On 3 September 2026, the European Court of Human Rights notified a decision that closed 879 individual applications against Russia without examining their merits. The lead file, lodged in 2007, had been waiting for almost nineteen years. The applicants complained of matters as concrete as unfair trials, expression, detention conditions, property and movement, yet the Third Section of the Court held that it was no longer justified to continue examining them. Four weeks later, on 30 September 2026, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe answered from the political side: Russian state assets, roughly 260 billion euros immobilised worldwide including about 210 billion euros held in the European Union, should be repurposed to pay Ukraine compensation after two inter-state rulings against Russia, an operation the Assembly describes as a lawful countermeasure under international law. For victims, lawyers and families reading these two announcements together, the question is brutally practical. Your Strasbourg file may be closed, Russia refuses to execute the judgments that do exist, and the frozen billions sit in accounts you cannot touch. What, then, can still be done from Paris, in French courts and before French authorities, to keep a claim alive, to obtain restoration in Strasbourg, to preserve evidence for asylum, or to prepare the enforcement of an award if money ever becomes available?
This analysis explains the two decisions in their exact legal terms, then tests each remaining remedy the way a Paris judge would: the request for restoration under Article 37 section 2 of the Convention, the Committee of Ministers route for existing awards, the French criminal complaint for the gravest crimes, the French civil action and its immunity wall, and the use of a closed Strasbourg file in an asylum claim before the French Office for the Protection of Refugees and Stateless Persons and the National Court of Asylum. Nothing in this article promises payment from frozen assets. The Court itself warns that the practical individual benefit presently capable of being secured is limited, and French enforcement law protects foreign-state property behind a prior judicial authorisation that central-bank assets almost never pass. The value of acting now is different: limitation periods, evidence and procedural standing are preserved only by those who file in time.
I. Strasbourg closed 879 cases against Russia on 3 September 2026: can my file be restored?
A. Why the Court struck out the applications in Lebedeva and Others v. Russia
The decision is Lebedeva and Others v. Russia, Third Section, decided as a Chamber on 7 July 2026 and notified in writing on 3 September 2026. The first listed file is application number 49120/07, introduced by Tatyana Aleksandrovna Lebedeva on 20 September 2007, and the appendix joins 878 further applications, with Germany intervening in one of them, number 868/15, under Article 36 section 1 of the Convention. The Court states at the outset that the decision concerns the striking-out of the remaining individual applications against the Russian Federation, excluding the applications arising out of the armed conflicts involving that State, so readers with conflict-related files are not concerned by this ruling. The factual background is set out as a chain of institutional dates: suspension of Russia from its rights of representation on 25 February 2022, cessation of membership of the Council of Europe on 16 March 2022 by Resolution CM/Res(2022)2, and the plenary Resolution of 22 March 2022 taken under Article 58 of the Convention, which declared that the Russian Federation ceases to be a High Contracting Party to the Convention on 16 September 2022, while the Court remains competent to deal with applications directed against the Russian Federation in relation to acts or omissions capable of constituting a violation of the Convention provided that they occurred until 16 September 2022. The Court then confirms that neither the cessation of membership nor the refusal of the Russian authorities to take part in the proceedings affects its competence over acts predating the critical date, citing its earlier rulings in Svetova and Others and in Pivkina and Others, but it adds that the non-participation of the respondent State is nevertheless relevant to the assessment of whether continued examination remains justified. The operative provision is Article 37 sections 1 and 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights, applied in decision Lebedeva and Others v. Russia (application 49120/07 and 878 others), Third Section, 7 July 2026, notified 3 September 2026, and the Court quotes it in these terms: 1.The Court may at any stage of the proceedings decide to strike an application out of its list of cases where the circumstances lead to the conclusion that … (c)for any other reason established by the Court, it is no longer justified to continue the examination of the application. However, the Court shall continue the examination of the application if respect for human rights as defined in the Convention and the Protocols thereto so requires. 2.The Court may decide to restore an application to its list of cases if it considers that the circumstances justify such a course. The reasoning then proceeds in three layers that any applicant must understand before deciding what to do next. First, the Court recalls that Article 37 section 1 (c) confers a wide discretion, usable in exceptional circumstances where continued examination would represent a disproportionate burden on resources in relation to the objectives served, and it anchors that reading in Burmych and Others v. Ukraine (striking out), Grand Chamber, numbers 46852/13 and four others, 12 October 2017, in which more than 12,000 repetitive Ukrainian non-enforcement files were closed, and in Turan and Others v. Turkey, numbers 75805/16 and 426 others, 23 November 2021, where the Court dispensed with the separate examination of certain complaints after finding a violation of Article 5 section 1. Second, the Court distinguishes the present situation from both precedents: this is the first instance in which it has been required to organise the adjudication of a substantial body of cases against a State which has left the Convention system altogether, while remaining internationally responsible for acts occurring before the critical date, a State which has refused to participate, to submit observations, or to recognise any obligation to comply. Third, the Court finds that the remaining files raise neither issues of marked importance for Russia’s responsibility nor questions calling for the development of its case-law, that they are not amenable to simplified repetitive-case processing owing to their factual or legal particularities, and that the principal patterns of violations have already been addressed in fully reasoned judgments delivered in the exercise of residual jurisdiction. The passage applicants will find hardest to read is paragraph 46: the Court states that it cannot ignore the practical implications of the Russian authorities’ stated refusal to execute its judgments and the resulting absence, in practice, of payment of awards, adding at once that this consideration is not decisive because a judgment retains declaratory value, but that it is relevant to proportionality, since the practical individual benefit presently capable of being secured is limited. The decision was taken unanimously, it joins the applications, it strikes them out under Article 37 section 1 (c), and it preserves restoration under Article 37 section 2. Reactions were immediate and severe: Amnesty International called the ruling deeply disappointing, stating that it deprives hundreds of individuals of what for many of them is their last hope of seeing justice for the violations they have suffered, and that the decision to deny these victims their day in court cannot be justified by Russia’s refusal to execute Court judgments, or the fact that the remaining applications raise no novel questions of law, or restraints on resources, urging that the decision should be reversed and the cases brought back on the docket, while Memorial and the International Federation for Human Rights published protests in the same week and American academic commentary examined what the 879 closed files mean for Russian asylum claims in the United States. None of that criticism changes the legal position of a person whose file is in the appendix: the application is closed, the complaints were not decided, and the only Strasbourg door left open is restoration.
B. How restoration under Article 37 section 2 works and when Strasbourg reopens a file
Restoration is not an appeal, because the striking-out decision is final within the Convention system, and it is not a fresh application either, because the original file number survives. It is a request addressed to the Court asking it to find that the circumstances justify bringing the case back onto its list, and the Court examines such requests against the very reasons that led to the strike-out. In Lebedeva, three of those reasons are spelled out and each suggests, by mirror image, the only arguments capable of supporting a restoration request. The first reason is the absence of any unresolved issue of principle: the Court held that the complaints, although potentially meritorious, do not disclose any unresolved issue of principle or any lacunae in the Court’s assessment of the respondent State’s conduct which would require further clarification in a judgment. A restoration request must therefore identify something the decision says is missing, such as a significant new fact unknown at the time, for example a domestic judgment or document that transforms the legal assessment, or a development in the Court’s own case-law after 3 September 2026 that gives the file a precedential value it previously lacked. A simple disagreement with the strike-out, however sincerely held, does not meet that test, and the Court says so expressly when it recalls that Article 37 section 1 in fine does not require it to continue the examination of every potentially meritorious application where the broader Convention interests have already been addressed by other means. The second reason is the absence of any current risk: the Court observes that the present applications do not disclose any current circumstance, such as an immediate risk to life, liberty or physical integrity, requiring their continued examination notwithstanding the considerations set out above. An applicant who can demonstrate such a present and personal risk, with dated evidence, therefore speaks directly to a criterion the Court itself framed as capable of outweighing the strike-out logic, and interim-measures practice under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court remains available in genuine urgency, through a separate request that must be reasoned independently. The third reason is the safeguard structure of the decision itself: the strike-out is pronounced without prejudice to the Court’s power under Article 37 section 2 to restore any of the applications to its list if it considers that the circumstances justify such a course, and the Court adds that the requirements of respect for human rights have been sufficiently addressed, so far as presently possible, through the judgments already delivered and through the preservation of the possibility of restoration. Practically, a restoration request is made by letter to the Registrar, referencing the application number as listed in the appendix, setting out the new circumstances with exhibits, and explaining precisely which paragraph of the strike-out reasoning the new element answers. The request must be written with restraint: it concedes the strike-out framework instead of attacking it, it attaches translations of any new domestic document, and it states what adjudication is sought, whether a full examination or, in the files marked with a double asterisk in the appendix where the strike-out applies only to the question of just satisfaction reserved in earlier principal judgments, a ruling limited to compensation. Applicants should also understand what restoration cannot do. It cannot order Russia to pay, because execution of Strasbourg judgments belongs to a different organ, the Committee of Ministers under Article 46 section 2 of the Convention, and the Court recalls this division of roles when it cites Georgia v. Russia (II), Grand Chamber, just satisfaction, number 38263/08, 28 April 2023, alongside paragraph 7 of Resolution CM/Res(2022)3. It cannot convert declaratory findings into seizable assets in France, because enforcement against a foreign State meets the immunity rules examined below. And it cannot succeed twice on identical papers: a second request repeating the first invites summary rejection and weakens any later step. For files where no new element exists, the honest advice is that restoration is a dormant option to be kept under review rather than an immediate filing, and that energy is better spent on the Paris remedies, which do not depend on Strasbourg’s docket at all.
II. Russia will not pay and the billions are frozen: what can a Paris judge actually order?
A. Why frozen Russian central-bank assets in France cannot simply be seized to pay victims
The political announcements of late September and early October 2026 are easily misread as payment orders, and the first service a Paris lawyer renders is to explain why they are not. On 30 September 2026 the Parliamentary Assembly, acting on a report by Tony Vaughan of the United Kingdom, adopted a resolution and a recommendation stating that Russian state assets should be repurposed to pay Ukraine potentially billions of euros in compensation after two rulings against Russia by the European Court of Human Rights in inter-state cases brought by Ukraine, in which Russia was held responsible for serious violations caused by its war of aggression although the amounts of just satisfaction have not yet been set, with the Assembly observing that any awards could potentially amount to billions, tens of billions, or hundreds of billions of euros given damage unprecedented in the history of the Council of Europe. The Assembly states in its 30 September 2026 session report that repurposing Russian state assets to pay compensation would constitute a lawful countermeasure under international law, it records that around 260 billion euros of Russian Central Bank assets were immobilised following the full-scale invasion, of which 210 billion euros are currently held in the European Union, it urges the creation of a funding mechanism under Council of Europe auspices to receive these funds and disburse them, and it adds that this obligation under international law does not diminish with time and cannot be set aside by Russian domestic law. Parallel pressure continued into October: press reports on 1 October 2026 describe 122 members of the European Parliament and four member States pushing to use the immobilised funds for Ukraine ahead of a summit, and the United Kingdom published a Russia sanctions notice on 1 October 2026 adding further individuals, entities and vessels to its asset-freeze and travel-ban lists. Holders of existing Strasbourg awards, notably Ukraine itself and the individual applicants whose just satisfaction Russia refuses to pay, with press coverage of the Assembly debate putting unpaid court-ordered compensation at more than 3.3 billion euros, naturally ask whether a Paris enforcement judge could order seizure of Russian money or securities located in France. French law answers through a protective architecture built in 2016, and each layer must be tested in order. The starting point is that European Union immobilisation is a freeze, not a confiscation: funds are blocked and windfall management is regulated at Union level, but ownership is not transferred and no individual creditor acquires a title over them by virtue of the freeze alone. The second layer is the immunity from execution enjoyed by foreign States before French courts. Article L.111-1-2 of the Code of Civil Enforcement Procedures provides that conservatory measures or forced execution against property belonging to a foreign State may be authorised by the judge only if one of three conditions is met: the State has expressly consented to the measure, or it has reserved or earmarked the property for satisfaction of the claim, or a judgment or arbitral award has been rendered against it and the property is specifically used or intended for use otherwise than for non-commercial public service purposes and is linked to the entity against which proceedings were brought. Central-bank reserves fail that test structurally, because they serve sovereign monetary functions, and the diplomatic-property shield reinforces the wall: Article L.111-1-3 of the same Code provides that enforcement against property used for the functions of foreign diplomatic missions, consular posts, special missions or missions to international organisations is possible only in case of express and special waiver by the State concerned. A Strasbourg judgment awarding just satisfaction is authoritative as to responsibility, and the Court recalls in Lebedeva that supervision of execution falls to the Committee of Ministers under Article 46 section 2, but it is not, as such, an enforceable French title against specific assets, and it does not constitute the express consent of the debtor State. The Assembly knows this, which is why its text urges member States to ensure that national legal frameworks allow the domestic enforcement of Strasbourg just-satisfaction awards against Russia for as long as Russia refuses to pay: that call is addressed to legislators, not to sitting judges, and no French court can anticipate a statute that does not yet exist. Readers of this site’s earlier analysis will find the full enforcement mechanics set out in the companion piece on how a Paris enforcement judge handles Russian-state asset seizure, the European reparations loan and existing Strasbourg awards, whose framework the present article completes for the newly closed files. Two practical consequences follow for victims holding only a struck-out file. First, no seizure application should be filed today over immobilised central-bank assets on the sole basis of the strike-out decision, because there is no award to enforce and no consent to exhibit, and a hasty rejection would create an adverse precedent in the creditor’s own later case. Second, holders of genuine existing awards, whether Ukrainian inter-state just satisfaction once quantified or individual awards already issued in the residual-jurisdiction judgments, should prepare enforcement methodically: identify non-sovereign commercial property with a documented link to the debtor entity, obtain prior judicial authorisation with evidence satisfying one of the three statutory branches, and coordinate with the Committee of Ministers supervision process rather than acting as though the freeze alone were a title. The frozen billions are therefore neither a mirage nor a cashier’s desk: they are the object of a legislative and diplomatic construction site, the Assembly’s funding mechanism, in which individual victims currently have no direct withdrawal right, and any lawyer who suggests otherwise, in Paris or elsewhere, should be asked to name the consent, the earmarking or the commercial-use link on which the seizure would rest.
B. The French remedies that remain open: criminal complaint, civil action and asylum evidence from Paris
Once the illusion of immediate seizure is set aside, three French-law paths remain genuinely available, and each has been tested by the courts in ways this article can state precisely. The first path is the criminal complaint for the gravest crimes, and it is the only one capable of producing coercive investigative measures on French soil. Article 689 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides that perpetrators of or accomplices to offences committed outside the territory of the Republic may be prosecuted and tried by French courts either where French law is applicable or where an international convention confers jurisdiction on French courts, and Article 689-11 of the same Code allows French courts to try any person suspected of having committed abroad genocide, other crimes against humanity or war crimes, on condition of habitual residence in France, with prosecution brought only at the request of the anti-terrorism public prosecutor and where no international or national court seeks surrender or extradition. The definitions supporting such complaints are written in the Criminal Code in terms a complainant can verify: Article 211-1 defines genocide as acts committed in execution of a concerted plan to destroy totally or partially a national, ethnic, racial or religious group, or a group defined by any other arbitrary criterion, listing wilful killing, serious attacks on physical or mental integrity, subjection to destructive conditions of existence, measures to prevent births and forcible transfer of children, punished by life imprisonment, while Article 212-1 defines crimes against humanity as listed acts, including wilful killing, extermination, enslavement, deportation, imprisonment in violation of fundamental international law and torture, committed in execution of a concerted plan against a civilian population in the context of a generalised or systematic attack, likewise punished by life imprisonment. That this framework is not theoretical is shown by a published Bulletin decision of the Criminal Chamber: in its judgment of 1 February 2023, number 22-82.235, published in the Bulletin, the Cour de cassation ruled in a preliminary investigation opened in France on charges of war crimes, crimes against humanity and complicity concerning facts allegedly committed in Ivory Coast, where the liberty and custody judge had ordered the criminal seizure of 231,931.23 euros held in a life-insurance contract, and it required the investigating chamber to examine the immunity plea raised on appeal. The lesson for victims of conduct in Russia or in territories under its control is concrete: where the suspect resides in France, a complaint with constitution of civil party before the Paris judicial court can trigger verification of the residence condition, of the prosecutor’s exclusive initiative and of competing surrender requests, and can lead to seizures, witness hearings and requests for mutual legal assistance, even though immunity attached to certain official functions at the time of the facts may later bar trial and must be assessed case by case, exactly as the 2023 ruling required. The second path is the civil action for damages, and here honesty requires stating its limits first. Article 1240 of the Civil Code states that any act whatever of man which causes damage to another obliges him by whose fault it occurred to make reparation, and that provision founds claims against private defendants, employers, insurers and perpetrators sued personally before French courts, with the Strasbourg file serving as organised evidence of the facts, the chronology and the harm. Against the Russian State itself, however, the same immunity wall examined above applies at the merits stage as well as in enforcement, so a civil writ should target solvent private actors where they exist, or be framed as a protective filing preserving limitation while the legislative framework for State-asset enforcement evolves, rather than as a suit expected to yield a payable judgment this year. The third path concerns applicants who are in France and fear return, and it is often the most immediately useful: the closed Strasbourg file becomes evidence in an asylum claim. Article L.513-1 of the Code on the Entry and Residence of Foreigners and the Right of Asylum provides that refugee status is recognised and subsidiary protection granted by the French Office for the Protection of Refugees and Stateless Persons or by the National Court of Asylum, and Article L.512-1 of the same Code grants subsidiary protection to persons facing a real risk of the death penalty, torture or inhuman or degrading treatment, or, for civilians, a serious individual threat from indiscriminate violence in armed conflict. A struck-out application proves neither persecution nor risk by itself, because Strasbourg never decided the merits, but the underlying exhibits, medical certificates, summonses, detention records and the government’s own non-cooperation narrative corroborate a personal account, and American academic analysis of the same 879 files already treats them as material for Russian asylum claims in the United States, a reasoning transposable to French files where country-of-origin information documents the current risk. Across all three paths, one rule of method applies: file early, file in the correct forum, and keep Strasbourg restoration, Committee of Ministers supervision, French criminal investigation and asylum proceedings running on separate tracks with consistent facts, because contradiction between tracks is the one error no later mechanism can repair.
Conclusion
The autumn of 2026 confronts victims of Russian violations with two truths that must be held together. The first is that Strasbourg has closed 879 individual files, unanimously, on the ground that continued examination would serve no proportionate Convention purpose while Russia refuses all cooperation and payment, preserving only the narrow door of restoration where genuinely new circumstances arise. The second is that the political response, the Assembly’s 30 September 2026 call to channel immobilised Russian state assets toward compensation as a lawful countermeasure, creates no individual right of seizure today, and French enforcement law, with its three-branch authorisation test and its special shield for diplomatic and central-bank property, would reject any attempt to treat the freeze as a title. Between those two truths lies the useful space this article has mapped: restoration requests where new facts exist, Committee of Ministers supervision for awards already rendered, French criminal complaints where suspects live in France, civil preservation against private debtors, and asylum filings in which a closed Strasbourg file corroborates a present risk. None of these steps recovers money tomorrow. Each of them prevents the second loss that follows the first when victims, discouraged by a strike-out, let time extinguish the remedies that remain. The files closed on 3 September 2026 keep their numbers, their exhibits and, through Article 37 section 2, their theoretical return to the list; the task now is to give those papers a second life in the forums that are still open, in Paris as in Strasbourg, before limitation and dispersal do what the strike-out itself did not: erase the claim entirely.