On 3 January 2026, American forces raided Caracas and seized Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro and his wife Cilia Flores. Two days later, the couple were walked past cameras into the Daniel Patrick Moynihan federal courthouse in Manhattan to face charges of narco-terrorism, conspiracy, drug trafficking and money laundering. Maduro has been held in a Brooklyn federal jail ever since, has pleaded not guilty, and will stand trial on 1 June 2027 if his lawyers fail to stop the case. On 2 September 2026, his lawyer Barry Pollack filed the motion the whole world was waiting for before Manhattan-based United States District Judge Alvin Hellerstein: dismiss the indictment, because a sitting head of state enjoys absolute immunity from foreign criminal prosecution. As Reuters reported, Pollack argued that Hellerstein lacked jurisdiction both because sovereign heads of state enjoy complete immunity and because the acts Maduro is accused of formed part of his official duties. This prosecution, he wrote, violates the absolute immunity from criminal jurisdiction to which heads of state and foreign officials acting in their official capacities have been entitled for hundreds of years. The motion turns a drug case into the most important immunity litigation in decades, and it raises a question this firm answers every week for clients arrested far from home: what happens when the way a defendant was seized is as controversial as the charges themselves, and what would a French court do with the same file?
I. Seized in Caracas and Flown to New York: Can a Head of State Be Kidnapped Into Court?
A. What the Manhattan Indictment Alleges and Why the Defence Claims Absolute Immunity
The American file against Nicolas Maduro did not begin with the January raid. Federal prosecutors in Manhattan had indicted him years earlier, accusing the man who ran Venezuela of placing the machinery of the state at the service of cocaine trafficking: protection for shipments, partnerships with armed groups, and the laundering of the proceeds through the international financial system. The charges unsealed around the seizure, narco-terrorism, drug-trafficking conspiracy and money laundering, describe a criminal organisation theory in which the presidency itself was the enterprise. That framing matters because it answers, in advance, the immunity objection. Washington does not present Maduro as a president who committed crimes while governing. It presents him as the head of a trafficking network who happened to occupy a presidential palace, and it asks the court to treat the palace as irrelevant.
The defence motion of 2 September 2026 attacks exactly that framing. Before Judge Hellerstein, Barry Pollack advances two linked arguments. First, a sitting sovereign enjoys complete personal immunity from the criminal jurisdiction of any foreign court, so the Manhattan court has no jurisdiction at all, whatever the charges say. Second, the conduct described in the indictment, meetings with officials, orders given to the armed forces, decisions about borders and ports, was by definition the exercise of official duties, so even the narrower functional immunity that survives departure from office continues to protect him. Reuters summarised the filing in one line that will be quoted in every international law seminar for years: this unprecedented prosecution violates the absolute immunity from criminal jurisdiction to which heads of state and foreign officials acting in their official capacities have been entitled for hundreds of years. The trial date sharpens the stakes. If Hellerstein rejects the motion, opening statements begin on 1 June 2027, and federal prosecutors and defence lawyers are already negotiating that calendar, with reporting in September 2026 describing both sides working toward a June 2027 trial.
Three features make this motion harder than the textbook immunity case. The first is recognition. The United States had for years refused to recognise Maduro as the legitimate president of Venezuela, backing instead his domestic opponents. Pollack’s answer, predictable and doctrinally serious, is that immunity flows from the effective exercise of sovereign power, not from the forum state’s political approval. A government cannot de-recognise a ruler for a decade and then seize him on the theory that he was a private trafficker all along, while keeping the presidency as the factual centre of its own indictment. The second feature is the method of arrival. Maduro was not extradited. No treaty procedure was used, no Venezuelan judge authorised anything, and no American extradition magistrate tested the file before the defendant travelled. He was taken by force in a military operation and flown to New York. The defence has every incentive to argue that a court which arrives at its defendant through a commando raid rather than through a judicial surrender starts its proceedings with a jurisdictional wound. The third feature is precedent, and it is bleak for the defence. As Reuters recalled, in 1990 a federal judge in Miami rejected former Panamanian military leader Manuel Noriega’s attempt to assert head-of-state immunity. Noriega was seized in his own country by American forces, flown to Florida, tried, convicted and imprisoned. Every American prosecutor working the Maduro file knows the Noriega playbook by heart, and every defence lawyer knows that distinguishing it is the whole case.
Around the Manhattan proceedings, two parallel tracks confirm that the immunity question will not stay confined to one courtroom. In February 2026, Argentina asked the United States to extradite Maduro to Buenos Aires to face crimes-against-humanity charges, a request that treats the former president as prosecutable and simply disputes the forum. And the Congressional Research Service devoted a full September 2026 paper to the prosecution, United States v. Maduro, canvassing the court proceedings and the historical precedents, including the motion practice around dismissal and the extradition-treaty arguments inherited from the Noriega era. The picture is therefore not one isolated trial. It is a competition of jurisdictions, New York, Buenos Aires, and potentially The Hague, over the same man, with immunity as the gate through which every forum must pass. That competition is precisely where French procedure has something distinctive to say, because France runs one of the most complete national systems for deciding who may be tried, where, and after what kind of arrest.
B. Why American Courts Usually Try the Seized Defendant Anyway: the Ker-Frisbie Rule and Alvarez-Machain
To understand why Maduro’s lawyers face an uphill fight in Manhattan, one must understand a doctrine American courts have repeated for well over a century: the manner of the arrest, however irregular, does not destroy the jurisdiction of the trial court. The rule comes from two old cases, Ker v. Illinois and Frisbie v. Collins, and it was given its modern and most controversial form in 1992, when the Supreme Court decided United States v. Alvarez-Machain. A Mexican doctor suspected of involvement in the murder of an American drug-enforcement agent had been kidnapped in Mexico by men paid by the United States and delivered to Texas for trial. Mexico protested. The Supreme Court answered that the forcible abduction did not violate the extradition treaty between the two countries, because the treaty said nothing explicit about kidnapping, and that the trial could therefore proceed. The violation of Mexican sovereignty was, in effect, Mexico’s diplomatic problem, not the defendant’s jurisdictional defence.
A remarkable essay published on 7 September 2026 by Carlos Moreno on Verfassungsblog, under the deliberately provocative title America’s Right to Kidnap, explains why that 1992 decision still governs cases like Maduro’s. Moreno shows that the Alvarez-Machain majority did not deny that Mexico’s sovereignty had been violated. It conceded, almost in passing, that the abduction may be in violation of general international law principles, language that belongs to the law of state responsibility. What the Court refused was any automatic transmission of that violation into the American courtroom. Diplomatic protest, yes. A jurisdictional bar, no. For a European reader, Moreno suggests, the most useful key is the old monism-dualism debate inherited from Kelsen: in the American dualist vision, a breach of international law at the border does not automatically become a rule of the domestic trial. The state that ordered the seizure bears no jurisdictional cost for choosing the most coercive available method, because the court treats the violation of another state’s sovereignty as someone else’s problem. That structural incentive, Moreno warns, persists undisturbed, available for reactivation whenever formal channels prove insufficient.
The aftermath of Alvarez-Machain completes the picture and qualifies it. The doctor was acquitted at trial, the evidence proving too thin, and when he sued the United States for his abduction, the Supreme Court rejected his claims in 2004 in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, holding that a single brief detention abroad did not violate a norm definite and universal enough to support damages. The lesson defence lawyers draw is therefore double-edged. An irregular seizure almost never buys dismissal in an American courtroom, but it can corrode the prosecution’s evidence, its witnesses and its legitimacy, and it can generate civil and diplomatic fallout that shapes the trial. Applied to Maduro, the prediction writes itself. Judge Hellerstein is overwhelmingly likely to follow Alvarez-Machain on the seizure point: the January raid, even if it breached international law, does not by itself empty the Manhattan court of jurisdiction. The immunity point is analytically separate and genuinely open, because it concerns not how the defendant arrived but who he is. That separation structures everything that follows. American law keeps the two questions apart and answers the first against the defendant. French law, as the next part shows, keeps them apart too, but examines each with tools American courts do not possess, starting with a judge who must raise immunity on his own motion.
II. Arrested in Paris on the Same File: How French Judges Would Test Immunity and the Arrest
A. Would French Courts Grant a Sitting President Immunity for Drug Charges?
Suppose the connecting flight had stopped at Roissy. Suppose French police, acting on an American extradition request or on a French investigating judge’s own warrant, arrested Nicolas Maduro at Paris Charles de Gaulle while he was still president of Venezuela. The first question a Paris judge would ask is not whether the drug charges look serious. It is whether the man in the dock is a serving head of state, because French law treats that question as a procedural wall the judge must check without being asked. The authority is barely a year old and it comes from the highest possible formation. On 25 July 2025, the Assemblée plénière of the Cour de cassation, Ass. plén., 25 July 2025, no. 24-84.393, ruled on the French arrest warrant issued on 13 November 2023 against the Syrian president over the sarin attacks of August 2013, and it annulled that warrant. The reasoning is now the controlling statement of French immunity law, and every paragraph of it reads as if written for the Maduro file.
The Court begins from first principles: “L’immunité pénale de juridiction procède de l’égalité souveraine des États” (Ass. plén., 25 July 2025, no. 24-84.393). From that foundation it draws the personal immunity rule in its strongest form: “L’immunité personnelle, distincte de l’immunité fonctionnelle, est reconnue aux seuls chef d’État, chef du gouvernement et ministre des affaires étrangères, en exercice. Elle concerne tous les actes accomplis, tant à titre privé qu’à titre officiel” (Ass. plén., 25 July 2025, no. 24-84.393). Two consequences follow that American lawyers find startling. First, the protection covers private acts as well as official ones, so characterising cocaine trafficking as a private criminal enterprise does not escape it. Second, the judge must police the wall himself: “Constituant ainsi un obstacle procédural manifeste à l’exercice de sa compétence par une juridiction nationale, l’immunité personnelle doit être examinée d’office par le juge” (Ass. plén., 25 July 2025, no. 24-84.393). No motion required, no waiver presumed. The European Court of Human Rights, as the decision recalls, endorses the same analysis: “le bénéfice de l’immunité ne doit pas être considéré comme un tempérament à un droit matériel, mais comme un obstacle procédural à la compétence des cours et tribunaux nationaux pour statuer sur ce droit” (ECHR, decision of 23 May 2024, M.M. v. France, no. 13303/21, as recalled in Ass. plén., 25 July 2025, no. 24-84.393).
The 2025 ruling then demolishes, one by one, the three arguments most often raised against a controversial ruler. Non-recognition changes nothing: the Court holds that conditioning immunity on recognition would give every state, democratic or not, discretionary power to authorise criminal proceedings against any foreign head of state, striking at the very substance of personal immunity. Washington’s refusal to recognise Maduro as president would therefore be irrelevant in Paris. Gravity changes nothing either: “en l’état du droit international, les crimes contre l’humanité et les crimes de guerre ne font pas exception au principe de l’immunité de juridiction des chefs d’État étrangers en exercice” (Ass. plén., 25 July 2025, no. 24-84.393). If even sarin attacks on civilians do not pierce the immunity of a serving president, drug-trafficking charges cannot do it. And the Court recalls its own lineage on the point, the 13 March 2001 ruling, no. 00-87.215, published in Bulletin criminel 2001, no. 64, which first stated that customary international law bars proceedings against serving heads of state before the criminal courts of a foreign state. The through-line from 2001 to 2025 is unbroken, and it favours Pollack’s Manhattan motion more than most American commentators admit.
But French law also contains the mechanism that would eventually defeat Maduro, and the same 2025 decision states it with unusual clarity: “L’immunité n’équivaut pas à l’impunité. Elle n’exonère pas la personne qui en bénéficie de sa responsabilité pénale” (Ass. plén., 25 July 2025, no. 24-84.393). Personal immunity is temporary, limited to the duration of the mandate. Timing is therefore everything, and the Court fixes the clock with precision: “la régularité d’un mandat d’arrêt, au regard du droit des immunités, doit s’apprécier en fonction de la situation factuelle au jour de sa délivrance” (Ass. plén., 25 July 2025, no. 24-84.393). In the Syrian case, the warrant had been issued in November 2023 while its target was still in office, so the later fall of the regime could not save it: “la perte par M. [S] de la qualité de chef d’État en exercice postérieurement à l’émission du mandat d’arrêt ne saurait avoir une incidence sur la validité de cet acte”, Ass. plén., 25 July 2025, no. 24-84.393, and the warrant was declared null. Apply that clock to Maduro. An indictment or warrant issued against him while he effectively governed would have been void in Paris. But the man now sitting in a Brooklyn cell is ousted. Personal immunity has expired with the office. What remains is only functional immunity, the protection of official acts, and here the 2025 ruling closes the second door: in its twin decision of the same day, the Assemblée plénière held that functional immunity cannot be opposed to prosecutions for genocide, crimes against humanity or war crimes. Drug trafficking, meanwhile, was never an act of sovereignty in the first place. Running cocaine routes is not governing, even when the presidential palace takes a cut, so Pollack’s fallback argument, that trafficking formed part of official duties, would collapse the moment immunity stopped being personal and became merely functional.
French statute confirms the narrowness of the remaining forum. Article 689-11 of the Code of Criminal Procedure allows French courts to try any person suspected of having committed abroad “Le crime de génocide défini au chapitre Ier du sous-titre Ier du titre Ier du livre II du code pénal”, crimes against humanity, or war crimes, provided the suspect has habitual residence in France. Narco-terrorism is absent from that list, and a trafficker transiting through Roissy has no French residence. The general extension of jurisdiction in article 689 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, under which perpetrators of offences committed outside France may be tried by French courts where an international convention gives France jurisdiction, would need a treaty hook such as the Vienna drug-trafficking convention, and even then only within the convention’s terms. For contrast, the French definition of the gravest crimes shows what universal jurisdiction is really built for: article 212-1 of the Criminal Code punishes with life imprisonment acts “commis en exécution d’un plan concerté à l’encontre d’un groupe de population civile dans le cadre d’une attaque généralisée ou systématique”, from wilful killing to torture. Maduro is accused of moving cocaine, not of exterminating a civilian population, so France would not manufacture a universal-jurisdiction trial for him. It would do something more useful to a defendant: test the foreign request that asks for him.
B. Would a French Judge Throw Out a Case Built on a Cross-Border Seizure?
Assume immunity resolved, the defendant ousted and the charges extraditable in principle. The American request arrives in Paris through diplomatic channels and the file lands before the chambre de l’instruction of the Paris court of appeal. What happens next is the part of French procedure that foreign ministries consistently underestimate: an adversarial, public, reasoned hearing in which the person sought, assisted by counsel with full access to the file, can attack every link of the chain before any minister signs anything. The statutory frame is set by article 696 of the Code of Criminal Procedure: “En l’absence de convention internationale en stipulant autrement, les conditions, la procédure et les effets de l’extradition sont déterminés par les dispositions du présent chapitre.” Between France and the United States there is an extradition treaty, but the statute governs every point the treaty leaves open, and the treaty itself cannot authorise what French public policy forbids.
The paperwork test comes first. Article 696-8 of the Code of Criminal Procedure requires that every request be sent through diplomatic channels “accompagnée soit d’un jugement ou d’un arrêt de condamnation, même par défaut, soit d’un acte de procédure pénale décrétant formellement ou opérant de plein droit le renvoi de la personne poursuivie devant la juridiction répressive, soit d’un mandat d’arrêt ou de tout autre acte ayant la même force et décerné par l’autorité judiciaire, pourvu que ces derniers actes renferment l’indication précise du fait pour lequel ils sont délivrés et la date de ce fait.” A Manhattan indictment and arrest warrant would satisfy that condition without difficulty. But the mandatory bars of article 696-4 of the Code of Criminal Procedure would then each be tested in open court: “L’extradition n’est pas accordée : 1° Lorsque la personne réclamée a la nationalité française, cette dernière étant appréciée à l’époque de l’infraction pour laquelle l’extradition est requise ; 2° Lorsque le crime ou le délit à un caractère politique ou lorsqu’il résulte des circonstances que l’extradition est demandée dans un but politique”. Maduro is not French, so the nationality shield does not apply, though its corollary shows French logic at work: article 113-6 of the Criminal Code provides that “La loi pénale française est applicable à tout crime commis par un Français hors du territoire de la République”, meaning France tries its own instead of surrendering them. The political-offence argument would be pleaded hard by any defence team, a January military raid followed by a prosecution arguably serving a regime-change policy, but drug trafficking for profit is classically treated as common crime, and the chambre de l’instruction would likely hold that cocaine is not politics even when presidents sell it.
The decisive French filter would more probably be the fair-trial guarantee. Article 696-4 continues its list of mandatory refusals with two provisions made for cases like this one: extradition is refused where the offence is punishable in the requesting state by a penalty contrary to French public policy, and where the person would be tried by a court failing to ensure fundamental procedural guarantees and defence rights. A defence team would argue that a prosecution built on a cross-border military seizure, with years of Brooklyn pre-trial detention already served and a docket shaped by intelligence rather than judicial investigation, cannot promise the adversarial fairness Paris demands. French courts do not apply this test rhetorically. They examine prison conditions, delay, access to counsel and the independence of the trial court, and they give unfavourable opinions that ministers must then either follow or publicly override. Nullity doctrine reinforces the same discipline inside French proceedings: article 171 of the Code of Criminal Procedure states that “Il y a nullité lorsque la méconnaissance d’une formalité substantielle prévue par une disposition du présent code ou toute autre disposition de procédure pénale a porté atteinte aux intérêts de la partie qu’elle concerne.” A French judge seized of a file poisoned by an unlawful foreign arrest would not ask, as Manhattan does, whether the poison travelled with the defendant. He would ask whether a substantial formality was breached and whether the defence’s interests suffered, and an affirmative answer annuls.
Finally, French law would audit the chain of consents with a strictness the Maduro file, produced by force rather than by surrender, could never satisfy. The Cour de cassation recalled the specialty rule in Cass. crim., 2 December 2020, no. 19-87.428: “Le second énonce que, lorsque le ministère public qui a délivré un mandat d’arrêt européen a obtenu la remise de la personne recherchée, celle-ci ne peut être extradée vers un Etat non membre de l’Union européenne sans le consentement de l’autorité compétente de l’Etat membre qui l’a remise.” No Venezuelan authority consented to anything, so there is no scope of surrender to police, and every additional count Manhattan might add, from weapons to immigration charges, would arrive without the producing state’s agreement. That is the deepest French lesson of the Maduro affair. Extradition is a paper bridge between two sovereigns, and each plank, the warrant, the consent, the specialty limit, the fair-trial guarantee, must hold before anyone walks across. A military helicopter carries no paper. American courts may let the passenger stay for trial anyway. A Paris chambre de l’instruction would send the file back until the paper exists, and that refusal, reasoned and public, is itself a form of international justice.
Conclusion
Nicolas Maduro will probably lose his immunity motion in Manhattan and face a New York jury on 1 June 2027. Alvarez-Machain protects the seizure, Noriega buries the immunity claim as American judges read it, and the distinction between personal immunity, which died with the presidency, and functional immunity, which never covered trafficking, does the rest of the prosecution’s work. Yet the French mirror held up in this analysis changes what victory means. In Paris, the same file would have passed through three gates Manhattan never built: a judge obliged to examine immunity on his own motion, an adversarial extradition hearing testing every mandatory bar from nationality to fair-trial guarantees, and a chain-of-consents audit that force cannot supply. The Assemblée plénière’s July 2025 ruling gives the defence its strongest paragraph and the prosecution its strongest page. Immunity is absolute while the office lasts, even for the gravest crimes, even without recognition, and it is examined ex officio. But immunity is not impunity, the clock stops when the office ends, and trafficking was never an act of state. For anyone facing a cross-border file, from an executive detained in transit to a banker named in a foreign indictment, the method is the message this firm applies daily. Challenge who the defendant was when the warrant issued before challenging anything else, because immunity decides whether there is a case at all. Attack the arrest and the surrender separately from the charges, because the bridge matters as much as the destination. Count every mandatory bar in the requested state’s statute, because one solid refusal ends an extradition that ten weak arguments cannot. And test the penalty and the forum before the trial, because a court that would try you unfairly is a court you must never reach. Seized in Caracas, tried in Manhattan: the law of nations allowed it. In Paris, it would first have had to survive the paper.