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Nord Stream Sabotage and the European Arrest Warrant: Why Italy Surrendered a Suspect to Germany While Poland Refused — and What France Would Do

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Source: French Court of Cassation – Judilibre and Légifrance open data

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Nord Stream Sabotage and the European Arrest Warrant: Why Italy Surrendered a Suspect to Germany While Poland Refused — and What France Would Do

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On 26 September 2022, a series of underwater explosions ruptured the Nord Stream 1 and 2 gas pipelines in the Baltic Sea, ending Russian gas deliveries to Germany through those pipes. Three years later, the criminal investigation led by Germany’s Federal Public Prosecutor General has produced one of the most instructive European Arrest Warrant cases in recent memory: seized with German warrants targeting Ukrainian nationals, the courts of Italy and Poland gave opposite answers. Italy surrendered its suspect to Berlin; Poland refused and freed its own. In January 2026, Germany’s Federal Court of Justice closed the circle by upholding the detention of the man surrendered from Italy and rejecting his claims of immunity and combatant privilege. For anyone exposed to a European Arrest Warrant in France — requested person, counsel, or issuing authority — this split deserves close study, because every argument raised in Warsaw, Bologna, Rome and Karlsruhe has a direct equivalent before the Paris chambre de l’instruction. This article reconstructs the two rulings from verified sources, then tests each defence the way a French court would.

I. Two German warrants, two opposite answers: how Italy surrendered while Poland refused

A. Italy surrendered Serhij K. to Germany: when will a European Arrest Warrant survive immunity, ne bis in idem and Article 3 defences?

Germany’s case, as summarised by the specialist European criminal-law review eucrim, is that seven Ukrainian nationals chartered a sailing yacht, sailed to the pipelines in the Baltic Sea in September 2022, and laid explosive devices that damaged Nord Stream 1 and 2 so badly that gas could no longer flow from Russia to Europe. Because the acts were regarded as capable of undermining the internal security of the Federal Republic and given the exceptional importance of the case, jurisdiction was taken by the Federal Public Prosecutor General (Generalbundesanwalt), the authority competent for state-security offences. Arrest warrants were issued for anti-constitutional sabotage committed together with causing an explosion and destroying structures, under Sections 88, 305 and 308 of the German Criminal Code. On that basis Germany issued European Arrest Warrants into several Member States.

The Italian chapter concerned a Ukrainian national identified in German and Italian reporting as Serhij K., described as the suspected ringleader. The proceedings went through two full rounds. After an initial surrender order was set aside on a procedural defect and the case remitted, the Bologna Court of Appeal on 23 October 2025 ordered his surrender to Germany a second time. This second ruling cured the procedural flaw identified on remittal but, as eucrim notes, did not revisit in substance the defence’s central refusal grounds: functional immunity, ne bis in idem, and the risk of a violation of Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights. The defence appealed again, and on 19 November 2025 the Italian Supreme Court of Cassation dismissed the second appeal and confirmed the surrender order — a ruling reported the same month by DW with Reuters material. The surrender was then executed: Serhij K. was handed over to Germany on 27 November 2025.

The German epilogue came on 15 January 2026. Brought before the Federal Court of Justice (Bundesgerichtshof) to challenge his continued detention, Serhij K. argued that he enjoyed immunity and that his acts were covered by a combatant’s privilege justifying the sabotage as a lawful act of war. The Federal Court of Justice dismissed the complaint. According to the Court’s press release on case StB 60/25, relayed by eucrim, the judges confirmed both a strong suspicion of an offence falling within the Federal Public Prosecutor General’s jurisdiction and a risk of flight justifying detention. They rejected the immunity and combatant-privilege arguments outright. On the much-debated question of jurisdiction over explosions in international waters, Karlsruhe adopted the effects doctrine: Germany has territorial jurisdiction because the result of the offence — the pipelines being rendered permanently inoperable — also occurred on German territory, where the pipelines end. A private national acting outside any recognised state command structure, the Court held in substance, cannot borrow the privileges of a lawful combatant, and damage whose effects materialise in Germany can be prosecuted in Germany.

Three lessons emerge from the Italian-German sequence. First, within the European Arrest Warrant system, procedural defects buy delay but rarely decide the outcome: once Bologna cured the flaw identified on remittal, the substantive refusal grounds failed at both levels of Italian jurisdiction. Second, the defences that dominate public debate — immunity, the laws of war, prison conditions — were all litigated and all rejected, in line with the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union that keeps refusal grounds narrow. Third, the jurisdictional objection that persuaded Warsaw cut no ice in Rome or Karlsruhe: the courts that surrendered and then detained Serhij K. treated sabotage in the Baltic as prosecutable in the state where its destructive result landed. Each of these points maps directly onto French procedure, as Part II will show.

B. Poland refused Volodymyr Z.: can a just defensive war defeat double criminality and German jurisdiction?

The Polish chapter produced the mirror image. On 17 October 2025, the Regional Court in Warsaw refused to extradite 46-year-old Ukrainian national Volodymyr Z. to Germany and lifted his pre-trial detention, as reported by the BBC and documented in the court’s published reasoning summarised by eucrim. The court’s reasoning rested on two pillars, each remarkable. First, on double criminality: any action by the suspect would have been taken within the framework of a just defensive war waged on behalf of Ukraine, so the suspect had committed no crime under Polish law — and therefore the double-criminality condition of Article 607r paragraph 1 point 1 of the Polish Code of Criminal Procedure was not met. Second, on jurisdiction: the German state had no authority to prosecute any natural person for blowing up the pipelines; in Warsaw’s view, jurisdiction would belong to an international tribunal adjudicating armed conflicts at sea, or to an ad hoc tribunal appointed by the United Nations for this incident. Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk publicly welcomed the refusal in political terms, adding a layer of executive commentary unusual in European Arrest Warrant litigation.

This ruling is the outlier of the saga, and it matters precisely because it contradicts the system’s design. Under Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA on the European Arrest Warrant, an executing judge examines neither the political context of the offence nor the issuing state’s jurisdiction as Warsaw did; the grounds for mandatory and optional non-execution are exhaustively listed, and the Court of Justice has repeatedly held that they must be interpreted strictly. A justification drawn from the laws of war — however sincerely held — has no slot in that closed list when the requested person is a private individual rather than a member of regular armed forces entitled to combatant immunity. Nor does the executing court normally second-guess the issuing state’s assertion of jurisdiction, beyond verifying that the warrant contains the required factual description. The Warsaw court’s creation of a bespoke forum — an international or UN tribunal — has no anchor in the Framework Decision or in any existing jurisdictional treaty for this fact pattern, and no other European court has followed it.

The contrast with the Italian handling of the parallel warrant could hardly be sharper. Where Bologna and Rome treated the German description of sabotage, explosion and destruction of structures as sufficient and left jurisdiction, immunity and war-law justifications to the trial court in Germany, Warsaw converted those same questions into refusal grounds and freed the requested person. The result is a genuine split in the application of ostensibly uniform European Union law: the same issuing authority, the same alleged operation, the same legal instrument — surrender in one Member State, refusal in another. That divergence is what makes the saga a live precedent rather than a historical curiosity. Defence teams across Europe now cite the Warsaw order; prosecutors cite Bologna, Rome and Karlsruhe. The question for a French reader is which line Paris would take if a German warrant of this type ever landed on the desk of the procureur général. The answer requires walking through French surrender procedure step by step.

II. What a Paris chambre de l’instruction would do with a German warrant of this type

A. Would double criminality, territorial jurisdiction or the political offence save the requested person in France?

French surrender procedure starts from a simple definition. Article 695-11 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides that “Le mandat d’arrêt européen est une décision judiciaire émise par un Etat membre de l’Union européenne, appelé Etat membre d’émission, en vue de l’arrestation et de la remise par un autre Etat membre, appelé Etat membre d’exécution, d’une personne recherchée pour l’exercice de poursuites pénales ou pour l’exécution d’une peine ou d’une mesure de sûreté privative de liberté.” Once the German warrant is notified, the procureur général brings the requested person before the chambre de l’instruction, which alone decides surrender. Three preliminary objections would be tested first: double criminality, jurisdiction, and the political character of the acts.

On double criminality, the French court would almost certainly follow the Italian rather than the Polish line — and for a reason that is mechanical, not political. Article 695-23 of the Code of Criminal Procedure allows refusal where the facts “ne constitue pas une infraction au regard de la loi française”, but lifts the double-criminality check entirely where the issuing state’s law punishes the conduct with at least three years’ imprisonment and the conduct falls into one of the listed categories of Article 694-32, a list that includes terrorism, sabotage-adjacent offences such as the illicit trafficking of arms, munitions and explosives, and organised crime. Even outside that exemption, the fallback check is easily satisfied here: Article 322-6 of the Criminal Code punishes “La destruction, la dégradation ou la détérioration d’un bien appartenant à autrui par l’effet d’une substance explosive, d’un incendie ou de tout autre moyen de nature à créer un danger pour les personnes” with ten years’ imprisonment and a 150,000 euro fine, while the basic destruction offence in Article 322-1 covers lesser damage. Underwater explosive sabotage of an energy pipeline is a textbook Article 322-6 fact pattern. No French court would need to ask whether the sabotage served a just cause: French criminal law contains no general justification for destroying another’s property with explosives in the name of a foreign defensive war, and the state-of-necessity defence of Article 122-7 of the Criminal Code requires an imminent danger to the person acting, proportionate means, and the absence of any voluntary contribution to the danger — conditions structurally absent from a clandestine expedition mounted months in advance.

French case law adds a procedural sting that defence teams underestimate. Double criminality under Article 695-23, first paragraph, is only an optional ground for refusal, and the Court of Cassation has held that the surrender judges are not obliged to examine it on their own motion. In its judgment of 29 May 2024, No. 24-82.747, the Criminal Chamber ruled that “les juges ne sont pas tenus de rechercher d’office si les faits, objet du mandat d’arrêt européen, constituent une infraction au regard de la loi française”, so that a complaint attacking merely supporting reasoning on that point is ineffective where the requested person never raised the optional ground (Cour de cassation, crim., 29 May 2024, No. 24-82.747). In plain terms: a Warsaw-style double-criminality argument in Paris must be pleaded expressly, documented precisely, and won on the merits — the court will not build it for the defence, and given Article 322-6 it would fail on the merits anyway. The related discussion of surrender cases where the issuing state’s penalty threshold and the listed categories interact, including detention-conditions litigation, is developed further in our analysis of refused surrenders and serving the sentence in France.

On jurisdiction, Paris would likewise part company with Warsaw. French courts apply Article 113-2 of the Criminal Code — “L’infraction est réputée commise sur le territoire de la République dès lors qu’un de ses faits constitutifs a eu lieu sur ce territoire” — to assert French jurisdiction on minimal territorial hooks, and they symmetrically accept that an issuing state may rely on its own equivalent of the effects doctrine. The executing judge’s task is not to arbitrate competing theories of jurisdiction over the Baltic Sea or to invent an international tribunal; it is to verify that the warrant describes facts, time, place and applicable penalties as the Framework Decision requires. Karlsruhe’s reasoning — the result of rendering the pipelines inoperable materialised in Germany, where they end — is exactly the kind of assertion a French chambre de l’instruction would leave to the trial court of the issuing state. Finally, on the political-offence objection: unlike classic extradition treaties, the European Arrest Warrant system abolished the political-offence exception between Member States. The refusal grounds are exhaustively listed in the Framework Decision and transposed in Articles 695-22 to 695-24 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and none of them covers the political character or motive of the offence — a point the Court of Justice has enforced strictly, including in the line from Petruhhin (C-182/15) on the very different question of extradition of Union citizens to third states, which confirms that within the Union the warrant procedure is the exclusive, depoliticised channel. A French court asked to refuse surrender because sabotage was political resistance would answer, as Rome did, that the argument belongs to the trial — and, as Karlsruhe showed, it loses there too when the actor is a private national without combatant status.

B. How would immunity, detention conditions, ne bis in idem and reintegration actually be litigated in France?

Assume the preliminary objections fail, as they almost certainly would. Four substantive defences remain, and French procedure gives each a precise procedural home — with outcomes that closely track the Italian-German sequence.

First, immunity and combatant privilege. Before a French chambre de l’instruction, immunity must attach to a status recognised by international law — head of state, diplomat, or member of regular armed forces acting under responsible command — not to private nationals who chartered a civilian yacht. The Federal Court of Justice’s rejection of combatant privilege for Serhij K. rests on exactly this distinction, and French courts apply the same one: the Geneva Conventions’ combatant privilege covers members of the armed forces of a party to the conflict meeting the criteria of lawful combatancy, a category that cannot be self-conferred by sympathisers however just they consider the cause. A French judge would add a second filter that Karlsruhe did not need: even a colourable immunity claim must be documented by the state supposedly conferring the status, and Ukrainian investigative or military authorities have issued no such attestation for the Nord Stream suspects — on the contrary, Kyiv has consistently distanced itself from the operation. Pleaded without a conferring state’s certificate, the immunity argument in Paris would be declared unfounded at the surrender stage and remitted to the German trial court, mirroring Bologna’s approach.

Second, detention conditions and Article 3 of the European Convention. This is the only defence in the family that can genuinely delay a French surrender — but it delays rather than defeats. Since the Court of Justice’s Aranyosi and Căldăraru judgments (C-404/15 and C-659/15 PPU), an executing court faced with evidence of systemic or individualised inhuman or degrading detention conditions in the issuing state must request supplementary information under the equivalent of Article 695-33 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, assess the individual risk, and postpone — not refuse — surrender while the risk persists. Against Germany, whose prison system generates virtually no successful Article 3 challenges in Strasbourg, the defence would need individualised evidence concerning the specific facility, regime or protective measures envisaged for the requested person, not general press material. The Italian courts’ treatment of the Article 3 plea in the Serhij K. file — noted but not determinative — previews the Paris outcome: supplementary questions at most, then surrender. Counsel should also remember the consent architecture of Article 695-31, under which a requested person who consents to surrender is heard on the consequences and irrevocability of that consent, with a decision within seven days and no appeal — a fast track that waives most of these debates, and a strategic choice to be weighed before raising ambitious defences.

Third, ne bis in idem. Article 695-22, point 2, of the Code of Criminal Procedure makes refusal mandatory where the requested person has already been finally judged in France or another Member State for the same facts, provided any sentence has been executed, is being executed, or can no longer be executed. The key word is same facts: parallel German, Polish, Swedish and Danish investigations into the same explosions do not constitute final judgments, and discontinued or still-pending foreign files trigger no bar. Unless the defence produces a final acquittal or conviction covering the pipeline sabotage itself — which, to public knowledge as of early 2026, no jurisdiction has issued — the plea fails at the threshold. This matches the Italian experience, where the ne bis in idem argument was raised and went nowhere.

Fourth, the specifically French safety valve that has no equivalent in the Nord Stream rulings so far: refusal to surrender a French national or a person durably resident in France so that a custodial sentence may be served on French soil. Under Article 695-24, point 2, surrender for the execution of a sentence may be refused where the requested person shows French nationality or residence and the sentence can be enforced in France — a provision whose purpose the Court of Cassation has stated plainly: “L’objectif de ce texte est d’accroître les chances de réinsertion sociale de la personne recherchée” (Cour de cassation, crim., 7 August 2024, No. 24-81.863). The Nord Stream warrants were issued for prosecution, not for the execution of a sentence, so this ground would not apply to them directly — but it matters for the day after: a Ukrainian national durably settled in France, once convicted in Germany, could invoke the residence-based enforcement route through the transfer-of-sentenced-persons machinery rather than a second surrender. That two-stage perspective — surrender now, serve later near home — is precisely the counselling a Paris extradition lawyer owes a client who, unlike Volodymyr Z., cannot count on a Warsaw-style refusal.

Conclusion

The Nord Stream warrants have done European criminal lawyers a service: they have stress-tested the European Arrest Warrant against every hard question — sabotage as warfare, jurisdiction over the high seas, immunity for irregulars, double criminality for politically sympathetic acts — and produced reasoned answers at every level up to two supreme courts. The scorecard as of early 2026 reads: surrender ordered twice and confirmed by the Italian Court of Cassation, detention upheld and combatant privilege rejected by the German Federal Court of Justice, one refusal standing alone in Warsaw on reasoning no other court has adopted. For a requested person in France, the predictive value is clear. A Paris chambre de l’instruction seized with a German warrant of this type would find double criminality satisfied through Article 322-6 of the Criminal Code, decline to second-guess German jurisdiction, hold that the political motive of sabotage is no refusal ground between Member States, reject private-actor immunity, treat Article 3 detention arguments as a request for supplementary information at most, and dismiss ne bis in idem absent a final judgment on the same facts. Surrender would be granted — with the genuine French particularity lying not in refusal but in what follows: the residence-based enforcement options of Article 695-24 and the transfer machinery for serving any eventual sentence closer to home. Warsaw freed its suspect; Rome surrendered its own; Paris, applying its code as written and its supreme court’s case law as decided, would surrender — and then organise the aftermath. Anyone holding a warrant of this kind should therefore litigate early, plead the optional grounds expressly as the Court of Cassation requires, document any immunity claim with a conferring state’s attestation, and prepare the sentence-enforcement strategy from day one rather than betting the file on a justification defence that convinces one court in Europe and loses everywhere else.

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