On 18 September 2026, Colombia told the International Court of Justice that it was leaving someone else’s case. The Registry announced it four days later in Press Release No. 2026/24 of 22 September 2026: Colombia was withdrawing the declaration of intervention it had filed under Article 63 of the Court’s Statute on 5 April 2024 in the proceedings over the application of the Genocide Convention in Gaza, brought by South Africa against Israel in December 2023. Around twenty other intervening States stay in. France, which used the very same Article 63 door to intervene against Russia in September 2022, has never walked through it in this case. A withdrawal of this kind is rare enough to deserve a close look: how does a State enter another State’s case, what does leaving change in law and in politics, and what does the French record, in The Hague and in Paris courtrooms, teach about the same Convention?
This analysis explains the mechanics of intervention under Articles 62 and 63 of the Statute, reconstructs Colombia’s two-and-a-half-year round trip, measures the legal effects of its exit, and holds up the French mirror: the 2022 French intervention in the Ukraine case and the French domestic prosecution of genocide and crimes against humanity, where the Cour de cassation has built one of Europe’s most assertive universal-jurisdiction doctrines.
I. Colombia Leaves South Africa v Israel: What the 22 September 2026 Press Release Really Means
A. How Does a State Walk Into, and Out of, Someone Else’s Genocide Case?
The Statute offers two different doors. Under Article 62, a State that considers it has a legal interest at stake may ask the Court for permission to intervene, and the Court decides. Under Article 63, whenever the construction of a convention shared with other States is in issue, the Registrar notifies those States, and each notified State has a right to intervene; the construction the judgment gives will then bind it equally. Colombia chose the second door on 5 April 2024, a few weeks after the Court’s first provisional-measures order of 26 January 2024 and just after the additional measures indicated on 28 March 2024. South Africa had filed its application on 29 December 2023, alleging violations of the Genocide Convention in Gaza, and would return twice more for provisional measures, obtaining a further order on 24 May 2024.
Colombia did not leave a small club. The Registry’s release lists the States that filed Article 62 requests or Article 63 declarations after it: Libya in May 2024, Mexico later that month, Palestine under both articles at the end of May, Spain in June, Türkiye in August, Chile in September, the Maldives and Bolivia in October, Ireland and Cuba in January 2025, Belize under both articles at the end of that month, Brazil in September 2025, the Comoros in October, Belgium in December, Paraguay in March 2026, the Netherlands and Iceland also in March 2026, then Namibia, the United States, Hungary and Fiji. That is the largest crowd of interveners in the Court’s history, and Colombia’s departure does not thin the legal argument before the judges: the construction of the Genocide Convention will be pleaded with or without Bogotá. The press release records no ruling admitting or rejecting Colombia’s declaration before the withdrawal, and no reason given for the exit. In practice, Article 63 declarations in this case have accumulated without admissibility hearings so far, which makes the exit procedurally clean: there is no order to revisit, no observations to strike from the record, and no hearing to reorganise. Contrast this with cases where interveners have already pleaded and find themselves bound mid-stream. Colombia leaves before the merits phase has produced a single binding construction, which is precisely why the legal cost of exit today is near zero while the political message is maximal. The remaining interveners, from Libya, first in line in May 2024, to the four States that filed together in March 2026, continue to carry the collective argument forward, and each of them will be bound by the construction the judgment eventually gives. In procedural terms, a declaration unexamined and now withdrawn simply ceases to produce effects: Colombia will file no written observations on the Convention, take no part in hearings on its construction, and, above all, will not be bound by the construction the future judgment gives, since that binding effect attaches to States that use the Article 63 right.
The political reading is harder and belongs to diplomacy, not to the Registry. Colombia filed under one government and withdraws under another, after two and a half years in which the case grew from provisional measures into the slowest and most crowded merits phase in recent memory. Withdrawing avoids being bound by a construction the withdrawing State may no longer wish to own, spares the cost and exposure of full participation, and sends a signal whose addressees sit in Bogotá at least as much as in The Hague. None of that stops the case: South Africa and Israel remain bound by whatever the Court decides, the remaining interveners keep their seats, and the provisional-measures orders stay in force.
B. What Does Withdrawing Change, and What Does It Leave Untouched?
Three legal consequences follow, and three limits contain them. First, Colombia recovers its freedom toward the future judgment’s construction of the Genocide Convention: a State that does not intervene is not bound by the interpretation, while one that does is bound equally with the parties on the points construed. Second, Colombia sheds the procedural burdens of an intervener, written observations, oral argument and coordination with twenty others. Third, it removes a potential target: an intervener under Article 63 exposes its own reading of the Convention to adversarial testing, and its past and future conduct can be measured against the construction it defended.
The limits matter more for everyone else. The withdrawal does not affect the Court’s jurisdiction over the main case, which rests on the compromissory clause of the Genocide Convention between South Africa and Israel, not on Colombia’s presence. It does not lift a single provisional measure, which bind the parties regardless of who watches from the gallery. And it does not erase the two and a half years of Colombia’s declared position: diplomats keep archives, and a State that defended one construction in 2024 before walking away in 2026 will be asked about both. On costs, the default rule is that each party bears its own, unless the Court decides otherwise, so an intervener’s exit is also a way to cap exposure to a multi-year mega-case. For practitioners, the episode confirms a practical rule about Article 63: the right to intervene is easy to exercise and hard to time, because the binding-construction price is paid at the end, when the judgment lands, while the political price of staying or leaving is paid continuously. Our analysis of the September 2026 preliminary-objections hearings in the Nicaragua v Germany case showed a different ICJ filter at work; here there is no filter at all under Article 63, only a sovereign decision to enter, to stay, or, as Colombia just did, to leave. Future candidates for intervention will study this exit as closely as the thirty-three entries of 2022, because it prices the Article 63 commitment more honestly than any commentary.
II. The French Mirror: Intervening in The Hague, Prosecuting at Home
A. How Did France Use Article 63 Against Russia in 2022?
France knows the door Colombia just closed, because it walked through it four years ago. On 14 September 2022, as recorded on the Court’s page for the Ukraine v Russia genocide-convention case, France filed a declaration of intervention under Article 63 of the Statute in the proceedings Ukraine had brought against Russia. It joined what became an unprecedented collective move: thirty-three States filed Article 63 declarations in that case, turning the construction of the Genocide Convention into a genuinely multilateral exercise. Paris has not repeated the move in South Africa v Israel: France appears nowhere in the Registry’s list of interveners there, a choice that is itself a position. The contrast is deliberate and instructive. In the Ukraine case, France joined a collective Western effort to deny Russia the cover of the Genocide Convention, putting thirty-three flags behind one construction of the treaty. In the Gaza case, Paris has stayed out, preferring bilateral diplomacy, European coordination and its domestic criminal-justice track to a front-row seat in a case that divides even its allies, as the presence of the United States and Hungary on the interveners’ list alongside Ireland, Belgium, Spain and the Netherlands shows. Colombia’s trajectory is the mirror image: early enthusiasm in April 2024, when intervention signalled solidarity with the Convention’s enforcement, followed by retreat in September 2026, when the price of that signal, being bound by whatever construction emerges, apparently outweighed its value.
The French method in such interventions is the same method French courts apply to treaties every week. On 6 May 2026, the First Civil Chamber opened an investment-arbitration judgment with the visa “Vu l’article 1520, 1°, du code de procédure civile et les principes du droit international coutumier relatifs à l’interprétation des traités”, then recalled, in Cass. 1re civ., 6 May 2026, No 24-10.445, that “Conformément au droit international coutumier, tel que reflété par l’article 31 de la Convention de Vienne sur le droit des traités du 23 mai 1969, aux fins de l’interprétation d’un traité, il doit être tenu compte, en même temps que du contexte, de tout accord ultérieur intervenu entre les parties au sujet de l’interprétation du traité ou de l’application de ses dispositions.” Construing a convention in good faith, with context and subsequent agreements, is exactly what an Article 63 intervener asks the World Court to do, and exactly what a withdrawing State declines to underwrite. The same decision adds a principle that runs through this whole file: “En matière de protection des investissements transnationaux, le consentement de l’État à l’arbitrage procède de l’offre permanente d’arbitrage formulée dans un traité”. Consent structures everything: States consent to arbitrate by treaty offer, consent to the Court by declaration, intervene by right under Article 63, and, as Colombia shows, un-consent by walking away before judgment.
B. How Do French Courts Prosecute Genocide and Crimes Against Humanity Themselves?
While The Hague construes the Convention, Paris applies its domestic twin. Article 211-1 of the Criminal Code provides that “Constitue un génocide le fait, en exécution d’un plan concerté tendant à la destruction totale ou partielle d’un groupe national, ethnique, racial ou religieux, ou d’un groupe déterminé à partir de tout autre critère arbitraire, de commettre ou de faire commettre, à l’encontre de membres de ce groupe, l’un des actes suivants : – atteinte volontaire à la vie ; – atteinte grave à l’intégrité physique ou psychique ; – soumission à des conditions d’existence de nature à entraîner la destruction totale ou partielle du groupe ; – mesures visant à entraver les naissances ; – transfert forcé d’enfants.” It adds that “Le génocide est puni de la réclusion criminelle à perpétuité.” Article 212-1 punishes as a crime against humanity, also with life imprisonment, acts “commis en exécution d’un plan concerté à l’encontre d’un groupe de population civile dans le cadre d’une attaque généralisée ou systématique”, listing “1° L’atteinte volontaire à la vie ; 2° L’extermination ; 3° La réduction en esclavage ; 4° La déportation ou le transfert forcé de population ;” in Article 212-1 of the Criminal Code.
French courts do not wait for the crime to touch French soil. Article 689-1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure states that “En application des conventions internationales visées aux articles suivants, peut être poursuivie et jugée par les juridictions françaises, si elle se trouve en France, toute personne qui s’est rendue coupable hors du territoire de la République de l’une des infractions énumérées par ces articles.” Article 689-2 covers torture under the New York Convention: “Pour l’application de la convention contre la torture et autres peines ou traitements cruels, inhumains ou dégradants, adoptée à New York le 10 décembre 1984, peut être poursuivie et jugée dans les conditions prévues à l’article 689-1 toute personne coupable de tortures au sens de l’article 1er de la convention”, in Article 689-2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. And Article 689-11 opens the Rome-Statute track: “Hors les cas prévus au sous-titre Ier du titre Ier du livre IV pour l’application de la convention portant statut de la Cour pénale internationale, ouverte à la signature à Rome le 18 juillet 1998, peut être poursuivie et jugée par les juridictions françaises toute personne soupçonnée d’avoir commis à l’étranger l’une des infractions suivantes : 1° Le crime de génocide défini au chapitre Ier du sous-titre Ier du titre Ier du livre II du code pénal ; 2° Les autres crimes contre l’humanité définis au chapitre II du même sous-titre Ier ; 3° Les crimes et les délits de guerre définis aux articles 461-1 à 461-31 du même code.” The suspect must have habitual residence in France, and “La poursuite de ces crimes ne peut être exercée qu’à la requête du procureur de la République antiterroriste et si aucune juridiction internationale ou nationale ne demande la remise ou l’extradition de la personne”, under Article 689-11 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
The Cour de cassation has given these texts teeth against the hardest cases. In the Syrian Jaysh Al-Islam file, the Assembly of the Chambers held, in Cass., Ass. plén., 12 May 2023, No 22-82.468, that “Selon l’article 689-1 du code de procédure pénale, peut être poursuivie et jugée par les juridictions françaises, si elle se trouve en France, toute personne qui s’est rendue coupable, hors du territoire de la République, de l’une des infractions énumérées par les articles suivants.” It then decided the point on which the whole universal-jurisdiction architecture turned: “Il s’en déduit que le cas de compétence universelle de l’article 689-2 précité est limité aux tortures imputées à un agent de la fonction publique ou une personne agissant à titre officiel ou à son instigation ou avec son consentement exprès ou tacite.” But it refused to stop there: “Cependant, la notion de personne ayant agi à titre officiel, au sens du renvoi fait par le texte national à la Convention précitée, doit être comprise comme visant également une personne agissant pour le compte ou au nom d’une entité non gouvernementale, lorsque celle-ci occupe un territoire et exerce une autorité quasi gouvernementale sur ce territoire.” The Court had first recalled the treaty gateway: “Aux termes de l’article 689-2 du même code, pour l’application de la Convention contre la torture et autres peines ou traitements cruels, inhumains ou dégradants, adoptée à New York le 10 décembre 1984, peut être poursuivie et jugée dans les conditions prévues à l’article 689-1 toute personne coupable de tortures au sens de l’article 1er de la Convention.” Because, the Court concluded, “Une telle interprétation est conforme au but de la Convention, qui est d’accroître l’efficacité de la lutte contre la torture, en évitant l’impunité des auteurs de ces actes.” A rebel spokesman for a non-state armed group holding territory can therefore face French judges: that is what universal jurisdiction means in Paris.
The Criminal Chamber confirmed the Rome-Statute track two years earlier in a Syrian torture and crimes-against-humanity file, holding, in Cass. crim., 24 November 2021, No 21-81.344, that “Peut être poursuivie et jugée par les juridictions françaises, si elle réside habituellement sur le territoire de la République, toute personne soupçonnée d’avoir commis à l’étranger le crime de génocide, prévu par le code pénal, les autres crimes contre l’humanité définis par ce code, si les faits sont punis par la législation de l’Etat où ils ont été commis ou si cet Etat ou l’Etat dont la personne soupçonnée a la nationalité est partie à la Convention de Rome, portant statut de la Cour pénale internationale, outre les crimes et délits de guerre, dans les conditions prévues par le texte susvisé.” Syria never ratified the Rome Statute, yet French prosecution survived through double criminality, because, as the chamber noted in rejecting the jurisdictional objection, even though crimes against humanity are not expressly labelled as such in the Syrian penal code, that code punishes murder, acts of barbarity, rape, violence and torture, while the 2012 Syrian constitution prohibits torture. Double criminality, in French hands, is a functional test, not a labelling test. Put the two levels together and the French position reads clearly: in The Hague, France intervenes by right to shape the construction of the Genocide Convention; at home, its courts try torturers and génocidaires found on French soil under universal jurisdiction. Colombia’s exit from the gallery changes nothing in either French courtroom.
Conclusion
Colombia’s withdrawal of 18 September 2026 closes a two-and-a-half-year intervention that began on 5 April 2024 and ends with no observations filed, no hearing attended and no construction owned. Legally, Bogotá recovers its freedom toward the future judgment and sheds an intervener’s burdens; politically, it signals a reassessment whose reasons it keeps to itself. The case itself loses nothing it needs: jurisdiction over South Africa and Israel stands on the Convention’s compromissory clause, the provisional measures stand on the Court’s orders, and some twenty interveners still plead the Convention’s meaning. France’s contrasting record frames the event: an Article 63 intervener against Russia in September 2022, absent from the interveners’ bench in this case, and simultaneously one of the few States whose highest court sends non-state torturers exercising quasi-governmental power to trial at home. Three tracks, one Convention: The Hague construes it, Paris prosecutes under it, and Bogotá has just chosen to watch the construction from outside. Watch who follows, if anyone, and watch the merits phase, where the construction Colombia declined to underwrite will bind those who stayed.