On 15 September 2026, the Bank of Russia filed a second direct action before the General Court of the European Union in Luxembourg, this time aimed at the most aggressive defensive weapon the European Union has ever built against Russian litigation. According to its press release of 17 September 2026, the Bank of Russia filed that claim on 15 September 2026 against Article 1(28) of Council Regulation No. 2026/1848 of 23 July 2026. The target is a mechanism that allows the courts of EU Member States to order Russian litigants not to enforce Russian court judgments anywhere in the world, on pain of financial penalties. Behind the case sits the largest asset freeze in modern history, around 300 billion dollars of Russian sovereign funds immobilised in the West, most of it at the Belgian depository Euroclear, and a Moscow court judgment in which the Russian central bank claims roughly 230 billion dollars in damages from that same depository. Moscow describes the European text as a mechanism letting EU Member State courts prohibit Russian persons from seeking recognition and enforcement of certain Russian court orders in “any jurisdiction”. For readers in France, the dispute is far from abstract. French banks, insurers and asset managers apply the freeze every day on French territory, French judges decide whether foreign judgments can be enforced in France, and the French Court of Cassation has built, case after case, one of the most detailed bodies of law in Europe on the immunity from execution of foreign central banks. This analysis reconstructs the September 2026 filing from verified primary sources, explains exactly how the European anti-enforcement injunction works, and assesses the Moscow challenge through the lens of French immunity and enforcement law.
I. Bank of Russia v Euroclear: how a Moscow judgment for 230 billion dollars collided with the 21st EU sanctions package
A. What the Moscow Arbitration Court decided in case A40-345157/2025 and where enforcement stands
The story begins with the freeze itself. After the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Western states immobilised approximately 300 billion dollars of Russian sovereign funds, with most of those assets held in Europe at the Belgian central securities depository Euroclear. In December 2025, the European Union moved to freeze those assets indefinitely, and the Bank of Russia reacted on two fronts at once. In Moscow, it sued Euroclear before the Arbitration Court of the City of Moscow, seeking about 230 billion dollars in damages in response to the indefinite freeze and to proposals to confiscate the assets to fund Ukraine. In Luxembourg, it lodged a first application before the General Court in March 2026, arguing that the indefinite freeze had been adopted by majority vote rather than unanimously, as EU law allegedly required, with what it called serious procedural violations. That first case is still working its way through the Luxembourg docket, and it already frames the September filing: Moscow believes the freeze is unlawful, and it intends to prove it in every forum available.
The September 2026 action is narrower, more tactical and arguably more dangerous for Brussels. The Bank of Russia is not asking the General Court to unfreeze a single euro. It is attacking the legal shield the Union built around the freeze during the summer of 2026. The press release is explicit about the battlefield: Moscow presents the European text as a direct attempt to intervene in pending Belgian proceedings and block enforcement of the order of the Arbitration Court of the City of Moscow in case A40-345157/2025, brought by the Bank of Russia against Euroclear. In other words, Moscow has won, or expects to win, a colossal domestic judgment against Euroclear, and it has opened enforcement proceedings in Belgium, where Euroclear holds the immobilised securities. The European Union answered with a regulation designed to kill that enforcement before it starts, and the central bank now asks the Union courts to annul the answer.
Three features of the Moscow track matter for anyone holding frozen assets or advising on them from Paris. First, the judgment is Russian and domestic: it was rendered by the Arbitration Court of the City of Moscow, the commercial court of first instance for major economic disputes, in a case brought by the Russian central bank itself. Second, the enforcement target sits inside the European Union: Euroclear Bank in Brussels holds the bulk of the immobilised Russian reserves, which is why the Bank of Russia opened proceedings in Belgium rather than attempting enforcement in a third country. Third, the amounts at stake dwarf every previous sovereign-asset dispute litigated in Europe, including the Argentine and Congolese saga that shaped French immunity law over the last two decades. A 230-billion-dollar enforcement file changes the scale of every legal question it touches, from sovereign immunity to the extraterritorial reach of European regulations.
B. Why Regulation 2026/1848 lets EU courts ban enforcement of the Moscow judgment in any jurisdiction
On 23 July 2026, the Council of the European Union adopted its 21st package of sanctions against Russia, amending Council Regulation (EU) No 833/2014 through Council Regulation (EU) 2026/1848. Buried in that package is the provision Moscow is now challenging: Article 1(28), which rewrites the Union’s defences against Russian court decisions obtained in disputes affected by sanctions. The official recitals explain the diagnosis in unusually blunt terms. Russian legislation and court practice, the Council writes, enable claimants to seize certain Russian courts, which then assert jurisdiction over disputes and render judgments condemning Union companies in connection with contracts or transactions affected by Union restrictive measures. To preserve the effectiveness of its restrictive measures, the Council says the Union must act to mitigate such practices. The remedy has two limbs, and both are sweeping.
The first limb is a rule of non-recognition. The new Article 11c provides, in substance, that no injunction, order, judgment or other court or administrative decision derived from Article 248.1 or 248.2 of the Russian Arbitration Procedure Code, or from equivalent Russian legislation, holding a protected Union person liable in connection with a sanctions-affected contract or transaction, may be recognised, given effect or enforced in any Member State. Articles 248.1 and 248.2 of the Russian Arbitration Procedure Code are the provisions that allow Russian commercial courts to hear disputes despite foreign jurisdiction or arbitration clauses and to issue anti-suit injunctions against parties pursuing parallel proceedings abroad. The Union’s response is therefore symmetrical: Russian judgments obtained through those provisions, or through any equivalent mechanism, are dead on arrival in every Member State, including France. No exequatur, no enforcement, no legal effect.
The second limb is the true innovation, and the direct target of the September 2026 action. The new Article 11ca entitles a protected Union person sued in Russia to obtain, from the courts of a Member State, an order commanding the Russian claimant not to seek to enforce, recognise or rely upon, in “any jurisdiction”, any injunction, judgment or other court decision obtained or obtainable in those Russian proceedings. The words “in any jurisdiction” are the heart of the dispute: a judge in Paris, Brussels or Frankfurt can forbid the Bank of Russia from pursuing enforcement not only in Europe but in any court in the world, including courts outside the Union. Disobedience is priced explicitly: breach of such an order triggers court-imposed “financial penalties” proportionate to the potential loss of the protected Union person. The penalty is payable to the protected person that requested the order, which turns every European enforcement judge into a potential worldwide gatekeeper of the Moscow judgment against Euroclear.
II. Can the Bank of Russia win in Luxembourg, and what does the fight mean for frozen assets in France
A. Sovereign immunity, access to justice and extraterritoriality: the three battlefields before the General Court
The Bank of Russia advances three clusters of arguments, and each of them has a precise echo in French law. The first is sovereign immunity. Moscow argues the measures contradict access to justice, legal certainty and the sovereign immunity of states and their central banks. The immunity claim is structurally strong because central-bank reserves enjoy a special protection in almost every Western legal system, and France is no exception. French statute provides: “Ne peuvent être saisis les biens de toute nature, notamment les avoirs de réserves de change, que les banques centrales ou les autorités monétaires étrangères détiennent ou gèrent pour leur compte ou celui de l’Etat ou des Etats étrangers dont elles relèvent.” That is Article L153-1 of the French Monetary and Financial Code, foreign central-bank reserves unseizable in France. The French Court of Cassation has given that text a broad and principled reading. In its landmark ruling of 12 May 2021, Commisimpex, the First Civil Chamber held that this unseizability “est instituée, en raison de la nature des biens concernés, afin de garantir le fonctionnement de ces banques et autorités monétaires, indépendamment de l’immunité d’exécution reconnue aux Etats étrangers” as recorded in Court of Cassation, First Civil Chamber, 12 May 2021, no. 19-13.853, central-bank foreign reserves unseizable. In plain terms, Paris protects foreign central-bank reserves by their nature, independently of state immunity itself.
The general French law of immunity from execution points in the same direction and sets a high bar for any creditor. The Court of Cassation applies customary international law as reflected in the 2004 United Nations Convention on the Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Property, holding: “Selon le droit international coutumier, tel que reflété par l’article 19 de la Convention des Nations Unies du 2 décembre 2004 sur l’immunité juridictionnelle des Etats et de leurs biens, à défaut de renonciation à l’immunité d’exécution, ou d’affectation des biens saisis à la satisfaction de la demande, les biens d’un Etat étranger ou de ses émanations ne peuvent faire l’objet d’une mesure d’exécution forcée,” except over assets specifically used for non-public commercial purposes, as stated in Court of Cassation, First Civil Chamber, 3 November 2021, no. 19-25.404, Rasheed Bank immunity from execution. The French legislature has codified the same three gateways: “Des mesures conservatoires ou des mesures d’exécution forcée visant un bien appartenant à un Etat étranger ne peuvent être autorisées par le juge que si l’une des conditions suivantes est remplie : 1° L’Etat concerné a expressément consenti à l’application d’une telle mesure ; 2° L’Etat concerné a réservé ou affecté ce bien à la satisfaction de la demande qui fait l’objet de la procédure” under Articles L111-1-2 and following of the French Code of Civil Enforcement Proceedings, state immunity from execution. And an express waiver goes far: “Selon les principes du droit international coutumier reflétés par la Convention des Nations Unies du 2 décembre 2004 sur les immunités des Etats et de leurs biens, la renonciation expresse à l’immunité d’exécution suffit pour que les biens d’un Etat, quels qu’ils soient, puissent faire l’objet d’une mesure d’exécution, sans que soit en outre requise une renonciation spéciale” in Court of Cassation, First Civil Chamber, 13 March 2024, no. 21-17.599, express waiver of immunity from execution, confirmed by the earlier annulment ruling in Court of Cassation, First Civil Chamber, 10 January 2018, no. 16-22.494, waiver requirements under the Sapin II law. The paradox Moscow faces is that this protective law was written for creditors seizing state assets, whereas here the state, through its central bank, is the claimant trying to seize, and the Union is the party blocking. Immunity shields reserves from seizure; it does not obviously grant a central bank a right to enforce a domestic judgment abroad.
The second battlefield is access to justice, and here the Bank of Russia’s rhetoric is at its strongest but its prospects are uncertain. The press release denounces disproportionate restrictions on the defence of its rights outside the EU, including financial penalties for breaching related injunctions. The argument, translated into Union law, is a plea of ineffective judicial protection: a litigant with a final domestic judgment is forbidden, worldwide and under financial threat, from asking any judge anywhere to enforce it. The General Court will weigh that plea against the Union’s stated legitimate aim, preserving the effectiveness of restrictive measures, and against its own traditionally deferential review of sanctions adopted for foreign-policy purposes. Recent history counsels caution for challengers. On 2 September 2026, just thirteen days before the Bank of Russia’s filing, the Tenth Chamber dismissed the second sanctions challenge of Russian businessman Igor Kesaev: “Le recours est rejeté,” with Kesaev ordered to bear the costs of the proceedings, in a judgment delivered in open court in Luxembourg on 2 September 2026 in case T-296/24. That ruling, following an earlier dismissal in September 2024, confirms that the Luxembourg judges currently sustain the Council’s broad listing logic, including designations based on operating in economic sectors that provide a substantial source of revenue to the Russian state. A central bank is not a businessman, and an annulment action against a regulation is not a delisting request, but the institutional mood in Luxembourg is unmistakably hostile to Russian claimants.
The third battlefield is extraterritoriality, and it may be the most interesting for French lawyers. Moscow calls the worldwide litigation ban extraterritorial and unlawful. A Paris judge ordering a Russian public entity not to seek enforcement in, say, a Gulf or Asian court does look like the mirror image of the Russian anti-suit injunctions the regulation claims to fight. French private international law is firmly territorial on enforcement: “Les jugements rendus par les tribunaux étrangers et les actes reçus par les officiers étrangers sont exécutoires sur le territoire de la République de la manière et dans les cas prévus par la loi” under Article 509 of the French Code of Civil Procedure, enforcement of foreign judgments in France. France knows how to give, or refuse, effect to foreign judgments on its own territory; it has never claimed the power to dictate what a foreign judge does on theirs. The Union will answer that Article 11ca does not order foreign courts around but orders persons within its jurisdiction to abstain, a classic technique of anti-suit injunctions familiar in common-law systems. Whether the General Court accepts that characterisation, or sees instead an unlawful worldwide gag on a foreign sovereign litigant, will decide the case. Procedural discipline will also matter enormously: Union annulment actions obey a guillotine rule, since Article 263 TFEU requires the action within two months of publication of the contested act, its notification to the claimant or, failing that, the day the claimant learned of it. The Bank of Russia filed on 15 September against a regulation of 23 July, which suggests careful calendar work, and any bank, company or listed person contemplating its own Luxembourg challenge should treat that two-month clock as the single most dangerous date in the file.
B. Frozen Russian assets in France: what banks, companies and listed persons must do now
Whatever the outcome in Luxembourg, the freeze applies in France today, and French operators have no margin for improvisation. The domestic machinery is direct and personal. The Minister of the Economy can order, for six months renewable, the freezing of funds and economic resources belonging to, owned, held or controlled by persons designated under United Nations or European Union acts, since the statute covers assets “Qui appartiennent à, sont possédés, détenus ou contrôlés par des personnes physiques ou morales, ou toute autre entité qui commettent, tentent de commettre, facilitent ou financent des actions sanctionnées ou prohibées par les résolutions adoptées dans le cadre du chapitre VII de la charte des Nations unies ou les actes pris en application de l’article 29 du traité sur l’Union européenne ou de l’article 75 du traité sur le fonctionnement de l’Union européenne, y participent ou qui sont désignées sur le fondement de ces résolutions ou ces actes” under Article L562-3 of the French Monetary and Financial Code, ministerial asset freezes giving effect to EU designations, alongside the terrorism freeze in Article L562-2 of the French Monetary and Financial Code, six-month renewable terrorism asset freezes. And the obligation falls on everyone: “Sont tenus d’appliquer sans délai les mesures de gel et les interdictions de mise à disposition ou d’utilisation prévues au présent chapitre” with immediate notice to the minister, a duty that reaches French nationals and residents on national territory, regulated financial institutions, and French companies for their activities abroad, including branches and free provision of services, under Article L562-4 of the French Monetary and Financial Code, immediate application of freezes by banks and companies. A Paris bank that releases frozen Russian funds, or makes funds available to a listed person without authorisation, exposes itself to criminal and administrative liability; a Paris company that pays a listed counterparty through a foreign branch is caught by the same net.
For listed persons and their counsel in France, the practical roadmap has four stations. First, verify the exact scope of the designation and the applicable regulation, because the 21st package added layers, including the Article 11c and 11ca defences, on top of the asset freezes in Regulation 269/2014 and the sectoral restrictions in Regulation 833/2014. Second, use the authorisation channels for basic needs, legal fees and ordinary business where the texts allow them, documenting every request, because unauthorised dealings compound the file. Third, calendar the Luxembourg remedies immediately: delisting and annulment actions go to the General Court under Article 263 TFEU within two months, and the Kesaev sequence shows both how strictly the Court polices those time limits and how demanding the substantive review remains even after two attempts. Fourth, assume that no Russian judgment connected with sanctions-affected transactions can be recognised or enforced in France for as long as Article 11c stands, and that any attempt to enforce the Moscow Euroclear judgment through French courts would meet both the European non-recognition rule and the French exequatur filter of Article 509. French judges do not enforce foreign decisions automatically; they verify jurisdiction, regularity and compatibility with French international public policy, and a judgment that European law declares unenforceable will not survive that examination.
Two forward scenarios should concentrate minds in Paris. If the Bank of Russia wins, even partially, the worldwide anti-enforcement injunction falls or narrows, and Euroclear faces a live Belgian enforcement file for hundreds of billions, with immediate aftershocks for every custodian, clearer and paying agent in France holding immobilised Russian-linked securities. If Moscow loses, the Union’s shield becomes settled case law, Russian judgments in sanctions disputes become unenforceable paper across the entire Union, and the only remaining exits for affected persons are political, delisting, licensing, or negotiated settlement, not judicial enforcement. Either way, the Paris Bar will be on the front line: French banks need compliance opinions that withstand regulator scrutiny, listed persons need delisting strategies filed on time in Luxembourg, and counterparties of Russian entities need contract clauses that anticipate the next package. The September 2026 filing proves that Moscow litigates this war as seriously as Brussels legislates it, and the next move belongs to the judges.
Conclusion
The Bank of Russia’s action of 15 September 2026 is the most direct legal attack yet mounted against the European Union’s sanctions enforcement architecture. It does not contest a single designation or a single frozen account. It contests the Union’s right to forbid, worldwide and under financial penalty, the enforcement of a 230-billion-dollar Moscow judgment against the depository that holds the frozen reserves. The three questions before the General Court, sovereign immunity of central banks, effective access to justice, and the extraterritorial reach of a “in any jurisdiction” injunction, go to the foundations of international economic law, and the answers will bind every Member State court, including the courts of Paris. French law arrives at this rendezvous unusually well armed: an absolute statutory shield for foreign central-bank reserves, a codified immunity-from-execution regime interpreted by a demanding Court of Cassation, a territorial exequatur system, and a daily freeze practice run by French banks under ministerial orders. The Luxembourg ruling will say whether Europe’s shield holds; French practitioners should prepare both outcomes now, because the enforcement battle for the frozen billions will pass through Paris whatever Luxembourg decides. Our firm follows each General Court sanctions ruling from Paris and acts before the French courts, the General Court of the European Union and the enforcement judge in asset-freeze, delisting and cross-border enforcement matters.