On 24 September 2026, France authorised the state aircraft carrying Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to cross French airspace on its way to the United Nations General Assembly in New York, even though an International Criminal Court arrest warrant has targeted him since November 2024 over alleged war crimes and crimes against humanity in Gaza. Paris called the clearance, in the words of Foreign Ministry spokesperson Pascal Confavreux, “in full conformity with international law”. The episode ignited a legal and political storm: New York politician Zohran Mamdani had called for Netanyahu’s arrest on American soil, President Donald Trump answered that no arrest would happen and urged ICC member states to quit what he called an out-of-control institution, and commentators asked the blunt question — if France is bound to cooperate with the Court, why did it wave the plane through?
The answer matters far beyond one flight. It defines when France must arrest a person wanted by the ICC, when it may lawfully refuse, and what victims and suspects can actually do in Paris when an ICC suspect touches French soil. France is the country of a landmark 25 July 2025 Assemblée plénière ruling that annulled a French arrest warrant against a sitting head of state, and it is also the country whose Code of Criminal Procedure builds the fastest surrender lane in French law for ICC suspects who are physically present. For an international audience — journalists, NGOs, executives, and anyone who may one day be named in, or protected by, an ICC warrant — a Parisian lawyer’s reading of this week is the difference between slogans and procedure. Here is what happened in the sky, why Paris says it owed nothing, and what would happen on the ground if the suspect landed.
I. Why France let Netanyahu’s plane cross French airspace on the way to New York
A. What happened on 24 and 25 September 2026 between Paris, Rome, Athens and New York?
The facts are reported by Le Monde on 25 September 2026: Netanyahu’s aircraft flew over Greece, Italy, France and Canada on the way to New York for the 81st session of the United Nations General Assembly, according to flight-tracking data. France publicly defended the overflight clearance, and Italy’s Foreign Ministry said it could not immediately answer whether Israeli authorities had sought permission. The striking detail is repetition: this was the ninth time since the November 2024 warrant that France let the Israeli prime minister cross its airspace. As international judge Gilbert Bitti explained to Le Monde, the ICC judges have never required member states to arrest a suspect mid-flight — former Sudanese president Omar al-Bashir, likewise indicted by the Court, flew over dozens of countries without the judges reprimanding them. What matters, in his analysis, is the capacity for arrest, meaning enforcement of the warrant once the wanted person is actually on state territory.
The context makes the flight remarkable. The ICC issued arrest warrants in November 2024 against Netanyahu and his then defence minister Yoav Gallant, alongside a warrant against the then military commander of Hamas. Israel rejects the Court’s jurisdiction, denies war crimes in Gaza, and is contesting the warrants. Because of them, Netanyahu’s travel map has shrunk: a year earlier he flew a circuitous route to New York to skirt the airspace of several European countries, including France, according to media reports recalled by Reuters. This year he flew straight over France — and Paris said yes.
In New York, the politics were even louder. Municipal figure Zohran Mamdani invoked the ICC warrant to demand an arrest on American soil, while the White House shut the door: the United States is not a party to the Rome Statute, it rejects ICC jurisdiction over American and allied personnel, and the Trump administration has gone further, preparing fresh sanctions against the Court itself and pressing member states to walk away from what the President described as an out-of-control institution. Washington’s campaign to isolate the Court is the background noise of every ICC file this year, and it shapes what France — an ICC member state that also needs its American alliance — says and does.
Three legal questions emerge from the flight, and they must not be confused. First, does an ICC State Party have to deny its airspace to a suspect’s plane? Second, does it have to force the plane down or arrest the passenger? Third, what changes if the suspect lands? Paris answered the first two with a no and left the third deliberately open. Understanding why requires reading the French position on immunity, which predates this flight by almost two years.
B. Why does Paris say the Rome Statute imposes no duty for overflights?
The French statement is short and technical. Foreign Ministry spokesperson Pascal Confavreux told reporters that the clearance was in full conformity with international law, on the ground that the Rome Statute creates no obligation for a State Party regarding the overflight of its territory by a foreign state aircraft carrying a person targeted by an arrest warrant. The reasoning underneath has two pillars. The cooperation duties of the Rome Statute — arrest and surrender under its Articles 86 to 89 — attach to persons found on the territory of a State Party. An aircraft in overflight, especially a foreign state aircraft, is not presence on the territory in the sense that triggers the duty to arrest and surrender. And transit by air of a sitting head of government travelling to the United Nations engages a second body of law: immunities.
France stated its immunity position on 27 November 2024, days after the warrants were issued. The Foreign Ministry said France would respect its international obligations, then added the passage that still governs French practice today, as reported by Le Monde: a state cannot be required to act incompatibly with its international-law obligations on immunities enjoyed by states that are not parties to the ICC, and those immunities cover the Israeli prime minister and the ministers concerned, so France would have to take them into account if the Court ever asked Paris to arrest and surrender them. Israel is not a party to the Rome Statute, and France reads Article 98 of the Statute — the provision on cooperation where third-state immunity is engaged — as preserving that shield at the national-execution stage.
That reading is contested, and a serious analysis must say so. Human-rights organisations and several scholars argue that Article 27 of the Rome Statute removes official-capacity immunity before the Court, that the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber has held personal immunity not opposable before it with no waiver required, and that France’s position contradicts its own support for ICC warrants against officials of Russia, likewise a non-party. The criticism is strongest where the suspect sets foot on the territory: Mongolia learned the price of that distinction when ICC Pre-Trial Chamber II found on 24 October 2024 that, by failing to arrest Mr Putin while he was on its territory and surrender him to the Court, Mongolia had failed to comply with the Court’s request to cooperate, and referred the matter to the Assembly of States Parties under Article 87(7). The Chamber reaffirmed that personal immunity, including that of Heads of State, is not opposable before the ICC, and no waiver is required, and that States Parties are duty-bound to arrest and surrender individuals subject to ICC warrants, regardless of official position or nationality. Overflight is the gap in that construction; landing is where the duty bites. And on landing, French domestic law takes over — with rules that every practitioner should know by heart.
One more distinction protects readers from the most common error in this debate. The ICC warrant is not a French extradition request, and France’s extradition bars do not apply to it. Under Article 696 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, extradition in the absence of a treaty follows the Code’s own chapter, and Article 696-4 lists the classic refusal grounds: “L’extradition n’est pas accordée : 1° Lorsque la personne réclamée a la nationalité française” — surrender is never granted where the person claimed is French — followed by the political-offence exception, “2° Lorsque le crime ou le délit à un caractère politique ou lorsqu’il résulte des circonstances que l’extradition est demandée dans un but politique”, territoriality, ne bis in idem, limitation periods, punishments contrary to French public order, courts without fundamental fair-trial guarantees, and purely military offences. None of that governs an ICC surrender. ICC cooperation runs on a separate, faster track built by the Law of 26 February 2002, codified at Articles 627-1 and following — and on that track, the question is not whether France may refuse, but how quickly it must deliver.
II. If an ICC suspect lands in France, who arrests and who decides?
A. How fast can France arrest and surrender an ICC suspect who lands in Paris?
French ICC procedure starts the moment a suspect is on French soil, and it starts with the anti-terrorism prosecution service. Under Article 627-1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, “Les demandes d’entraide émanant de la Cour pénale internationale sont adressées aux autorités compétentes en vertu de l’article 87 du statut en original ou en copie certifiée conforme accompagnées de toutes pièces justificatives. Ces documents sont transmis au procureur de la République antiterroriste qui leur donne toutes suites utiles.” In urgent cases the documents may go directly to that prosecutor by any means. Under Article 627-2, those requests are then executed by the anti-terrorism prosecutor or by the Paris investigating judge acting across the whole national territory, if needed in the presence of the ICC Prosecutor. Conservatory measures for the Court — freezing, seizure, preservation of assets — are ordered under Article 627-3 by the anti-terrorism prosecutor, for a maximum of two years, renewable at the Court’s request. The machine is centralised in Paris by design: one prosecutor, one investigating judge, one court of appeal, one clock.
The clock runs fast. Under Article 627-5, “Toute personne appréhendée en vertu d’une demande d’arrestation aux fins de remise doit être déférée dans les vingt-quatre heures au procureur de la République territorialement compétent.” Within that period the custody safeguards of Articles 63-1 to 63-7 apply; the prosecutor verifies identity, informs the person in a language he understands of the arrest request for surrender purposes, tells him he will appear within five days at most before the prosecutor general at the Paris Court of Appeal, and notifies him of the right to counsel of his choice or court-appointed counsel, with immediate access. If the prosecutor does not leave the person at liberty, the liberty and detention judge orders remand, or may impose judicial supervision or house arrest where appearance at every step is sufficiently guaranteed. Compare this with classic extradition, where Article 696-8 still routes the request through diplomatic channels with the judgment or warrant, precise statement of facts and applicable statutes, and where Article 696-15 gives the chambre de l’instruction one month from appearance to deliver its reasoned opinion. ICC surrender compresses everything.
The decision itself belongs to the chambre de l’instruction of the Paris Court of Appeal, and its review is deliberately narrow. Under Article 627-8, “Lorsque la chambre de l’instruction constate qu’il n’y a pas d’erreur évidente, elle ordonne la remise de la personne réclamée et, si celle-ci est libre, son incarcération à cette fin. Toute autre question soumise à la chambre de l’instruction est renvoyée à la Cour pénale internationale qui lui donne les suites utiles.” The chamber rules within fifteen days of appearance; on appeal, “la chambre criminelle de la Cour de cassation statue dans un délai de deux mois suivant la réception du dossier à la Cour de cassation”. No evident error means surrender; every other argument — jurisdiction of the ICC, admissibility of the case, immunity as the ICC understands it — goes to The Hague, not to Paris. That is the single most important sentence for any suspect arrested at Roissy or in Paris: the French judge checks identity and paperwork, not the merits of the ICC case.
Immunity is the only national-court argument with real teeth, and France’s highest court sharpened it weeks ago. On 25 July 2025, the Assemblée plénière of the Cour de cassation — judgment no. 685, appeal no. 24-84.393, published in the Bulletin — ruled on the French arrest warrant issued on 13 November 2023 against sitting Syrian President Bashar al-Assad over the 2013 chemical attacks. The full decision recalls the foundations in terms every international reader should keep: “L’immunité pénale de juridiction procède de l’égalité souveraine des États.” It continues: “Elle s’applique devant les juridictions nationales. Le principe de l’immunité ne peut être opposé devant les juridictions internationales, dont les statuts écartent expressément toute immunité, et qui agissent au nom de la communauté internationale.” Then the operative holdings: “L’immunité personnelle, distincte de l’immunité fonctionnelle, est reconnue aux seuls chef d’État, chef du gouvernement et ministre des affaires étrangères, en exercice. Elle concerne tous les actes accomplis, tant à titre privé qu’à titre officiel.” And the procedural consequence: “Constituant ainsi un obstacle procédural manifeste à l’exercice de sa compétence par une juridiction nationale, l’immunité personnelle doit être examinée d’office par le juge.”
The Court therefore quashed the Paris investigating chamber’s decision and held, in its operative part: “DIT que le mandat d’arrêt délivré le 13 novembre 2023 contre M. [S] est nul”. But it added the sentence that keeps every file alive, in the same operative part: “cette annulation est sans incidence sur la validité d’un mandat d’arrêt délivré postérieurement à la perte de la qualité de chef d’État en exercice”. A French warrant against a sitting head of state is void; a French warrant issued the day after he leaves office is valid. For ICC practice in France, the lesson is double-edged. A suspect who is a sitting head of state of a non-party can invoke before the French judge the immunity France itself recognised — the very reasoning Paris applied to Netanyahu. A former official enjoys no such shield, and the French surrender machine then runs at full speed: twenty-four hours, five days, fifteen days, two months.
B. Can victims force an arrest in France, and can a suspect block surrender?
Victims ask whether they can trigger an arrest the next time a wanted figure transits through France. The honest answer distinguishes three doors. The first door is the criminal complaint with constitution de partie civile before the Paris judicial court, home to the specialised war-crimes unit within the anti-terrorism prosecution service — the same office that receives ICC cooperation requests. A documented complaint naming the suspect, his functions, his travel and the evidence already gathered can put the file on the prosecutor’s desk before the aircraft doors open. The second door is signalling presence: French universal jurisdiction and ICC cooperation both presuppose that the suspect is, or will be, on French territory, so flight numbers, hotel bookings and conference programmes, transmitted to counsel and the authorities with proof, turn an abstract warrant into an operational file. The third door is the ICC itself, through victim representations to the Prosecutor and Article 15 communications, which can press for a sealed warrant to become executable at the right border.
But victims should understand the limits before they act. An overflight, as this week’s episode confirms, triggers no French arrest duty under Paris’s reading. A sealed ICC warrant may exist without France being obliged — or even able — to disclose it. Immunity claims by sitting officials will be examined by the French judge of his own motion, following the Assemblée plénière, and can defeat the arrest even where the underlying crimes are chemical attacks or mass atrocities. And where the suspect is a national of a state under American sanctions pressure against the Court, diplomatic friction can slow operational cooperation without changing the law. The Mongolia referral shows the Court’s answer to a state that lets a suspect walk away from its territory; it does not give a Paris victim a lever to force a plane down from French skies. Evidence fixed early, counsel instructed early, and complaints filed before travel — that is the lever that works.
Suspects and their advisers face the mirror image of the same procedure, and the defence playbook in Paris is now well mapped. First, contest presence and identity: no evident error on identity means surrender, so the earliest hearing is the decisive one, with passports, travel records and counsel present within twenty-four hours. Second, raise personal immunity immediately with exhibits on official status — the Assemblée plénière8007s rule that the judge examines it of his own motion helps the defence, but a documented status file helps more. Third, shift every immunity, admissibility and jurisdictional argument toward The Hague while asking the French chamber to stay within its narrow review, since Article 627-8 sends all other questions to the Court. Fourth, prepare the European Convention layer: detention conditions, surrender logistics and any American-style consecutive-sentencing exposure engage Article 3, and the defence should file prison, medical and sentencing exhibits rather than declarations. Fifth, where a parallel extradition request from a third state competes with the ICC surrender, invoke the specialty protections and the hierarchy of cooperation, because an ICC surrender and a classic extradition under Articles 696 and following do not obey the same bars or the same judges.
Companies, banks and carriers form the third circle of exposure that this flight illustrates. An airline that boards a listed suspect, a bank that moves his funds, an airport services provider that fuels a sanctioned state aircraft — each operates under EU restrictive measures, American secondary-sanctions risk and French criminal law at once. France’s EU-law blocking statute and national authorisation practice for frozen funds are their own files, but the overflight week is a reminder that ICC, sanctions and aviation law now collide on the same tarmac. Any institution that touches the logistics of a wanted person’s travel needs a clearance memo before the flight plan, not after the press release.
Conclusion
The Netanyahu overflight of 24 September 2026 will be remembered as the week France put its ICC doctrine in plain language: no duty in the sky, immunity recognised for sitting leaders of non-party states, and a surrender machine that starts only on the ground. Whether that doctrine survives contact with the ICC’s own case law — Mongolia’s referral, the irrelevance of official capacity before the Court, the contestation proceedings Israel itself has brought — is the legal battle of the next two years, and it will be fought as much in Paris as in The Hague. The Assemblée plénière has given French judges the immunity grammar; Articles 627-1 to 627-8 give them the surrender clock; the victims’ complaints and the suspects’ defences filed in Paris this autumn will decide what those texts mean in practice.
For the international reader, three practical conclusions follow. If you are a victim and the person responsible for your suffering travels through France, build the file before the travel: complaint with partie civile in Paris, proof of presence, counsel on standby within the twenty-four-hour window. If you are exposed — executive, official, or family member named in a foreign file or an ICC warrant — treat any French transit as a potential arrest point once wheels touch the runway, secure immunity evidence and ECHR exhibits in advance, and never confuse an overflight clearance with a landing guarantee. And if you advise an institution that moves people or money across borders, write the ICC-and-sanctions clearance into every travel and payment checklist now. The sky over France stayed open this week. French soil is a different jurisdiction — with different judges, different clocks, and no room for improvisation.