On 29 September 2026, the United Kingdom switched on a new set of rules for one of the most feared situations in cross-border criminal law: being convicted of a crime in a country where you never set foot in the courtroom, then arrested years later on an extradition warrant served in London, Paris or anywhere else. Section 246 of the Crime and Policing Act 2026 rewrote the test that British judges apply when the requesting state wants to enforce a conviction handed down in the absence of the accused. For defence lawyers, the reform redraws the map of winnable arguments. For anyone living in France with a foreign conviction hanging over them, it changes the questions to ask in the first forty-eight hours after an arrest. And a Paris court, applying French extradition law, still runs a stricter test of its own: the Cour de cassation requires the chambre de l’instruction to verify that the person will genuinely get a fresh trial, heard in person, on the facts and on the law, before any surrender. This article explains what London changed, where the traps are, and what Paris demands before it hands anyone over.
I. What London changed on 29 September 2026 for people convicted without appearing
Until this week, a British judge dealing with an extradition request based on a conviction in absence applied sections 20 and 85 of the Extradition Act 2003 in their old wording. From 29 September 2026, section 246 of the Crime and Policing Act 2026 substitutes a new, more detailed mechanism. The official revised text confirms the timing itself: section 246 took effect on 29 September 2026 under regulation 3(c) of the commencement regulations, with savings in regulation 6 for earlier arrests, see The Crime and Policing Act 2026 (Commencement No. 3 and Saving Provisions) Regulations 2026. The reform covers both halves of the British system at once: section 20, for Category 1 territories, and section 85, for Category 2 territories, are amended in identical terms. Requests from France travel under the post-Brexit warrant-based surrender arrangement of Part Three, Title VII of the EU-UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement, implemented domestically through the 2003 Act as amended by the European Union (Future Relationship) Act 2020. Because both sections now mirror each other, the analysis below holds whichever Part of the Act the warrant travels under.
A. Who London can still surrender after a conviction in absence: the four new retrial gateways
The heart of the reform is the new subsection (5) shared by sections 20 and 85. A British judge may now move to the next stage of the extradition hearing only where, in the words of the statute, “any of the following applies”. The four gateways deserve a close paraphrase, because every future contested hearing in London will turn on their exact scope: first, an unconditional entitlement to a retrial or to an appeal that amounts to one; second, the same entitlement where it is conditional only on the requesting state court not finding deliberate absence from trial; third, an entitlement of either kind that the person has expressly waived; fourth, an entitlement of either kind that the person, once informed of it, let lapse by missing the permitted deadline.
Gateway (a) is the straightforward case: the requesting state guarantees a genuine retrial or an appeal that amounts to one, and the judge can proceed. Gateway (b) is the innovation that will generate the most litigation. It covers conditional retrial rights, the systems in which the convicted person gets a new trial unless a court of the requesting state finds that they deliberately stayed away. Under the new wording, the British judge does not have to resolve the deliberate-absence question itself; it is enough that the entitlement exists subject to that finding by the foreign court. Defence teams will therefore need evidence, early, about how that foreign finding is actually made: which court decides, on what standard of proof, with what presumptions about notice of the hearing, and with what remedy if the finding goes against the accused. A paper guarantee that collapses in practice is precisely what the French courts refuse to accept, as the second half of this article shows.
Gateways (c) and (d) close the other two exits. An express waiver of the retrial right, once given, lets the extradition proceed, and so does a failure to use the right in time after being properly informed of it. Both provisions put a premium on the paper trail: was the person really informed, in a language they understand, of the right and of the deadline, and did they waive it expressly rather than by silence or by the conduct of a lawyer they never instructed? Practitioners quoted in the first British commentary on the reform, published on 23 September 2026 by the head of extradition at Church Court Chambers, warn that the warrant and any further information from the requesting state must be read against the full history of the foreign proceedings, because disputed notice of the hearing and uncertainty over the available remedy remain live factual questions the amendments do not answer by themselves.
One technical change deserves attention from anyone comparing the British and French systems. In subsection (8) of both sections, the words now read “constitute (or would have constituted)” and “have (or would have had)”. The judge assesses the foreign remedy as it stands or as it would have stood, which matters when the requesting state has reformed its own retrial procedure between the conviction and the extradition hearing. A guarantee abolished since the trial, or a new guarantee created after it, must each be placed on the correct side of the timeline, and the defence should insist on dated legislation and dated case law rather than general assurances.
B. The lawyer in the empty chair and the cut-off date most files will miss
The second major change is the new subsection 7A, inserted after subsection (7) in both sections 20 and 85. In plain terms, if a lawyer stood in the empty chair, the statute now deems the accused to have been present for this part of the test: representation without personal attendance counts as presence when the judge applies the conviction-stage test. That single sentence shifts the battleground. The argument is no longer only absence; it becomes a concrete challenge to the representation itself: who that lawyer was, who instructed them, what they actually did at the trial, and whether the accused knowingly waived the right to appear in person. A court-appointed lawyer the accused never met, a lawyer instructed by family members without a mandate, or representation limited to a formal presence with no adversarial testing of the evidence are all situations in which the deemed-presence rule should be challenged on the facts, even though the statute states the rule in absolute terms.
French extradition judges approach the same problem from the opposite direction, as shown below: the Cour de cassation asks whether the person knowingly gave up the right to appear, not whether a chair was filled. Anyone facing a London hearing under the new law should therefore build the file the French way too: proof of non-notification of the hearing date, proof of absence of mandate to the lawyer, and a reasoned opinion from a lawyer of the requesting state on what the representation actually covered. The deemed-presence rule makes that evidence more important, not less, because it is the only route left to show that the trial, though attended by counsel, did not satisfy the minimum rights of the defence.
The third point is procedural and urgent: the new law does not apply to every pending case. The commencement regulations contain savings. The new section 20 provisions do not apply to an extradition hearing arising from an arrest under section 3 or 5 before 29 September 2026, and the corresponding saving for section 85 applies to arrests under section 71, 73 or 74A before that date. The hearing date alone does not decide which version of the law governs; the arrest date does. Concretely, a person arrested in London on 28 September 2026 and heard in October is still judged under the old test, while a person arrested on 30 September falls under the new gateways. Defence solicitors should therefore check the custody record before anything else. Requesting states, for their part, cannot repair an old-law case by simply supplying fresh assurances drafted for the new wording; the applicable test is fixed by the arrest. This cut-off will produce a two-speed case law for months, and the first appeals under each version will be watched closely, including in Paris, where Franco-British files are routine.
II. What a Paris court still tests before surrendering you, and why it is stricter than London
France does not extradite its own nationals, does not extradite for political offences, and subjects every other request to a double filter: the statutory bars of the Code of criminal procedure and the judge-made requirements derived from the European Convention on Human Rights. The starting point is article 696 of that Code: “En l’absence de convention internationale en stipulant autrement, les conditions, la procédure et les effets de l’extradition sont déterminés par les dispositions du présent chapitre. Ces dispositions s’appliquent également aux points qui n’auraient pas été réglementés par les conventions internationales.” The full text is available on Légifrance. And article 696-1 sets the threshold condition for any surrender: “Aucune remise ne pourra être faite à un gouvernement étranger de personnes n’ayant pas été l’objet de poursuites ou d’une condamnation pour une infraction prévue par la présente section”, on Légifrance. Around these provisions, the Cour de cassation has built the most demanding in-absentia case law in Europe. Two recent rulings, one refusing surrender and one quashing a surrender order, show exactly what a Paris chambre de l’instruction must check.
A. The flagrant-denial-of-justice bar: no surrender without a genuine fresh trial
On 28 March 2023, the criminal chamber of the Cour de cassation gave the leading modern statement of the French test for convictions in absence. Italy sought the extradition of one of its nationals to enforce a sentence of life imprisonment imposed by the Milan assize appeal court on 28 November 1985, which had become enforceable on 4 November 1986, for acts classified as an attack with terrorist and subversive aims committed on 12 November 1980. The Paris chambre de l’instruction issued an unfavourable opinion, and the public prosecutor appealed. The Cour de cassation rejected the appeal: pourvoi no. 22-84.382, 28 March 2023, rejection, published on Court of Cassation.
The ruling restates three layers of law. First, the treaty layer (Cour de cassation, 28 March 2023, no. 22-84.382): “L’article 3 du deuxième protocole à la Convention européenne d’extradition stipule que, dans le cas où l’extradition est demandée aux fins d’exécution d’une peine résultant d’une décision rendue par défaut, la partie requise peut refuser d’extrader si, à son avis, la procédure de jugement n’a pas satisfait aux droits minimaux de la défense reconnus à toute personne accusée d’une infraction.” Second, the Convention layer, which turns that option into a duty (Cour de cassation, 28 March 2023, no. 22-84.382): “Il se déduit de l’article 6 de la Convention européenne des droits de l’homme relatif au droit à un procès équitable qu’un Etat partie à la Convention, requis aux fins d’extradition d’une personne, a l’obligation de s’assurer que celle-ci ne sera pas exposée, dans l’Etat requérant, à un déni de justice flagrant pouvant résulter, notamment, de l’impossibilité d’obtenir qu’une juridiction statue à nouveau sur le bien-fondé de l’accusation, alors qu’elle a fait l’objet d’une condamnation in abstentia au sens de la jurisprudence de la Cour européenne des droits de l’homme.”
Third, the ruling gives the chambre de l’instruction its working instructions, and this is the passage every defence file in Paris now quotes: where the person was tried in their absence, and it is not established that they gave up the right to appear and defend themselves or intended to evade justice, the court must verify that the person will have the possibility, if they so wish, of obtaining a fresh ruling by a court, after hearing them, on the merits of the charge in fact and in law. The judgment’s own words, at paragraph 12 (Cour de cassation, 28 March 2023, no. 22-84.382), define the test: the person must be able to obtain “qu’une juridiction statue à nouveau, après l’avoir entendue, sur le bien-fondé de l’accusation en fait comme en droit”, and “Si, à son avis, la procédure de l’Etat requérant ne satisfait pas à ces exigences, la chambre de l’instruction rend un avis défavorable à l’extradition.” Applied to the Italian file, the Paris judges concluded, on reasoning the Cour de cassation, 28 March 2023, no. 22-84.382 left untouched, “que la loi italienne ne garantit pas au condamné par défaut le droit qu’une juridiction statue à nouveau, après l’avoir entendu, sur le bien-fondé de l’accusation en fait comme en droit.” The result followed: no further inquiries ordered, unfavourable opinion confirmed.
Two features of this decision matter for British comparisons. First, the French test looks at the reality of the remedy, not its label. A foreign procedure called an appeal or an opposition satisfies Paris only if it re-examines the merits in fact and in law after hearing the person. A review limited to points of law, or a retrial conditioned on a prior finding the person cannot effectively contest, fails the test. London’s new conditional-retrial gateway, which accepts a retrial that the requesting state grants subject only to a judicial finding of deliberate absence, would therefore face a harder question in Paris: who decides deliberate absence, how, and with what defence rights? Second, the Cour de cassation controls only the legal framework, not the assessment: “La Cour de cassation ne peut substituer son appréciation à celle des juges.” So holds the Cour de cassation, 28 March 2023, no. 22-84.382. The chambre de l’instruction is sovereign on the facts, which is why the evidentiary file, expert opinions on foreign law included, decides these cases.
The same ruling adds the proportionality layer that now accompanies every French extradition opinion. Citing article 8 of the Convention, the Court recalls that extradition is an interference with private and family life that must be necessary in a democratic society, and it upheld the Paris finding that surrendering a man present continuously on French soil for thirty-nine years, married, father of two, employed and socially integrated, for facts of exceptional gravity, would be disproportionate. Length of roots in France, family stability and severance of ties with the requesting state are therefore argued alongside the retrial point in every serious Paris file. The statutory backbone behind all of this includes article 696-4 of the Code of criminal procedure, on Légifrance, whose first bar provides that “L’extradition n’est pas accordée : 1° Lorsque la personne réclamée a la nationalité française”, and whose seventh bar refuses surrender “Lorsque la personne réclamée serait jugée dans l’Etat requérant par un tribunal n’assurant pas les garanties fondamentales de procédure et de protection des droits de la défense”. A conviction in absence without a genuine retrial falls squarely within that seventh bar, and comparable American-side overreach in mega-sentence cases has already been examined on this desk through the lens of what France would do with an extradition file built on extreme sentences.
B. The defence rights that sink a surrender even when the foreign file looks perfect
The second ruling is even fresher, and it concerns not the foreign trial but the Paris hearing itself. On 14 April 2026, the criminal chamber quashed a favourable extradition opinion given by the Riom chambre de l’instruction in a Moldovan case: a Moldovan national sought to serve eighteen years imposed by the Chisinau appeal court on 21 February 2014 for attempted theft, brigandage and voluntary homicide committed in 2010. Pourvoi no. 25-85.155, 14 April 2026, quashing and remand to Lyon, published by the Court of Cassation. The defect had nothing to do with Moldova’s file. The requested person’s lawyer, facing surgery the day before the hearing and given the Moldovan reply to a second request for further information only the Friday before a Tuesday hearing, asked for an adjournment. The chambre de l’instruction refused, on the grounds that counsel knew the hearing date, could send written materials since the procedure is written, and, most strikingly, that the assistance of counsel in extradition proceedings is optional.
The Cour de cassation, 14 April 2026, no. 25-85.155 answered with a principle stated as a rule: “Vu les articles 6, § 3, de la Convention européenne des droits de l’homme, 696-10, alinéa 2, 696-13 et 696-15 du code de procédure pénale”, then “Il résulte de ces textes que la personne réclamée a droit à l’assistance d’un avocat de son choix ou commis d’office.” So holds the Cour de cassation, 14 April 2026, no. 25-85.155. The refusal was censured on two combined grounds. First, nothing in the judgment showed that the requested person had been heard on counsel’s adjournment request or had given up assistance by a chosen or appointed lawyer, whether to prepare the defence after the late return of the further information or to appear before the court ruling on the request. Second, the general demand for speed, the one-month period for the opinion, could not by itself justify refusing the adjournment given the risk to the right to counsel, aggravated by counsel’s late receipt of the new documents and absence from the hearing: In the Court’s words (Cour de cassation, 14 April 2026, no. 25-85.155), “l’exigence générale de diligence résultant des dispositions impartissant à la chambre de l’instruction un délai d’un mois pour rendre son avis sur la demande d’extradition ne pouvait en soi justifier le refus de report de l’audience au regard du risque d’atteinte au droit à l’assistance d’un avocat”. The opinion was quashed in full and the case remitted to Lyon.
This is where the new British deemed-presence rule meets its French mirror. London will now treat a person tried with a lawyer in the empty chair as tried in their presence. Paris, in the same factual configuration, asks whether the person knowingly gave up appearing and whether the lawyer was truly theirs. The practical consequence for a Franco-British file is direct: evidence that defeats deemed presence in London, a mandate never given, a hearing never notified, a lawyer never met, is exactly the evidence that triggers the flagrant-denial-of-justice bar in Paris. Build it once, use it twice.
The surrounding French procedure reinforces the point. From the first forty-eight hours, article 696-10 requires the prosecutor general, after verifying identity, to inform the person in a language they understand of the request and to advise them “qu’elle peut être assistée par un avocat de son choix ou, à défaut, par un avocat commis d’office”, full text on Légifrance. If the person consents, article 696-13 sends them before the chambre de l’instruction within five working days for identity confirmation and recorded statements, on Légifrance. If they refuse, article 696-15 gives them a hearing within ten working days and a reasoned opinion within one month absent further inquiries, on Légifrance, and the 2026 Moldovan ruling shows that the one-month clock never authorises a court to sacrifice the defence. For surrenders inside the European Union under a European arrest warrant, the neighbouring provisions confirm the same philosophy: article 695-22 of the Code, on Légifrance, lists the mandatory refusal grounds, while article 695-32 allows the executing chamber, for French nationals and long-term residents, to condition surrender on verification that the person may be returned to France to serve any sentence imposed. And where France refuses to surrender, it does not grant impunity: articles 113-6 and 113-7 of the Criminal Code give French courts jurisdiction over crimes and, under conditions of dual criminality, over délits committed abroad by French nationals, and over crimes and imprisonable délits committed abroad against French victims, texts on Légifrance and Légifrance: “La loi pénale française est applicable à tout crime commis par un Français hors du territoire de la République”, and “La loi pénale française est applicable à tout crime, ainsi qu’à tout délit puni d’emprisonnement, commis par un Français ou par un étranger hors du territoire de la République lorsque la victime est de nationalité française au moment de l’infraction.” These are the provisions behind the Paris prosecutor’s alternative of trying the person in France instead of handing them over.
At the European level, the same demand for a real second hearing structures the entire field. The Strasbourg Court’s Grand Chamber judgment in Sejdovic v. Italy, available on HUDOC, holds that a person convicted in absentia without proven waiver must be able to obtain a fresh determination of the merits, and the Luxembourg Court held in Melloni, case C-399/11 of 26 February 2013, text on EUR-Lex, that the European arrest warrant system, under Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA, may presume sufficient protection only where the issuing state offers one of the defined guarantees, including the right to a retrial or appeal amounting to one. The British reform of September 2026 is best read as London’s domestic translation of that European compromise. The French test goes one step further: Paris verifies the guarantee itself, on evidence, file by file.
Conclusion
Britain’s reform changes the locks but not the house. From 29 September 2026, a London judge can authorise surrender after a conviction in absence through four defined gateways, treats a trial attended only by a lawyer as a trial in presence, and applies the new test only to arrests made on or after that date. Anyone arrested earlier stays under the old law, whatever the hearing date. Anyone arrested later must attack the file at its weakest documented points: the reality of the retrial right, the procedure for finding deliberate absence, the proof of information and of any waiver, and the true mandate of the lawyer who sat in the empty chair. In Paris, the standard remains higher and judge-made: no surrender without a verified, genuine fresh trial on the facts and the law after hearing the person, effective assistance of counsel at the French hearing itself, and a proportionality review of family and private life. The first advice to anyone arrested on a foreign conviction warrant, in London or in Paris, is therefore the same: say nothing on the merits before a lawyer has the foreign judgment, the proof of summons, the record of representation and the text of the retrial remedy in hand, because the forty-eight hours after arrest decide which test applies and whether the file can survive it.