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Algerian Divorce Requested by the Wife: Who Can Obtain Exequatur in France After 30 September 2026?

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Algerian Divorce Requested by the Wife: Who Can Obtain Exequatur in France After 30 September 2026?

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You hold an Algerian divorce judgment, or your spouse does, and a French town hall, a notary or a bank still treats the marriage as alive. An Algerian court dissolved the marriage under a rule that does not give both spouses the same route out. The question after 30 September 2026 is not only whether France can recognize that kind of divorce. It is who may ask a French court to do so, and what must still be proved.

On that day the First Civil Chamber of the Cour de cassation, the French Court of Cassation, rejected an appeal against an order of exequatur. Exequatur is the French judicial decision that allows a foreign judgment to be enforced in France. The El Eulma court had divorced the spouses on 28 April 2019, on the wife’s request. On 7 January 2022 the husband asked a French judge for exequatur. The Court of Appeal of Lyon ordered it on 3 December 2024. The wife said France could recognize such a divorce only when the spouse facing the less favorable foreign rule was the person invoking it in France. The Court of Cassation did not accept that limit.

This guide is for English-speaking expatriates in France, binational couples, foreigners married to a French national, residents of Paris and Île-de-France, and people abroad whose divorce touches France. It explains each French term at first use, quotes the Court’s words, and separates three procedures that are often folded into one: court exequatur, a prosecutor’s check before a divorce can be written on a French register, and the European shortcut, which does not apply to a judgment from Algeria. This judgment does not mean that every Algerian divorce will pass. It rejected one appeal. The judge in the next case still decides.

I. Who can obtain exequatur in France of an Algerian divorce the wife requested?

The useful question is not the dictionary meaning of an Algerian divorce. It is whether the person who needs the divorce to work in France is allowed to ask for that result, and on what proof. The 30 September 2026 judgment answers the first half more clearly than the case law English-language summaries have been repeating. It does not hand either spouse a blank certificate.

A. What the 30 September 2026 judgment actually decided

The published judgment is the arrêt of the First Civil Chamber of 30 September 2026, pourvoi number J 25-14.299, arrêt number 557 FS-B, ECLI:FR:CCASS:2026:C100557. It is marked as published in the Bulletin, which is the Court’s official report of decisions it treats as significant. The formation was a section formation, not a three-judge panel and not the full plenary court. The solution is rejection: “Rejet”. The full text, read in full for this article and not taken from a press summary, is on the Court’s site: Cour de cassation, 30 September 2026, no. 25-14.299.

The facts, as the Court states them, are short. A judgment of 28 April 2019 of the tribunal of El Eulma, in Algeria, pronounced the divorce of Mme [M] and M. [S]. Those bracketed initials are the Court’s own anonymization. This article does not identify them further. On 7 January 2022, M. [S] seized a French judge for exequatur of that decision. The judgment under appeal was the arrêt of the Court of Appeal of Lyon, first civil chamber B, of 3 December 2024. That court declared M. [S] admissible in his application and ordered exequatur. Mme [M] brought the appeal in cassation. Partial legal aid in defense was granted to M. [S]; the judgment records “Aide juridictionnelle partielle en défense au profit de M. [D] [S]” (partial legal aid for the defense, in favor of M. [S]), admitted by the legal-aid office of the Court of Cassation on 18 June 2025. Legal aid is the public scheme that can cover all or part of a lawyer’s fees according to resources. It is not a promise by any private firm. See the 30 September 2026 judgment.

The Court did not give a specially reasoned answer to the first two branches of the single ground of appeal. Applying article 1014, paragraph 2, of the Code of civil procedure, it held that there was no need for a specially reasoned decision on those complaints, which were not such as to lead to cassation. The third branch is the one that matters for anyone standing in the husband’s place, or in the wife’s.

Mme [M] argued that the Lyon court had violated article 1(d) of the Franco-Algerian Convention of 27 August 1964 on exequatur and extradition, together with article 5 of Protocol No. 7 of 22 November 1984 to the European Convention on Human Rights. Her lawyers put the prior test this way: when a divorce has been pronounced abroad under a law that does not grant one of the spouses, because of their sex, equal access to divorce, recognition does not clash with international public policy provided that it is invoked by the spouse against whom the less favorable rules are provided, that the procedure was not tainted by fraud, and that the other spouse was able to assert their rights. She said the Lyon court had itself noted that the exequatur applicant was M. [S], not Mme [M], the spouse for whom the divorce rules were less favorable. From that finding, she said, the appeal court should have deduced that recognition clashed with international public policy. The Lyon court had instead relied on the fact that Mme [M] had chosen, without being forced, to seize the Algerian judge under article 54 of the Algerian Family Code, and on financial orders against the husband that, in the appeal court’s view, largely offset the compensation charged to the wife.

The Court of Cassation began with the convention, not with a general textbook formula. It held: “Selon l’article 1er, d), de la Convention franco-algérienne du 27 août 1964 relative à l’exequatur et à l’extradition, en matière civile, les décisions contentieuses et gracieuses rendues par les juridictions algériennes n’ont de plein droit l’autorité de la chose jugée sur le territoire français que si elles ne contiennent rien de contraire à l’ordre public international.” (According to article 1(d) of the Franco-Algerian Convention of 27 August 1964 on exequatur and extradition, in civil matters, contentious and non-contentious decisions given by Algerian courts have, by operation of law, the authority of res judicata on French territory only if they contain nothing contrary to international public policy.) The convention was published in France by Decree No. 65-679 of 11 August 1965. That sentence is the Court’s statement of article 1(d), taken from the judgment verified for this article. It is the gateway the Court applied. It is not a paraphrase of the general three-condition list that service-public.fr uses for non-European judgments in general. See the 30 September 2026 judgment.

The Court then set out the equality rule it was measuring that gateway against: “Aux termes de l’article 5 du Protocole du 22 novembre 1984, n° 7, additionnel à la Convention de sauvegarde des droits de l’homme et libertés fondamentales, les époux jouissent de l’égalité de droits et de responsabilités de caractère civil entre eux et dans leurs relations avec leurs enfants au regard du mariage, durant le mariage et lors de sa dissolution.” (Under article 5 of Protocol No. 7 of 22 November 1984, additional to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, spouses enjoy equality of rights and responsibilities of a civil character between them and in their relations with their children, as regards marriage, during marriage and at its dissolution.) International public policy, ordre public international, is not a mood and not a political opinion about a foreign legal system. In this judgment it is the control that asks whether giving effect in France to this foreign decision would clash with a fundamental principle, here the equality of spouses at the dissolution of marriage. See the 30 September 2026 judgment.

The holding is in the next paragraph, and it should be read as a whole, not as a slogan. “Lorsqu’une décision de divorce a été prononcée à l’étranger en application d’une loi qui n’accorde pas à l’un des époux, en raison de son appartenance à l’un ou l’autre sexe, une égalité d’accès au divorce, sa reconnaissance peut cependant être obtenue en France dès lors que cette décision a été sollicitée par celui des époux à l’égard duquel sont prévues les règles les moins favorables, que ce dernier a pu faire valoir ses droits et que n’est pas établie l’existence d’un autre motif de contrariété à l’ordre public de fond ou de procédure.” (When a divorce decision has been pronounced abroad under a law that does not grant one of the spouses, because of belonging to one sex or the other, equal access to divorce, its recognition may nevertheless be obtained in France provided that this decision was requested by the spouse in respect of whom the less favorable rules are provided, that this spouse was able to assert their rights, and that the existence of another ground of conflict with substantive or procedural public policy is not established.) See the 30 September 2026 judgment.

Three conditions sit inside that sentence. First, the foreign decision must have been requested by the spouse against whom the less favorable rules are provided. The French verb is sollicitée, requested, not invoquée, invoked. Second, that spouse must have been able to assert their rights. Third, no other ground of conflict with public policy, whether of substance or of procedure, is established. The third condition is written in the negative: recognition may be obtained where such another ground is not established. It does not require the applicant to prove, in the abstract, the absence of every imaginable objection. It does leave the objection available if someone establishes it.

The Court then recorded how the Lyon court had applied Algerian article 54. The appeal court had set out that article as follows: “« L’épouse peut se séparer de son conjoint, sans l’accord de ce dernier, moyennant le versement d’une somme à titre de « khol’â ». En cas de désaccord sur la contrepartie, le juge ordonne le versement d’une somme dont le montant ne saurait dépasser la valeur de la dot de parité « sadaq el mithl » évaluée à la date du jugement. »” (The wife may separate from her husband, without his agreement, against payment of a sum by way of khol’â. If they disagree on the consideration, the judge orders payment of a sum whose amount may not exceed the value of the parity dower, sadaq el mithl, assessed at the date of the judgment.) Khol’â, often written khol’a or khula in English, is that wife-initiated separation against a sum. It is not, on this wording, a divorce that requires the husband’s consent. It is also not, as the next section shows, the same institution as a husband’s repudiation. See the 30 September 2026 judgment.

The appeal court’s findings, which the Court of Cassation accepted as capable of supporting the exequatur, were these. “c’est l’épouse elle-même qui avait fait le choix de saisir le juge algérien d’une demande en divorce sur le fondement de l’article 54 du code de la famille algérien, quand bien même sa résidence était en France et que rien ne la contraignait à un tel choix procédural.” (It was the wife herself who had chosen to seize the Algerian judge with a divorce application based on article 54 of the Algerian Family Code, even though her residence was in France and nothing compelled her to that procedural choice.) “Après avoir écarté toute fraude, elle a retenu, d’autre part, que chacune des parties avait pu faire valoir ses droits.” (After excluding any fraud, it held, secondly, that each of the parties had been able to assert their rights.) “les condamnations financières prononcées à l’encontre de l’époux pondéraient la compensation mise à la charge de l’épouse.” (The financial orders pronounced against the husband offset the compensation charged to the wife.) “De ces constations et appréciations, elle a pu déduire que le jugement de divorce dont l’exequatur était sollicité ne portait pas atteinte à l’ordre public international.” (From these findings and assessments, it was able to deduce that the divorce judgment whose exequatur was sought did not infringe international public policy.) The word constations appears in that form in the official text. The legal point is the deduction the Court allowed, not the spelling. See the 30 September 2026 judgment.

Read together, those sentences answer the question people actually ask: if my wife requested the Algerian divorce, can I, the husband, still obtain exequatur in France? In this case, yes, the husband’s application was upheld, and the wife’s argument that only she could invoke the judgment in France was rejected. The decisive request is the request made to the foreign court, not the identity of the person who later walks into the French court. The wife had requested the El Eulma divorce. She lived in France. Nothing in the findings forced that choice. Fraud was excluded. Both sides could assert their rights. The money orders against the husband were treated as offsetting the sum charged to her. On that package, Lyon could order exequatur, and cassation rejected the challenge.

Two limits belong in the same breath. The financial offset was part of the appeal court’s assessment in this file. The Court of Cassation said the appeal court was able to deduce the result from its findings. It did not enact a tariff under which any payment by the husband cures an unequal foreign law. And the word peut, “may”, in the holding is not “must”. Recognition may be obtained when the three conditions are met. A later court that finds fraud, a party who could not be heard, or another established public-policy ground, is not bound to copy the Lyon order.

B. How the 17 March 2021 rule differs, and what this judgment does not cover

The wife’s lawyers were not inventing the older formula. On 17 March 2021 the same chamber, in a Bulletin judgment, pourvoi no. F 20-14.506, arrêt no. 220 FS-P, ECLI:FR:CCASS:2021:C100220, had used a neighboring sentence. The full text is at Cour de cassation, 17 March 2021, no. 20-14.506. The Court said: “Lorsqu’une décision de divorce a été prononcée à l’étranger en application d’une loi qui n’accorde pas à l’un des époux, en raison de son appartenance à l’un ou l’autre sexe, une égalité d’accès au divorce, sa reconnaissance ne heurte pas l’ordre public international, dès lors qu’elle est invoquée par celui des époux à l’égard duquel sont prévues les règles les moins favorables, que la procédure suivie n’a pas été entachée de fraude et que l’autre époux a pu faire valoir ses droits.” (When a divorce decision has been pronounced abroad under a law that does not grant one of the spouses, because of belonging to one sex or the other, equal access to divorce, its recognition does not clash with international public policy provided that it is invoked by the spouse in respect of whom the less favorable rules are provided, that the procedure followed was not tainted by fraud, and that the other spouse was able to assert their rights.)

The verb that did the work in 2021 was invoquée, invoked. In that case the person invoking the Algerian judgment in France was the wife. She was French and Algerian. He was Algerian. They had married in Algeria, without a marriage contract, and had set their first marital home in Algeria. In 2009 she alone bought a house in Vénissieux. On 4 July 2017 an Algerian judge, at the tribunal of Hussein Dey, pronounced the divorce on her application. She then relied on that judgment, and on what the file treated as the separatist character of the Algerian legal matrimonial regime, to seek his eviction from the Vénissieux house. He said a khol’a divorce, taken on the wife’s unilateral will, without his agreement having any legal effect on the principle of the divorce, was as contrary to equality as repudiation. The Court rejected his appeal.

It did so after drawing a line that still matters, and that some commentaries blur. “toute assimilation du divorce par compensation prévu à l’article 54 du code de la famille algérien à la répudiation prévue à l’article 48 du même code doit être écartée, dès lors que le premier, prononcé à l’initiative de l’épouse, est subordonné au paiement d’une somme d’argent, tandis que la seconde procède de la seule volonté de l’époux, lequel ne peut être tenu à une réparation pécuniaire qu’en cas de reconnaissance par le juge d’un abus de droit.” (Any assimilation of the divorce by compensation provided for in article 54 of the Algerian Family Code to the repudiation provided for in article 48 of the same code must be ruled out, since the first, pronounced on the wife’s initiative, is subject to payment of a sum of money, whereas the second proceeds from the husband’s will alone, and he can be held to a pecuniary reparation only if the judge finds an abuse of right.) The Court then approved the conclusion that “la décision algérienne, invoquée par l’épouse, n’était pas contraire au principe d’égalité des époux lors de la dissolution du mariage, et donc à l’ordre public international.” (The Algerian decision, invoked by the wife, was not contrary to the principle of equality of spouses at the dissolution of the marriage, and therefore not contrary to international public policy.) See the 17 March 2021 judgment.

Put the two judgments side by side and the shift is concrete. In 2021 the wife requested the Algerian divorce and she was the one who invoked it in France, in order to have the husband removed from a house. In 2026 the wife requested the Algerian divorce, but the husband was the one who asked France for exequatur, and the wife was the one trying to stop him. The 2026 Court did not repeat “invoquée par”. It required that the foreign decision have been “sollicitée par” the spouse facing the less favorable rules, that this spouse have been able to assert their rights, and that no other public-policy ground be established. A reader who was told, after 2021, that only the wife may ever rely on a khol’a judgment in France was given a reading the 30 September 2026 rejection does not support.

That is not a license for every Algerian divorce. A repudiation under the article 48 pattern described by the 2021 Court proceeds from the husband’s will alone. The 2026 test asks whether the foreign decision was requested by the spouse for whom the rules are less favorable. A divorce that only the husband was entitled to request, without the wife’s request, does not meet that first condition on the wording the Court used. This article does not add a fresh holding that every husband-initiated repudiation will be refused. It says the 30 September 2026 grant of exequatur is not a precedent for that different institution. The 2021 Court refused to treat article 54 and article 48 as the same thing. Keeping them apart is the point of both judgments.

Tunisia is a second boundary, and it is easy to miss if a page talks about “the Maghreb” as one law. On 12 July 2023 the First Civil Chamber rejected another appeal, pourvoi no. M 21-21.185, arrêt no. 484 FS-B, also published in the Bulletin: Cour de cassation, 12 July 2023, no. 21-21.185. The spouses, both Tunisian, had married in Tunisia on 8 April 2006 and had acquired French nationality on 25 January 2016. On 8 August 2019 the wife seized a juge aux affaires familiales, the French family judge, with a divorce petition. The husband raised a fin de non-recevoir, a plea of inadmissibility, based on the res judicata of a divorce pronounced on 26 December 2017, on his unilateral application, by the court of first instance of Sousse, which had become final on the principle of the divorce after a Sousse appeal of 16 May 2018 and a Tunisian Court of Cassation decision of 12 December 2018. The Versailles court of appeal held the Tunisian decisions opposable in France and declared the French divorce petition inadmissible. The wife said a foreign decision that merely records the husband’s unilateral will, gives no legal effect to the wife’s possible opposition, and leaves the court only to arrange the financial consequences, is contrary to equality.

The Court did not apply the Franco-Algerian convention. It applied a different instrument, as it stated it: “Selon l’article 15, d), de la Convention franco-tunisienne du 28 juin 1972 relative à l’entraide judiciaire en matière civile et commerciale et à la reconnaissance et à l’exécution des décisions judiciaires, les décisions contentieuses et gracieuses rendues par les juridictions tunisiennes, en matière civile, n’ont de plein droit l’autorité de la chose jugée sur le territoire français que si elles ne contiennent rien de contraire à l’ordre public international.” (According to article 15(d) of the Franco-Tunisian Convention of 28 June 1972 on judicial cooperation in civil and commercial matters and on the recognition and enforcement of judicial decisions, contentious and non-contentious decisions given by Tunisian courts, in civil matters, have by operation of law the authority of res judicata on French territory only if they contain nothing contrary to international public policy.) It then set out article 31 of the Tunisian Personal Status Code, including “3) à la demande du mari ou de la femme.” (3) at the request of the husband or of the wife.) The appeal court had stated, and the Court of Cassation approved, that “l’article 31, 3), du code du statut personnel tunisien édicte un cas de divorce qui n’est pas assimilable à une répudiation unilatérale, accordée au seul mari, dès lors que celui-ci est ouvert de manière identique à chacun des conjoints.” (Article 31(3) of the Tunisian Personal Status Code enacts a ground of divorce that cannot be assimilated to a unilateral repudiation granted to the husband alone, since it is open in the same way to each of the spouses.) The wife had been duly summoned and represented by a lawyer before the Tunisian courts. She did not show that the decisions, reached after an adversarial debate and against which she had used the remedies open to her, had been given in fraud of her rights. The Court held that “les décisions tunisiennes invoquées par M. [D] n’étaient pas contraires au principe d’égalité des époux lors de la dissolution du mariage et donc à l’ordre public international.” (The Tunisian decisions invoked by the husband were not contrary to the principle of equality of spouses at the dissolution of the marriage and therefore not contrary to international public policy.) See the 12 July 2023 judgment.

The contrast is the protection against a bad analogy. Algerian article 54, as the 2021 and 2026 Courts described it, is a wife-initiated divorce against a sum, without the husband’s agreement, under a law the 2026 Court still treated as not granting equal access by sex. Tunisian article 31(3), as the 2023 Court described it, is a ground open in the same way to either spouse, and for that reason not assimilable to a repudiation reserved to the husband. A Tunisian divorce under that ground is not decided by the 30 September 2026 test about who requested an unequal law. A Moroccan judgment is not decided by either convention article quoted above. Morocco has its own instruments. This judgment does not cite them. Using an Algerian exequatur grant as if it were a Moroccan or Tunisian template is how files are lost.

Other questions stay outside the holding even when the country is Algeria. The 30 September 2026 judgment decided a challenge to exequatur of the divorce on the equality ground. It is not a residence order, not a passport order, and not a decision on where a child lives. If the Algerian judgment also dealt with children, that part needs its own analysis. It is not silently approved because the divorce itself passed. The 2021 eviction from a house in Vénissieux rested on that case’s findings: the wife owned the house alone, and she invoked a divorce the Court held opposable. It is not a general right, after any recognized Algerian divorce, to remove the other spouse from a jointly owned flat in Paris. Property consequences depend on the operative part of the foreign judgment, on the matrimonial regime, and on what the French order actually covers. A broader account of how a foreign divorce is recognized, transcribed and enforced in France remains the place for the steps that this judgment does not rewrite. The earlier English guide to Maghreb divorces pronounced without the other spouse’s agreement was published before 30 September 2026 and does not contain this holding. A French-language note on the same arrêt is at the 30 September 2026 exequatur judgment on a wife-initiated Algerian divorce.

II. How to have that Algerian divorce recognized, enforced and entered on French records

Knowing the test is not the same as knowing which desk to walk up to. France uses at least two tracks for a non-European divorce, and an Algerian judgment can need both, for different effects. Mixing them is the mistake that leaves people divorced in one file and married in another.

A. Which French court, which papers, and the Paris and Île-de-France route

Start with the code rule on enforcement, because it explains why a convention and a court order can both be in the story. Article 509 of the Code of civil procedure, in force on 1 October 2026, provides: “Les jugements rendus par les tribunaux étrangers et les actes reçus par les officiers étrangers sont exécutoires sur le territoire de la République de la manière et dans les cas prévus par la loi.” (Judgments given by foreign courts and instruments received by foreign officers are enforceable on the territory of the Republic in the manner and in the cases provided by law.) The official text is article 509 of the Code of civil procedure. “The law”, for an Algerian civil judgment, includes the 1964 convention as the Court stated it. Article 1(d), in the Court’s words, gives Algerian decisions the authority of res judicata in France by operation of law only if they contain nothing contrary to international public policy. Res judicata, l’autorité de la chose jugée, means the decision binds as a decided case. Executory force, the power to use public constraint to collect a sum or to carry out an order, is a further step. In the 2026 file the husband did not stop at a theoretical “by operation of law”. He seized a French judge for exequatur. Lyon ordered it. The wife challenged it through to cassation. A reader who is told that the convention makes a court application unnecessary should look at what these parties actually had to do once the other spouse disputed public policy.

The official practical page for enforcing a foreign civil judgment, including a divorce, is service-public.fr, execution of a foreign civil judgment in France, read for this article on 1 October 2026. Its section on judgments from outside the European Union says that such a decision does not apply directly in France and must be the subject of an exequatur procedure. It defines that procedure as the request that a French judge give the foreign decision executory force. The French judge does not modify the content of the foreign decision. He checks that it can apply in France. The same page states that the judge grants exequatur only if three conditions are met: the foreign judgment was given by a competent foreign judicial authority; the judgment is not contrary to international public policy; and the applicant did not seize the foreign judge with the fraudulent intention of obtaining a decision contrary to French law.

Those three conditions are the general non-EU account on that page. They are not a substitute for the test the Court of Cassation stated on 30 September 2026 for a divorce pronounced under a law that denies equal access by sex, and they are not a substitute for article 1(d) of the Franco-Algerian convention as the Court applied it. Competence of the foreign court, absence of fraud, and international public policy all appear, in one form or another, in both accounts. The 2026 holding adds a specific structure inside the public-policy control: who requested the foreign divorce, whether that spouse could assert their rights, and whether another substantive or procedural public-policy ground is established. A brief that stops at the three service-public bullets will miss the question that lost in cassation, which was not “was the Algerian court competent?” but “must the French applicant be the wife?”

On procedure, the same service-public page says the tribunal judiciaire, the judicial court, is seized by an assignation, the document by which a commissioner of justice notifies a person that proceedings have been brought and summons them, or by a joint requête, a joint formal application. A lawyer is mandatory. The court it describes as competent is the tribunal judiciaire of the place where the defendant lives, if the claimant knows that domicile. Otherwise, it says, the competent court is that of the place where the claimant lives, or a court of the claimant’s choice if the defendant lives abroad. If the defendant has no known domicile or residence, the claimant may seize the court of the place where the claimant lives. The court of the location of immovable property can also be competent, for example where the dispute concerns that property. The page adds a warning: foreign judgments cannot be applied in France unless they have been notified. Appeal is open against the exequatur decision, and a lawyer is mandatory before the court of appeal. If resources are insufficient, the public legal-aid scheme described on that page may cover all or part of the lawyer’s fees. The 2026 judgment shows that scheme operating at cassation level, as partial legal aid for the husband as respondent.

The code rule on venue is narrower than that practical page, and the difference should not be smoothed over. Article 42 of the Code of civil procedure, in force on 1 October 2026, provides: “La juridiction territorialement compétente est, sauf disposition contraire, celle du lieu où demeure le défendeur. S’il y a plusieurs défendeurs, le demandeur saisit, à son choix, la juridiction du lieu où demeure l’un d’eux. Si le défendeur n’a ni domicile ni résidence connus, le demandeur peut saisir la juridiction du lieu où il demeure ou celle de son choix s’il demeure à l’étranger.” (The territorially competent court is, unless a contrary provision applies, that of the place where the defendant lives. If there are several defendants, the claimant seizes, at his choice, the court of the place where one of them lives. If the defendant has neither a known domicile nor a known residence, the claimant may seize the court of the place where he lives, or the court of his choice if he lives abroad.) The text is at article 42 of the Code of civil procedure. The opening words are “sauf disposition contraire”, unless a contrary provision applies. A bilateral convention can be that contrary provision. This guide does not set out every procedural article of the 1964 convention, because the decree page did not yield a reliable full text in this run. What can be said from the texts that were read is that article 42 is the general rule, that service-public.fr describes a specific exequatur sequence, and that a known address in Algeria is a known residence. Article 42’s third sentence, which lets the claimant choose his own court or a court of his choice, applies when the defendant has neither a known domicile nor a known residence. It is not a sentence that says “defendant lives abroad, therefore any French court”.

For a reader in Paris or Île-de-France, the practical map follows those texts rather than a slogan about the capital. If the spouse who must be sued lives in Paris, service-public.fr points to the tribunal judiciaire of Paris. If that spouse lives in a suburb whose judicial seat is Nanterre, Bobigny, Créteil, Évry, Pontoise or Versailles, the same rule points to that court, not automatically to Paris, because the connecting factor is the defendant’s residence when it is known. If the other spouse lives in Algeria at a known address, and the applicant lives in Paris, the applicant should not assume that a Paris writ is safe merely because the applicant’s life is here. Service-public.fr does say that, where the defendant lives abroad, the court of the claimant’s residence or a court of the claimant’s choice can be used. Article 42, read alone, is more guarded. The mandatory lawyer has to plead the venue. A wrong court is a procedural risk, not a detail to repair after the other spouse has been served.

Which judge inside that court is a separate point, and it is often misnamed. People coming from a French divorce think of the juge aux affaires familiales, the family judge who decides a French divorce, child residence and child support. Exequatur of a foreign judgment is not, on the text that allocates it, that office. Article R. 212-8 of the Code of judicial organisation, in force on 1 October 2026, provides that the tribunal judiciaire sits with a single judge for, among other matters, “Des demandes en reconnaissance et en exequatur des décisions judiciaires et actes publics étrangers ainsi que des sentences arbitrales françaises ou étrangères” (applications for recognition and exequatur of foreign judicial decisions and foreign public instruments, and of French or foreign arbitral awards). The article is at article R. 212-8 of the Code of judicial organisation. The 2026 judgment says M. [S] seized “un juge français” for exequatur. It does not call that judge the family judge. Asking the family-judge clerk for a divorce petition, when what you need is exequatur of an Algerian judgment, sends the file to the wrong procedure. The reverse mistake also happens: a spouse who wants a French divorce, and who is met with an Algerian judgment the other spouse says is already binding, is in the situation the 2023 Tunisian case illustrates, not in a simple exequatur application.

Time to appeal is fixed by the code, and the starting point is notification, not the day you heard about the order from a relative. Article 538 of the Code of civil procedure provides: “Le délai de recours par une voie ordinaire est d’un mois en matière contentieuse ; il est de quinze jours en matière gracieuse.” (The time limit for an ordinary appeal is one month in contentious matters; it is fifteen days in non-contentious matters.) See article 538 of the Code of civil procedure. Article 528 provides: “Le délai à l’expiration duquel un recours ne peut plus être exercé court à compter de la notification du jugement, à moins que ce délai n’ait commencé à courir, en vertu de la loi, dès la date du jugement. Le délai court même à l’encontre de celui qui notifie.” (The time at the end of which an appeal can no longer be brought runs from notification of the judgment, unless that time has, by law, started to run from the date of the judgment. The time runs even against the person who notifies.) See article 528 of the Code of civil procedure. Service-public.fr allows both an assignation, which is contentious in form, and a joint application. The characterization changes whether article 538 gives one month or fifteen days. The Lyon order of 3 December 2024 was taken to cassation, so the appellate route exists. This article does not state that every exequatur order in France is contentious, and it does not borrow the one-month figure from the European section of the service-public page and paste it onto an Algerian file. Read the notification. The date on the judgment and the date you opened the email are not the same legal event.

The 2026 judgment does not publish a bundle of exhibits. Inventing one would be false comfort. What the findings show is the kind of proof that carried the public-policy control: who seized the Algerian court, under which article, whether that choice was constrained, whether fraud was excluded, whether each party could assert their rights, and how the financial orders sat against each other. A judgment that does not say who requested the divorce, or that is not yet final, is a weak document to put in front of a French judge. Service-public.fr adds that the foreign judgment must have been notified before it can be applied in France. Translation by a sworn translator is a practical necessity when the judgment is in Arabic, and the civil-status track described below requires it expressly. The court track should not be assumed to be more casual.

B. Remarriage, the civil-status mention, and what exequatur does not decide

The reason most people start this process is not a taste for procedure. They want to marry again, or they want a French record to stop saying they are married, or they want a sum in the foreign judgment to be collectible, or they want a French divorce petition not to be thrown out. Each of those effects has its own door.

Remarriage is the strictest door, and it is a statute, not a custom. Article 147 of the Civil Code, in force continuously since 1804 and still applicable on 1 October 2026, provides: “On ne peut contracter un second mariage avant la dissolution du premier.” (One cannot contract a second marriage before the dissolution of the first.) The text is at article 147 of the Civil Code. A French civil registrar who still sees an undissolved marriage on the French records can refuse the new ceremony. An Algerian judgment in a drawer, however authentic in El Eulma, does not by itself dissolve the marriage on the French register. That is why people who are already divorced in Algeria are told, at a Paris town hall, that they are still married. The refusal is not a comment on the Algerian judgment’s wisdom. It is article 147 applied to a French record that has not yet been updated.

Updating that record is a different procedure from exequatur, and the Ministry of Europe and Foreign Affairs describes it on the page recognizing a divorce pronounced abroad, read on 1 October 2026. In general, the Ministry says, a divorce pronounced by a foreign authority must be the subject of a vérification d’opposabilité, a verification of opposability, by the procureur de la République, the public prosecutor, on whom the civil registrar who celebrated the marriage depends, for marriages celebrated in France, and by the public prosecutor at the tribunal judiciaire of Nantes for marriages celebrated abroad. An important warning on the same page: if the marriage was celebrated abroad on or after 1 March 2007, the corresponding record must first be transcribed on the French civil-status registers. Transcription is the copying of a foreign civil-status event onto a French register. Without it, there may be no French marriage record on which a divorce mention can be written.

For a couple who married at a Paris town hall, that rule points to the prosecutor attached to the Paris judicial court, because that is the prosecutor on whom the Paris registrar depends. It does not point to Nantes. For a couple who married in a town hall in Seine-Saint-Denis, Hauts-de-Seine, Val-de-Marne or another Île-de-France department, it points to the prosecutor of the tribunal judiciaire on which that registrar depends, which is often not Paris. For a couple who married in Algeria, the Ministry names the prosecutor at Nantes, not the prosecutor in the arrondissement where the spouses now rent a flat. If that Algerian marriage dates from 1 March 2007 or later and has never been transcribed, the divorce mention is not the first paper. The marriage transcription is. People lose months by posting a divorce file to the Paris prosecutor when the marriage was celebrated in Annaba or Oran and the Ministry’s rule sends the file to Nantes, or the other way around.

The Ministry’s list of papers for that verification, for countries outside the European Union and for Denmark, is specific. It asks for a full copy of the decision, original or certified true copy; if the decision is not reasoned, also the document that seized the foreign court or any other document setting out the claim; proof that the foreign decision is final, such as a certificate of no appeal, a deed of acquiescence, a certificate from the lawyer or from another authorized authority, or failing that another foreign document mentioning the decision; a translation by an expert translator of documents in a foreign language, legalized where required; proof of the parties’ domicile on the day the foreign proceedings were introduced, if that domicile does not appear from the decision itself; proof of the parties’ nationality on that day; and full copies of the civil-status records held by a French authority, in the margin of which the foreign decision is, where applicable, to be mentioned. If the foreign decision is held opposable in France, the prosecutor instructs the registrars who hold those records to enter the divorce mention. Opposable means it can be relied on against the persons concerned. It is the civil-status track. It is not, by itself, the court order of exequatur that Lyon granted.

That distinction is the gap in many explanations. A prosecutor’s verification can be enough to have “divorced” written on a French birth or marriage record, which is what a town hall will look at before a new marriage. Exequatur is what you need when you want executory force: to collect a sum, to enforce an order, to have a contested judgment carry the weight of an enforceable title. The husband in the 2026 case asked for exequatur. The wife in the 2021 case invoked the Algerian judgment as regular and opposable in order to obtain an eviction. Both routes exist. Neither replaces the other in every file. A mention on a birth certificate does not, by itself, tell a commissioner of justice that a sum of Algerian dinars fixed in 2019 can be seized from a French account. An exequatur order does not, by itself, instruct the Nantes prosecutor to transcribe a marriage that was never entered on a French register.

The European shortcut does not close that gap for Algeria. Regulation (EU) 2019/1111 of 25 June 2019, often called Brussels II ter, is the European instrument on jurisdiction, recognition and enforcement in matrimonial matters and parental responsibility. On the English text read for this article, a decision for that regulation means a decision of a court of a Member State, including a decree, order or judgment granting divorce, legal separation or annulment, or concerning parental responsibility. A court in El Eulma is not a court of a Member State. The same text limits the regulation to proceedings instituted, authentic instruments drawn up or registered, and agreements registered on or after 1 August 2022. That date sorts European files. It does not pull an Algerian judgment into the regulation. Maintenance obligations are outside its scope, so a sum fixed in an Algerian divorce is not turned into a European maintenance certificate by calling it family law. That reading of the regulation is the text consulted on 1 October 2026. Before anyone relies on a European certificate, the regulation itself should be opened, because an Algerian judgment sits outside the Member State definition just described.

The Ministry page read on 1 October 2026 still describes a civil-status shortcut by reference to Council Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003, and it lists European countries, with dates, plus a specific window for the United Kingdom. Algeria is not on that list. Denmark is expressly kept on the verification track. A Paris registrar cannot be asked to update a marriage record on the strength of a European certificate that an Algerian court does not issue under that regulation. The service-public page cites Regulation 2019/1111 among its references for matrimonial matters. Citing the regulation is correct for a divorce from another Member State. Citing it as the route for El Eulma is the error.

Money inside the Algerian judgment needs the same separation of questions. In the 2026 file, the Lyon court treated financial orders against the husband as offsetting the compensation charged to the wife, and the Court of Cassation accepted that this assessment could support the conclusion that international public policy was not infringed. That is a public-policy finding about recognition. It is not a calculation of what is still owed, and it is not a holding that every dinar in the operative part is now collectible in euros in France. Article 509 says foreign judgments are enforceable in the manner and in the cases provided by law. If the exequatur order covers a money condemnation, and the debtor does not pay, service-public.fr points to enforcement by a commissioner of justice. The scope is the operative part covered by the French order, not the narrative of the Algerian judgment and not the khol’â discussed in a commentary. A reader who needs the arithmetic of a French compensatory allowance, the prestation compensatoire, is in a different regime. This judgment does not set that allowance.

Children are the other false friend. Nothing in the 30 September 2026 dispositif, the operative part, decides where a child lives, whether a parent may leave France with the child, or whether parental authority is withdrawn. The operative part rejects the pourvoi, orders Mme [M] to pay the costs, and, under article 700 of the Code of civil procedure, rejects the claims for a costs indemnity. If an Algerian divorce judgment also contains measures about children, those measures are not approved by silence. That European regulation, which defines a decision as a decision of a court of a Member State, does not convert them into decisions of a Member State court. A parent who needs a French residence order, or who is facing a move, is not served by an exequatur file built only on article 54.

Fraud and constraint remain open even after this rejection. The Lyon court, as recorded by the Court of Cassation, excluded fraud and found that nothing compelled the wife’s choice to seize the Algerian judge although she lived in France. A different file, in which the wife was pressed, not served, or sent to Algeria to defeat a French case already underway, is not decided by that finding. The 2026 formula allows recognition where another ground of conflict with substantive or procedural public policy is not established. If such a ground is established, the formula does not require recognition. The 2021 formula was explicit that the procedure must not have been tainted by fraud and that the other spouse must have been able to assert their rights. The 2026 formula keeps the rights-of-defense condition and the residual public-policy condition. What changed is who may bring the French application, not the duty to look at how the foreign case was brought.

A last confusion is worth naming because the search volume around it is large and the law is different. A séparation de corps, a French judicial separation, leaves the marriage in place. An Algerian divorce, once it is opposable or granted exequatur, is relied on as a dissolution. Article 147 cares about dissolution. A couple who obtained a French legal separation, or who are only living apart, are not in the position of M. [S] and Mme [M]. They still have a marriage, and a foreign judgment that does not pass the 30 September 2026 test will not dissolve it for them. Conversely, spouses who already have a final Algerian divorce requested by the wife should not be advised to start a French divorce from zero without first asking whether that Algerian judgment is already binding. The 2023 case is the warning: a French family-judge petition was declared inadmissible because Tunisian decisions were held opposable. Filing twice feels like action. It can be the step that loses the French case.

Conclusion

The Court of Cassation, on 30 September 2026, did not declare Algerian divorces automatically valid in France, and it did not declare them automatically void. It rejected the appeal against an exequatur order in a case where the wife had requested the divorce under article 54 of the Algerian Family Code, the husband had asked the French court for exequatur, and the appeal court had found that she chose that route without being forced, that fraud was excluded, that each party could assert their rights, and that financial orders against the husband offset the compensation charged to her. Recognition may be obtained, on the Court’s words, when the foreign decision was requested by the spouse facing the less favorable rules, when that spouse was able to assert their rights, and when no other ground of conflict with substantive or procedural public policy is established. The person who files in France need not be that spouse.

What still blocks a file is as concrete as what opens it. A divorce requested only under a husband-only repudiation is not this case. A Tunisian divorce under a ground the 2023 Court treated as open to either spouse is not this case. A missing finality certificate, a judgment that was never notified, a marriage celebrated abroad since 1 March 2007 and never transcribed, a petition sent to the Paris prosecutor when Nantes is the Ministry’s prosecutor, or a European certificate asked of a court that is not a court of a Member State, will not be cured by quoting paragraph 7 of the 30 September 2026 judgment. Exequatur, the prosecutor’s verification of opposability, and the European regulation are three different mechanisms. Article 147 still prevents a second marriage before the first is dissolved on the records the registrar actually uses. The operative part of the foreign judgment, and the scope of any French order, prevail over a general account. The Court rejected one pourvoi. It did not decide the next family’s children, flat or debts. That remains for the judge seized of those questions.

📄 Official circular