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Nicaragua v. Germany at the ICJ: Can a Weapons Supplier Answer for Genocide — and What France Would Face Next

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Source: French Court of Cassation – Judilibre and Légifrance open data

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Nicaragua v. Germany at the ICJ: Can a Weapons Supplier Answer for Genocide — and What France Would Face Next

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On 22 September 2026, Germany filed written comments with the International Court of Justice in the case Nicaragua brought against it over the war in Gaza, six days after Nicaragua answered a question put by Judge Hilary Charlesworth. Twelve days earlier, four days of public hearings on Germany’s preliminary objections had closed at the Peace Palace in The Hague. The Court is now deliberating behind closed doors on a question that comes before any discussion of the merits: can a state that is not itself a party to an armed conflict be hauled before the World Court for allegedly helping another state commit genocide? For an international audience, and in particular for anyone exposed to French jurisdiction, the answer matters far beyond Berlin and Managua. France is bound by the same Genocide Convention, licenses its own arms exports, and prosecutes genocide and crimes against humanity committed abroad in its own courts. This analysis explains what Nicaragua claims, why Germany says the case should be thrown out, and what the French criminal code and the Cour de cassation already say about the same underlying conduct.

I. Why Is Nicaragua Suing Germany Before the World Court Over Gaza?

A. What Does Nicaragua Accuse Germany of Doing?

On 1 March 2024, Nicaragua filed an application instituting proceedings against Germany before the International Court of Justice, alleging violations by Germany of its obligations under the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide and under international humanitarian law, in connection with the conflict in Gaza. The case is listed on the Court’s docket as Alleged Breaches of Certain International Obligations in respect of the Occupied Palestinian Territory (Nicaragua v. Germany), and its procedural history is published in full on the ICJ case page for case number 193.

Nicaragua’s central allegation, as reported by Al Jazeera when the September 2026 hearings opened, is that Germany violated its obligations under the 1948 Genocide Convention by providing Israel with military equipment despite being aware of the risk that genocide could be committed in Gaza, and that it also breached international humanitarian law. When it filed the case in March 2024, Nicaragua stated, as reported by Al Jazeera, that by sending military equipment and suspending funding to UNRWA, Germany was facilitating the commission of genocide. The reference to UNRWA concerned Germany’s decision, taken together with several other donor states in early 2024, to suspend funding to the United Nations agency for Palestine refugees after allegations against some of its staff, a decision Nicaragua presented as part of the same pattern of conduct.

The factual premise of the claim rests on Germany’s weight as an arms supplier. As Al Jazeera noted, Germany is Israel’s biggest arms supplier after the United States, which gives the case an economic and political dimension well beyond a bilateral dispute between two states that are neither directly involved in the fighting in Gaza. Nicaragua’s argument is therefore structural: a third state that equips one side of a conflict, knowing the risk of mass atrocities, could itself engage its international responsibility under the Genocide Convention, whose contracting parties undertake not only to refrain from genocide but to prevent and punish it.

The case has already survived one decisive round. In April 2024, at the height of the war in Gaza, Nicaragua asked the Court to indicate emergency provisional measures, including an order halting German weapons exports to Israel. The Court declined to indicate the measures Nicaragua had requested, so exports continued, but it also refused to throw the case out at the earliest stage, keeping Germany in the proceedings. As DW summarised the position on the eve of the September 2026 hearings, the initial bid for an emergency injunction failed in 2024, but Germany also failed in its bid to have the case summarily and permanently dismissed at the earliest opportunity. Both sides therefore arrived in The Hague in September 2026 with everything still to play for.

The broader Hague context adds to the stakes. A separate case brought by South Africa against Israel, alleging genocide in Gaza, is still pending before the same Court, and the International Criminal Court, a different institution trying individuals rather than states, has issued arrest warrants in connection with the conflict. The Nicaragua case is nevertheless distinct: it does not ask the Court to rule on whether Israel committed genocide, but whether Germany, as a supplier and donor state, breached its own distinct obligations. Nicaragua’s agent before the Court, Carlos Jose Arguello Gomez, appeared at the Peace Palace on 7 September 2026 to argue that this question deserves a full hearing on the merits.

For readers in France, one procedural detail deserves emphasis. The hearings held from 7 to 10 September 2026 did not decide whether Germany violated international law. As Al Jazeera’s explainer put it, they will determine whether the case can move towards a fuller examination of the allegations. That is the function of preliminary objections in The Hague: a respondent state may argue, before any witness is heard and before any document is disclosed on the merits, that the Court lacks jurisdiction or that the claim is inadmissible. If Germany prevails, the case ends without any finding on the arms exports themselves. If Germany loses, the case enters a merits phase that would likely take years, contingent in part on the findings from the separate Gaza-related cases pending in The Hague.

B. Why Does Germany Say the Case Should Never Reach Trial?

Germany asked the International Court of Justice to dismiss the case on jurisdiction grounds and to reject Nicaragua’s claims in full. Its line of defence, presented during the September hearings, combines a procedural attack with a substantive denial. On procedure, Berlin argues that Nicaragua did not take the proper steps before seizing the Court and that much of the dispute falls outside the Court’s jurisdiction. On substance, it denies that its arms-export policy could be characterised as assistance to genocide and points to the strictness of its own licensing system.

The German position was stated plainly in the courtroom. Julia Monar, legal adviser to the German Foreign Ministry, told the judges that Germany respectfully asked the Court to reject Nicaragua’s claims in their entirety, as reported by DW. On the export-control system itself, she added that all German weapons exports to Israel and other countries undergo strict review procedures going beyond international standards. The argument invokes Germany’s intentionally restrictive weapons-export policies adopted after the Second World War, under which each licence is documented, published, and reviewed against human-rights and international-law criteria. In mid-May 2026, the Bundestag published figures showing that between November 2025, shortly after a truce was brokered, and March 2026, exports to Israel worth around 167 million euros, roughly 194 million dollars, had been approved, figures DW cited as evidence that the trade is public and traceable rather than clandestine.

Nicaragua answers that the Convention itself founds jurisdiction. Its position, again as summarised by DW, is that the case should be heard because both states are signatories to the Genocide Convention, even though neither is directly involved in the fighting between Israel and Hamas and even though the Court’s ruling on whether genocidal acts occurred in Gaza could itself take years. In other words, Managua treats the compromissory clause of the Genocide Convention, the provision by which contracting parties accept the Court’s jurisdiction over disputes about the Convention’s interpretation and application, as sufficient to open the door, regardless of the position of Israel, which is not a party to these proceedings.

The Court’s handling of the case since the hearings shows how seriously it takes the preliminary phase. According to the official docket, the public hearings on the preliminary objections concluded on 10 September 2026, as recorded in press release 2026/23 of 10 September 2026. The judges then put a question to the parties through Judge Charlesworth. Nicaragua filed its written reply on 16 September 2026, and Germany filed written comments on that reply on 22 September 2026. Both filings are listed on the case page as part of the preliminary-objections procedure. The Court is now deliberating, and its ruling will take one of two forms: either it upholds Germany’s objections, in whole or in part, and the case ends there or continues in narrowed form, or it rejects them and orders proceedings on the merits, opening years of written pleadings, oral argument, and eventually a judgment on state responsibility.

Three cautions are essential at this stage, and they shape everything that follows. First, no court has found that Germany committed, aided, or facilitated genocide; the allegation remains exactly that, an allegation contested by Berlin. Second, the preliminary-objections phase tests jurisdiction and admissibility, not the truth of the arms-export figures or the legality of any particular licence. Third, even a decision sending the case to the merits would decide nothing about individual criminal guilt, which belongs to criminal courts, not to the Court that settles disputes between states. With those reserves stated, the French dimension of the story can be addressed precisely, because France has equipped itself with one of the most detailed legal arsenals in Europe for prosecuting the very crimes discussed in The Hague.

II. What Would Happen in France if Such a Case Landed in Paris?

A. How Can French Courts Prosecute Genocide Committed Abroad?

Unlike the International Court of Justice, which judges states, French courts judge individuals, and they may do so for atrocities committed thousands of kilometres from France. The French Criminal Code defines genocide in terms that mirror the 1948 Convention. Article 211-1 of the Criminal Code provides, in its exact words: “Constitue un génocide le fait, en exécution d’un plan concerté tendant à la destruction totale ou partielle d’un groupe national, ethnique, racial ou religieux”. The provision then lists the covered acts, wilful killing, grave attacks on physical or mental integrity, subjection to conditions of existence likely to destroy the group, measures to prevent births, and forcible transfer of children, and punishes genocide with life imprisonment. Crimes against humanity are defined next door. Article 212-1 of the Criminal Code punishes with life imprisonment acts “commis en exécution d’un plan concerté à l’encontre d’un groupe de population civile dans le cadre d’une attaque généralisée ou systématique”, followed by an enumeration running from murder and extermination to torture, sexual violence, persecution, enforced disappearance, and apartheid.

The gateway for prosecuting such crimes when committed outside France is the Code of Criminal Procedure. Article 689 of the Code of Criminal Procedure states the general principle in full: “Les auteurs ou complices d’infractions commises hors du territoire de la République peuvent être poursuivis et jugés par les juridictions françaises soit lorsque, conformément aux dispositions du livre Ier du code pénal ou d’un autre texte législatif, la loi française est applicable, soit lorsqu’une convention internationale ou un acte pris en application du traité instituant les Communautés européennes donne compétence aux juridictions françaises pour connaître de l’infraction.” In plain English, French courts may try perpetrators or accomplices of offences committed abroad either where French law declares itself applicable or where an international convention confers jurisdiction on them. The Genocide Convention, the Convention against Torture, and the Geneva Conventions are among the treaties that open this door.

Two specialised provisions show how the mechanism works in practice. Article 689-2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, adopted for the Convention against Torture signed in New York on 10 December 1984, provides: “Pour l’application de la convention contre la torture et autres peines ou traitements cruels, inhumains ou dégradants, adoptée à New York le 10 décembre 1984, peut être poursuivie et jugée dans les conditions prévues à l’article 689-1 toute personne coupable de tortures au sens de l’article 1er de la convention.” The Cour de cassation clarified the boundaries of this provision in a published ruling of 12 May 2023, holding, in the exact words of its reasoning: “Il s’en déduit que le cas de compétence universelle de l’article 689-2 précité est limité aux tortures imputées à un agent de la fonction publique ou une personne agissant à titre officiel ou à son instigation ou avec son consentement exprès ou tacite.” The full reasoning of the 12 May 2023 ruling on Article 689-2 extends the notion of a person acting in an official capacity to individuals acting for a non-governmental entity exercising quasi-governmental authority over a territory, a point that matters whenever atrocities are committed by armed groups rather than regular armies.

The broadest tool is Article 689-11 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which gives French courts universal jurisdiction over genocide, other crimes against humanity, and war crimes committed abroad. Its opening words are: “peut être poursuivie et jugée par les juridictions françaises toute personne soupçonnée d’avoir commis à l’étranger l’une des infractions suivantes”, followed by genocide as defined in the Criminal Code, other crimes against humanity, and war crimes. Three locks frame this jurisdiction. First, the suspect must be habitually resident in France: “La personne soupçonnée doit avoir une résidence habituelle sur le territoire français”. Second, prosecution may only be initiated at the request of the public prosecutor, which excludes direct summons by a victim for these charges. Third, the prosecutor must verify subsidiarity, ensuring no prosecution by the International Criminal Court is under way: “le ministère public s’assure de l’absence de poursuite diligentée par la Cour pénale internationale et vérifie qu’aucune autre juridiction internationale compétente pour juger la personne n’a demandé sa remise et qu’aucun autre Etat n’a demandé son extradition.”

The case law shows these provisions are not theoretical. In a published judgment of 6 January 1998 concerning a Rwandan resident of the Ardèche prosecuted for genocide and crimes against humanity committed in Rwanda in 1994, the Criminal Chamber of the Cour de cassation held, in the exact words of its reasoning: “Attendu que, selon les articles 1er et 2 de la loi du 22 mai 1996 précitée, les auteurs ou complices des actes qui constituent, au sens des articles 2 à 4 du statut du tribunal international, des infractions graves aux Conventions de Genève du 12 août 1949, des violations des lois ou coutumes de guerre, un génocide ou des crimes contre l’humanité, peuvent, s’ils sont trouvés en France, être poursuivis et jugés par les juridictions françaises, en application de la loi française ;” The 6 January 1998 ruling on the prosecution in France of the Rwandan genocide remains the founding illustration that a person found in France may be tried there for genocide committed abroad.

A quarter of a century later, the full Assembly of the Cour de cassation refined one of the most litigated conditions of Article 689-11, dual criminality. In its plenary ruling of 12 May 2023 on dual criminality, concerning a Syrian national investigated in Paris for torture and crimes against humanity, the Court held, in the exact words of its plenary reasoning: “Il y a donc lieu de retenir que la condition de double incrimination, exigée pour la poursuite des crimes contre l’humanité et des crimes et délits de guerre, n’implique pas que la qualification pénale des faits soit identique dans les deux législations, mais requiert seulement qu’ils soient incriminés par l’une et l’autre.” It added: “La condition d’incrimination par la loi étrangère peut être remplie au travers d’une infraction de droit commun constituant la base du crime poursuivi, tels le meurtre, le viol ou la torture”. In other words, France does not require the foreign state to possess a crime-against-humanity statute; ordinary offences such as murder, rape, or torture in the foreign criminal code can satisfy the condition, provided the contextual element, concerted plan against a civilian population, is established in France under Articles 212-1 and following of the Criminal Code.

The comparison with Nicaragua v. Germany is instructive precisely because the two proceedings operate on different planes. In The Hague, the question is whether a state engaged its international responsibility by supplying weapons. In Paris, the question would be whether an individual, a decision-maker, an intermediary, or an exporter, committed or was complicit in genocide, crimes against humanity, or war crimes, and whether that person can be tried in France. State responsibility and individual criminal liability obey different rules, different burdens of proof, and different courts. But the underlying factual material, export licences, end-use certificates, knowledge of the destination, and foreseeability of atrocities, is the same, and findings made in one forum inevitably echo in the other. Readers interested in how France handles state-to-state litigation in The Hague may also consult the recent analysis of Vanuatu’s ICJ claim against France over the Matthew and Hunter islands, which explains the Court’s procedure from the French side of the bar.

B. What Should Victims, Exporters and Defence Lawyers in France Do Now?

The first practical consequence of the Nicaragua case concerns victims and associations in France. Anyone alleging genocide, crimes against humanity, or war crimes may file a complaint with the specialised war-crimes unit of the Paris prosecutor’s office, which holds national jurisdiction for these matters. Because Article 689-11 reserves prosecution to the public prosecutor, a direct complaint seeking trial will be examined through that filter, and a dismissal may be challenged before the Paris chief prosecutor, who must hear the complainant on request. The 12 May 2023 plenary ruling strengthens such complaints in one respect: where the territorial state lacks international-crimes legislation, counsel can satisfy dual criminality by pointing to ordinary offences in the foreign code, murder, rape, torture, or assault, that form the factual base of the alleged international crime. Documentary evidence, export records, official statements, and findings of international bodies should be attached from the outset, because the prosecutor’s subsidiarity check, no ICC prosecution, no competing extradition or surrender request, is conducted before any investigation opens.

The second consequence concerns companies and intermediaries involved in the defence and dual-use trade from France. French arms exports are subject to a prior-licensing regime administered on behalf of the government, and licences may be suspended or revoked when the destination situation changes. The Nicaragua proceedings demonstrate that licensing decisions are no longer reviewed only by domestic administrative courts: the political and legal risk now includes state-responsibility litigation in The Hague and criminal exposure of individuals in third states. Exporters should therefore treat end-use documentation, risk assessments at the time of each shipment, and reactions to public reports of atrocities as litigation records, not mere compliance paperwork. Where a licence covers goods that could be used in an internal or international armed conflict, contemporaneous written analysis of the recipient’s conduct, preserved with dates and sources, is the document a defence lawyer will need years later, whether the forum is a French investigating judge or an international court citing the exporter’s state.

The third consequence concerns the defence of individuals investigated or prosecuted in France for international crimes connected with a foreign conflict. French law offers structured defences that the Nicaragua hearings illustrate by contrast. Jurisdiction may be challenged on habitual residence, since Article 689-11 requires a sufficient connecting link with France, assessed through the duration and reasons of presence, the intention to settle, and family, social, material, or professional ties. Dual criminality may be challenged on the foreign law as it stood at the time of the acts, even though the 2023 plenary ruling narrowed that defence by accepting ordinary-law equivalents. Subsidiarity may be invoked where the International Criminal Court or another competent jurisdiction is already seised. And the contextual element itself, concerted plan, widespread or systematic attack, nexus with an armed conflict, must be proven act by act; German counsel’s insistence in The Hague that each export decision was individually reviewed has its criminal-law counterpart in the requirement that each accused’s personal contribution be established, rather than inferred from a general context of violence.

Timing is the final practical point. The International Court of Justice gives no advance notice of deliberation calendars, but rulings on preliminary objections typically arrive within months of the hearings, which would place the Nicaragua decision in late 2026 or early 2027. If the Court rejects Germany’s objections, the merits phase will run for years, with written memorials, a possible counter-memorial, replies, and new hearings, during which the parties’ factual narratives will harden and enter the public domain. French practitioners should monitor three milestones: the ruling on preliminary objections, which will clarify how far the Genocide Convention reaches into third-state support; the subsequent scope of any merits proceedings, which will define the evidentiary standard for knowledge and risk; and the parallel progress of the South Africa case against Israel, on which aspects of the Nicaragua reasoning may depend. Each milestone will generate documents, hearing transcripts, and judicial findings that can be filed directly into French complaints, export-risk reviews, and defence submissions.

One further French specificity deserves mention. France, like Germany, combines a restrictive official discourse on arms exports with a significant defence industry and a history of controversial licences. Any future allegation modelled on Nicaragua’s would therefore test the same French institutions described above: the licensing authority, the administrative courts reviewing its decisions, and the criminal courts applying Articles 211-1, 212-1, and 689-11. The lesson of September 2026 is not that such a case against France is imminent or likely to succeed; it is that the legal imagination for bringing one now exists, has survived its first judicial screening, and is being refined in open court in The Hague. States, companies, victims, and counsel in France should read the coming ruling as a users’ manual for the next decade of third-state litigation, whatever its outcome.

Conclusion

The hearings of 7 to 10 September 2026 and the written exchanges of 16 and 22 September have placed Nicaragua’s claim against Germany at the gates of the merits. Germany asks the Court to close those gates on jurisdiction and admissibility grounds, presenting its export controls as documented, published, and stricter than international standards. Nicaragua asks the Court to open them, arguing that two parties to the Genocide Convention may litigate a third state’s support for an alleged genocide even when neither litigant is a belligerent. The Court has given no indication of when it will rule, and no finding of any kind has been made against Germany: no breach established, no responsibility engaged, no individual guilt pronounced, and no order restraining any export in force. What is established is narrower but still significant. A claim that a weapons supplier may answer before the World Court for the use made of its supplies has passed its first judicial screening, is being argued with full honours by both sides, and will produce a reasoned ruling on the reach of the Genocide Convention within months. In France, the same conduct is already governed by precise statutes and tested case law, from Article 211-1 of the Criminal Code to the plenary rulings of 12 May 2023, which allow French courts to try individuals found or resident in France for genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes committed abroad. The Hague will decide the responsibility of states; Paris retains the power to judge individuals. Both forums now watch the same docket, and the ruling to come will shape complaints, compliance files, and defence strategies in France for years.

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