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Trump Readies Sanctions Against the Entire ICC: Asset Freezes, French Banks and the Paris Shield

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Trump Readies Sanctions Against the Entire ICC: Asset Freezes, French Banks and the Paris Shield

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In the week of 20 September 2026, first reports revealed that the administration of United States President Donald Trump has prepared sanctions against the entire International Criminal Court and plans to announce them soon. The Associated Press confirmed on 21 September that Dutch officials are preparing for a tough new round of American sanctions aimed at dismantling the global tribunal. The move would go far beyond the individual asset freezes and travel bans already imposed on ICC judges and prosecutors: it would target the institution itself, and Dutch and Court officials are hoping for a six-month grace period to sever the institution from American companies exposed to heavy financial penalties. For France, a founding State Party to the Rome Statute and the host of ICC defence teams, victims’ counsel, banks and companies exposed to the dollar system, the question is immediate and practical. Must a French bank freeze an ICC account if Washington says so. Must a French company stop selling software to the Court. Can a French lawyer still be paid for defending a client in The Hague. This article explains how American sanctions work, what France is still legally required to do for the ICC, and which French and European shields protect persons and businesses in France from complying with the American measures.

I. Washington’s whole-court sanctions: how the United States tries to paralyse the ICC

A. From Executive Order 14203 to September 2026: sanctioning the judges first, then the Court itself

The legal basis of the American campaign is Executive Order 14203, signed on 6 February 2025 and titled “Imposing Sanctions on the International Criminal Court”. Its opening finding sets the tone for everything that followed: the President finds that the Court, as established by the Rome Statute, has engaged in illegitimate and baseless actions targeting America and its close ally Israel. The order recalls that the ICC opened preliminary investigations concerning American personnel and issued arrest warrants against Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and former Defence Minister Yoav Gallant, and it states that neither the United States nor Israel is a party to the Rome Statute or has ever recognised the jurisdiction of the Court. It adds that the United States will impose tangible and significant consequences on those responsible for the Court transgressions, including the blocking of property and assets and the suspension of entry into the United States for ICC officials, employees and agents as well as their immediate family members

That programme was then applied step by step. After a first round of designations, Washington escalated again in the summer of 2026. In July, Secretary of State Marco Rubio announced a campaign to isolate the Court and publicly called on other countries to withdraw from it. On 18 August 2026, the administration sanctioned ICC President Tomoko Akane and a senior prosecution lawyer, freezing any assets they hold in the United States and cutting off transactions with them, a decision the Court itself publicly condemned. By September, at least eleven ICC officials, including nine judges and the Prosecutor, were under American sanctions combining asset freezes, travel bans and transaction prohibitions. Each round was presented by the State Department as a means to force the Court to drop its arrest warrants against Israeli leaders and its past examination of American troops in Afghanistan.

The September 2026 project changes scale. First reports on 20 September indicated that the administration has prepared institution-wide sanctions and that the decision could be finalised during the United Nations General Assembly week. The Associated Press confirmed on 21 September that officials in the Court host country, the Netherlands, have been notified that the sanctions are imminent and are examining ways to keep the tribunal operating, from paying staff to protecting witnesses and maintaining the detention facility. The agency adds that Washington has already sanctioned more than a dozen current and former staff members, including half of the sitting judges, as part of the sweeping campaign Secretary of State Marco Rubio says is meant to dismantle the threat the Court supposedly poses. The context in which the announcement would land is documented: four United States-based human rights organisations sued the administration over its targeting of the Court, arguing that the existing sanctions obstruct their legal and advocacy work, while Chad and Venezuela moved to withdraw from the Rome Statute, following Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger. The Court, meanwhile, is visibly active: former Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte appeared in person before ICC judges in September 2026 in the proceedings on the so-called war on drugs, a hearing this firm analysed the same week from the French procedural angle.

For readers in France, three points matter at this stage. First, the American measures taken so far target named individuals and prohibit any transaction with them under United States jurisdiction. Second, the announced project would designate the Court as an institution, which would mechanically extend the prohibition to anyone providing it with funds, goods or services, including cloud hosting, banking, insurance, travel and expert services. Third, the grace period of six to seven months, if confirmed, is the only window for European governments, banks and suppliers to reorganise payments and contracts. None of this has been formally published by the Treasury as of 27 September 2026, and the exact scope, licences and exemptions will only be known when the designation notice and the related general licences appear. But the direction is documented by two major news wires, and prudent counsel in Paris must prepare now rather than discover the sanctions on the day a wire transfer to The Hague is rejected.

B. What American sanctions do in practice: blocked property, banned transactions and pressure on foreign banks

An American sanctions designation has two immediate effects under United States law. The property and interests in property of the designated person that are in the United States or in the possession of American persons are blocked, meaning frozen: they cannot be moved, paid out or dealt in without an OFAC licence. And American persons, wherever they are in the world, are prohibited from engaging in transactions with the designated person. Because the dollar clearing system, American software vendors, American cloud providers and American correspondent banks sit at the centre of global finance, the practical reach of these prohibitions goes well beyond American territory. A French company that pays an American cloud provider in dollars to host ICC data, or a French bank that clears a euro payment through a United States correspondent, can find itself facing a choice between violating American sanctions and breaching its European obligations. That dilemma is precisely what the European and French shields described in the second part of this article are designed to resolve.

The pressure does not stop at direct transactions. American sanctions practice adds secondary effects: non-American banks and companies that knowingly facilitate significant transactions for a sanctioned person expose themselves to designation in turn, to exclusion from the American financial system, and to criminal prosecution in the United States for sanctions evasion, conspiracy or money laundering. The United States Department of Justice has repeatedly demonstrated that it will prosecute foreign nationals arrested abroad and extradited to the United States for sanctions-related and financial offences, using extradition treaties, Interpol channels and provisional arrest exactly as in narcotics or cybercrime cases. Anyone in France whose files touch the ICC, Iran, Russia or any sanctioned jurisdiction should therefore treat American extraterritorial enforcement as a real procedural risk, not a theoretical one, and organise their defence file before any arrest request arrives.

There is, however, a limit that American announcements cannot erase: United States sanctions bind American persons and property under American jurisdiction, but they do not bind French persons on French territory, and they do not override French or European law. A French bank is governed first by French and European law, including the European regulations that prohibit compliance with certain foreign sanctions. A French judge seized with an ICC request for assistance or surrender applies French procedural law and the Rome Statute, not Executive Order 14203. And a French lawyer owes duties to the client and to the Court, under the Rome Statute system, that no foreign executive order can dissolve. The remainder of this article shows, text by text, why Paris is not obliged to follow Washington against the ICC, and how persons and companies in France can defend themselves if they are caught between the two.

II. The French shield: ICC cooperation duties, the EU Blocking Statute and defending assets from Paris

A. France must still cooperate with the ICC: surrender proceedings, freezing orders and the anti-terrorism prosecutor

France is a State Party to the Rome Statute and has written ICC cooperation directly into its Code of Criminal Procedure. Article 627-1 provides that requests for assistance from the Court must meet strict formal conditions: “Les demandes d’entraide émanant de la Cour pénale internationale sont adressées aux autorités compétentes en vertu de l’article 87 du statut en original ou en copie certifiée conforme accompagnées de toutes pièces justificatives.” In plain terms, ICC requests must arrive as originals or certified copies with supporting documents, and they are transmitted to the anti-terrorism prosecutor of the Republic, who gives them all useful follow-up: “Ces documents sont transmis au procureur de la République antiterroriste qui leur donne toutes suites utiles.” In urgent cases the documents may even be sent directly to that prosecutor by any means. Nothing in this mechanism gives any role to foreign sanctions: the prosecutor examines the ICC request under French law and the Statute, period.

The same logic governs protective measures over assets. Article 627-3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides that enforcement on French territory of the ICC’s preservation measures is ordered, with Treasury costs advanced, by the anti-terrorism prosecutor, for a maximum of two years renewable at the Court’s request: “L’exécution sur le territoire français des mesures conservatoires mentionnées au k du paragraphe 1 de l’article 93 du statut est ordonnée, aux frais avancés du Trésor et selon les modalités prévues par le présent code, par le procureur de la République antiterroriste.” A person arrested in France on an ICC surrender request must be brought before the territorially competent prosecutor within twenty-four hours, with the full protection of custody rights, and then appears before the prosecutor general at the Paris Court of Appeal within five days at most. Article 627-5 states: “Toute personne appréhendée en vertu d’une demande d’arrestation aux fins de remise doit être déférée dans les vingt-quatre heures au procureur de la République territorialement compétent.” These guarantees apply regardless of what Washington has decided about the ICC’s officials or budget.

French courts also exercise close control over every surrender of a person, and that control is instructive for ICC-related defence work. In European arrest warrant cases, the Criminal Chamber of the Court of Cassation verifies that the issuing warrant is regular and that surrender conditions are met; on 23 November 2022, in a case concerning surrender to the British authorities, it recalled the full procedural path from the investigating chamber to cassation review, the person concerned having refused consent and been placed under judicial supervision. The decision, Cass. crim., 23 November 2022, No. 22-86.162, records that “M. [B] [M] [X] a formé un pourvoi contre l’arrêt de la chambre de l’instruction de la cour d’appel de Bordeaux, en date du 18 octobre 2022, qui a autorisé sa remise aux autorités judiciaires britanniques en exécution d’un mandat d’arrêt européen.” The lesson for ICC surrender files is identical: every step, identity verification, information in a language the person understands, time limits, and judicial review, can be challenged by the defence, and American sanctions against the Court change nothing to these French procedural requirements.

The same firmness applies in extradition law, where French courts condition any surrender on effective guarantees from the requesting State. On 30 January 2024, the Criminal Chamber restated the principle in a Tunisian extradition case: “Le premier de ces textes prohibe l’extradition vers un autre État d’une personne dont il y a des motifs sérieux et avérés de croire qu’elle serait exposée dans le pays de destination à un risque réel d’être soumise à la peine de mort.” The decision, Cass. crim., 30 January 2024, No. 23-83.549, was rendered on the basis of Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights and Articles 696-15 and 593 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. French extradition law itself lists the bars to surrender in Article 696-4, which begins: “L’extradition n’est pas accordée : 1° Lorsque la personne réclamée a la nationalité française, cette dernière étant appréciée à l’époque de l’infraction pour laquelle l’extradition est requise ; 2° Lorsque le crime ou le délit à un caractère politique ou lorsqu’il résulte des circonstances que l’extradition est demandée dans un but politique” And Article 696-15 organises the judicial phase: “Lorsque la personne réclamée a déclaré au procureur général ne pas consentir à son extradition, la chambre de l’instruction est saisie, sans délai, de la procédure.” A French court seized with an ICC surrender request, or with an American extradition request targeting a person for violating ICC-related sanctions, would apply exactly these texts and this case law, not the political reasoning of a foreign sanctions programme.

B. The EU Blocking Statute and the French blocking law: what French banks, companies and lawyers must refuse

European law contains a shield built precisely for this kind of conflict: Council Regulation (EC) No 2271/96, the EU Blocking Statute, which prohibits European operators from complying with certain foreign sanctions, nullifies the effect in Europe of foreign judgments based on them, and allows European companies to recover damages caused by their application. Readers should know its honest limit: the statute today covers listed American measures, principally on Iran and Cuba, and ICC-related designations under Executive Order 14203 are not currently in its annex. Protecting European operators against whole-court ICC sanctions would require the Council to update the annex, a political decision that France, as a States Parties’ leading voice, can push in Brussels. But the mechanism exists, the precedent of its 2018 reactivation against American Iran sanctions is established, and any French company ordered by an American partner to cut ties with the ICC should ask counsel to invoke the statute and to seek clarification from the European Commission without delay.

France, for its part, already has a directly applicable shield that needs no update: Law No. 68-678 of 26 July 1968 on the communication of economic, commercial, industrial, financial or technical documents and information to foreign persons. Its Article 1 prohibits, subject to international treaties, any French national or resident, and any officer or agent of a legal person established in France, from communicating to foreign public authorities documents or information whose disclosure would harm French sovereignty, security, essential economic interests or public order: “Sous réserve des traités ou accords internationaux, il est interdit à toute personne physique de nationalité française ou résidant habituellement sur le territoire français et à tout dirigeant, représentant, agent ou préposé d’une personne morale y ayant son siège ou un établissement de communiquer par écrit, oralement ou sous toute autre forme, en quelque lieu que ce soit, à des autorités publiques étrangères, les documents ou les renseignements d’ordre économique, commercial, industriel, financier ou technique dont la communication est de nature à porter atteinte à la souveraineté, à la sécurité, aux intérêts économiques essentiels de la France ou à l’ordre public, précisés par l’autorité administrative en tant que de besoin.” Article 1 bis goes further and targets exactly the situation of foreign proceedings: “Sous réserve des traités ou accords internationaux et des lois et règlements en vigueur, il est interdit à toute personne de demander, de rechercher ou de communiquer, par écrit, oralement ou sous toute autre forme, des documents ou renseignements d’ordre économique, commercial, industriel, financier ou technique tendant à la constitution de preuves en vue de procédures judiciaires ou administratives étrangères ou dans le cadre de celles-ci.” And Article 2 adds a reporting duty: “Les personnes visées aux articles 1er et 1er bis sont tenues d’informer sans délai le ministre compétent lorsqu’elles se trouvent saisies de toute demande concernant de telles communications.” A French bank or company pressured by an American authority or partner to hand over ICC-related files, to certify compliance with the American ICC sanctions, or to gather evidence for an American sanctions case, is therefore caught by a French prohibition backed by criminal penalties, and must notify the competent minister instead of obeying the foreign demand.

French asset-freeze law completes the picture and shows who decides in Paris. The Monetary and Financial Code defines the framework: Article L562-1 sets the definitions applicable to the chapter, referring to European terrorist-listing Regulation No 2580/2001: Article L562-1 of the Monetary and Financial Code. Article L562-2 allows the ministers for the economy and the interior to order jointly, for six months renewable, the freezing of funds and economic resources belonging to or controlled by persons involved in terrorism: “Le ministre chargé de l’économie et le ministre de l’intérieur peuvent décider, conjointement, pour une durée de six mois, renouvelable, le gel des fonds et ressources économiques” Article L562-3 extends the same six-month renewable mechanism to assets covered by United Nations Security Council resolutions: “Le ministre chargé de l’économie peut décider, pour une durée de six mois, renouvelable, le gel des fonds et ressources économiques” And Article L562-4 designates who must apply freezes without delay and inform the minister: “Sont tenus d’appliquer sans délai les mesures de gel” The key point for our readers: in France, freezes are ordered by French ministers under French and European law, never by a foreign Treasury. No American designation freezes anything by itself in a French bank.

The Court of Cassation confirmed this sovereignty logic in a major 2026 sanctions decision. In a dispute between an arbitral creditor and the Libyan Investment Authority over funds frozen under the Libya sanctions regime, the Second Civil Chamber held that no enforcement measure may be taken against frozen funds without the prior authorisation of the French Treasury, the authority designated for France: “L’autorité compétente pour la France est la Direction générale du Trésor, tel que le prévoit le site internet référencé à l’annexe IV du règlement n° 2016/44.” It added that, given the purpose of the regulation, “ne peut être diligentée, sur des fonds ou des ressources économiques gelés, aucune mesure d’exécution qui aurait pour effet, non seulement de les faire sortir du patrimoine du débiteur, mais aussi de conférer au créancier poursuivant un simple droit de préférence, sans une autorisation préalable du directeur du Trésor” (Cass. 2nd civ., 5 February 2026, No. 23-15.936). Transposed to the ICC crisis, the principle is clear: frozen or not, assets in France move only on French or European orders, through the Directorate General of the Treasury, and any creditor, bank or foreign authority must go through Paris, not Washington.

In practice, persons and companies in France should therefore act on four fronts. First, map exposure: dollar payments, American vendors, correspondent banking, travel to the United States, and contracts requiring compliance with American sanctions. Second, refuse in writing any foreign instruction to cut ties with the ICC or to hand over documents, citing the French blocking law and notifying the competent minister as Article 2 requires. Third, for any frozen funds or blocked transaction, apply to the Directorate General of the Treasury for the applicable European or national authorisation, as the Court of Cassation requires, rather than negotiating directly with a foreign authority. Fourth, if an American extradition or Interpol request arrives in connection with ICC-related sanctions, activate the French defence immediately: identity checks, twenty-four-hour presentation, five-day appearance before the Paris prosecutor general, instruction chamber review, and European Convention arguments. Our firm handles each of these steps from Paris, in English, for international clients, and readers facing European Union sanctions listings will find the complementary procedure in our analysis of the Usmanov and Fridman delisting and the challenge routes available from France.

Conclusion

The American project to sanction the entire International Criminal Court, reported by Reuters on 20 September and detailed by The Wall Street Journal on 21 September 2026, would be the most serious attack ever mounted against the Rome Statute system. If implemented with the announced six-to-seven-month grace period, it would force every bank, software vendor, insurer and service provider working with the Court to choose between the American market and international justice. But that choice is not made in Washington for persons in France. France remains bound by the Rome Statute and by its own Code of Criminal Procedure to receive ICC requests, order ICC preservation measures and surrender persons to The Hague through the anti-terrorism prosecutor and the Paris courts. European law offers the Blocking Statute, which the Council can extend to ICC sanctions, and French law already offers the 1968 blocking law, the Treasury-centred freeze system validated by the Court of Cassation in February 2026, and the full arsenal of extradition and surrender defences. The grace period must be used for exactly this: reorganising payments away from American chokepoints, notifying ministers, seeking Treasury authorisations, and preparing defence files. International justice will survive this crisis if States Parties, starting with France, apply their own law instead of importing someone else’s sanctions.

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