On 30 September 2026, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe adopted a resolution that could redraw the legal map of the frozen Russian assets debate. Its message is blunt: Russia owes more than EUR 3.3 billion in unpaid compensation awarded by the European Court of Human Rights, and member states should get ready to redirect immobilised Russian state assets to pay Ukraine and Ukrainian victims once the Strasbourg Court delivers its judgments in the inter-State cases. Two weeks before a European Union summit in Brussels devoted in part to the same EUR 210 billion question, a French lawyer’s reading of the text matters, because whatever mechanism emerges will have to survive contact with enforcement judges, state-immunity rules and asset-freeze litigation, including in Paris, where much of this fight would land.
Strasbourg does not manage bank accounts. The Assembly cannot seize a euro on its own authority, and its resolution is not directly enforceable against a custodian. Its interest lies elsewhere: it sketches the legal theory, ECHR just satisfaction, domestic enforcement statutes, and a Council of Europe compensation mechanism, on which governments could rely to move from freezing assets to transferring them. That theory will be tested against sovereign immunity, central-bank immunity, European Union sanctions law and investment-protection rules operating in the other direction. Anyone holding, administering, auditing or claiming an interest in assets connected to the Russian state needs to understand the route PACE has mapped, the obstacles French courts would raise, and the files to prepare now.
I. What the Council of Europe decided on 30 September 2026 and why the timing matters
A. PACE Resolution 2678: frozen Russian state assets should pay for ECHR awards against Russia
The text adopted on 30 September 2026 addresses how to ensure the implementation of judgments of the European Court of Human Rights concerning the Russian Federation, including payment of the compensation awarded. Its starting point is a record of non-compliance: Russia owes over EUR 3.3 billion in unpaid just satisfaction awarded by the European Court of Human Rights, yet it refuses to implement the Court’s judgments or to engage with the Council of Europe’s supervision machinery. From that finding, the Assembly draws a practical consequence for every member and observer state.
According to the Ukrinform news agency’s report of 1 October 2026, the resolution urges states to adopt without delay the legal and practical measures needed to repurpose Russian state assets within their jurisdiction, so that once the European Court of Human Rights delivers judgments awarding just satisfaction in the inter-State cases brought by Ukraine against the Russian Federation over the war of aggression, the frozen funds can be directed to compensation. The same report notes that the Assembly regards such repurposing as a lawful countermeasure under international law, on the ground that Russia must bear the legal consequences of its aggression and compensate Ukraine for the damage caused.
Three features of the text deserve attention from practitioners. First, the trigger is judicial, not political: the transfer is meant to follow Strasbourg judgments awarding just satisfaction in the inter-State cases, not to anticipate them. The Court has already established Russia’s responsibility for serious human rights violations in two inter-State cases brought by Ukraine, although the compensation amounts have not yet been fixed. Given the scale of the damage documented, the resolution warns that future awards could run into the tens or even hundreds of billions of euros, in Ukrinform’s rendering of the text.
Second, the Assembly asks states to adapt their domestic law now. The resolution calls for national legal frameworks that allow the domestic enforcement of the Court’s awards, so that a Strasbourg judgment expressed in euros can be converted into seizure, transfer or set-off orders against identifiable state assets within each jurisdiction. That domestic-enforcement point is the hinge of the whole construction, and it is where French procedural law, exequatur, enforcement judges and state immunity, will decide what is actually possible in Paris.
Third, the Assembly proposes an institutional vehicle. In its accompanying recommendation, it suggests creating, under the auspices of the Council of Europe, a mechanism to receive Russian state assets earmarked for compensation payments, with sums transferred to Ukraine counted against the compensation Russia owes. Such a mechanism could operate on its own or feed into a future compensation fund. The Assembly adds two companion demands: targeted individual sanctions against identifiable perpetrators of the gravest violations documented in the Court’s judgments, with encouragement of universal-jurisdiction prosecutions where available, and the preservation of all case files concerning applications against Russia, including the protection of the identity of unlawfully deported Ukrainian children and full disclosure of information about them through an appropriate international mechanism.
The Grand Chamber judgment in Ukraine v. Russia (re Crimea), applications nos. 20958/14 and 38334/18 (HUDOC reference 001-235139), delivered on 25 June 2024, illustrates what these inter-State findings look like. The Court found multiple violations of the European Convention arising from allegations of disappearances, ill-treatment, unlawful detention, suppression of Ukrainian media and of the Ukrainian language in schools, overcrowded pre-trial detention, prosecutions on fabricated charges in reprisal for pro-Ukrainian positions, discrimination against Crimean Tatars and transfers of prisoners from Crimea to Russia. It concluded that it had enough evidence to find beyond reasonable doubt that the incidents were sufficiently numerous and interconnected to amount to a pattern or system of violations, officially tolerated by the Russian authorities. The just-satisfaction phase of such cases is precisely the stage at which the PACE mechanism is meant to operate: once Strasbourg puts a figure on the damage, the question becomes where the money is found.
B. The EUR 210 billion already frozen and the Brussels summit of 15-16 October 2026
The Strasbourg vote did not happen in a vacuum. European Union leaders meet in Brussels on 15-16 October 2026 with Ukraine financing on the agenda, and the frozen-assets dossier is back at the top of the pile. According to Forbes’ reporting of 1 October 2026, 122 members of the European Parliament signed a letter to EU leaders urging renewed discussion of using the frozen Russian assets to help Ukraine, proposing that the assets be moved into a new EU instrument that would assume the legal obligations toward Russia’s central bank. A separate letter signed in August by Sweden, the Netherlands, Poland and Spain argued that Ukraine needs greater financial support over both the short and the long term and that member states should make further use of Russia’s immobilised assets for Ukraine’s benefit. Estonia, Ireland, Portugal, Finland, Latvia and Lithuania have each, in various formulations, kept the option on the table.
The figures explain the pressure. Europe holds some EUR 210 billion in frozen Russian assets, of which about EUR 185 billion sits in Belgium with the central securities depository Euroclear, according to Reuters figures relayed by Forbes. Ukraine’s Defence Ministry faces a EUR 23.1 billion funding gap for personnel, social support and weapons purchases, a figure President Volodymyr Zelenskyy put forward in August. Supporters of mobilisation argue that using the immobilised assets would relieve budgetary pressure on the EU while making Russia pay for a war it started, with the assets funding Ukrainian public programmes, defence and reconstruction.
The obstacles are equally documented. Belgium, where the bulk of the assets are held, opposes the plan, warning of legal retaliation and lawsuits from Russia as well as of the financial burden it would carry. The European Central Bank has warned that touching central-bank reserves could weaken confidence in the euro. A first attempt at a reparations loan, launched in October 2025, failed after months of negotiation. Instead, EU leaders agreed in December 2025 on a EUR 90 billion loan to Ukraine, finalised by the Council in April 2026 to cover Ukraine’s most urgent budgetary and defence-industry needs in 2026 and 2027. Under the December 2025 European Council terms, Ukraine repays that loan only once it receives reparations, and the EU reserves the right to use the immobilised assets to repay it. In the same month, the EU used an emergency treaty provision to freeze the Russian assets indefinitely, removing the six-month renewal cycle that any single member state could previously veto.
Moscow has not stayed passive. On 27 February 2026, the Russian central bank sued the EU before the General Court in Luxembourg over the indefinite freeze. In May 2026, a Moscow court ordered Euroclear to pay compensation to the Russian central bank in connection with the frozen assets; Euroclear filed its own suit in Brussels in June, and in July a Moscow court rejected Euroclear’s appeal. As Forbes notes, Russian courts lack enforcement jurisdiction inside the EU, so these judgments currently bite only on paper, but they signal the retaliatory litigation any mobilisation scheme will attract, including suits against custodians, intermediaries and the states that order them to move funds.
This is the context in which the PACE resolution lands: not as an isolated declaration, but as the legal-theory complement to a financing negotiation. Brussels discusses who pays for Ukraine’s 2026-2027 needs; Strasbourg proposes the legal reasoning, ECHR awards plus domestic enforcement plus a compensation mechanism, that could justify paying with Russian state money. Whether that reasoning holds depends on courts, and French courts will be among the first asked.
II. How ECHR-based compensation against Russian state assets would be enforced from France
A. From a Strasbourg award to a Paris seizure: exequatur, enforcement titles and the wall of state immunity
A judgment of the European Court of Human Rights awarding just satisfaction is binding on the respondent state, but it is not a French enforcement title by itself. In France, the conversion of a foreign or international decision into measures against assets located on French territory runs through the ordinary enforcement framework. The starting rule is set by Article 509 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which provides that “Les jugements rendus par les tribunaux étrangers et les actes reçus par les officiers étrangers sont exécutoires sur le territoire de la République de la manière et dans les cas prévus par la loi.” An ECHR award in favour of Ukraine or of individual victims would therefore need a domestic enforcement pathway, exactly what the PACE resolution asks states to legislate, before a Paris enforcement judge could authorise seizure or transfer of assets held in France, whether securities accounts, bank balances, real estate or receivables.
French jurisdictional law gives Paris courts a broad reach over disputes connected to France. Article 14 of the Civil Code provides that “L’étranger, même non résidant en France, pourra être cité devant les tribunaux français, pour l’exécution des obligations par lui contractées en France avec un Français ; il pourra être traduit devant les tribunaux de France, pour les obligations par lui contractées en pays étranger envers des Français.” Article 15 of the same Code adds that “Un Français pourra être traduit devant un tribunal de France, pour des obligations par lui contractées en pays étranger, même avec un étranger.” And Article 3 of the Civil Code recalls that “Les lois de police et de sûreté obligent tous ceux qui habitent le territoire. Les immeubles, même ceux possédés par des étrangers, sont régis par la loi française.” None of these provisions authorises the seizure of foreign state property by itself, but together they explain why Paris is a natural forum for the satellite litigation, challenges to freezes, claims by custodians, actions by creditors seeking payment, that any mobilisation scheme will generate.
The decisive barrier is the immunity from execution enjoyed by foreign states. French statute law, shaped by the 2016 Sapin II legislation, sets strict cumulative conditions. Article L111-1-2 of the Code of Civil Enforcement Procedures provides that “Des mesures conservatoires ou des mesures d’exécution forcée visant un bien appartenant à un Etat étranger ne peuvent être autorisées par le juge que si l’une des conditions suivantes est remplie : 1° L’Etat concerné a expressément consenti à l’application d’une telle mesure ; 2° L’Etat concerné a réservé ou affecté ce bien à la satisfaction de la demande qui fait l’objet de la procédure ; 3° Lorsqu’un jugement ou une sentence arbitrale a été rendu contre l’Etat concerné et que le bien en question est spécifiquement utilisé ou destiné à être utilisé par ledit Etat autrement qu’à des fins de service public non commerciales et entretient un lien avec l’entité contre laquelle la procédure a été intentée.” The same article then lists categories deemed used for non-commercial public purposes, diplomatic mission property, military property, cultural heritage and archives, exhibition objects and tax or social-security claims, placing them presumptively beyond reach.
For diplomatic property the lock is even tighter. Article L111-1-3 of the same Code provides that “Des mesures conservatoires ou des mesures d’exécution forcée ne peuvent être mises en œuvre sur les biens, y compris les comptes bancaires, utilisés ou destinés à être utilisés dans l’exercice des fonctions de la mission diplomatique des Etats étrangers ou de leurs postes consulaires, de leurs missions spéciales ou de leurs missions auprès des organisations internationales qu’en cas de renonciation expresse et spéciale des Etats concernés.” Only an express and special waiver by the state concerned opens that door.
The Cour de cassation reads these shields narrowly but enforces them firmly. In a judgment of 3 February 2021, No. 19-10.669, the First Civil Chamber recalled that “Selon le droit international coutumier, les missions diplomatiques des Etats étrangers bénéficient, pour le fonctionnement de la représentation de l’Etat accréditaire, d’une immunité d’exécution à laquelle il ne peut être renoncé que de façon expresse et spéciale (1re Civ., 28 septembre 2011, pourvoi n° 09-72.057, Bull. 2011, I, n° 153 ; 1re Civ., 28 mars 2013, pourvois n° 10-25.938, n° 11-10.450 et n° 11-13.323, Bull. 2013, I, n° 62 à 64 ; 1re Civ., 10 janvier 2018, pourvoi n° 16-22.494, Bull. 2018, I, n° 2). Cette immunité s’étend, notamment, aux fonds déposés sur les comptes bancaires des missions diplomatiques, lesquels sont présumés être affectés aux besoins de la mission de souveraineté de l’Etat accréditaire.” It added that “Cette présomption, justifiée par la nécessité de préserver cette mission à l’exercice de laquelle participent les représentations diplomatiques, cède devant la preuve contraire qui, pouvant être rapportée par tous moyens, n’est pas rendue impossible aux créanciers.” That rebuttable presumption structures every enforcement attempt against embassy-linked funds in Paris.
More recently, in a judgment of 13 March 2024, No. 21-17.599, published in the Bulletin (ECLI:FR:CCASS:2024:C100126), the same chamber held that the provisions of Article L111-1-3, reflecting customary international law as expressed in the 2004 United Nations Convention on state immunity and Article 22(3) of the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, must be strictly interpreted: the functions of a diplomatic mission are distinct from diplomatic activity exercised by a head of state, so that an express waiver of immunity from execution by a state suffices for an aircraft assigned to that state’s presidency, but not forming part of the resources made available to its diplomatic mission, to be subject to enforcement, without any additional special waiver. The lesson for the Russian-assets debate is double-edged: waivers are read strictly, asset by asset, yet property genuinely unconnected to sovereign functions is not automatically sheltered.
Applied to immobilised Russian state assets, this framework produces a differentiated map rather than a single answer. Central-bank reserves benefit in principle from the strongest protection under customary international law, and a French judge would require either an express waiver, inconceivable from Moscow, or a legislative act reconfiguring the legal status of the frozen property before authorising enforcement. Commercial assets of state-owned entities used for non-sovereign purposes sit closer to the third opening of Article L111-1-2, provided a judgment or arbitral award has been rendered against the state and the property is specifically linked to the claim. Income streams generated by frozen principal, the interest and profits at the heart of the EU’s earlier extraordinary-revenues debate, occupy an intermediate zone that legislatures, rather than judges, would have to allocate by statute. And diplomatic and consular accounts remain, as the 2021 ruling confirms, behind the express-and-special-waiver wall.
The ordinary creditor’s route illustrates the mechanics. Article L221-1 of the Code of Civil Enforcement Procedures provides that “Tout créancier muni d’un titre exécutoire constatant une créance liquide et exigible peut, après signification d’un commandement, faire procéder à la saisie et à la vente des biens meubles corporels appartenant à son débiteur, qu’ils soient ou non détenus par ce dernier.” For ECHR-based compensation, the missing link is precisely the enforceable title against identified assets: a Strasbourg award names a debtor state and a sum, but the creditor, Ukraine, or victims assigned the claim, or a compensation mechanism subrogated to their rights, must still obtain a French judicial authorisation targeting specific property in France, defeating immunity objections asset by asset. The PACE call for domestic enforcement statutes is an admission that this link does not yet exist in most member states.
B. Freezes, sanctions challenges and the files Paris practitioners should prepare now
Freezing and seizing are different legal operations, and confusing them is the most common error in public commentary. A freeze immobilises: it prohibits movement, use or disposal without transferring ownership. French domestic law provides such tools, including the joint ministerial freeze mechanism of Article L562-2 of the Monetary and Financial Code, under which “Le ministre chargé de l’économie et le ministre de l’intérieur peuvent décider, conjointement, pour une durée de six mois, renouvelable, le gel des fonds et ressources économiques” belonging to, held or controlled by persons involved in terrorism and related networks. That provision targets terrorism financing rather than state aggression, which is why the Russia sanctions architecture rests instead on European Union regulations applied directly in France, complemented by national implementation measures. The distinction matters for litigation strategy: challenges to Russia-related freezes run primarily through EU courts in Luxembourg, with annulment actions by listed persons and entities, while French courts handle the domestic consequences, from banking disputes to the liability of custodians that execute freeze orders.
Sanctions litigation is already an active front, and its outcomes will shape any future mobilisation. Listed individuals and entities regularly petition the General Court for annulment of their designations, and the resulting case law defines how far the Council can go in reaching property through ownership or control criteria, including property held by non-designated entities. A September 2026 legal commentary noted a Court of Justice clarification on the application of asset-freeze measures to non-designated entities by virtue of ownership or control, a point of direct relevance to the structures through which Russian state wealth is often held in Western financial centres. Every extension of the freeze perimeter enlarges the pool of assets a future compensation mechanism could theoretically address, and every annulment shrinks it. Holders and intermediaries in Paris should therefore track Luxembourg rulings as closely as Strasbourg ones: the list of what is frozen determines the list of what could one day be transferred.
For custodians, banks, depositories and asset managers operating in France, the immediate risk is two-directional. On one side, European and national authorities require strict compliance with freeze and reporting obligations, with severe penalties for making funds available in breach of sanctions. On the other side, the Russian central bank’s Luxembourg action, the Moscow judgments against Euroclear and the prospect of further retaliatory suits mean that any institution moving frozen funds under a future mobilisation statute could face claims for breach of custody duties, at least in jurisdictions sympathetic to Moscow. The file to build now is a defensive one: complete mapping of frozen positions, segregation of principal, interest and extraordinary revenues, preservation of every instruction received from competent authorities, and written legal opinions supporting each step. An institution that can show it acted exclusively under binding orders of the competent authority, with full traceability, is far better placed than one that improvised.
For potential claimants, Ukrainian public entities, businesses and individuals holding ECHR awards or pending applications, the preparation is the mirror image. First, secure the title: a final Strasbourg judgment with a quantified award of just satisfaction remains the indispensable foundation, and pending inter-State developments should be monitored through the Court’s HUDOC database rather than press summaries. Second, identify French-situs assets early, with evidence of their link to the debtor state and of their non-sovereign use where enforcement under Article L111-1-2 is contemplated; the stricter the immunity screen, the more granular the proof must be. Third, anticipate the state’s defences: central-bank immunity, diplomatic-purpose presumptions on mixed accounts, and arguments that a transfer ordered by statute still requires judicial authorisation asset by asset. Fourth, coordinate with the mechanism PACE proposes: if a Council of Europe vehicle begins receiving earmarked assets, the procedural route for lodging claims, proving loss and obtaining payment will have its own deadlines and evidentiary rules, and early filers historically fare better in mass-claims processes.
Paris procedure adds its own layer. Enforcement measures against state property require prior judicial authorisation, sought from the enforcement judge with a file demonstrating that one of the statutory openings is met. Appeals run to the courts of appeal and, on points of law, to the Cour de cassation, whose strict-reading case law sets the standard of proof. Exequatur-style proceedings for recognising the enforceable character of an international award follow written, document-heavy rituals in which translations, apostilles, chains of title and proof of finality are checked before the merits are even addressed. None of this moves quickly: creditors should think in terms of years, interim protective measures and parallel tracks in several jurisdictions at once. In practice, files of this kind in Paris are handled through counsel admitted before the local courts; the line used for such files at this office is +33 6 89 11 34 45.
A final caution concerns the Moscow mirror judgments. The May and July 2026 rulings ordering Euroclear to compensate the Russian central bank have no enforcement effect inside the EU, as Forbes correctly notes, because Russian courts lack jurisdiction here. They cannot be recognised in France: the French exequatur framework, recalled above through Article 509 of the Code of Civil Procedure, requires verification that the foreign court had jurisdiction from the French point of view and that recognition would not offend French international public policy, tests a confiscatory judgment rendered in retaliation for EU sanctions would struggle to pass. Their significance is political and precautionary: they warn custodians and states that mobilisation will be answered with litigation, and they confirm that the endgame of this dispute will be fought as much in courtrooms as in summits.
Conclusion
The PACE resolution of 30 September 2026 does not move a single euro, but it supplies something the frozen-assets debate has lacked: a judicially triggered legal theory. ECHR just-satisfaction awards in the inter-State cases would fix Russia’s debt with the authority of a court; domestic enforcement statutes would convert that debt into orders against identifiable assets; a Council of Europe mechanism would channel the proceeds to Ukraine and count them against what Russia owes. Whether the Brussels summit of 15-16 October turns that theory into a financing decision, through a reparations loan or a more direct instrument, will depend on politics. Whether it survives contact with judges will depend on law: state immunity strictly read, central-bank reserves strongly shielded, commercial assets more exposed, and every transfer requiring a title, an authorisation and a traceable chain of orders.
For observers in Paris, the realistic timeline runs from Strasbourg to Luxembourg to the enforcement judge on the Ile de la Cite: first the just-satisfaction figures, then the EU instrument and its annulment litigation, then the asset-by-asset enforcement fights in the jurisdictions where the property sits. France’s contribution will be decided less by declarations than by statutes its Parliament is willing to adopt and by the rigour of the files its courts are asked to enforce. Holders should document, claimants should quantify, and both should reckon with a dispute measured in years rather than weeks. The resolution has named the destination; the procedural road to it remains to be built, order by order, appeal by appeal.