KOHEN AVOCATS FIRM · PARIS 16
EU Court: Autocracy Alone Cannot Freeze Your Company — How to Challenge a Sanctions Freeze From France

Hassan KOHEN acts in urgent matters, from the police station to the assize court. Initial strategic analysis: €80 incl. VAT, personal reply within 24 hours.

100% confidential · Legal professional privilege · No obligation

Article generated by artificial intelligence, through a process designed and supervised by the firm

Source: French Court of Cassation – Judilibre and Légifrance open data

Paris Bar Police custody, investigation, assize court CNB listing avocat.fr
Maître Hassan KOHEN, avocat au Barreau de Paris
Hassan KOHEN
Attorney at the Paris Bar

EU Court: Autocracy Alone Cannot Freeze Your Company — How to Challenge a Sanctions Freeze From France

Speak to a lawyer 06 89 11 34 45

On 3 September 2026, the Court of Justice of the European Union handed down the most practical sanctions judgment of the year for any company doing business anywhere near Russian capital. In Inter Rao Lietuva (C-147/25), the Fifth Chamber ruled that the autocratic and oligarchic nature of the Russian political regime does not, on its own, justify freezing the assets of a company that nobody has listed. A national authority that freezes a non-listed company must prove, with objective and sufficiently solid evidence, that the funds truly belong to, or are held or controlled by, a listed person. Fifteen days later, on 18 September 2026, the General Court dismissed Roman Trotsenko’s application to annul his own EU listing (Trotsenko v Council, T-459/24), a win for the Council decided on entirely different grounds. Two courts, two directions, one September: Luxembourg tightened the evidential screws on national freezes while leaving the Council’s listing power intact. For a company director or shareholder who discovers a frozen account in Paris, this distinction is the whole case. This analysis explains the 3 September ruling line by line, contrasts it with the 18 September dismissal, and sets out the exact playbook for challenging a freeze from France, from the first call to the bank to interim relief before the French judge.

I. The Luxembourg ruling every frozen company must read: autocracy is background, not proof

A. How Vilnius froze a company nobody had listed: the 51 percent chain to Moscow

Inter Rao Lietuva is an electricity trading and supply company active in Lithuania. It was never named in the annex to Council Decision 2014/145/CFSP or in Annex I to Council Regulation (EU) No 269/2014 of 17 March 2014 concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine. Yet the Lithuanian authority, the FNTT, placed the company on a national list of persons with links to sanctioned persons and froze its shares, then, on 1 June 2022, its immovable property. The reasoning was a chain on paper: 51 percent of Inter Rao Lietuva’s share capital belonged to Rao Nordic Oy, a company incorporated under Finnish law, which was itself wholly owned by Inter Rao Ues, a company incorporated under Russian law. The FNTT broke down the Russian parent’s capital as follows: Rosneftegaz with a 26.37 percent stake, Inter Rao Capital Group with a 29.56 percent stake, minority shareholders listed on the Moscow stock exchange with a 34.24 percent stake, and the joint stock company FGC UES with an 8.57 percent stake. Because the main shareholders were undertakings indirectly owned by the Russian Federation, and the Russian Head of State was himself subject to restrictive measures pursuant to Council Decision 2022/331, the FNTT concluded that Inter Rao Lietuva was linked to a listed person and froze everything.

The company applied to the FNTT on 12 and 30 May 2022 to be removed from the national list. By Decision No 1 of 27 May 2022 and Decision No 2 of 23 June 2022, the FNTT refused, finding no legal basis to delist. The Lithuanian courts were seized, and the Supreme Administrative Court of Lithuania stayed proceedings and referred three questions to Luxembourg on 17 February 2025, registered as request for a preliminary ruling C-147/25 Inter Rao Lietuva. The referring court asked, first, whether a non-listed person may be frozen at national level with only an ex post objection procedure; second, whether limited judicial review confined to manifest error satisfies the right to effective judicial protection under Article 47 of the Charter; and third, what standard of proof applies to links with sanctioned persons, and whether the autocratic character of the Russian regime can itself establish control. The court recalled the governing standard from the 21 April 2015 Anbouba v Council judgment (C-605/13 P): links with sanctioned persons must be shown by “objective and sufficiently solid evidence” capable of reasonably supporting the conclusion that such links exist. It added that the FNTT had relied on paragraphs 34 and 62 of Council Document No 8519/18 of 4 May 2018, the EU Best Practices for the effective implementation of restrictive measures, on ownership and control criteria. Advocate General Campos Sanchez-Bordona delivered his Opinion on 26 February 2026, and the Fifth Chamber, Judge-Rapporteur Smulders, gave judgment on 3 September 2026, ECLI:EU:C:2026:691. As Euronews summarised the same day, autocratic rule alone is not enough to freeze assets, and national authorities need solid, objective proof of actual control. That summary is accurate, but the full judgment says more, and the more is what wins cases.

B. What the Court actually held: three answers that redraw every challenge

The first answer concerns procedure. The Court held that Article 2(1) of Decision 2014/145 and Article 2(1) of Regulation No 269/2014, read with the principle of good administration, allow a national measure that puts a non-listed legal person on a domestic freeze list where the targeted funds belong to, or are held, owned or controlled by, a person named in the EU annexes, even if the company can only object to the national authority after being listed. In plain terms, a Member State may run its own implementing freeze list covering non-listed persons, and an objection procedure available only after the listing does not by itself breach EU law. The freeze is lawful in form if it is anchored to a listed person. Everything therefore turns on whether that anchor is real, which is the subject of the second and third answers.

The second answer concerns the intensity of judicial review. The Court then held that those provisions, read with the Article 47 Charter right to effective judicial protection, tolerate national review limited to the statement of reasons, the accuracy of the facts, manifest error in their assessment, compliance with procedural rules and absence of misuse of powers, with no inquiry into whether the freeze is necessary for the national security of the Member State. A review for reasons, accurate facts, manifest error, procedure and misuse of powers is enough. The judge does not second-guess the security necessity. For applicants, this means the fight is evidential, not political: attack the facts and the reasoning, never the foreign policy.

The third answer is the one that will be cited for years. The decisive holding is that courts may weigh circumstances showing the reality and effectiveness of informal control by a listed government representative over persons with dominant influence in the company, but only where their finding rests on objective and sufficiently solid evidence which, taken as a whole and in its context, supports the conclusion that the company actually meets one of the Article 2(1) criteria. Informal control counts, but only on proof. The referring court, the judgment continues, must satisfy itself that the FNTT proved, on an objective and sufficiently solid basis, through direct evidence or a sufficiently specific, precise and consistent body of indicia, that Inter Rao Lietuva sits in a situation where the Head of State can influence its decisions, even with no legal or equity tie. Then comes the passage that decided the case: The Court describes an autocratic and oligarchic regime wielding effective if informal control over economic operators, such that the President with de facto unlimited powers can control persons and firms in Russia, does not constitute sufficiently solid evidence of control over that company within the meaning of Article 2(1) of Regulation No 269/2014. The Court added that review cannot rest on the abstract plausibility of the alleged control, and that a general statement about autocracy does not show that the Head of State can specifically and actually influence the decisions of Inter Rao Lietuva.

Two qualifications keep the ruling balanced, and both matter for strategy. First, the autocratic context is not irrelevant: the Court accepts that an autocratic and oligarchic system may count as “one aspect of the background” for evaluating evidence, while insisting that such an observation cannot replace proof of the control described in Article 2(1) of Decision 2014/145 and Article 2(1) of Regulation No 269/2014. Background, not substitute. Second, concrete ownership facts remain usable: the referring court may treat a Russian State-owned undertaking’s direct or indirect stake as “relevant objective evidence”. And where a Russian company owns more than 50 percent through an intermediary, genuine influence over the Lithuanian company could be regarded as established, but freezing on the ground of links with the President additionally requires objective and sufficiently solid proof that he can genuinely influence the decisions of Inter Rao Lietuva. The ruling, ECLI:EU:C:2026:691, is published on Curia under case C-147/25 Inter Rao Lietuva. The file now returns to Vilnius, where the Lithuanian court must apply this test to the FNTT’s evidence. Any authority in the Union defending a comparable freeze, including in France, must now pass the same test.

II. How to challenge a freeze from France after 3 September 2026

A. Why losing your listing case is not the same as losing your freeze case: Trotsenko and the two tracks

On 18 September 2026, the sanctions bar received the apparent counter-signal: the General Court dismissed Roman Trotsenko’s application to annul his Russia sanctions designation, Trotsenko v Council, T-459/24. The Council had listed him in 2024 under Articles 3(1)(f) and (g) of the EU Russia sanctions listing criteria, and the Court let the listing stand. Commentators hostile to any challenge will cite this dismissal as proof that Luxembourg always backs the Council. That reading confuses two different tracks that obey two different burdens of proof, and the confusion costs clients their cases.

Track one is the listed person’s annulment action in Luxembourg. The applicant attacks his own designation, and the Council defends its assessment with the file it built at listing and each renewal. Review is deferential by design: statement of reasons, accurate facts, no manifest error. A businessman who meets a published listing criterion, on evidence the Council can show a judge, loses, as Trotsenko did. Track two is the non-listed company’s fight against a national implementing freeze, the Inter Rao Lietuva situation. There the authority extends a freeze beyond the annexes on the theory that the target’s funds belong to or are controlled by someone listed. Since 3 September 2026, that extension must rest on “objective and sufficiently solid evidence” assessed as a whole and in context, supporting the conclusion that the company actually meets one of the freezing criteria. The Council’s file on the listed person is not enough; the authority needs a file on the link, specific to the frozen company, showing real ability to influence its decisions. An ownership chart plus a paragraph about autocracy fails that test expressly. This is why the two September outcomes coexist without contradiction: deference to the Council on who is listed, strict proof from the national authority on who is merely linked.

The context makes the distinction urgent. Brussels had blacklisted around 3,000 individuals and entities under the Russia regime, with the package up for extension in mid-September 2026, and September also brought the usual wave of renewal litigation in Luxembourg. Companies check the annexes, find their name absent, and assume they are safe, until a bank in Paris blocks the account by reference to a national implementing measure or an expansive reading of ownership and control. The first reflex must be to identify which track the file is on. If you are listed, the remedy is an annulment action and a delisting request in Brussels, judged on the Council’s file. If you are not listed but frozen, the remedy is a national challenge judged on the authority’s file about you, and Inter Rao Lietuva is now the controlling precedent. Pleading the wrong track, for example asking a French judge to second-guess the Council’s listing of your shareholder, loses. Pleading the right track, forcing the authority to produce company-specific evidence of control, is how freezes fall.

B. The Paris playbook: bank, Treasury, judge, and the 72-hour file

EU regulations are directly applicable in France, but the freeze lands through French machinery that every practitioner must map before acting. The domestic framework sits in the Monetary and Financial Code. Definitions come first: Article L562-1 of the Monetary and Financial Code defines the funds and economic resources concerned, from cash and deposits to financial instruments and insurance values. The freeze power for international sanctions belongs to the Minister for the Economy: Article L562-3 of the Monetary and Financial Code provides that “Le ministre chargé de l’économie peut décider, pour une durée de six mois, renouvelable, le gel des fonds et ressources économiques” belonging to, held or controlled by persons designated under United Nations Chapter VII resolutions or acts adopted under Article 29 of the Treaty on European Union, or entities owned or controlled by them or acting knowingly for them. The parallel terrorism power is joint: Article L562-2 of the Monetary and Financial Code provides that “Le ministre chargé de l’économie et le ministre de l’intérieur peuvent décider, conjointement, pour une durée de six mois, renouvelable, le gel des fonds et ressources économiques” In practice the company learns of the freeze from its bank, because Article L562-4 of the Monetary and Financial Code provides that the persons concerned “Sont tenus d’appliquer sans délai les mesures de gel” are bound to apply freeze measures without delay and to inform the minister immediately. Around that core sit two prohibitions: Article L562-5 of the Monetary and Financial Code states that “Il est interdit aux personnes mentionnées à l’article L. 562-4 de mettre à disposition directement ou indirectement, ou d’utiliser des fonds ou ressources économiques au profit des personnes dont les fonds et ressources économiques font l’objet d’une mesure de gel”, and Article L562-6 of the Monetary and Financial Code punishes knowing circumvention, prohibiting participation “de participer, sciemment et volontairement, à des activités ayant pour objet ou pour effet de contourner les mesures”. Two further provisions shape litigation: Article L562-9 of the Monetary and Financial Code requires that ministerial decisions “sont publiées par extrait au Journal officiel et sont exécutoires à compter de leur date de publication”; publication starts time running, and Article L562-10 of the Monetary and Financial Code makes freezes effective against third parties, since measures “sont opposables à tout tiers qui peut invoquer un droit sur les fonds ou ressources économiques faisant l’objet d’une mesure de gel, y compris lorsque ce droit est né antérieurement auxdites mesures.” Banks also operate under their reporting duty: Article L561-15 of the Monetary and Financial Code obliges them “de déclarer au service mentionné à l’article L. 561-23 les sommes inscrites dans leurs livres ou les opérations portant sur des sommes dont elles savent, soupçonnent ou ont de bonnes raisons de soupçonner” a criminal origin or terrorist-financing link. The file therefore has three layers from day one: the EU regulation, the French implementing decision, and the bank’s compliance reading, and a challenge must address each layer separately.

The first 72 hours decide the trajectory. Secure the exact decision: the EU listing or the French order, the Journal officiel extract, the Treasury notice, and the bank’s written explanation with the precise criterion invoked. Then write immediately to the bank and to the Treasury unit handling freezes, requesting the freezing decision, the company-specific evidence relied upon, and the procedure for authorisation or release for essential payments. That last request has a solid legal footing: Article 4 of Regulation No 269/2014 lets the competent authorities of the Member States authorise the release of frozen funds, including funds for basic needs such as food, rent, medicine, taxes and utilities, and funds exclusively for reasonable legal fees and related expenses. Payroll, tax, suppliers and counsel fees travel through this door while the merits are fought. Cite the 3 September 2026 Inter Rao Lietuva ruling in that first letter and invite the authority to confirm whether the freeze rests on anything beyond the group chart and someone else’s listing. Many files move at this stage, because no authority enjoys defending a thin file before a judge holding a same-month precedent.

On the merits, the French judge applies Regulation No 269/2014 as interpreted by the Court of Justice, so plead the new threshold head-on: no freeze of a non-listed company on indirect linkage alone, requirement of objective and solid evidence assessed individually, duty to state company-specific reasons, and review for manifest error. Attach the corporate memo, the absence of flows to the listed person, the autonomy of management, and the disclosure requests left unanswered. French case law shows what a sufficient file looks like from the authority’s side, which tells you exactly what to demand. In CAA Paris, 3rd chamber, 26 May 2021, No 20PA02484, the court upheld the renewal of a six-month ministerial freeze because the order stated its grounds in detail, so that the applicant, who could know the reasons from reading the decision alone, “n’est pas fondé à soutenir que l’arrêté contesté serait insuffisamment motivé.” The minister had relied on an intelligence memorandum debated adversarially, a note “versée au débat contradictoire,” and the court examined its content. The lesson for applicants is direct: force the authority to put its memorandum, its intercepts, its ownership analysis on the table in adversarial proceedings. A freeze defended only by a shareholding diagram and generalities about a foreign regime no longer survives the Inter Rao Lietuva test, but a freeze supported by specific, precise and consistent indicia of real influence does, and you need to see which one you face before choosing between negotiation, interim relief and a full merits action. Where the freeze threatens the life of the business, interim relief is available: Article L521-1 of the Code of Administrative Justice allows the urgent judge, once an annulment action is filed, to order that “le juge des référés, saisi d’une demande en ce sens, peut ordonner la suspension de l’exécution de cette décision, ou de certains de ses effets, lorsque l’urgence le justifie” once shown. File the annulment and the suspension together, with payroll, tax deadlines and perishable contracts exhibited.

Two warnings close the playbook. First, this judgment is not an amnesty. Files showing real control by a listed person, real benefit flows, or post-listing circumvention survive, and cosmetic restructurings that paper over unchanged control aggravate exposure and destroy credibility. Second, the banking relationship needs separate treatment after release: banks keep their own risk appetite and often maintain enhanced monitoring once a freeze ends, so serve the release decision with a concise legal memorandum explaining the individual assessment now required, the compliance upgrades adopted, and a request for written confirmation that accounts and flags are restored. A purely commercial refusal after the legal freeze ends is a different dispute from a sanctions obligation, with different remedies. The companies that gain most from September 2026 will be those that file a precise, exhibit-backed challenge within days, forcing the authority to prove its case before a judge who now knows exactly what proof looks like.

Conclusion

September 2026 redrew the map of sanctions litigation in the Union. The Court of Justice confirmed that Member States may freeze non-listed persons at national level and that limited manifest-error review satisfies the Charter, which preserves the effectiveness of the regime. But it conditioned every such freeze on company-specific, objective and sufficiently solid evidence of real control, relegating the autocratic character of a foreign regime to background context and rejecting guilt by ownership chart. The General Court’s dismissal in Trotsenko fifteen days later changed nothing for frozen non-listed companies; it confirmed only that listed persons face a different, deferential track. For anyone frozen in France, the consequences are immediate: demand the written company-specific grounds, test them against paragraphs 85 to 90 of Inter Rao Lietuva, secure Article 4 authorisations for survival expenditure, and bring the thin files to the judge quickly. Authorities across the Union, including in Paris, are already re-reasoning their files to meet the new standard. Applicants who move first, with exhibits rather than slogans, will decide which freezes survive it.

📄 Official circular