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EU Traded Two Oligarchs for a French Prisoner in Baku: What the Usmanov-Fridman Delisting Changes for Frozen Assets in France

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EU Traded Two Oligarchs for a French Prisoner in Baku: What the Usmanov-Fridman Delisting Changes for Frozen Assets in France

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On 22 September 2026, the European Union did something it had never done before: it removed two of Russia’s wealthiest oligarchs, Alisher Usmanov and Mikhail Fridman, from its sanctions blacklist without either man having condemned the war in Ukraine, and it did so because France asked for it. Paris invoked national security and refused to explain further. The next morning, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev pardoned Martin Ryan, a French national serving a ten-year espionage sentence in Baku. The sequence — a delisting in Brussels on Tuesday, a pardon in Baku on Wednesday — turned an open secret of EU diplomacy into the first documented prisoner-for-sanctions deal in the history of the Union’s Russia regime. Kyiv reacted with fury, Latvia blocked the compromise for a day before abstaining, and Ukraine’s president publicly promised to bring the same two names back to Europe. For anyone with frozen accounts, Paris property or corporate interests caught in the EU sanctions net, the episode rewrites the playbook: listings that looked permanent can now be traded at renewal time, delistings can arrive overnight by political bargain rather than court judgment, and relisting is already on the table. This analysis reconstructs the deal from the official record and explains, from a Paris practice perspective, what a delisting mechanically changes inside France and how listed persons and their counterparties should position themselves before the next round.

I. How France Forced the EU to Trade Two Oligarchs for a Prisoner in Baku

A. Why Did the EU Remove Usmanov and Fridman From the Russia Sanctions List

The legal setting matters because it explains France’s leverage. EU individual sanctions on Russia live in two paired instruments: a Common Foreign and Security Policy decision that must be renewed by unanimity, and the implementing asset-freeze regulation, Regulation (EU) No 269/2014, adopted under Article 215 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union following the Council Decision 2014/145/CFSP taken under Article 29 of the Treaty on European Union. Every six months, each of the twenty-seven Member States held a veto over the survival of the entire list, then covering more than 2,600 individuals and entities. When France demanded Usmanov’s removal in mid-September on undisclosed national-security grounds, no renewal was possible without satisfying Paris, and the Council had to push the expiry deadline back by a week, to 22 September, to keep negotiating. That is the structural reason a single Member State protecting two nationals jailed abroad could hold a whole sanctions regime hostage: unanimity turns every name on the list into a potential bargaining chip at every rollover.

The compromise sealed by ambassadors on 22 September, and reported the same day by Euronews and France 24, had three moving parts. First, Usmanov and Fridman were removed, lifting the asset freeze and the travel ban against them. Second, to price that concession, the renewal period was stretched from six months to an unprecedented thirty-six, shielding the regime from fresh hostage-taking until 2029. Third, Latvia, which had blocked the deal on Monday as the wrong signal to Moscow, relented on Tuesday through a constructive abstention, the mechanism that lets a Member State stand aside without breaking unanimity. Slovakia had separately vetoed Fridman’s continued listing, and Luxembourg argued that removing Usmanov while keeping Fridman would be incoherent, all the more since Fridman has filed a reported 16-billion-dollar claim against Luxembourg over his frozen assets. The sanctions press confirmed the delistings and the three-year renewal the same evening, with formal adoption to follow by written procedure.

The political cost was immediate. Ukraine’s president, meeting his American counterpart in New York, denounced the move as the fruit of Russian efforts to fracture Western unity, thanked Latvia for its resistance, and warned that he would return to Europe with the same two surnames, a plain announcement that Kyiv will lobby for relisting. That reaction matters for practitioners because it confirms the central legal feature of the outcome: a Council delisting is a political act, not an acquittal. It settles nothing about the underlying allegations, creates no res judicata before the EU courts, and can be reversed at any future renewal by the same unanimous procedure that produced it. Usmanov, aged seventy-three with an estimated 16.6-billion-dollar fortune built on metals and telecoms, had challenged his listing before the General Court, which ruled on his action, Case T-237/22, on 7 February 2024, yet he remained listed until diplomacy, not judgment, recovered his assets. Fridman’s trajectory is even more instructive: in April 2024 the General Court annulled his 2022–2023 listings for defective reasoning, in Cases T-301/22 and T-304/22 concerning Petr Aven and Mikhail Fridman, the Council relisted him on fresh grounds, and only the September 2026 bargain finally lifted the freeze. Court victories pause a listing; Council politics end it, and Council politics can restart it.

B. Who Is Martin Ryan, the Frenchman Pardoned in Baku the Next Day

The quid pro quo surfaced within twenty-four hours. On 23 September, Reuters reported from Baku that President Aliyev had pardoned Martin Ryan, the French national arrested in December 2023, convicted of espionage in March 2026 and serving a ten-year sentence for gathering information on Azerbaijan’s military cooperation with Turkey and Pakistan. Ryan, who had worked in Azerbaijan for a food-import company with a consultancy arm, always contested the charges, as did Paris. He was pardoned alongside fourteen Azerbaijani citizens, two Turkish nationals, a dual Russian-Israeli citizen and a Pakistani citizen, and it was initially unclear whether he had physically left prison. Three European diplomats told Reuters that Paris had privately indicated Baku was using the Usmanov file to exert pressure over two French citizens held in Azerbaijan, while an Azerbaijani diplomat dismissed talk of a pressure campaign as categorically unfounded, insisting Baku viewed the Usmanov measures as unjust on the merits.

The second Frenchman is the reason this file is not closed. Euronews identified him as Anass Derraz, an executive of the French water-management group Saur, sentenced in 2025 to twelve years for a corruption case reaching back to a 2018 payment connected with efforts to release an impounded yacht. He was not on the pardon list. His continued detention explains why Paris invested so much capital that, in the words of one diplomat quoted after the vote, no Member State believed France would ever drop the Usmanov demand: France paid for one release and still has a second national behind bars. The French foreign ministry has warned since September 2024 against travel to Azerbaijan, citing the risk of arrest, arbitrary detention and unfair trial, and stating that respect for fundamental rights is not guaranteed in case of arrest or detention. It updated that advisory again in April 2026 after Ryan’s sentencing. For families and employers, the lesson is stark: consular visits and public statements did not move this file for three years, while a sanctions concession at a unanimous EU vote moved it in a day, which tells you exactly where the leverage sits when a State detains foreigners as diplomatic currency.

II. Delisted in Brussels, Unfrozen in Paris: What the Decision Changes Under French Law

A. What Happens to Frozen Bank Accounts and Property in France After a Delisting

An EU listing bites in France without any French transposition, because regulations are directly applicable, but the daily enforcement runs through French channels that every holder of frozen assets needs to understand. The economy minister may order, for six months renewable, the freezing of funds and economic resources belonging to, held or controlled by persons designated under resolutions adopted within the framework of Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter or acts taken pursuant to Article 29 of the Treaty on European Union or Article 75 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, or persons designated on the basis of those resolutions or acts. In practice the Treasury’s financial-crime unit notifies the banks, insurers, notaries and company registers, and every individual on national territory and every institution holding funds is bound to apply the freeze measures and the prohibitions on making available or using assets without delay and to inform the economy minister immediately. The definitions are deliberately total: freezing of funds means any action aimed at preventing any change in their volume, amount, location, ownership, possession, nature or destination, including portfolio management, and freezing of economic resources means any action aimed at preventing their use to obtain funds, goods or services in any way, including sale, rental or mortgaging. Accounts are blocked, dividends are trapped, sales are voidable, and making funds or economic resources available, directly or indirectly, to a designated person is prohibited. That is the cage Usmanov and Fridman have lived in since 2022 for every euro, flat and share sitting in the Union, including France.

A Council delisting dissolves that cage by operation of law: once the name leaves the annex of the regulation, the prohibitions lose their object and the French freeze orders built on the designation fall with it. Banks then face the mirror-image compliance question, releasing funds only after verifying that the specific legal basis has indeed lapsed for that exact person and that no overlapping national freeze subsists. France keeps autonomous domestic freezing powers that survive any Brussels delisting: the economy and interior ministers may jointly order, for six months renewable, the freezing of funds and resources linked to terrorism, and, since the recent foreign-interference legislation, the same two ministers may jointly freeze, for six months renewable and for the sole purpose of preventing interference acts, funds belonging to persons who commit, attempt, facilitate or finance such acts. Neither track is alleged against the two delisted men today, but the architecture matters: a Brussels delisting clears the EU layer, while Paris retains a national layer it can activate on its own evidentiary basis. Any released oligarch moving money through France in the coming months will therefore seek written comfort from the Treasury that no national measure targets him, because banks, bound by the immediate-information duty, will otherwise freeze first and ask questions later.

The Cour de cassation has already shown how literally French courts take the freeze while it lasts. In a 7 September 2022 ruling on Libyan frozen assets, the First Civil Chamber held, in a decision published in the Bulletin under appeal No. 19-25.108, that “Il en résulte que ne peut être diligentée, sur des fonds ou des ressources économiques gelés, aucune mesure d’exécution qui aurait pour effet, non seulement de les faire sortir du patrimoine du débiteur, mais aussi de conférer au créancier poursuivant un simple droit de préférence, sans une autorisation préalable du directeur du Trésor, autorité nationale désignée en application de l’article 11 § 2 du règlement n° 2016/44” Even a conservatory seizure with no transfer of ownership required the Treasury director’s prior authorisation, the Court reasoning that only that reading could preserve the effectiveness of restrictive measures. The ruling, which followed a preliminary reference to the Court of Justice answered on 11 November 2021 in Case C-340/20 and an Assemblée plénière referral of 10 July 2020 in appeals No. 18-18.542 and 18-21.814, is the authority creditors’ counsel in Paris still cite when a debtor’s accounts turn out to be frozen: sue if you must, but expect the enforcement judge to stop you at the Treasury’s door. Read in reverse, it measures exactly what the 22 September delistings restored to Usmanov and Fridman in France: the full disposal of their property, the capacity to sell, to collect income and to move funds, without prior administrative leave, for as long as no new listing replaces the old one.

B. How Do You Challenge an EU Listing or Prepare for the Next Relisting From Paris

The September deal teaches listed persons two parallel tracks, and Paris is the right place to run both. The judicial track is the annulment action before the General Court under Articles 263 and 275 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, the second provision preserving the Court’s jurisdiction over the legality of restrictive measures against natural and legal persons even inside the Common Foreign and Security Policy. Fridman’s 2024 partial victory proves the track can work: the Court annulled his early listings because the Council’s statement of reasons did not support them, forcing Brussels to rebuild the file before relisting. Usmanov’s 2024 judgment proves its limits: losing, or winning only the early period, leaves the current listing intact until the Council itself moves. The practical consequence is procedural discipline. A listed person with French assets should file for annulment within the two-month window of each renewed listing, attack the statement of reasons listing by listing and period by period, and simultaneously file for interim relief and for authorisation to use frozen funds for legal fees and essential needs, because the freeze does not pause for litigation and counsel must be paid through a Treasury licence. Each six-month rollover used to reset the clock; the new thirty-six-month cycle makes the first challenge after 2026 the decisive one, since a missed window now locks the file for three years.

The diplomatic track is the lesson of Baku, and it belongs in a lawyer’s advice even though no lawyer signs the deal. Listings are political acts adopted by unanimous vote, so a delisting campaign is partly a litigation file and partly a coalition-building exercise aimed at the Member State with the strongest reason to spend capital. Uzbekistan and the Organisation of Turkic States lobbied EU institutions and capitals for two years on Usmanov’s behalf; France supplied the decisive leverage only when it needed Baku to release its nationals. Anyone advising a designated person should therefore map, alongside the legal defects of the listing, the political economy of the next renewal: which Member State might need something, which presidency chairs the talks, and what unanimity rule turns a bilateral consular file into Union-wide currency. The mirror risk runs the same way. Zelenskyy’s pledge to bring the two names back means relisting files are probably already being drafted in Kyiv and allied capitals, and the Council can adopt them by the same procedure at any time. Funds released today and reinvested in the Union tomorrow can be frozen again the day after, with banks re-notified overnight under the same French machinery. Prudent counsel after a delisting therefore means three immediate steps: documented unfreezing with each French institution holding assets, repatriation or restructuring of the most exposed holdings before any relisting, and preservation of the full annulment arsenal, because the next listing will cite the same criteria of support for policies undermining Ukraine and will have learned from the reasoning defects the General Court sanctioned in 2024.

One French mirror deserves a final word for the families watching Baku. Had Ryan’s alleged conduct targeted France rather than Azerbaijan, French criminal law would have classified it under the treason and espionage chapter of the Penal Code: acts defined in Articles 411-2 to 411-11 constitute treason when committed by a French national or a serviceman in the service of France, and espionage when committed by any other person, and delivering to a foreign power, company or organisation, or their agents, any intelligence, process, object, document, computerised data or file whose exploitation, disclosure or combination is liable to harm the fundamental interests of the Nation carries fifteen years of criminal detention and a 225,000-euro fine. The symmetry is deliberate and worth stating plainly to any executive posted abroad: every State on earth punishes the same conduct with the same severity, and a posting in a high-risk jurisdiction combines that exposure with a consular-protection system that, as the Ryan file shows, can take three years to produce results by ordinary means. Employers sending staff to States under travel advisory should treat the advisory as an operational instruction, not a formality: register nationals with the consulate, audit what information they can access, secure specialised counsel at the first summons rather than the first conviction, and understand that when ordinary protection fails, the exit may eventually depend on bargains struck far above the detainee’s head, in rooms where their name is one line among 2,600. For background on how prisoner releases reshape the sanctions picture on the American side of the same trend, see our analysis of the September 2026 United States–Belarus sanctions-for-prisoners bargain and its consequences for assets frozen in France.

Conclusion

The 22 September compromise will be remembered as the day EU sanctions learned to haggle. France obtained the release of one jailed national and kept working for the second; Azerbaijan obtained the rehabilitation of a favoured billionaire; Usmanov and Fridman recovered the full disposal of Union-based wealth; Latvia obtained a thirty-six-month shield against the next circus; and Ukraine obtained the certainty that its hardest lobbying will henceforth be defensive. Legally, nothing about the listing criteria changed, and that is precisely the point practitioners must internalise. The same unanimity that froze 2,600 names can unfreeze any of them when a Member State’s national security demands it, and the same unanimity can freeze them again when the political wind turns. For holders of frozen assets in France, the operational conclusions fit on one page: keep an annulment action alive against every listing, because only the General Court can convert a political freeze into a legal defeat; calendar the new three-year renewal as the single moment when everything can change at once; document every unfreezing with the Treasury and the banks, because the national freeze layer survives Brussels delistings; and treat relisting as the default hypothesis, since Kyiv has announced it. The Ryan pardon closes a family’s three-year ordeal and leaves the Derraz family waiting, a reminder that behind the sanctions arithmetic of billions and vetoes stand individual detainees whose freedom now openly depends on the price of a name on a list. That transparency is uncomfortable, and it is also useful: it tells every future detainee’s lawyer exactly which room, which vote and which deadline will decide the case.

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