On 1 October 2026, American public radio broadcast the voice of a sitting international judge who cannot use her American bank account, cannot travel to the United States, and says she was punished for a ruling she joined six years ago. Kimberly Prost, a Canadian judge at the International Criminal Court in The Hague, told NPR that the American sanctions imposed on her stem from a unanimous appeals decision authorising an investigation into crimes connected with the war in Afghanistan, a decision in which the American component, in her words, was never pursued and later deprioritised. Two days earlier, on 29 September 2026, a federal court in Maine refused to throw out the First Amendment challenge to those same sanctions, allowing two American human rights advocates to continue their fight against an executive order, according to the ACLU account of the ruling, they say criminalises talking to ICC prosecutors. By August 2026, nine of the Court’s eighteen judges were under American sanctions, along with both deputy prosecutors, a former prosecutor and a staff member, while Washington threatens what it calls a whole-of-government campaign to systematically dismantle the institution. For anyone facing an ICC arrest warrant, an extradition request, or a frozen account in a sanctions file, the question is no longer theoretical: when the permanent international criminal court is itself sanctioned by a great power, what does France, a State Party that is legally bound to cooperate with it, actually do in Paris?
This analysis explains, from a French practitioner’s perspective, how the American sanctions machine against the ICC works, what the two American court developments of this week change, and what a Paris court would still test before arresting, surrendering, freezing, or prosecuting. The answer matters far beyond The Hague: French banks, French companies, witnesses on French soil, and suspects arrested at a Paris airport all sit at the intersection of an American prohibition and a French duty to cooperate.
I. Can Washington Punish ICC Judges and the Lawyers Who Talk to the Court?
A. Why is a Canadian ICC judge under American sanctions for a six-year-old ruling?
The story starts with a judicial act, not a crime. Six years ago, Kimberly Prost was temporarily sitting on the ICC Appeals Chamber when prosecutors asked the judges to authorise an investigation into alleged crimes connected with the war in Afghanistan. She and four colleagues unanimously approved the request. The investigation covered alleged crimes involving the Taliban and ISIS, with what Prost described as a small component related to the United States. That American component was never pursued and was later deprioritised by the prosecution. Yet she told NPR on 1 October 2026 that it was for that six-year-old unanimous decision that she stands sanctioned today.
Her role had been strictly judicial. The appeals judges had to decide whether the prosecutor had a proper legal basis and jurisdiction to proceed, a task she compared to a judge authorising a search warrant. She was not investigating Americans, and she stressed that there is no investigation touching any American component in Afghanistan and that she has nothing to do with the Israel-Gaza situation. The sanctions against her flow from the executive order targeting ICC officials involved in cases concerning Israel and Gaza or Afghanistan, the same instrument at the centre of the Maine litigation described below.
The scale of the American campaign is what makes this week historic rather than anecdotal. By August 2026, nine of the Court’s eighteen judges were under United States sanctions, together with both deputy prosecutors, its former prosecutor and one staff member. The confrontation intensified after the Hamas-led attack of 7 October 2023 and the ensuing war in Gaza, and it reached a diplomatic peak on 22 September 2026, when the American president called on all ICC member states to withdraw from the treaty, a call European leaders publicly rejected within days while, according to Reuters reporting on 24 September 2026, few states followed Washington’s lead. The administration has since announced what it presents as a whole-of-government campaign to systematically dismantle the Court over its investigations involving Americans and Israelis, and the State Department, asked by NPR whether additional designations are coming, did not answer.
For judges on international benches, the deeper alarm concerns judicial independence itself. Prost put it in terms every litigator will recognise: judges are being told, rather than deciding on the facts and the law before them as their oath requires, to decide cases, or not to decide them, in accordance with the wishes of a government. Her current docket illustrates that the work continues regardless: she is sitting on a case about alleged crimes tied to the jihadist takeover of Timbuktu in Mali, including persecution, torture and inhumane treatment. She vowed she would never quit her judicial office, dismissed the coercive measures as completely futile, and added that she and the other sanctioned judges and prosecutors keep doing their jobs under their judicial oath, with objectivity and independence.
The sanctions have changed her life outside the courtroom, freezing her out of parts of the dollar-based financial system and restricting her movement, but not the work inside it. And she is fighting back in court: in June 2026, she joined fellow ICC judges Reine Alapini-Gansou and Solomy Balungi Bossa in suing the American president and other officials in federal court in New York, arguing the measures are unlawful. That lawsuit, still pending, runs in parallel with the Maine case won in part this week by the advocates, and together they frame the central American legal question: can the United States punish foreign judges for judging, and punish its own citizens for talking to them?
From a Paris perspective, three practical consequences already follow. First, any payment, transfer of evidence, or expert mission routed in dollars or through American persons that touches a sanctioned judge, prosecutor or staff member potentially triggers American secondary exposure, which is why French banks have grown reluctant to process even lawful ICC-related payments. Second, witnesses, experts and counsel based in France who cooperate with the Court increasingly ask how to transmit testimony and funds without tripping either regime, the American prohibition or the European shield. Third, suspects and their counsel now systematically invoke the American sanctions politically, arguing that a Court under siege cannot try them fairly, an argument French courts will have to answer with procedure rather than rhetoric, as developed in Part II.
B. Can American advocates still work with the ICC after Executive Order 14203?
The second development of the week comes from Bangor, Maine. On Monday 29 September 2026, the United States District Court for the District of Maine allowed the central claims in the advocates’ challenge to move forward, rejecting the administration’s effort to dismiss the lawsuit brought by two American human rights experts against the sanctions targeting the ICC. In July 2025, the same court had already issued interim relief prohibiting the administration from punishing Matthew Smith and Akila Radhakrishnan for their communications with the Court. The administration then asked the court to dismiss the case outright. On Monday, the court refused, and the experts’ claims proceed to a full hearing.
The plaintiffs are not abstract test cases. Matthew Smith, the founder and chief executive of Fortify Rights, explained that his work helps the ICC investigate mass murder, torture and human trafficking perpetrated against the people of Myanmar. His organisation documents atrocities against the Rohingya and other communities whose own courts offer no remedy. Akila Radhakrishnan is an international human rights lawyer whose work focuses on gender-based violence under Taliban rule: Afghan victims, she said, cannot rely on their own courts for justice, which is why they turn to the ICC and why working alongside the Court matters so much to her. She explained that she sued to stop her own government from punishing her for trying to hold the Taliban accountable for systematic violence against women and girls in Afghanistan.
The legal theory is a First Amendment one. Under Executive Order 14203, Americans who have devoted their careers to atrocity accountability, from the genocide of Myanmar’s Rohingya to gender-based persecution in Afghanistan, face stiff civil and criminal penalties for conduct as ordinary as communicating with the ICC Office of the Prosecutor, providing legal advice, sharing expert analysis, or transmitting evidence. The lawsuit argues that these restrictions violate First Amendment speech protections by prohibiting the advocates, and Americans like them, from engaging and advocating with ICC investigators and prosecutors. Monday’s order is not a final ruling on the merits: the court has not yet decided whether the sanctions are unlawful. But the judge wrote that the record already shows a strong likelihood that the order violates constitutional protections, which is why the interim shield stays in place while the case continues.
Three litigation lessons travel directly to Paris files. First, the American courts are treating engagement with an international tribunal as expressive and associational conduct protected by the Constitution, not as a mere financial transaction the executive can prohibit at will. Counsel working across jurisdictions should therefore frame cooperation with the Court, expert opinions, witness preparation, amicus work, as protected legal activity, a characterisation that also resonates under French defence rights and Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights. Second, the interim relief model matters: where sanctions threaten to destroy an investigation or a defence before trial, French practitioners should think early about interim applications, whether before the EU General Court against an EU listing or before the French administrative judge against a domestic implementing measure, rather than waiting for a final annulment years later. Third, the Maine court’s reasoning distinguishes the person from the function: punishing an advocate for transmitting evidence to a prosecutor is not the same as sanctioning a perpetrator, and that distinction is exactly the one French courts draw when they separate targeted financial sanctions against individuals from the general duty to let justice take its course.
None of this suspends the American sanctions, which remain in force and continue to bite. The Maine ruling keeps two advocates able to work; it does not delist a single judge. The New York lawsuit by the three judges is still at an early stage. And the administration’s dismantling campaign continues. But the direction of travel in American courtrooms this autumn is unmistakable: judges are slowing the executive down, demanding justification, and protecting the channels, speech, counsel, evidence, through which international justice breathes. That breathing space is precisely what Paris needs, because France’s own obligations toward the Court do not pause when Washington objects.
II. What Must Paris Do When the Court It Must Cooperate With Is Under Sanctions?
A. Must France still arrest and surrender suspects to the ICC despite American sanctions?
The short answer is yes, and it follows from a statute that American sanctions cannot repeal. Article 627 of the French Code of Criminal Procedure states: “Pour l’application du statut de la Cour pénale internationale signé le 18 juillet 1998, la France participe à la répression des infractions et coopère avec cette juridiction dans les conditions fixées par le présent titre.” Participation in repressing the offences and cooperation with the Court are not policy options; they are the statutory mission, introduced by Loi n° 2002-268 du 26 février 2002 relative à la coopération avec la Cour pénale internationale, and they bind every French authority regardless of what a foreign executive order provides. An American designation of an ICC judge changes nothing in this duty: France cooperates with the institution, executes its requests, and lets its own courts review them under French procedure.
The cooperation machinery runs through Paris and the anti-terrorism prosecution service. Article 627-1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides: “Les demandes d’entraide émanant de la Cour pénale internationale sont adressées aux autorités compétentes en vertu de l’article 87 du statut en original ou en copie certifiée conforme accompagnées de toutes pièces justificatives.” Those requests go to the anti-terrorism prosecutor of Paris, who gives them their useful course, including in emergencies by any direct means. Article 627-2 of the same Code adds that mutual assistance requests are executed, as the case may be, by the anti-terrorism prosecutor or by the Paris investigating judge, acting across the entire national territory, in the presence, where applicable, of the ICC Prosecutor or representative. In practice, this means searches, seizures, witness hearings and service of documents requested by The Hague are carried out by French magistrates under French rules, with the record transmitted back to the Court, a circuit American sanctions neither authorise French officers to break nor entitle them to break.
Arrest and surrender follow an even more tightly framed path. Article 627-4 of the Code of Criminal Procedure states: “Les demandes d’arrestation aux fins de remise délivrées par la Cour pénale internationale sont adressées, en original et accompagnées de toutes pièces justificatives, aux autorités compétentes en vertu de l’article 87 du statut”, which verify formal regularity and transmit them to the prosecutor general at the Paris Court of Appeal while executing them nationwide. Article 627-5 of the same Code then sets the safeguards for the person arrested: “Toute personne appréhendée en vertu d’une demande d’arrestation aux fins de remise doit être déférée dans les vingt-quatre heures au procureur de la République territorialement compétent.” Within that period the custody protections of Articles 63-1 to 63-7 apply; the magistrate verifies identity, informs the person in a language they understand of the surrender request and of a hearing before the prosecutor general within five days maximum, and tells them that “elle pourra être assistée par un avocat de son choix ou, à défaut, par un avocat commis d’office”. Immediate access to counsel is therefore built into the first hours, a point defence teams should enforce literally, because everything decided later, consent, evidence, challenges, depends on it.
The decisive filter belongs to the Paris investigating chamber, and its review is deliberately narrow. Article 627-8 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides: “Lorsque la chambre de l’instruction constate qu’il n’y a pas d’erreur évidente, elle ordonne la remise de la personne réclamée”, with all other questions referred to the ICC itself for useful action. The chamber rules within fifteen days of the person’s appearance, and on further appeal the criminal chamber of the Court of Cassation decides within two months of receiving the file. The philosophy is identical to the one the Court of Cassation restated on 30 September 2020 in a surrender case to the international tribunal mechanism (appeal no. 20-83.181, rejection): the investigating chamber’s review is limited to verifying identity, the production of the instruments supporting the request, that the facts fall within the statutory definition, and the absence of a manifest error, with fundamental guarantees examined whenever their violation is invoked. Identity, papers, facts, no manifest error, plus fundamental guarantees when invoked: that is the whole test, and American sanctions against ICC personnel appear nowhere in it.
Two financial tools complete the picture and matter enormously in a sanctions-saturated environment. Article 627-3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides that protective measures on French territory mentioned in Article 93(1)(k) of the Rome Statute are ordered, with Treasury advances and under the Code’s procedures, by the anti-terrorism prosecutor: “L’exécution sur le territoire français des mesures conservatoires mentionnées au k du paragraphe 1 de l’article 93 du statut est ordonnée, aux frais avancés du Trésor et selon les modalités prévues par le présent code, par le procureur de la République antiterroriste.” The statute adds: “La durée maximale de ces mesures est limitée à deux ans”, renewable on ICC request, with difficulties resolved through the consultations provided in Articles 93(3) and 97 of the Statute. Separately, Article 627-16 of the Code of Criminal Procedure channels fines, confiscations and reparation orders pronounced by the ICC to the Paris criminal court, which authorises enforcement while remaining bound by the ICC decision: “Le tribunal est lié par la décision de la Cour pénale internationale, y compris en ce qui concerne les dispositions relatives aux droits des tiers.” For victims and their counsel, this is the enforcement gateway in France: ICC reparation orders are not decorative here; they are executed by the Paris court, third-party rights included, under French procedural rules.
Where does that leave a suspect arrested at Roissy on an ICC warrant who argues that the Court is crippled by American sanctions and cannot give him a fair trial? French procedure answers with the narrow filter, not with geopolitics: identity, titles, facts, manifest error, fundamental guarantees. A generalised attack on the Court’s functioning is referred to the Court itself under Article 627-8; only a concrete, evidenced violation of fundamental guarantees attached to this surrender, torture risk, flagrant denial of justice in this case, has traction before the Paris chamber. Conversely, where the person sought shows that surrender would expose them to treatment contrary to Article 3 of the European Convention, the chamber must examine it, because its control includes fundamental guarantees when invoked. The American sanctions are therefore legally neutral in the surrender test: they neither authorise Paris to refuse a regular ICC request, nor entitle a fugitive to escape it by pointing at Washington.
B. Can French courts prosecute in Paris when The Hague is strangled?
If American pressure ever degraded the ICC’s operational capacity, freezing its accounts, deterring its witnesses, grounding its missions, France holds a second string: trying the gravest crimes itself. Article 689 of the Code of Criminal Procedure lays the general foundation: “Les auteurs ou complices d’infractions commises hors du territoire de la République peuvent être poursuivis et jugés par les juridictions françaises soit lorsque, conformément aux dispositions du livre Ier du code pénal ou d’un autre texte législatif, la loi française est applicable, soit lorsqu’une convention internationale ou un acte pris en application du traité instituant les Communautés européennes donne compétence aux juridictions françaises pour connaître de l’infraction.” Perpetrators and accomplices of offences committed abroad may be prosecuted and tried in France either when French law applies or when an international convention gives French courts jurisdiction, which is exactly what the Geneva Conventions, the Torture Convention and the Rome Statute system do for their respective crimes.
Torture has its own long-standing channel. Article 689-1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides: “En application des conventions internationales visées aux articles suivants, peut être poursuivie et jugée par les juridictions françaises, si elle se trouve en France, toute personne qui s’est rendue coupable hors du territoire de la République de l’une des infractions énumérées par ces articles.” Presence on French soil plus an offence listed in the following articles is enough. The following article for torture adds: Article 689-2 of the same Code states: “Pour l’application de la convention contre la torture et autres peines ou traitements cruels, inhumains ou dégradants, adoptée à New York le 10 décembre 1984, peut être poursuivie et jugée dans les conditions prévues à l’article 689-1 toute personne coupable de tortures au sens de l’article 1er de la convention.” The Court of Cassation, sitting in plenary assembly on 12 May 2023 (appeal no. 22-82.468), applied exactly this framework to a Syrian torture and war-crimes file, holding that the Convention definition of torture covers only acts inflicted by a public official or a person acting in an official capacity, or at their instigation or with their express or tacit consent, and that the reference in Article 689-2 necessarily carries that definition of the perpetrator with it. The appeal was rejected. For victims’ counsel, the message is operational: a torture file with a suspect present in France and an official-capacity link can live in Paris whatever happens to funding or politics in The Hague.
Crimes against humanity and war crimes committed abroad fall under a neighbouring provision with one additional filter. Article 689-11 of the Code of Criminal Procedure opens with the principle: “Hors les cas prévus au sous-titre Ier du titre Ier du livre IV pour l’application de la convention portant statut de la Cour pénale internationale, ouverte à la signature à Rome le 18 juillet 1998, peut être poursuivie et jugée par les juridictions françaises toute personne soupçonnée d’avoir commis à l’étranger l’une des infractions suivantes : 1° Le crime de génocide défini au chapitre Ier du sous-titre Ier du titre Ier du livre II du code pénal ; 2° Les autres crimes contre l’humanité définis au chapitre II du même sous-titre Ier ; 3° Les crimes et les délits de guerre définis aux articles 461-1 à 461-31 du même code.” It continues: “La personne soupçonnée doit avoir une résidence habituelle sur le territoire français, celle-ci se définissant par un lien de rattachement suffisant avec la France.” Habitual residence, not mere transit, is required, assessed through concrete ties: length of presence, conditions and reasons for it, the person’s demonstrated will to settle or remain, family, social, material links. The same 12 May 2023 plenary assembly decision made habitual residence the decisive battleground, treating its interpretation as a question on which the criminal chamber had never ruled and testing it against a suspect whose French presence lasted barely three months for university conferences, underlining how fact-sensitive and strategic this forum choice is.
Three practical consequences follow for files that touch both the ICC and American sanctions. First, Paris can serve as a fallback forum: where ICC proceedings stall because witnesses cannot be paid, experts cannot travel, or evidence cannot transit the dollar system, a French complaint with constitution de partie civile before the Paris war-crimes unit keeps the facts alive under Articles 689 and following, provided the presence or residence conditions are met. Second, the residence condition must be built deliberately and early: school enrolment, lease, administrative filings, family regrouping, every document that evidences stable, effective and lasting presence counts, while a three-month academic stay, the very pattern debated in the 2023 case, invites a jurisdictional challenge. Third, the double-punishability alternative inside Article 689-11 gives counsel room to manoeuvre: even where neither the territorial state nor the suspect’s national state is an ICC party, prosecution remains possible if the conduct was punishable where committed, which atrocity conduct invariably is through ordinary criminal law.
The remaining friction is financial, and here European law shields French actors. The EU Blocking Statute, Regulation 2271/96, prohibits EU operators from complying with the foreign sanctions laws it lists and allows recovery of damages, which means a French bank that freezes an ICC-related transfer solely to please a foreign designation, or a French company that cuts ties with counsel for the Court, may itself breach EU law. The correct reflex in Paris is therefore a documented triage: identify whether the counterparty is designated under EU or UN measures, which France enforces strictly, or only under American measures, which France does not enforce and EU law forbids obeying where listed; route lawful ICC cooperation payments through euro channels with a written sanctions memo; and where a bank over-complies, challenge the freeze with the legal basis attached. American sanctions bite through the dollar; they do not rewrite the Code of Criminal Procedure, and no compliance department in Paris is entitled to surrender French jurisdiction to a foreign executive order.
None of this makes Paris an easy forum. Universal-jurisdiction cases take years, require the suspect’s presence or habitual residence, depend on open-source and witness evidence gathered abroad, and face well-funded challenges on immunity, legality and double jeopardy. But the architecture exists, the plenary assembly has clarified its keys in 2023, and the anti-terrorism and war-crimes units in Paris know how to run these files. If The Hague were ever strangled, Paris would not be starting from nothing; it would be continuing, under French statutes, the repression of the same crimes.
Conclusion
A Canadian judge sanctioned for a six-year-old judicial vote, two American advocates kept able to talk to prosecutors by a Maine court, nine judges out of eighteen under foreign sanctions, and a dismantling campaign announced against the very court France is bound by statute to assist: the autumn of 2026 has turned the ICC from a distant tribunal into a live test of every cross-border file. The French answer is procedural, not declamatory. Paris still arrests on ICC requests within twenty-four hours with counsel from the first hour, still surrenders when the investigating chamber finds no manifest error, still freezes and confiscates at the ICC’s request within a two-year renewable frame, still enforces its fines and reparation orders through the Paris criminal court, and still prosecutes torture, crimes against humanity and war crimes itself when the suspect is present or habitually resident. American sanctions complicate payments, travel and evidence flows, and they demand rigorous euro-based triage under the EU shield; they do not suspend a single article of the cooperation title. For suspects, witnesses, victims and counsel navigating this intersection, the method is the same as ever in Paris: identify the exact request, check identity, papers, facts and guarantees, build residence or presence where prosecution is the goal, and put every decisive assertion back to its verified text. That discipline is what keeps a fair trial possible, in The Hague or in Paris, while great powers quarrel over the Court.