On 29 September 2026, Ukraine asked Europe for something it has asked for before, but never with this much urgency attached to the calendar: bold action on immobilised Russian state assets to plug a defence funding shortfall of 78 billion dollars in 2027. The figure comes from Euronews reporting published the same day, and it reopens a file many in Brussels thought closed last December, when European leaders shelved the controversial Reparations Loan and settled instead for a 90 billion euro support loan funded by joint debt. Behind the headlines sits roughly 210 billion euros of Russian central bank assets immobilised since February 2022, most of it sitting with the Euroclear depository in Brussels. And behind that number sit two live legal tracks that every bank, company, listed person and State with exposure in France should understand: the European Union track, which now runs through an EU-owned custodian proposal debated at the European Policy Centre the day before, and the Strasbourg track, where a September 2026 report to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe proposes enforcing European Court of Human Rights just-satisfaction awards directly against frozen Russian assets held in member states. This article explains both tracks from the standpoint that matters most to readers in France: what a Paris enforcement judge would actually do if someone tried to seize those assets on French soil.
The French angle is decisive because freezing is not seizing, and seizing a foreign State is not seizing an ordinary debtor. Under French enforcement law, execution against State property starts with a wall: Article L. 111-1 of the Code of Civil Enforcement Procedures provides that “L’exécution forcée et les mesures conservatoires ne sont pas applicables aux personnes qui bénéficient d’une immunité d’exécution.” Any creditor targeting Russian state assets in France — whether armed with an ECtHR judgment, an arbitral award or an EU regulation — must therefore get past immunity of execution before any bailiff moves. Two recent rulings of the First Civil Chamber of the Cour de cassation, given on 13 March 2024 and 13 April 2023, drew the current map of that wall with unusual precision, and they control the answer to the question this article asks: can the new September 2026 proposals actually reach Russian assets through French courts, and what should holders, custodians and claimants do in the meantime?
I. Why the 210 billion is moving again in September 2026
A. Can the EU Reparations Loan or a European custodian touch central bank reserves?
To understand the news of 29 September 2026, start with what the European Union holds and what it has already tried. According to Associated Press reporting, a total of 210 billion euros in Russian assets are frozen in Europe, the vast majority of it held in Euroclear, a Belgian financial clearing house, frozen under EU sanctions imposed over the war launched on 24 February 2022. Last year the European Commission tried to channel those assets into a zero-interest credit line for Ukraine — the Reparations Loan — and the inventive proposal fell apart in December when, as the Associated Press reported, Belgium rejected the scheme and insisted that it posed major financial and legal risks. As a Plan B, EU leaders agreed to set up a 90 billion euro support loan based on joint debt, evenly halved with 45 billion for 2026 and 45 billion for 2027. That compromise bought a year of calm. The 78 billion dollar shortfall for 2027 has now ended it.
The legal distinction at the heart of the Commission’s original plan still structures every serious discussion, and Modern Diplomacy states it plainly: rather than simply confiscating Russian central bank reserves and handing them to Ukraine, the Commission proposed using cash balances connected to the immobilised assets to support a Reparations Loan, because actually taking ownership of another country’s central bank reserves would raise far more serious legal questions. That distinction, stressed by legal commentaries on the Commission plan, contains the whole problem. A freeze immobilises; a confiscation transfers ownership. Between the two lies the law of State immunity, and central bank property sits at its most protected point. The 2004 United Nations Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Property, whose text is published by the United Nations International Law Commission, treats property of a central bank as presumptively immune from execution, and the International Court of Justice confirmed in its 2012 judgment in Jurisdictional Immunities of the State, published on the Court’s official case page for Germany v. Italy, that immunity reflects customary international law and does not melt away even in the face of grave breaches. France has not ratified the 2004 Convention, but French courts apply its substance as custom — which is exactly what the Cour de cassation did in the two 2023-2024 rulings examined in Part II.
The newest EU-side idea, debated on 28 September 2026 at a panel hosted by the European Policy Centre, as reported the next morning, is to transfer the assets from Euroclear into an EU-owned custodian to mitigate the risks weighing on Belgium. For readers in France, the practical translation is this: as long as the assets sit with a Belgian depository under EU immobilisation regulations — principally Council Regulation (EU) No 833/2014 and the listing-freeze machinery of Council Regulation (EU) No 269/2014 — no French judge has anything to seize, because there is nothing in France to seize and no transfer of ownership has occurred. A custodian transfer would not change that analysis by itself; it would merely move the legal seat of the political problem. The day a European instrument purports to transfer ownership of central bank reserves to Ukraine or to a loan vehicle, every holder, clearer and paying agent with a Paris nexus becomes a potential defendant in immunity litigation before the enforcement judge of the Paris judicial court. That is why the French rules below matter now, before any decision is taken, and not after.
One related French development deserves attention from compliance officers: the sanctions-challenge route from France remains open and active, whatever happens to sovereign reserves. As our earlier analysis of the EU’s 2026 delistings practice showed, listed persons and entities can contest listings before the General Court in Luxembourg and the consequences of freezes before national courts, and French banks apply those freezes daily. The sovereign-assets debate does not suspend those rights; if anything, a more aggressive EU posture makes rigorous, documented challenges more valuable. Readers facing a frozen account in France should keep the two files strictly separate: the personal listing challenge, which follows EU administrative law, and the sovereign-asset seizure question, which follows immunity law. Confusing them is the costliest mistake a file can contain.
B. Will Strasbourg just satisfaction become an enforcement title against frozen assets?
The second track opened in Strasbourg, and it is the more immediately operational of the two for litigators. In an analysis published on 21 September 2026, European Pravda reports that the Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe approved, in early September, a report by rapporteur Tony Vaughan calling for a more active role of the Council of Europe in the confiscation process. The core idea is disarmingly simple: member states would use Russian assets frozen within their own jurisdictions to satisfy European Court of Human Rights rulings on compensation — just satisfaction in the Court’s terminology — principally in the interstate cases between Ukraine and Russia, where Russia has not paid what was awarded. The same analysis recalls the institutional groundwork already laid under Council of Europe auspices: Russia’s expulsion from the organisation, the Tribunal for the Crime of Aggression, the Register of Damage for Ukraine and the agreement creating the International Claims Commission, plus a Parliamentary Assembly call dating back to April 2022 for sanctioned assets to be confiscated and used to compensate Ukraine. Earlier expert memoranda pointing the same way — including work associated with Dapo Akande and Philippe Sands, and a study by Philippa Webb for the European Commission’s research service — are also cited, which shows this is a convergent expert movement rather than a lone proposal.
Why does the Strasbourg route look legally smoother than a straight confiscation? Because it dresses the transfer in the oldest respectable clothing in enforcement law: execution of a final judgment. The European Court of Human Rights, whose official site publishes its interstate docket, has already delivered an interim judgment in Ukraine’s favour in the Big Donbas case brought by Ukraine and the Netherlands against Russia, although the amount of compensation in the key interstate cases has not yet been determined, as the same 21 September analysis notes. If and when the Court fixes just-satisfaction sums running into billions, Ukraine — or assignees and compensation vehicles acting on those awards — would hold judicial titles against Russia. A title changes the conversation: the question is no longer whether Europe may punish by confiscation, but whether a creditor may execute a judgment against a debtor State’s property. Every enforcement lawyer knows that second question has a structured answer, built over decades, and in France that answer is written in the Code of Civil Enforcement Procedures and in the Cour de cassation’s recent case law.
Three cautions are nevertheless essential, and a serious Paris practice states them upfront. First, no enforceable amount exists yet: the compensation phase of the interstate cases is pending, and a report is not a judgment. Any file built today on the Strasbourg route is preparatory — mapping assets, testing immunity arguments, securing interim protection — not executive. Second, Russia was expelled from the Council of Europe and denies the Court’s authority, so voluntary payment will not happen; everything will have to be taken through coercive execution against property located in cooperating States, which brings immunity back to centre stage. Third, just satisfaction is awarded to applicants — including a State applicant such as Ukraine in interstate cases — but converting an interstate award into seizures from accounts held by entities other than the debtor State raises attribution and veil questions that no report can wish away. The Vaughan logic works cleanly only against property belonging to the Russian State itself, starting with central bank reserves, and central bank property is precisely the category French law protects most. That protection is the subject of Part II, and it is stronger than most commentators admit.
Before turning to it, one clarification for non-lawyers reading the September press: immobilisation, windfall levies and confiscation are three different legal animals. Immobilisation freezes transactions under EU regulations without touching ownership. The extraordinary-revenues schemes debated in 2024-2025 skimmed profits generated by the frozen principal, again without transferring the principal. Confiscation — or execution on a judgment — transfers ownership and therefore collides head-on with immunity of execution. Journalists sometimes present the step from the second to the third as a small political push; for a judge, it is a chasm. The French enforcement judge does not ask whether confiscation would be morally satisfying or geopolitically useful. The judge asks three questions in this order: do I have jurisdiction over the execution, does immunity bar the measure, and has the State waived that immunity in a form the law accepts? The answers, in France in 2026, are precise.
II. What a Paris enforcement judge would do with a Russian-asset seizure
A. How French immunity of execution protects central bank property after the 2023-2024 rulings?
French enforcement against foreign States is governed by a closed set of provisions introduced in December 2016, and any file targeting Russian assets in France must walk through them in order. The starting point is the general bar recalled in the introduction: Article L. 111-1 of the Code of Civil Enforcement Procedures states that “L’exécution forcée et les mesures conservatoires ne sont pas applicables aux personnes qui bénéficient d’une immunité d’exécution.” The procedure then becomes judicial by design: Article L. 111-1-1 provides that “Des mesures conservatoires ou des mesures d’exécution forcée ne peuvent être mises en œuvre sur un bien appartenant à un Etat étranger que sur autorisation préalable du juge par ordonnance rendue sur requête.” No creditor, however strong the title, seizes State property in France by private deed or by surprise: a judge authorises first, on an ex parte application, and the State can then challenge the order. Competence for that control sits with one judge: under Article L. 121-1 of the same Code, the enforcement judge hears these matters, and Article L. 213-6 of the Code of Judicial Organisation confirms that “Le juge de l’exécution connaît, de manière exclusive, des difficultés relatives aux titres exécutoires et des contestations qui s’élèvent à l’occasion de l’exécution forcée, même si elles portent sur le fond du droit”, adding that “Dans les mêmes conditions, il autorise les mesures conservatoires et connaît des contestations relatives à leur mise en oeuvre.” In Paris, that means the enforcement judge of the Paris judicial court — the only door through which a Russian-asset seizure on French territory can lawfully pass.
The heart of the matter is Article L. 111-1-2, which lists the only three keys that open that door. A judge may authorise conservatory or enforcement measures against property belonging to a foreign State only if one of three conditions is met: first, the State has expressly consented to the measure; second, the State has reserved or earmarked the property for satisfaction of the claim at issue; or third, a judgment or arbitral award has been rendered against the State and the property is specifically used or intended for use by that State for other than non-commercial public service purposes, with a link to the entity against which the proceedings were brought. The same article then shields five categories it deems used for non-commercial public service: diplomatic and consular property including bank accounts, military property, cultural heritage and archives not for sale, scientific exhibition objects not for sale, and — decisive for our subject — State tax and social-security claims. And the absolute summit of protection is Article L. 111-1-3: “Des mesures conservatoires ou des mesures d’exécution forcée ne peuvent être mises en œuvre sur les biens, y compris les comptes bancaires, utilisés ou destinés à être utilisés dans l’exercice des fonctions de la mission diplomatique des Etats étrangers ou de leurs postes consulaires, de leurs missions spéciales ou de leurs missions auprès des organisations internationales qu’en cas de renonciation expresse et spéciale des Etats concernés.” Two adjectives — express and specific — and no judge in France can go around them.
Apply this grid to 210 billion euros of central bank reserves. The first key — express consent — will never exist: Russia will not consent to seizure of its central bank’s property. The second — earmarking — will never exist either. Everything therefore turns on the third key: are central bank reserves property used for other than non-commercial public service purposes? The answer under French law, read with custom, is no. Managing monetary reserves is a paradigmatic sovereign function, and central bank property enjoys reinforced protection in every immunity system precisely because seizure of a nation’s reserves would paralyse its monetary sovereignty. Neither an ECtHR just-satisfaction award nor an EU regulation nonlocally can rewrite that characterisation by itself: a judgment satisfies the “title” half of the third condition, but the property must still be commercial in use, and reserves are not. This is the point on which political commentary most often misleads: holding an enforceable judgment against Russia is necessary but not sufficient — the asset itself must be seizable, and reserves fail that test.
The Cour de cassation sharpened these rules twice in two years, and both rulings repay close reading because they show how narrow the openings are. On 13 March 2024, the First Civil Chamber ruled on the seizure by the company Commisimpex, enforcing arbitral awards against the Republic of Congo, of an aircraft assigned to the Congolese presidency: Cass., Civ. 1re, 13 March 2024, appeal no. 21-17.599. The Court held, in the operative reasoning verified from the full judgment for this article: “Il en résulte que doivent être interprétées strictement les dispositions de l’article L. 111-1-3 du code des procédures civiles d’exécution, selon lesquelles les biens, y compris les comptes bancaires, utilisés ou destinés à être utilisés dans l’exercice des fonctions de la mission diplomatique des Etats étrangers ou de leurs postes consulaires, de leurs missions spéciales ou de leurs missions auprès des organisations internationales ne peuvent faire l’objet de mesures conservatoires ou de mesures d’exécution forcée qu’en cas de renonciation expresse et spéciale des Etats concernés”, adding that “la cour d’appel, qui a, à bon droit, retenu que les fonctions d’une mission diplomatique se distinguaient de l’activité diplomatique exercée par un chef d’Etat, en a exactement déduit que la renonciation expresse à l’immunité d’exécution, consentie par cet Etat dans le litige l’opposant à la société Commisimpex, suffisait pour que l’actif en cause affecté à la présidence de la République puisse faire l’objet d’une mesure d’exécution, sans que soit, en outre, requise une renonciation spéciale”. In plain terms: a presidential jet is not embassy property, so an express waiver — given here through the arbitration clause and related commitments — sufficed without an additional specific waiver. Creditors read this as encouragement; defence lawyers read the strict-interpretation warning and the careful fence around genuine diplomatic property.
On 13 April 2023, the same Chamber decided the mirror case on waiver: Cass., Civ. 1re, 13 April 2023, appeal no. 18-20.915. The operative reasoning, again verified from the full text, states: “a exactement déduit que, selon les principes du droit international coutumier reflétés par la Convention des Nations Unies du 2 décembre 2004 sur les immunités des Etats et de leurs biens, la renonciation expresse à l’immunité d’exécution, consentie par cet Etat dans le litige l’opposant à la société Commisimpex, suffisait pour que les actifs en cause puissent faire l’objet d’une mesure d’exécution, peu important qu’ils aient consisté en des créances fiscales, sans que soit en outre requise une renonciation spéciale” The seized assets were tax claims owed by debtors domiciled in France — property the Code lists as presumptively sovereign — yet execution succeeded because the State had expressly waived immunity. The lesson for Russian assets is double-edged and must be stated exactly: waiver is the master key, and only waiver opens commercial-use property; but nothing in either ruling supplies a waiver where none was given. Russia has waived nothing. An ECtHR judgment condemning Russia does not contain a waiver of immunity of execution; acceptance of the Court’s jurisdiction in 1998 is not consent to seizure of central bank reserves in 2026. Unless a future instrument — a treaty, a Security Council decision, or Russian consent — creates one, the third key does not turn on reserves, and the two Cassation rulings, far from helping claimants, confirm the lock by showing precisely what an opening looks like when it exists.
B. How would a seizure file in Paris be built, defended and decided?
Suppose, then, that a claimant — Ukraine, a compensation vehicle, or an ECtHR award-holder — instructs counsel to move against Russian-linked assets in France. What does the file look like from the inside, on each side of the bar? The claimant’s first task is not seizure but cartography: identifying, on French territory, property belonging to the Russian State that is not covered by reinforced protection. Embassy accounts, consular premises, military assets and cultural property are excluded by Articles L. 111-1-2 and L. 111-1-3. Commercial receivables, non-diplomatic real estate used for business, and funds in ordinary commercial activity are the only plausible targets — and the claimant must evidence the commercial use specifically, because the judge starts from a presumption of sovereign purpose. The second task is the title: an ECtHR judgment, once final and quantified, is a judicial decision against the State that can anchor the third condition of Article L. 111-1-2, provided the property link and commercial-use tests are met. The third task is the application itself: under ordinary conservatory law, Article L. 511-1 allows “Toute personne dont la créance paraît fondée en son principe” to seek authorisation “de pratiquer une mesure conservatoire sur les biens de son débiteur, sans commandement préalable, si elle justifie de circonstances susceptibles d’en menacer le recouvrement”, with the measure taking “la forme d’une saisie conservatoire ou d’une sûreté judiciaire”, while Article L. 521-1 recalls that “La saisie conservatoire peut porter sur tous les biens mobiliers, corporels ou incorporels, appartenant au débiteur” and that “Elle les rend indisponibles”. Procedurally, Article R. 511-1 requires that “La demande d’autorisation prévue à l’article L. 511-1 est formée par requête” and that “une autorisation préalable du juge est nécessaire” — a requirement redoubled for State property by Article L. 111-1-1. In practice the claimant files an ex parte request to the Paris enforcement judge, obtains an order, serves it on the bank or holder, and braces for the State’s challenge.
The defence answers on four levels, and each has recent authority behind it. First, ownership and attribution: the claimant must prove the asset belongs to the State, not to a separate legal person, a listed oligarch, or a commercial entity with its own personality. Piercing the corporate veil of State-owned enterprises before a French judge requires more than political assertion; it requires documents. Second, sovereign purpose: the defence shows the asset serves monetary, diplomatic or military functions, invoking the five protected categories of Article L. 111-1-2 and, for mission property, the double lock of Article L. 111-1-3. Third, absence of waiver: no clause, no treaty, no earmarking — and, following the 2023-2024 Cassation rulings, the defence insists that any alleged waiver be express and, for diplomatic property, specific, with strict interpretation. Fourth, European law itself: as long as EU immobilisation regulations freeze without transferring ownership, the defence argues there is nothing to execute against and no French-law basis for a transfer the Union has not ordered. Banks served with a conservatory seizure add a fifth voice: they declare what they hold, freeze under judicial cover, and demand clarity, because wrongful release exposes them to liability while wrongful retention exposes them to damages claims from the account holder.
One French instrument that claimants sometimes invoke — and usually misunderstand — is the national asset-freeze regime. Article L. 562-2 of the Monetary and Financial Code allows the ministers of the economy and of the interior to order, jointly, for six months renewable, the freezing of funds belonging to persons who commit, attempt, facilitate or finance acts of terrorism, or entities controlled by them: “Le ministre chargé de l’économie et le ministre de l’intérieur peuvent décider, conjointement, pour une durée de six mois, renouvelable, le gel des fonds et ressources économiques” of persons linked to terrorism. This is a counter-terrorism tool, not a war-reparations tool; it cannot be stretched to cover central bank reserves of a State, and citing it in a Russian-assets file signals confusion between sanctions, counter-terrorism and war damages. The competent freeze for Russian assets in France is the directly applicable EU regulation, applied by French banks and supervised by the Treasury’s services — a point that matters because challenges to EU freezes follow EU-law routes to Luxembourg, while challenges to seizures follow French enforcement law to the Paris enforcement judge and then to the Court of Appeal and the Cour de cassation. Running the wrong challenge in the wrong court wastes the months in which interim protection matters most.
Timelines complete the picture. A conservatory seizure can be authorised in days; the State’s challenge to it takes months; an appeal to Paris and a cassation appeal take years. Meanwhile, the underlying geopolitics moves faster than procedure: the December 2025 summit showed that a single member state can block a Union-wide confiscation, the September 2026 custodian debate shows the file is technically alive, and the Strasbourg compensation phase will fix numbers on its own judicial calendar, not on Ukraine’s budgetary one. For holders and custodians in France, the operational advice is therefore conservative and concrete: keep ownership chains documented, segregate sovereign-purpose property from commercial activity with paper trails a judge can follow, log every waiver clause in every contract with a State entity, monitor the ECtHR interstate compensation phase and the EU legislative agenda weekly, and treat any seizure order as a litigation event requiring counsel within hours, not days. For claimants, the mirror advice is equally concrete: do not file before the title is quantified, do not target diplomatic or central-bank property without a waiver theory that survives the 2023-2024 rulings, and build the commercial-use evidence first — because a Paris enforcement judge who finds sovereign purpose will lift the seizure, award costs, and publish reasoning the next claimant will have to overcome.
Conclusion
The 29 September 2026 push on Russian assets is real, and it has two serious legal engines: the European Union’s revived debate over a Reparations Loan or an EU-owned custodian for 210 billion euros of immobilised reserves, and the Council of Europe’s September 2026 proposal to enforce future ECtHR just-satisfaction awards against frozen assets held in member states. Neither engine, as the law stands today, drives through Paris without stopping at the enforcement judge’s door. French law bars execution against persons enjoying immunity of execution, requires prior judicial authorisation for any measure against State property, opens only three narrow keys — express consent, earmarking, or a judgment plus commercial-use property — and doubly locks diplomatic assets behind express and specific waiver. The Cour de cassation’s rulings of 13 April 2023 and 13 March 2024 confirm both the strictness of the locks and the shape of the only working key: a genuine, express waiver, which Russia has not given and which no judgment against Russia contains by itself. Central bank reserves, as monetary-sovereignty property, remain on the protected side of that line.
That assessment is not the end of the story; it is the starting point of competent files. Claimants should prepare now — titles, cartography, commercial-use evidence — so that the day numbers are fixed in Strasbourg or an instrument is adopted in Brussels, the Paris application is ready and aimed at seizable property. Holders, banks and custodians should prepare symmetrically — documentation, segregation, waiver audits — so that lawful property is not swept up in the political urgency of a funding gap. No officially confirmed transfer of ownership of Russian central bank reserves has occurred at the date of writing, no liability of any custodian or holder has been established by a court, signed contracts and immunity rules take precedence over general commentary, and only a judge decides. What 29 September 2026 changed is the tempo, not the law: the money is moving back onto the agenda, and the agenda will eventually meet the judge. Files built on verified titles, precise asset mapping and the immunity grid above will survive that meeting; files built on headlines will not.