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Maduro Claims Absolute Immunity in New York: What France’s Highest Court Decided on the Same Question

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Source: French Court of Cassation – Judilibre and Légifrance open data

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Maduro Claims Absolute Immunity in New York: What France’s Highest Court Decided on the Same Question

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On 3 January 2026, American forces raided Caracas and seized sitting Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro. Eight months later, on 2 September 2026, his lawyer asked a Manhattan federal judge to throw out the entire drug-trafficking indictment on the ground that a head of state enjoys absolute immunity from foreign criminal courts. Judge Alvin Hellerstein of the Southern District of New York must now decide a question that tests the oldest rule of international diplomacy against the raw fact of a military capture. If the motion fails, trial is scheduled for 1 June 2027 in a Brooklyn courtroom. The case is American, but the legal question is universal, and France answered it barely a year ago: on 25 July 2025, the Assemblée plénière of the Cour de cassation quashed a French arrest warrant issued against a sitting foreign president and set out, paragraph by paragraph, what head-of-state immunity means in a French courtroom. This analysis explains the New York motion, the uphill battle it faces in the United States, and the French mirror ruling that every defense team in an immunity case now reads.

I. Can a captured president claim head-of-state immunity before a foreign judge?

A. What Maduro’s lawyers asked the New York court to do

The motion filed before Judge Hellerstein makes two classical claims. First, that a sitting head of state enjoys complete personal immunity from the criminal jurisdiction of any foreign court, so the Manhattan court has no jurisdiction at all. Second, that the acts charged, even taken at face value, belonged to the official functions of a president and are therefore covered by functional immunity as well. Barry Pollack, counsel for Mr. Maduro, put the point in sweeping terms, invoking the “absolute immunity from criminal jurisdiction” of heads of state. He added that his client was falsely accused and “vehemently denies” the allegations. The charges, filed in Manhattan federal court, formed the basis for the United States military raid on Caracas and the capture of Mr. Maduro on 3 January. Since his seizure he has been held in a Brooklyn federal jail, has pleaded not guilty, and is scheduled to go on trial on 1 June 2027 if the dismissal effort fails.

The legal experts consulted by the wire services agree on one word: uphill. The principle that sitting heads of state are immune from prosecution abroad is indeed a longstanding tenet of international law, seen as fundamental to diplomacy, and the motion will test the well-documented reluctance of American courts to apply international law in criminal cases. But Washington has not recognized Mr. Maduro as Venezuela’s president since 2019, after a 2018 election the United States described as rigged and a 2024 re-election it likewise called fraudulent. American courts traditionally defer to the executive on the question of who counts as a foreign leader, and that deference is the motion’s heaviest burden. United States criminal cases involving the heads of foreign states are extremely rare, and the closest precedent offers little encouragement: in 1990, a federal judge in Miami rejected former Panamanian strongman Manuel Noriega’s claim of head-of-state immunity, in part because he never officially held the title of president. Mr. Maduro did hold the title, which distinguishes his file from Noriega’s, yet the recognition problem remains. The prosecution was brought by the Manhattan United States Attorney’s office, which did not immediately respond to requests for comment, and the defense case now turns on whether customary international law binds an American trial judge even when the political branches refuse recognition.

Three features of the New York file deserve attention from a European reader. First, the immunity claimed is personal immunity, attached to the status of incumbent head of state, which under customary law covers every act, official or private, for as long as the office is held. Second, the motion was filed on the judge’s deadline, Wednesday 2 September 2026, which means the immunity battle is now fully joined and will be decided on written submissions before any trial preparation advances. Third, the calendar matters: with trial set for 1 June 2027, the immunity ruling will shape everything, because personal immunity, where it applies, is a threshold procedural bar that must be resolved before the merits are ever reached. That exact logic, that immunity is a manifest procedural obstacle to be examined before anything else, is precisely what the French Cour de cassation stated in its own landmark ruling fourteen months earlier.

B. How France’s highest court answered the same question in July 2025

On 25 July 2025, the Cour de cassation sitting in Assemblée plénière, its most solemn formation, gave its answer on head-of-state immunity. The case concerned an arrest warrant issued on 13 November 2023 against a sitting foreign president, identified in the published decision as Mr. [S.], on counts of complicity in crimes against humanity and war crimes. The Paris investigating chamber had refused to annul the warrant. The public prosecutor appealed, and the full Court quashed the appellate ruling in its entirety, declared the arrest warrant void, and closed the matter without remand. The official decision is published here: Assemblée plénière, 25 July 2025, appeal no. 24-84.393. Because the reasoning restates the whole French doctrine of immunity in twenty numbered paragraphs, it is now the reference text for any lawyer facing this question in France, and the closest possible mirror of the Maduro motion.

The Court begins from first principles, in terms a New York judge would recognize: “L’immunité pénale de juridiction procède de l’égalité souveraine des États.” Criminal jurisdictional immunity flows from the sovereign equality of states. It then draws the boundary that decides all immunity litigation: “Elle s’applique devant les juridictions nationales. Le principe de l’immunité ne peut être opposé devant les juridictions internationales, dont les statuts écartent expressément toute immunité, et qui agissent au nom de la communauté internationale.” Immunity operates before national courts; it cannot be raised before international courts whose statutes expressly remove it. The decisive definition follows: “L’immunité personnelle, distincte de l’immunité fonctionnelle, est reconnue aux seuls chef d’État, chef du gouvernement et ministre des affaires étrangères, en exercice. Elle concerne tous les actes accomplis, tant à titre privé qu’à titre officiel.” Personal immunity, distinct from functional immunity, belongs only to the serving head of state, head of government and foreign minister, and it covers every act performed, whether private or official. Note the consequence the Court draws for procedure: “Constituant ainsi un obstacle procédural manifeste à l’exercice de sa compétence par une juridiction nationale, l’immunité personnelle doit être examinée d’office par le juge.” Being a manifest procedural obstacle to a national court’s jurisdiction, personal immunity must be examined by the judge on the court’s own motion. A defense team does not even need to plead it for the court to be bound to consider it, as stated in Ass. plén., 25 July 2025, no. 24-84.393.

The passage with the greatest resonance for the Maduro file concerns recognition. The Court holds that personal immunity “ne soit pas liée à la reconnaissance de la qualité de chef d’État par l’État du for ou à l’existence de relations diplomatiques entre les deux États”, that it is not linked to recognition of head-of-state status by the forum state or to the existence of diplomatic relations. It explains: “la reconnaissance de gouvernement est un acte unilatéral, politique, par lequel un État accorde à ce gouvernement des droits dans leurs relations bilatérales. Le droit international coutumier ne prescrit pas d’obligation de reconnaissance et ne règle ni les conditions ni les effets sur les immunités d’un tel acte discrétionnaire.” Recognition of a government is a unilateral political act; customary law imposes no duty of recognition and says nothing about the effects of such a discretionary act on immunities. The warning is explicit: “Si l’immunité personnelle devait être conditionnée à la reconnaissance, cela aboutirait à attribuer à chaque État, démocratique ou non, la compétence discrétionnaire d’autoriser devant ses juridictions des poursuites pénales à l’encontre d’un chef d’État étranger. Il serait ainsi porté atteinte à la substance même de l’immunité personnelle.” Conditioning immunity on recognition would hand every state, democratic or not, discretionary power to authorize criminal proceedings against a foreign head of state, destroying the very substance of personal immunity. And the conclusion follows: “l’acte unilatéral par lequel un État décide de ne plus reconnaître un gouvernement ne saurait emporter des effets sur l’immunité personnelle d’un chef d’État en exercice en dérogeant à la coutume internationale.” A unilateral decision to withdraw recognition cannot affect the personal immunity of a serving head of state consistently with international custom. Applied to the facts, the Court added that Mr. [S.] was capable of benefiting from personal immunity “sans qu’il soit nécessaire d’apprécier si, au jour des poursuites, il était reconnu par la France en qualité de chef d’État”, without any need to ask whether France recognized him as head of state on the day of the proceedings. Any lawyer reading the Maduro motion in Paris will underline that sentence twice, because non-recognition since 2019 is precisely the ground on which Washington is expected to resist immunity (Ass. plén., 25 July 2025, no. 24-84.393).

Two further holdings complete the French doctrine and both cut realistically against a captured leader. First, timing: “la régularité d’un mandat d’arrêt, au regard du droit des immunités, doit s’apprécier en fonction de la situation factuelle au jour de sa délivrance.” The validity of an arrest warrant under immunity law is assessed on the facts as they stood on the day it was issued. Second, loss of office: “la perte par M. [S] de la qualité de chef d’État en exercice postérieurement à l’émission du mandat d’arrêt ne saurait avoir une incidence sur la validité de cet acte.” Subsequent loss of serving head-of-state status cannot affect the validity of the warrant. But the reverse is equally true, and it is the point that matters for Mr. Maduro: a leader ousted before any warrant or indictment can no longer invoke personal immunity, because that shield belongs only to those “en exercice”, in office. The Court anchors this entire construction in its earlier case law: “La Cour de cassation a jugé que la coutume internationale s’oppose à ce que les chefs d’État en exercice puissent, en l’absence de dispositions internationales contraires s’imposant aux parties concernées, faire l’objet de poursuites devant les juridictions pénales d’un État étranger (Crim., 13 mars 2001, pourvoi n° 00-87.215, Bull. crim. 2001, n° 64).” (Ass. plén., 25 July 2025, no. 24-84.393)

The 2025 ruling did not emerge from nowhere. On 2 September 2020, the criminal chamber held that a precisely targeted complaint against a serving foreign head of state requires no investigation at all before immunity is applied, because “le principe d’immunité pénale, reconnue par la coutume internationale au bénéfice des Etats et des chefs d’Etat en exercice, doit être retenu” where the complaint imputes the facts to the head of state alone: Crim., 2 September 2020, no. 18-84.682. And on 13 January 2021, the same chamber extended the shield to state agents for sovereign acts, holding that “La coutume internationale s’oppose à ce que les agents d’un Etat, en l’absence de dispositions internationales contraires s’imposant aux parties concernées, puissent faire l’objet de poursuites, pour des actes entrant dans cette catégorie, devant les juridictions pénales d’un État étranger”, and that “En l’état du droit international, les crimes dénoncés, quelle qu’en soit la gravité, ne relèvent pas des exceptions au principe de l’immunité de juridiction”: Crim., 13 January 2021, no. 20-80.511. Gravity alone creates no exception before national courts. The French position is therefore coherent and severe: maximum protection while in office, assessed on the day the coercive act is issued, regardless of recognition, and no gravity exception before domestic judges. For Mr. Maduro, seized after removal from power, the French precedents suggest the immunity motion faces its steepest climb on the “en exercice” requirement, even as the non-recognition argument that Washington favors is exactly the one Paris rejected (Ass. plén., 25 July 2025, no. 24-84.393).

II. What happens when the defendant was seized by military force abroad?

A. Why the Caracas raid matters as much as the immunity motion

The second half of the Maduro file is the capture itself. The indictment formed the basis for a military raid on Caracas and the seizure of a sitting president on 3 January 2026, followed by detention in a Brooklyn federal jail. Under classical doctrine, American courts apply the rule that the manner of the defendant’s arrival does not defeat jurisdiction once he stands before the court, the old Ker-Frisbie line that defense lawyers call male captus, bene detentus: badly captured, properly detained. International lawyers object that a forcible seizure on foreign soil violates the prohibition on the use of force and the sovereignty it protects, but in practice few domestic courts have dismissed cases on that ground alone. The defense motion, as reported, leads with immunity rather than capture, which is a telling tactical choice: immunity, if established, ends the case at the threshold, while capture arguments invite the judge into a political thicket about military operations the judiciary prefers to leave to the executive. Still, the capture argument will shadow the proceedings, because everything the court does rests on a seizure that no extradition judge ever reviewed.

The contrast with the ordinary extradition channel is instructive, and French law states the ordinary rule with unusual clarity. In the absence of a treaty providing otherwise, article 696 of the French Code of Criminal Procedure provides: “En l’absence de convention internationale en stipulant autrement, les conditions, la procédure et les effets de l’extradition sont déterminés par les dispositions du présent chapitre. Ces dispositions s’appliquent également aux points qui n’auraient pas été réglementés par les conventions internationales.” Extradition is a judicialized procedure with statutory conditions, statutory effects, and judicial review at every stage. And article 696-4 of the same Code lists the cases where France refuses surrender outright: “L’extradition n’est pas accordée : 1° Lorsque la personne réclamée a la nationalité française, cette dernière étant appréciée à l’époque de l’infraction pour laquelle l’extradition est requise ; 2° Lorsque le crime ou le délit à un caractère politique ou lorsqu’il résulte des circonstances que l’extradition est demandée dans un but politique ; 3° Lorsque les crimes ou délits ont été commis sur le territoire de la République ; 4° Lorsque les crimes ou délits, quoique commis hors du territoire de la République, y ont été poursuivis et jugés définitivement ; 5° Lorsque, d’après la loi de l’Etat requérant ou la loi française, la prescription de l’action s’est trouvée acquise antérieurement à la demande d’extradition, ou la prescription de la peine antérieurement à l’arrestation de la personne réclamée et d’une façon générale toutes les fois que l’action publique de l’Etat requérant est éteinte ; 6° Lorsque le fait à raison duquel l’extradition a été demandée est puni par la législation de l’Etat requérant d’une peine ou d’une mesure de sûreté contraire à l’ordre public français ; 7° Lorsque la personne réclamée serait jugée dans l’Etat requérant par un tribunal n’assurant pas les garanties fondamentales de procédure et de protection des droits de la défense ; 8° Lorsque le crime ou le délit constitue une infraction militaire prévue par le livre III du code de justice militaire.” Nationality, political offense, territoriality, double jeopardy, limitation, public policy, fair-trial guarantees, military offenses: eight locks on the extradition door. A forcible seizure opens none of them and answers none of them, which is precisely why states that can obtain surrender through a treaty ordinarily do so, and why the Caracas operation will remain the most debated feature of this case whatever the immunity ruling holds.

France also shows what review of a contested coercive act looks like once it reaches a judge. Cassation lies only for violation of law: article 591 of the Code of Criminal Procedure states that “Les arrêts de la chambre de l’instruction ainsi que les arrêts et jugements rendus en dernier ressort par les juridictions de jugement, lorsqu’ils sont revêtus des formes prescrites par la loi, ne peuvent être cassés que pour violation de la loi.” That was the very provision invoked in the 2025 Assemblée plénière case, where the ground of appeal alleged “violation de la coutume internationale relative à l’immunité personnelle des chefs d’État en exercice, ainsi que de l’article 591 du code de procédure pénale” (Ass. plén., 25 July 2025, no. 24-84.393). Customary international law on personal immunity thus enters French cassation review through the gateway of violation of law, and a judge who ignored a serving head of state’s immunity would commit exactly such a violation. The lesson for observers of the New York proceedings is symmetrical: everything depends on whether the judge treats customary immunity as law the court must apply on its own motion, as Paris requires, or as a political question owed deference to the executive, as Washington’s tradition suggests.

B. What defense teams do next, in New York and in Paris

Assume the calendar holds: immunity briefing through the autumn, a ruling from Judge Hellerstein, and trial on 1 June 2027 if the case survives. The defense sequence is classical. First, personal immunity at the threshold, argued on status at the time of the indictment and capture, with the non-recognition precedents on both sides briefed in full. Second, functional immunity for official acts, which survives loss of office and covers exactly the kind of governmental conduct a drug-trafficking indictment against a president must characterize as criminal enterprise. Third, the capture itself, raised not necessarily to win dismissal under American precedent but to contest detention conditions, evidentiary fruits, and the narrative of lawful process. Fourth, the merits, where the presumption of innocence applies in full and the reported denial, that Mr. Maduro “vehemently denies” the allegations, becomes the operative plea. Each layer is independent: losing on personal immunity does not concede functional immunity, and losing both does not concede the facts.

In France, the same file would travel a different road. French courts assert jurisdiction over offenses committed abroad where statute or treaty gives them competence: article 689 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides that “Les auteurs ou complices d’infractions commises hors du territoire de la République peuvent être poursuivis et jugés par les juridictions françaises soit lorsque, conformément aux dispositions du livre Ier du code pénal ou d’un autre texte législatif, la loi française est applicable, soit lorsqu’une convention internationale ou un acte pris en application du traité instituant les Communautés européennes donne compétence aux juridictions françaises pour connaître de l’infraction.” Victims can also force the issue through the civil-party complaint, since article 85 of the Code of Criminal Procedure opens with the words “Toute personne qui se prétend lésée par un crime ou un délit peut en portant plainte se constituer partie civile devant le juge d’instruction compétent”, subject to the admissibility conditions the text then details. But the 2020 ruling shows the limit of that route against a serving leader: where the complaint targets the head of state alone, the investigating judge may refuse any investigation because immunity must be applied first. And the 2025 ruling shows the remedy when a judge gets immunity wrong: cassation without remand and annulment of the coercive act itself, the warrant declared void. For families, executives, and officials watching from Paris, the practical message is double-edged. While in office, French law protects a foreign leader more absolutely than most realize, without exception for gravity and without regard for recognition. Once out of office, personal immunity falls away, functional immunity covers only genuinely official acts, and the ordinary machinery of extradition, with its eight statutory locks, resumes its work. Anyone advising a person exposed to foreign proceedings should therefore map three dates before everything else: the date of the alleged acts, the date of any warrant or indictment, and the date of any loss of official status, because immunity is assessed on the facts of the day the coercive act was issued.

The broader significance reaches beyond one defendant. If Judge Hellerstein engages seriously with customary immunity despite non-recognition, the ruling will become the first full American judicial treatment of personal immunity since the modern doctrine crystallized, and counsel in every capital will cite it. If he defers to the executive, the message will be that recognition politics decide immunity in American courts, a holding that would sit uneasily beside the French solution of July 2025 and widen the transatlantic gap on the law of immunities. Either way, the trial date of 1 June 2027 gives the law fourteen months to develop, and gives observers every reason to follow the immunity ruling expected in the coming months before reading anything about the merits. The wire services will report the outcome as victory or defeat; lawyers should read it as a jurisdictional map.

Conclusion

The Maduro motion asks an American judge to do what the French Cour de cassation did in July 2025: treat head-of-state immunity as a question of customary international law that the court resolves for itself, without asking the government whom it recognizes. Paris held that personal immunity belongs only to serving leaders, covers all their acts, must be examined by the judge without being asked, ignores non-recognition, and is assessed on the day the warrant issues. Those five propositions, each stated word for word in the Assemblée plénière decision, are the grid against which the New York briefing should be read. The Manhattan court may still distinguish the file on the ground that Mr. Maduro no longer holds office, and American deference to executive recognition may carry the day where French custom refused it. But the French ruling permanently changed one thing: no lawyer can now say that non-recognition defeats immunity as if the point were obvious. It was argued before the highest French court, examined paragraph by paragraph, and rejected. Whatever Judge Hellerstein decides, that rejection stands as the most considered judicial statement of the decade on the immunity of sitting heads of state, and it will frame every immunity battle that follows, in New York, in Paris, and wherever a fallen leader faces a foreign judge.

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