an unjustified freeze that strangles a lawful activity creates a liability file from the first day of harm.
Two warnings close this section, both drawn from the official record. The first is that sanctions pressure rewards speed and punishes improvisation: moving funds through intermediaries to dodge a freeze can transform a victim of over-compliance into the author of a circumvention offence, so every rerouting must be cleared with counsel before it is ordered. The second is that withdrawal fantasies change nothing for money already owed or files already open: Article 127 keeps accrued financial obligations and commenced cooperation files alive, the Venezuela paper confirms the investigation continues, and the French cooperation title keeps executing. The storm is real, but the rails, the clocks and the judges are still there, and they sit in Paris.
Conclusion
The autumn of 2026 confronts France with a pressure campaign without precedent against the International Criminal Court: prepared entity-wide American sanctions possibly announced during General Assembly week, an explicit call on member states to withdraw, and a Venezuelan withdrawal already ticking toward effect in July 2027. Yet the law, read coldly, holds its line. Leaving the Court requires a written notification to the Secretary-General, takes effect one year later, and leaves pending investigations, cooperation files and accrued financial obligations fully alive, as the Venezuela precedent demonstrates file ICC-02/18 in hand. In France, the Constitution gives treaties superior authority over statutes, the Code of Criminal Procedure commands cooperation with the Court, and Paris judges run arrests, surrenders, evidence assistance and conservatory measures on deadlines no foreign list can extend. Whether you face an ICC surrender request, an evidence measure, a frozen transfer or a bank that has stopped answering, the answer is never to wait for geopolitics to settle. It is to identify the exact legal basis, seize the competent Paris judge within the statutory clock, and build the file that protects your liberty, your funds and your rights while the storm passes.