On 24 September 2026, France authorised the aircraft of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to cross French airspace on his way to the United Nations General Assembly in New York, even though an International Criminal Court arrest warrant has targeted him since November 2024. Asked by reporters, the French Foreign Ministry said the clearance was “in full conformity with international law”. The episode raises a question that matters far beyond one flight: when exactly does an ICC member state have to arrest a fugitive, and what happens the day such a person sets foot on French soil? This analysis answers both questions with the texts and the case law that French courts actually apply.
I. Can France Be Forced to Arrest a Fugitive Who Merely Flies Over Its Territory?
A. What the ICC Arrest Warrants Against Benjamin Netanyahu and Yoav Gallant Actually Order
On 21 November 2024, Pre-Trial Chamber I of the International Criminal Court, sitting for the Situation in the State of Palestine, issued arrest warrants for Mr. Benjamin Netanyahu and Mr. Yoav Gallant. The Chamber stated the position in these terms: on 21 November 2024 Pre-Trial Chamber I, sitting for the Situation in the State of Palestine, unanimously rejected Israel’s challenges brought under articles 18 and 19 of the Rome Statute and issued warrants of arrest for Mr. Benjamin Netanyahu and Mr. Yoav Gallant A warrant was issued the same day for the then Hamas military commander. Israel rejects the jurisdiction of the Hague-based court, denies war crimes in Gaza, and is contesting the warrants against Mr. Netanyahu and his former defence chief.
Two points of that decision shape everything that follows. First, the Prosecution’s applications for the warrants had been submitted on 20 May 2024, so the warrants are the outcome of a full judicial examination, not a political declaration. Second, on jurisdiction, the Chamber held that Israel’s acceptance of the Court’s jurisdiction was not required because the Court could exercise jurisdiction on the territorial basis of Palestine. In other words, the warrants rest on the territory where the alleged crimes occurred, and the nationality of the suspects does not neutralise them. That is why Mr. Netanyahu cannot travel to many countries: every State Party to the Statute of the International Criminal Court, published in France by Decree No. 2002-925 of 6 June 2002, is in principle bound to cooperate with the Court, including by arresting suspects who enter its territory, as Reuters recalled in its coverage of the overflight.
France is a State Party and it says so itself. French domestic law organises that cooperation in detail: “Pour l’application du statut de la Cour pénale internationale signé le 18 juillet 1998, la France participe à la répression des infractions et coopère avec cette juridiction dans les conditions fixées par le présent titre”, provides Article 627 of the French Code of Criminal Procedure. That cooperation was built by Law No. 2002-268 of 26 February 2002 on cooperation with the International Criminal Court, which created a complete surrender procedure entrusted to the Paris prosecution authorities, the Paris investigating chamber and the criminal chamber of the Court of Cassation. The machinery exists, it is precise, and it starts working the moment a wanted person is apprehended on French territory. The whole controversy of September 2026 is whether it must also start working when that person is at 35,000 feet above that territory.
Flight-tracking data showed Mr. Netanyahu’s aircraft crossing Greece, Italy and France on its way to New York, and Le Monde counted that this was the ninth time since the warrants were issued on 21 November 2024 that the Israeli Prime Minister had crossed French airspace, along with the airspace of three other ICC States Parties, Greece, Italy and Canada. Last year, by contrast, Mr. Netanyahu had flown a circuitous route to New York to skirt the airspace of several European countries, including France. The change of route between 2025 and 2026 is itself a legal signal: governments and flight planners now read the Rome Statute the same way Paris does, as imposing no interception duty in the sky.
B. Why an Overflight Creates No Duty to Intercept or Arrest Under the Rome Statute
The French position was stated without ambiguity by Foreign Ministry spokesperson Pascal Confavreux said the Rome Statute imposes no obligations on overflights of French territory by a state aircraft carrying a passenger targeted by an arrest warrant. The Quai d’Orsay added that the clearance was “in full conformity with international law”. Three layers of law support that reading.
First, ICC cooperation duties attach to persons present on the territory of a State Party, not to aircraft transiting its airspace. An arrest warrant is executed where the suspect can actually be apprehended, brought before a judge and surrendered. A French judge quoted by Le Monde, international judge Gilbert Bitti recalled that the Court has never required states to arrest a suspect in flight. The same judge added the decisive test: “Ce qui compte, c’est la capacité d’arrestation”, and that enforcement of the warrant is therefore a matter for the moment the prosecuted person is on the soil of the state in question. Interception of a foreign state aircraft in flight would raise air law, immunity and safety problems of a completely different order, and no ICC decision has ever ordered a State Party to do it.
Second, a state aircraft flies over France only with French authorisation, which is a sovereign act, not an ICC enforcement measure. Granting an overflight clearance to a foreign government aircraft does not place the passenger at the disposal of the French authorities and does not constitute a refusal to cooperate with the Court either. The Court’s own practice confirms this: the former Sudanese president Omar Al-Bashir, also indicted by the ICC, was able to fly over dozens of countries without any call to order from the Court, as Le Monde recalled. The Court reacts when a suspect is on the ground and the territorial state does nothing, not when radar tracks cross its members’ skies.
Third, the contrast with genuine non-cooperation findings shows where the line sits. On 24 October 2024, on 24 October 2024 Pre-Trial Chamber II found that Mongolia, by failing to arrest Mr. Putin while he was on its territory, had failed in its cooperation duty, and the Chamber formally found that Mongolia failed to cooperate in the arrest and surrender of Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin and refers the matter to the Assembly of States Parties. Mr. Putin had visited Mongolia on 3 September 2024 and left unarrested. Presence on the territory plus inaction equals a cooperation failure; transit through airspace plus a standard diplomatic clearance does not. The ICC judges have never summoned the four states overflown in September 2026 for explanations, and they are not expected to, precisely because the Court has never demanded arrests of suspects in flight.
The political context makes the legal distinction even more important. The United States has opened a campaign to isolate the Court, President Donald Trump has urged ICC members to quit what he called an “out of control institution”, and France has said it condemns the threats against the Court. Hungary went further: during Mr. Netanyahu’s visit to Budapest, it announced its withdrawal from the ICC, and the Hungarian authorities formally notified the United Nations secretary-general on June 2, 2025, that Hungary is withdrawing from the Rome Statute. Withdrawal takes effect one year after notification, and as Amnesty International headlined, Hungary’s withdrawal from the ICC does not absolve Hungary of its legal obligation to arrest fugitive Benjamin Netanyahu while it remains a State Party. Each of these episodes confirms the same rule: obligations are measured on the ground, at the moment the suspect is within reach, not on the radar screen.
II. What Happens If a Person Wanted by the ICC Enters France or Is Arrested Here?
A. How France Arrests and Surrenders a Suspect to The Hague Step by Step
If a person targeted by an ICC arrest warrant lands in France, the French procedure leaves no room for improvisation. ICC arrest-and-surrender requests follow a dedicated channel: “Les demandes d’arrestation aux fins de remise délivrées par la Cour pénale internationale sont adressées, en original et accompagnées de toutes pièces justificatives, aux autorités compétentes en vertu de l’article 87 du statut qui, après s’être assurées de leur régularité formelle, les transmettent au procureur général près la cour d’appel de Paris et, dans le même temps, les mettent à exécution”, states Article 627-4 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Paris centralises everything: the Prosecutor General at the Paris Court of Appeal, the Paris investigating chamber, the Paris remand prison.
The person apprehended must be brought within twenty-four hours before the territorially competent public prosecutor: “Toute personne appréhendée en vertu d’une demande d’arrestation aux fins de remise doit être déférée dans les vingt-quatre heures au procureur de la République territorialement compétent”, provides Article 627-5 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. After verifying identity, that prosecutor informs the person, in a language they understand, of the surrender request and of their forthcoming appearance, within a maximum of five days, before the Prosecutor General at the Paris Court of Appeal: “Après avoir vérifié l’identité de cette personne, ce magistrat l’informe, dans une langue qu’elle comprend, qu’elle fait l’objet d’une demande d’arrestation aux fins de remise et qu’elle comparaîtra, dans un délai maximum de cinq jours, devant le procureur général près la cour d’appel de Paris”. The statute insists on language rights from the first hours, which is exactly where defence counsel must be present.
Transfer to Paris is then a matter of days, not weeks: “La personne réclamée est transférée, s’il y a lieu, et écrouée à la maison d’arrêt du ressort de la cour d’appel de Paris”, and “Le transfèrement doit avoir lieu dans un délai maximum de cinq jours à compter de sa présentation au procureur de la République”, under Article 627-6 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. If the transfer does not happen in time, the person is released by decision of the president of the investigating chamber of the Paris Court of Appeal, unless the delay was caused by insurmountable circumstances. France also executes the Court’s protective measures on its territory: Article 627-3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure entrusts the anti-terrorism public prosecutor with ordering conservatory measures requested by the Court, for a maximum of two years, renewable at the Court’s request. Assets, accounts and evidence can therefore be frozen in France while the surrender case runs its course.
The decision itself belongs to the investigating chamber of the Paris Court of Appeal, and its review is deliberately narrow: “Lorsque la chambre de l’instruction constate qu’il n’y a pas d’erreur évidente, elle ordonne la remise de la personne réclamée et, si celle-ci est libre, son incarcération à cette fin”, under Article 627-8 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The chamber rules within fifteen days of the person’s appearance, and on appeal the criminal chamber of the Court of Cassation decides within two months of receiving the file: “La chambre de l’instruction statue dans les quinze jours de la comparution devant elle de la personne réclamée. En cas de pourvoi, la chambre criminelle de la Cour de cassation statue dans un délai de deux mois suivant la réception du dossier à la Cour de cassation.” Any other question raised before the chamber is referred to the ICC itself. French judges do not retry the international case; they check that the surrender is formally regular, and the Court in The Hague decides the rest.
The Court of Cassation has described that limited review in identical terms for surrenders to international criminal jurisdictions: “le contrôle de la chambre de l’instruction consiste seulement, en cette matière, à vérifier si les conditions de remise sont remplies quant à l’identité de la personne, la production des titres en vertu desquels la demande est formée, l’existence de faits entrant dans la définition posée à l’article 1er de cette loi, et l’absence d’une erreur évidente” (Cass. crim., 30 Sept. 2020, No. 20-83.181, published in the Bulletin). The same decision adds the essential safety valve: “Ce contrôle inclut par ailleurs, si sa violation est invoquée, le respect des garanties fondamentales accordées à la personne réclamée.” Identity, titles, facts, no manifest error, plus fundamental guarantees when invoked: that is the whole battlefield for the defence in Paris. Detention is not automatic either: release, lifting or variation of judicial supervision or of electronically monitored house arrest can be requested at any time from the Paris investigating chamber, which applies the procedure of Articles 148-1 and following: “La mise en liberté ou la mainlevée ou la modification du contrôle judiciaire ou de l’assignation à résidence sous surveillance électronique peut être demandée à tout moment à la chambre de l’instruction de la cour d’appel de Paris qui procède conformément à l’article 59 du statut et à la procédure prévue aux articles 148-1 et suivants du présent code” (Article 627-9 of the Code of Criminal Procedure). And where the wanted person is already prosecuted or convicted in France on other counts, Article 627-11 of the Code of Criminal Procedure keeps the surrender procedure running while suspending the French limitation periods. A parallel French case therefore neither blocks nor replaces surrender to The Hague.
One more protection comes from classic extradition case law and applies by analogy to every surrender file: “Il s’ensuit qu’une personne remise à la France en exécution d’un mandat d’arrêt et qui n’a pas renoncé au principe de spécialité ne peut faire l’objet d’une mesure de détention provisoire pour une infraction autre que celle qui a motivé sa remise” (Cass. crim., 12 Apr. 2022, No. 22-80.284). Specialty travels in both directions: a person surrendered to the ICC answers for the charges in the warrant, and a person surrendered to France cannot be detained for earlier facts outside the surrender. Defence strategy in Paris is built on these hinges: identity, titles, manifest error, fundamental guarantees, release, specialty.
B. What the Mongolia, Hungary and Al-Bashir Precedents Change for Targets, Victims and Counsel
The September 2026 overflight does not stand alone; it belongs to a series of stress tests that redraw the practical map for anyone concerned by an ICC warrant. Mongolia is the warning: a State Party that receives a wanted head of state on its territory and lets him leave faces a formal non-cooperation finding and a referral to the Assembly of States Parties. The reputational price is immediate and public, and the Prosecutor remembers which capitals cooperate. Hungary is the mirror image: a State Party can announce withdrawal, but withdrawal takes a year to take effect and does not erase pending obligations, starting with the duty to arrest a fugitive present on its territory. Governments that host wanted leaders during that window remain exposed to the same finding Mongolia received.
The Al-Bashir years add a third lesson, on the side of the fugitive: overflights and friendly airspaces never ended the proceedings, and the warrants outlasted the travel arrangements. Sudan’s former president criss-crossed the skies for years, yet the charges remained, and domestic change eventually did what foreign airports had not. For a person targeted by a warrant, the rational conclusion is not that flying is safe but that every landing is a legal event: each state of transit or destination has its own surrender procedure, its own judges and its own timetable, and France’s is among the fastest, with fifteen days before the investigating chamber and two months on appeal to the Court of Cassation. Travel planning for exposed individuals is therefore a country-by-country legal audit, not a flight-path drawing exercise, and the September 2026 route itself proves it: the same aircraft avoided French airspace a year earlier and crossed it openly once the legal reading was settled.
For victims and NGOs, the precedents point the other way: the system moves when national authorities are forced to take a position. Communications to the ICC Prosecutor, targeted sanctions files and domestic complaints that trigger universal-jurisdiction investigations all raise the cost of inaction for host states. France offers several entry points: the ICC cooperation machinery described above when the suspect is on French soil, French criminal complaints for crimes committed abroad under the conditions of extraterritorial jurisdiction, and civil-party action that keeps a file alive even when the suspect is absent. Each of these routes has strict admissibility conditions, short limitation traps and heavy evidentiary demands, which is why early advice from counsel experienced in both French procedure and ICC practice changes outcomes. Readers following the Court’s American front will find the Paris angle on sanctions against the Court itself in our earlier analysis of how a sanctioned Court is defended from Paris.
For defence counsel, the French forum has concrete advantages worth knowing. The procedure is codified article by article, the deadlines are short and enforceable, release can be requested at any time, fundamental guarantees are part of the investigating chamber’s control when invoked, and the Court of Cassation decides in two months. A lawyer seized within hours of an arrest in Roissy, Orly or anywhere on French territory can challenge identity, contest the titles, plead a manifest error, demand release or electronic monitoring, and prepare the referral of substantive defences to The Hague, where the real trial takes place. The overflight controversy usefully recalls the boundary of all of this: none of these tools operates at cruising altitude. They operate on the ground, in Paris, before identified judges, under published texts, and that is where cases are won or lost.
Conclusion
France was legally entitled to let Mr. Netanyahu’s state aircraft cross its airspace in September 2026: the Rome Statute obliges States Parties to arrest suspects who enter their territory, it has never obliged them to intercept suspects in flight, and the Court’s own record, from Al-Bashir’s unhindered overflights to the Mongolia referral for a failure on the ground, confirms the distinction. But the same texts show what would happen the day a wanted person lands in France: centralised Paris procedure, twenty-four hours to see a prosecutor, five days for transfer, fifteen days for the investigating chamber to order surrender absent manifest error, two months for the Court of Cassation on appeal, release available at any time, fundamental guarantees reviewable when invoked. The sky is not the Court’s jurisdiction; French soil is, and Paris applies it quickly. Anyone exposed to an ICC warrant, or seeking to enforce one, should treat every border crossing as a legal act and take advice before travelling, not after landing.