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Strasbourg Refuses to Bring Them Home: 25 French ISIS Detainees in Iraq After the ECHR Rule 39 Rejection

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Source: French Court of Cassation – Judilibre and Légifrance open data

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Strasbourg Refuses to Bring Them Home: 25 French ISIS Detainees in Iraq After the ECHR Rule 39 Rejection

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On 22 September 2026, the European Court of Human Rights, sitting as a Chamber, refused to tell France to bring home 25 French nationals held in a Baghdad prison. The men had asked Strasbourg to order their repatriation, or at least the enforcement of the French arrest and search warrants hanging over them, because they face trial before Iraqi courts where the death penalty is on the table. The Court said no: France has no jurisdiction over them within the meaning of Article 1 of the Convention, so the request falls outside Rule 39 altogether. For families who hoped Strasbourg would force Paris to act, the decision of 22 September 2026, announced in press release ECHR 231 (2026) of 23 September 2026, reads like a closed door. It is not. The ruling concerns only interim measures, decided without prejudging admissibility or the merits, and it leaves intact every French criminal lever that matters: prosecution in Paris for acts committed in Iraq and Syria, French arrest warrants, negotiated transfers, and the long French practice of demanding guarantees before anyone is exposed to execution. This article explains what the 25 applicants asked, why Strasbourg declined, and how France can still try its nationals at home and shield them from the death sentence.

I. Why did the European Court refuse to order France to bring the detainees home?

The starting point is the press release itself. The facts it recites are stark, and every line of the legal reasoning that follows flows from one finding: the applicants are in Iraqi hands, on Iraqi soil, answering to Iraqi judges.

A. What exactly did the 25 French detainees ask the Strasbourg Court on 17 September 2026?

The applicants are 25 French adults who left France to join the ranks of the so-called Islamic State. The Registry describes them as 25 French adults who left France to join the ranks of the so-called Islamic State. After the collapse of the caliphate they were detained in various detention centres in north-eastern Syria, then transferred between 2025 and 2026 to a prison in Baghdad, where Iraqi courts are now prosecuting them for offences within Iraqi jurisdiction. Around 50 French nationals are in the same position in Iraq, and Iraqi hearings have already begun: six French nationals stood trial in Baghdad in the week of 21 September 2026 facing possible death sentences, and the French press reported trials opening from Sunday 20 September 2026. The fear is not theoretical. In 2019, eleven French nationals were sentenced to death in Iraq for membership of the Islamic State, a precedent that still shapes every file.

On 17 September 2026, the 25 men lodged a request for interim measures under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. Their principal demand was striking in its ambition: repatriation to France, or enforcement of the French arrest and search warrants already issued against them. In other words, either France flies them home, or France activates its own criminal warrants against them from Paris. In the alternative, they asked the Court to direct France to take the steps needed to keep them alive and fairly tried, including seeking the necessary guarantees from the Iraqi authorities against a death sentence and for a fair trial. They relied on Article 2 of the Convention, which protects the right to life, Article 3, which prohibits torture and inhuman or degrading treatment, and Article 1 of Protocol No. 13, which abolishes the death penalty in all circumstances.

France, for its part, has refused repatriation, arguing that Iraq is a sovereign country whose courts are capable of prosecuting individuals for crimes committed on Iraqi territory. Paris simultaneously restates its principled opposition to the death penalty everywhere, while respecting Iraqi sovereignty over trials held in Baghdad. That tension, between an abolitionist diplomacy and a refusal to substitute French justice for Iraqi justice, is the political background of the whole case. The applicants tried to break it with procedure: Rule 39, the emergency lever of Strasbourg, which allows the Court to indicate to a State any interim measure it considers should be adopted in the interests of the parties or of the proper conduct of the proceedings, most often to stop an imminent expulsion, extradition or execution.

Rule 39 is granted only on an exceptional basis, and the Registry recalls in every press release that interim measures are decided in connection with proceedings before the Court, without prejudging any subsequent decisions on admissibility or the merits. Families should read that sentence twice. A refusal under Rule 39 is not a judgment that France has done nothing wrong. It is a finding that the emergency procedure is not the vehicle. The merits, including whether France owes any positive obligation toward nationals facing execution abroad, remain to be examined if the applications proceed.

B. Why does France have no jurisdiction over a Baghdad prison under Article 1 of the Convention?

The Court’s answer fits in one sentence: the request was rejected because it falls outside the scope of Rule 39, France having no jurisdiction over the applicants within the meaning of Article 1 of the Convention. Article 1 obliges each contracting party to secure Convention rights to everyone within its jurisdiction. Jurisdiction is primarily territorial. Outside national territory, the Court accepts only narrow exceptions: effective control over an area, authority and control by State agents over individuals, or specific procedural links the State itself created. None is present here. The 25 men are detained by Iraq, guarded by Iraq, and tried by Iraq. No French soldier holds the prison keys, no French agent exercises authority over their bodies, and France has taken no procedural step, such as an extradition request or a custody decision, that would create the kind of link the Grand Chamber identified in other settings.

The contrast with the Grand Chamber judgment in H.F. and Others v. France, delivered on 14 September 2022 on applications nos. 24384/19 and 44234/20, is instructive, and it explains why lawyers who remembered that ruling still lost this round. In H.F., grandparents complained about France’s refusal to repatriate their daughters and grandchildren held in Kurdish-run camps in north-eastern Syria. The Grand Chamber concluded, first, that France cannot be held responsible for the inhumane conditions in the camps, and second, that there is no general right to repatriation. It found only a procedural violation: France had failed to ensure proper safeguards in its repatriation decision-making, resulting in a procedural violation of the rights of the children to enter their own country. Three features made H.F. exceptional, and all three are absent in Baghdad. The H.F. beneficiaries were small children, French policy itself organised case-by-case examination of repatriation requests from Syria, creating a procedural link with France, and no sovereign State was exercising criminal jurisdiction over them through regular courts. In Iraq, the applicants are adults, France has no equivalent examination procedure for adults held by a foreign judiciary, and Iraqi courts are actively seized. Put simply, Syria’s camps presented a vacuum France partially filled with its own procedure; Iraq’s prisons present a functioning sovereign judiciary France has no title to override.

International commentary had already warned that H.F. was a narrow, fence-sitting ruling rather than a repatriation charter. Analysts summarised it as holding that France cannot be held responsible for camp conditions, that no general right to repatriation exists, and that only the absence of safeguards around decisions on children breached the Convention. Transposed to 25 adults in Iraqi custody, that reading leaves almost nothing to build on: no French decision to surround with safeguards, no entry-right of a child to invoke, no vacuum to fill. The Chamber’s refusal follows directly. It also signals how the Court will likely approach the merits. Jurisdiction under Article 1 will be the threshold battle, and on the facts recited in the press release, France starts it with the stronger hand. That is the bad news. The good news, for the defence, sits in an entirely different body of law: the French criminal code, which gives Paris full power to prosecute these men at home, and in doing so, to offer Iraq and the families an alternative to a Baghdad death row.

II. How can France still prosecute its nationals at home and shield them from execution?

Strasbourg having stepped back, the file returns to where it has always belonged: the French criminal courts, the investigating judges of the Paris judicial counter-terrorism unit, and the diplomatic channel between Paris and Baghdad. France does not need ECHR jurisdiction to act, because French criminal jurisdiction over its own nationals abroad is among the widest in Europe, and the Cour de cassation has spent the last three years widening it further.

A. Which French courts can try crimes committed in Syria and Iraq?

The foundation is the active personality principle. Article 113-6 of the Criminal Code provides: “La loi pénale française est applicable à tout crime commis par un Français hors du territoire de la République.” Any crime committed abroad by a French national falls under French criminal law, with no condition of dual criminality and no prior complaint. For terrorism, the net is cast wider still. Article 113-13 of the Criminal Code states: “La loi pénale française s’applique aux crimes et délits qualifiés d’actes de terrorisme et réprimés par le titre II du livre IV commis à l’étranger par un Français ou par une personne résidant habituellement sur le territoire français.” A French national who joined the Islamic State in Raqqa or Mosul is therefore triable in Paris for terrorist offences, whether or not Iraq prosecutes him, and whether or not he ever sets foot in France voluntarily.

The Cour de cassation has removed the last doubts around that provision. On 6 March 2024, in case no. 23-87.046, the Criminal Chamber held that Article 113-13 applies to a foreign national habitually resident in France with no requirement that residence predate the facts: “Ce texte ne distingue pas selon que la personne de nationalité étrangère a fixé sa résidence habituelle en France avant ou après la commission, à l’étranger, d’actes de terrorisme.” If even a foreigner who settled in France after the acts can be tried in Paris, a French citizen needs no discussion: nationality alone founds jurisdiction, for crimes absolutely, and for terrorist délits through Article 113-13. One practical caveat matters for lesser charges. Outside terrorism, Article 113-8 of the Criminal Code warns that for délits, “la poursuite des délits ne peut être exercée qu’à la requête du ministère public” and “doit être précédée d’une plainte de la victime ou de ses ayants droit ou d’une dénonciation officielle par l’autorité du pays où le fait a été commis.” Prosecutors anticipating an Iraqi trial therefore build their Paris file on crimes and on terrorist qualification, where no complaint is needed, rather than on ordinary délits that would require an official Iraqi denunciation.

The terrorist qualification itself is broad. Article 421-1 of the Criminal Code defines as terrorist the intentional attacks on life and physical integrity, kidnapping, hijacking and comparable offences, when committed in connection with an individual or collective enterprise aimed at seriously disturbing public order by intimidation or terror: “Constituent des actes de terrorisme, lorsqu’elles sont intentionnellement en relation avec une entreprise individuelle ou collective ayant pour but de troubler gravement l’ordre public par l’intimidation ou la terreur, les infractions suivantes : 1° Les atteintes volontaires à la vie, les atteintes volontaires à l’intégrité de la personne, l’enlèvement et la séquestration ainsi que le détournement d’aéronef, de navire ou de tout autre moyen de transport, définis par le livre II du présent code”. And Article 421-2-1 adds the workhorse charge of every French jihadist file: “Constitue également un acte de terrorisme le fait de participer à un groupement formé ou à une entente établie en vue de la préparation, caractérisée par un ou plusieurs faits matériels, d’un des actes de terrorisme mentionnés aux articles précédents.” Membership of the Islamic State, documented by travel, training, propaganda work or combat, fits that definition without requiring proof of a specific attack. This is the association de malfaiteurs terroriste charge on which French courts have convicted hundreds of returnees.

Two recent Assemblée plénière rulings complete the arsenal. On 25 July 2025, in case no. 24-84.071, the full Court approved the combined use of Articles 689 of the Code of Criminal Procedure with Articles 113-6 and 121-6 of the Criminal Code to try complicity abroad by a French national even where the principal is a foreigner acting abroad: the combined provisions allow French courts to hear “d’actes de complicité, commis à l’étranger, par une personne de nationalité française, même si l’infraction a été commise à l’étranger par un auteur principal étranger”, since under Article 121-6, “Sera puni comme auteur le complice de l’infraction” A Frenchman who financed, recruited for, or logistically supported foreign Islamic State operatives is therefore triable in Paris for complicity, whatever the nationality of the principal author. And Article 689 itself states the general gateway: “Les auteurs ou complices d’infractions commises hors du territoire de la République peuvent être poursuivis et jugés par les juridictions françaises soit lorsque, conformément aux dispositions du livre Ier du code pénal ou d’un autre texte législatif, la loi française est applicable, soit lorsqu’une convention internationale ou un acte pris en application du traité instituant les Communautés européennes donne compétence aux juridictions françaises pour connaître de l’infraction.”

Universal jurisdiction adds a second string for the gravest facts. Article 689-2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides: “Pour l’application de la convention contre la torture et autres peines ou traitements cruels, inhumains ou dégradants, adoptée à New York le 10 décembre 1984, peut être poursuivie et jugée dans les conditions prévues à l’article 689-1 toute personne coupable de tortures au sens de l’article 1er de la convention.” Article 689-11 extends the mechanism to genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes: it allows French courts to try any suspect of “1° Le crime de génocide défini au chapitre Ier du sous-titre Ier du titre Ier du livre II du code pénal ; 2° Les autres crimes contre l’humanité définis au chapitre II du même sous-titre Ier ; 3° Les crimes et les délits de guerre définis aux articles 461-1 à 461-31 du même code.” But the Assemblée plénière polices the boundaries. On 12 May 2023, in case no. 22-82.468, it held that universal jurisdiction for torture under Article 689-2 “est limité aux tortures imputées à un agent de la fonction publique ou une personne agissant à titre officiel ou à son instigation ou avec son consentement exprès ou tacite”, while accepting that an official-capacity perpetrator can include “une personne agissant pour le compte ou au nom d’une entité non gouvernementale, lorsque celle-ci occupe un territoire et exerce une autorité quasi gouvernementale sur ce territoire.” For Islamic State crimes committed while the group held territory and administered it, that extension matters: atrocities committed as part of a quasi-governmental apparatus can fall within French universal jurisdiction. The lesson for defence and prosecution alike is symmetrical. France has no shortage of jurisdictional titles to try the Baghdad 25 in Paris. What it lacks is their presence, and presence is a matter of warrants, diplomacy and transfers, not of Strasbourg orders.

B. What can families and lawyers do now: warrants, transfers and guarantees against the death penalty?

The applicants’ first demand, enforcement of French arrest and search warrants, misunderstands what a French warrant can do on Iraqi soil, but it points toward the right strategy. Article 131 of the Code of Criminal Procedure allows an investigating judge, on the prosecutor’s opinion, to issue an arrest warrant where the suspect has fled or lives abroad: “Si la personne est en fuite ou si elle réside hors du territoire de la République, le juge d’instruction, après avis du procureur de la République, peut décerner contre elle un mandat d’arrêt si le fait comporte une peine d’emprisonnement correctionnelle ou une peine plus grave.” Most of the Baghdad detainees are already under such warrants from the Paris counter-terrorism judges. But a French mandat d’arrêt has no executory force in Baghdad. France cannot send police to arrest on Iraqi territory; only Iraq can arrest, and Iraq is already detaining them for its own prosecutions. The warrant becomes useful in three scenarios: if Iraq agrees to surrender them, if they transit through a cooperative third State where an Interpol diffusion leads to provisional arrest, or if they are transferred to serve or stand trial and France needs a domestic title to detain them on arrival. Lawyers should therefore verify that every client is covered by a current, precisely qualified warrant, and that Interpol data reflects it, while understanding that the warrant alone moves no one.

Extradition from Iraq to France is theoretically available but politically narrow. Iraq asserts primary jurisdiction over crimes committed on its soil and has shown no appetite for surrendering Islamic State defendants to Europe. The mirror image is instructive: when France is the requested State, Article 696-15 of the Code of Criminal Procedure requires that a person who refuses surrender be brought before the chambre de l’instruction, since “Lorsque la personne réclamée a déclaré au procureur général ne pas consentir à son extradition, la chambre de l’instruction est saisie, sans délai, de la procédure”, and that chamber “donne son avis motivé sur la demande d’extradition.” France surrounds surrender with judicial guarantees. Iraq applies its own logic, and its logic currently favours Baghdad trials. The realistic paths are therefore repatriation by sovereign agreement, transfer to serve sentences, or assurances extracted before any French cooperation that exposes a detainee to execution.

Repatriation itself is the hardest lever because French law treats it as foreign policy, not as an appealable administrative decision. The Conseil d’État settled this for the Syrian files on 9 September 2020 in case no. 439520: the families challenged the President’s case-by-case repatriation policy for children in north-eastern Syria, the Paris administrative tribunal rejected the claim as “ne relevant manifestement pas de la compétence de la juridiction administrative”, the Paris administrative court of appeal confirmed, and the Conseil d’État refused admission, holding “Le pourvoi de Mmes D… et E… n’est pas admis.” The underlying reasoning, debated throughout the proceedings, was that the decision to examine repatriation case by case “n’était pas détachable des relations internationales de la France” No administrative judge in Paris can order the Élysée to fetch adults from Baghdad. Families must therefore work politically and diplomatically, through consular pressure, parliamentary channels and negotiated State-to-State returns, of the kind France has already operated from Syria for children and some mothers, rather than through administrative litigation.

Two further French tools frame the negotiation. First, deprivation of nationality under Article 25 of the Civil Code cannot be used pre-emptively to keep them out: “L’individu qui a acquis la qualité de Français peut, par décret pris après avis conforme du Conseil d’Etat, être déchu de la nationalité française, sauf si la déchéance a pour résultat de le rendre apatride”, and only upon conviction for terrorism or attacks on the fundamental interests of the Nation, including “un crime ou un délit constituant un acte de terrorisme” The men remain French, France remains answerable for them, and any déchéance debate comes after a conviction, not before a rescue. Second, France’s abolitionist commitment is absolute in its own legal order and a constant of its diplomacy: Paris opposes the death penalty in all places and all circumstances, and French cooperation practice conditions assistance, extradition and transfers on guarantees that execution will not be carried out. Applied to Baghdad, that means every French step, from sharing evidence with Iraqi prosecutors to accepting a transfer, should be tied to a written, verifiable assurance against death sentences and executions, with commutation of any capital sentence already pronounced. The 2019 precedent, when French nationals were death-sentenced in Iraq within weeks in expeditious trials, shows what happens when the assurance track lags behind the trial calendar.

The operational playbook for counsel is therefore clear. Keep the ECHR applications alive on the merits, since the Rule 39 refusal prejudges nothing and a future finding on positive obligations, however narrow after H.F., would reshape negotiations. Consolidate the Paris criminal file: current warrants, precise terrorist qualification, evidence preserved for a French trial so that Paris can credibly offer Iraq an alternative forum. Press for State-to-State transfer discussions, whether to stand trial in France or to serve in France sentences imposed in Iraq, always conditioned on no-execution guarantees. Mobilise consular assistance for fair-trial monitoring in Baghdad: access to counsel of choice, interpreters, time to prepare, and public observation of capital hearings. And prepare the French trial, because if any of the 25 reach France, Articles 113-6, 113-13 and 421-2-1 mean the Paris cour d’assises spéciale or the tribunal correctionnel will have a full file waiting, with sentences measured in decades rather than in a death chamber. Strasbourg closed the emergency door. Paris criminal law leaves the main entrance wide open.

Conclusion

The Chamber’s refusal of 22 September 2026 is a decision about judicial geography, not about guilt, innocence, or the value of 25 French lives. France has no jurisdiction in Baghdad within the meaning of Article 1, so Rule 39 could not compel repatriation or the execution of French warrants from Strasbourg. But the same France that cannot be ordered to fetch its nationals is fully entitled to try them: crimes by French nationals abroad, terrorist offences wherever committed by French nationals or habitual residents, complicity with foreign principals, and, within the limits set by the Assemblée plénière, torture and war crimes under universal jurisdiction. The Conseil d’État will not order the executive to repatriate, nationality cannot be stripped before conviction, and Iraqi courts will not easily surrender defendants they claim as their own. Everything therefore depends on the work lawyers and diplomats do now: keeping the Strasbourg merits alive, maintaining flawless French warrants and files, negotiating transfers and written guarantees against execution, and monitoring Baghdad trials for the fair-trial standards France demands. The emergency order failed. The criminal and diplomatic strategy remains entirely available, and for men facing Iraqi death sentences, it is the only one that can still save them.

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