Two French couples went to Ontario, signed surrogacy agreements permitted under Canadian law, and came home with court orders naming each intended father as a legal parent. The Paris court of appeal agreed to enforce both orders, but added something the Canadian judges never said: that the filiation would produce, in France, the effects of a plenary adoption. The public prosecutor appealed, and on 3 July 2026 the Court of Cassation sitting in plenary assembly — its most solemn formation — handed down twin rulings, case numbers 24-50.028 and 24-50.029, that every international family with a surrogacy-born child should read. The outcome looks paradoxical at first glance: the Assembly annulled the Paris rulings, yet granted the families everything that mattered. It quashed without remand, declared the Ontario orders enforceable in France on its own authority, recognised each child’s filiation with both intended fathers as filiation — not as adoption — and held that the orders may be transcribed for both fathers onto the French civil-status registers.
This is the most important French cross-border surrogacy decision since the First Civil Chamber’s pair of rulings of 2 October 2024, and it closes a debate the 2021 bioethics statute had tried to reopen. For intended parents in London, New York, Toronto or Brussels who wonder whether France will recognise their child, the answer is now clearer than ever: yes, through exequatur, provided the foreign file proves two things — the surrogate’s informed consent and the identity of everyone involved in the parental project. What follows is the complete road map: the three conditions a French judge checks, the documents that satisfy them, the transcription that follows, and the one drafting error that cost the Paris appeal court its rulings.
I. Will France enforce a foreign surrogacy judgment despite its own ban?
A. Can the French ban on surrogacy still block a Canadian or American parentage order?
French domestic law could hardly be more hostile to surrogacy. Article 16-7 of the Civil Code states, in one lapidary sentence: “Toute convention portant sur la procréation ou la gestation pour le compte d’autrui est nulle.” Any agreement for procreation or gestation on behalf of another is void, and the prohibition carries criminal sanctions. When the 2021 bioethics statute — Law No. 2021-1017 of 2 August 2021 on bioethics, which amended Article 47 of the Civil Code on the evidential value of foreign civil-status records — deliberately shut the transcription door to birth certificates naming two fathers or a non-biological intended mother, Parliament’s message was unmistakable: the biological parent may transcribe; the intended partner must adopt. The public prosecutor’s appeals in the two Ontario cases were built on exactly this logic. If a French court enforces a foreign judgment that installs two intended fathers at birth, the argument ran, the domestic ban becomes an empty shell, and the order offends French international public policy on the substance.
The plenary assembly rejected that reasoning, and the way it did so matters enormously. First, it refused even to consider the prosecutor general’s invitation to raise, of its own motion, an objection drawn from the parliamentary debates preceding the 2021 statute — the fear of circumvention of international adoption rules and the concern for the child’s access to origins information. The Court held that, absent any statutory judicial procedure capable of rebuilding the child’s filiation in France with the safety, effectiveness and speed required by the child’s best interests — a right the Court counts as part of French international public policy itself — there was no reason to raise that objection. In plain terms: as long as Parliament offers no workable domestic path from intention to filiation, the courts will not use the 2021 statute as a battering ram against foreign judgments.
Second, the Assembly anchored its position in a decade of Strasbourg case law that no French court can now ignore. The European Court of Human Rights held in Mennesson v. France of 26 June 2014, application No. 65192/11, paragraphs 46 and 96, that identity — including filiation — is an integral part of private life under Article 8 of the Convention, and that everyone must be able to establish the details of their identity. It added in D v. France of 16 July 2020, application No. 11288/18, paragraph 54, that domestic law must offer a path to recognition of the tie with both the intended father and the intended mother, whether or not she is genetically related. And in C v. Italy of 31 August 2023, application No. 47196/21, paragraph 53, it condemned any general and absolute impossibility, lasting a significant time, of obtaining recognition of the bond between the child and the intended father as a disproportionate interference with the child’s private life. The plenary rulings cite each of these authorities verbatim, alongside the Court’s first advisory opinion under Protocol No. 16 of 10 April 2019, request No. P16-2018-001 — published on the Court’s HUDOC database under request No. P16-2018-001 — which demands that recognition procedures guarantee effectiveness and speed so that children are not kept in legal uncertainty. The European portal for the Court’s case law is the ECHR’s official site. The message for foreign families is therefore settled at the highest level: France may prohibit surrogacy on its own soil, but it may not leave a child lawfully declared someone’s son or daughter abroad in a legal void at home. The ban punishes the practice; it no longer erases the child.
That distinction explains why the Court treated the two Ontario files differently from a routine transcription request. Transcription under Article 47 of the Civil Code asks the registrar to copy a foreign birth certificate; exequatur under Article 509 of the Code of Civil Procedure asks a judge to declare a foreign judgment enforceable. Article 509 provides: “Les jugements rendus par les tribunaux étrangers et les actes reçus par les officiers étrangers sont exécutoires sur le territoire de la République de la manière et dans les cas prévus par la loi.” Foreign judgments and foreign official instruments are enforceable on the territory of the Republic in the manner and in the cases provided for by law. Where no treaty governs — and no bilateral convention on parentage links France with Canada or the United States — the judge applies three judge-made conditions inherited from the classic Munzer and Cornelissen line: the indirect jurisdiction of the foreign court, meaning a genuine connecting factor between the dispute and the court seised; conformity with French international public policy on substance and on procedure; and the absence of fraud. The plenary assembly confirmed that a surrogacy agreement, void as it is in France, does not by itself breach substantive public policy. The child’s best interests, protected by Article 3(1) of the New York Convention on the Rights of the Child of 20 November 1989 and by Article 8 of the European Convention, are themselves part of that policy, and they point toward recognition. What remains is procedure — and that is where files are won or lost.
B. What must the foreign judgment and its supporting file prove to a French exequatur judge?
The controlling test comes from the First Civil Chamber’s rulings of 2 October 2024, appeal No. 22-20.883 — published on the Court of Cassation’s official database — which the plenary assembly expressly endorsed two years later. The principle is strict. The Court recalls in appeal No. 22-20.883: “Est contraire à la conception française de l’ordre public international de procédure la reconnaissance d’une décision étrangère non motivée lorsque ne sont pas produits des documents de nature à servir d’équivalent à la motivation défaillante. Il incombe au demandeur de produire ces documents.” A foreign decision without reasons offends French procedural public policy unless the applicant produces documents capable of standing in for the missing reasoning, and producing them is the applicant’s burden. For surrogacy cases the requirement hardens further, because of what the Court calls the vulnerability risks of the parties to the agreement and the dangers inherent in these arrangements, balanced against the privacy rights of the child and everyone involved.
Concretely, the exequatur judge must be able, from the reasoning of the foreign decision or from equivalent documents supplied to him, to do two things. The plenary assembly repeats the formula word for word in appeal No. 24-50.028: the judge must be in a position “d’identifier la qualité des personnes mentionnées qui ont participé au projet parental d’autrui et de s’assurer qu’il a été constaté que les parties à la convention de gestation pour autrui, en premier lieu la mère porteuse, ont consenti à cette convention, dans ses modalités comme dans ses effets sur leurs droits parentaux” — to identify the capacity of the persons named who took part in the parental project for another, and to satisfy himself that it was established that the parties to the surrogacy agreement, first and foremost the surrogate mother, consented to that agreement, in its terms as in its effects on their parental rights. Two checks, then: who is who in the file, and proof that the surrogate’s consent was recorded as covering both the arrangement and the surrender of parental rights.
Apply that test to the two Ontario files and the reason for the annulments becomes clear. In case 24-50.028 — Assemblée plénière, 3 July 2026, appeal No. 24-50.028, judgment No. 692 — a boy conceived with one intended father’s gametes and a third-party donor’s eggs was born on 28 February 2011, and the Ontario Superior Court of Justice held on 29 March 2011 that both intended fathers were his parents by law while the surrogate was not his mother, ordering a conforming birth record. In case 24-50.029 — Assemblée plénière, 3 July 2026, appeal No. 24-50.029, judgment No. 691 — twins conceived with one intended father’s gametes and a donor’s eggs were born on 26 June 2013, and the Ontario court held on 1 August 2013 that both intended fathers were the parents by law while the carrying couple were not. In each case the Ontario order itself said nothing about the surrogacy agreement, nothing about the surrogate’s capacity, and nothing about the facts and legal grounds submitted to it. The Paris appeal court had papered over that silence with the application the fathers had filed before the Canadian judge, which described the surrogate, the agreement and its performance culminating in the birth. In appeal No. 24-50.028 the plenary assembly held that this was not enough: the appeal court had granted enforcement “sans vérifier au besoin d’office, que le jugement étranger, le cas échéant complété de la requête, avait constaté que les parties à la convention de gestation pour autrui, en premier lieu la mère porteuse, avaient consenti à cette convention, dans ses modalités comme dans ses effets sur leurs droits parentaux” — without verifying, if necessary of its own motion, that the foreign judgment, supplemented where appropriate by the application, had established that consent. That omission deprived the rulings of a legal basis, and it is the first ground of annulment.
But in appeal No. 24-50.028 the Assembly did something only it can do: instead of sending the families back to years of further proceedings, it cured the defect itself. Sitting in plenary formation, the Court examined the surrogacy agreement of 12 February 2010, produced for the first time at the cassation stage, and satisfied itself that the Canadian judge had been in a position to establish the surrogate’s consent both to the agreement and its terms and to the surrender of her parental rights over the child to be born — the document specifying that she would have no parental rights or duties toward the child, that she would not seek custody or access, and that she would not attempt to build a parental relationship. The ruling quotes the agreement’s own words: the surrogate “n’aura aucun droit ou devoir parental à l’égard de l’enfant”, she “ne cherchera pas à obtenir la garde, l’accès à l’enfant” and she will not attempt “d’établir une relation parentale avec l’enfant”. Combined with the application already noted by the appeal court, these materials served as the equivalent of the missing reasoning, and the Court held the Canadian decision compatible with French procedural public policy. The lesson for practitioners is blunt: never file an exequatur request with the foreign order alone. File the order, the application that led to it, and the underlying surrogacy agreement showing informed, specific consent — because the Court has now said, in so many words, that the burden of producing these equivalents lies on the applicant.
The same evidentiary logic already governed the First Civil Chamber’s 2024 pair. In appeal No. 22-20.883, decided 2 October 2024, the Court dismissed the prosecutor’s appeal and upheld enforcement of a foreign parentage judgment for intended parents — the very ruling the plenary assembly cites as the post-dated yardstick against which the Paris decisions of 4 June 2024 had to be measured. And on 14 November 2024, in appeal No. 23-50.016 — First Civil Chamber, 14 November 2024, appeal No. 23-50.016 — the Court went further still on the facts: a single intended mother had obtained a 1 February 2021 order of the Supreme Court of British Columbia declaring her the sole parent of a child born 8 December 2019 after a surrogacy agreement, where the child had been conceived with the gametes of two third-party donors — no genetic link to the intended mother at all. There too the Court quashed the Paris appeal court’s ruling, but only in so far as it had given the Canadian order the effects of a plenary adoption in France, while preserving enforcement itself. Genetics help; their absence is not fatal. Consent and traceability are what count.
II. What does a French exequatur actually give your family?
A. Can both intended fathers be entered on the French civil-status registers?
Yes — and this is the heart of the two plenary rulings (appeal No. 24-50.028 and appeal No. 24-50.029). After annulling the Paris decisions, the Assembly ruled on the merits itself, as Article L. 411-3, paragraph 2, of the Code of Judicial Organisation allows when the interests of the proper administration of justice so justify, combined with Article 627 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which permits the Court of Cassation to decide the substance without remand. It set aside the Paris tribunal judgments of 22 March 2023 that had rejected the families’ claims, declared the Ontario orders of 29 March 2011 and 1 August 2013 enforceable in France, and — decisively — rejected the fathers’ own request that the orders be given the effects of a plenary adoption. The governing principle is stated without ambiguity: “Lorsque, sans prononcer d’adoption, une décision étrangère établissant la filiation d’un enfant né d’une gestation pour autrui est revêtue de l’exequatur, cette filiation est reconnue en tant que telle en France et produit les effets qui lui sont attachés conformément à la loi applicable à chacun d’eux.” Where a foreign decision establishing the filiation of a surrogacy-born child, without pronouncing an adoption, is granted exequatur, that filiation is recognised as such in France and produces the effects attached to it under the law applicable to each of those effects. And the practical consequence follows in the operative part: “elle pourra être transcrite à l’égard des deux pères sur les registres de l’état civil français” — the Canadian decision, establishing two paternal filiations, may be transcribed for both fathers onto the French civil-status registers.
Three consequences flow from this for international families. First, the Paris appeal court’s well-meaning shortcut — converting a foreign parentage order into a French plenary adoption — is now formally prohibited. The Assembly explains why in appeal No. 24-50.028: the exequatur judge “ne peut procéder à la révision au fond de celle-ci” and, once a foreign decision bears the exequatur, it “ne peut davantage être modifiée, sauf à être exceptionnellement adaptée pour en permettre la parfaite intégration dans l’ordre juridique français. Cette adaptation est exclusive de toute dénaturation.” The judge may not revise the substance of the foreign decision, and the decision, once enforceable, may not be altered either, save for exceptional adaptation to integrate it perfectly into the French legal order — an adaptation that excludes any distortion. Turning filiation into adoption is not adaptation; it is revision, and revision is forbidden by Article 509. Families should therefore stop asking for adoption effects, as the Ontario fathers had done, and ask for exactly what the foreign court gave them: parentage, recognised as parentage.
Second, recognition as such is stronger than it sounds. Filiation recognised as filiation carries, under the law applicable to each effect, the full incidents of parentage: parental authority, the child’s name, maintenance, succession rights, nationality transmission where the conditions are met, and social benefits derived from the tie. An adoption would have severed the child’s pre-existing ties and rebuilt them artificially; direct recognition preserves the legal truth established abroad. For the boy born in February 2011 and the twins born in June 2013, that means French law now sees what Ontario saw: two fathers, from birth, with no adoptive fiction in between. The Court even ordered costs against the Treasury, a quiet signal of where it considers the balance of the litigation to lie.
Third, transcription is the administrative finishing line, and it is now open. A transcribed foreign parentage order gives the child French birth records mentioning both parents, the document schools, consulates, hospitals and inheritance files will ask for for the rest of the child’s life. Note the boundary the Court preserves: transcription follows exequatur; it does not replace it. Parents who hold only a foreign birth certificate, without a foreign judgment, remain on the narrower transcription track of Article 47 of the Civil Code as amended in 2021 — the track Parliament deliberately restricted. Parents who hold a reasoned foreign court order, or an order plus the file that explains it, hold the key the plenary assembly has just polished: a judicial declaration of enforceability that no registrar can second-guess.
B. How should intended parents living abroad build a file that survives French review?
Start from the three locks the judge must open and work backwards. The first lock is indirect jurisdiction: the foreign court must have a genuine link to the case. In practice this is the easiest to satisfy — birth in the forum, residence of the surrogate, or proceedings brought where the surrogacy was lawfully performed, as in Ontario for both plenary cases and in British Columbia for the 2024 single-mother case. Keep proof of that territorial anchor in the file: the child’s birth certificate, evidence of where the agreement was performed, and the foreign court’s own statement of jurisdiction where one exists.
The second lock is substantive public policy, and here the news is reassuring. The existence of a surrogacy agreement, though void in France, does not by itself defeat enforcement; the child’s best interests and right to identity are themselves components of French international public policy and weigh decisively toward recognition, as the Mennesson, D and C v. Italy line confirms. Do not, however, invite the judge to re-weigh the ethics of surrogacy in the abstract. Frame the request around the child: the stability of a filiation lawfully established abroad, the length of time the family has already lived it — fifteen years for the boy born in 2011 — and the concrete harm that non-recognition inflicts on daily life, from travel documents to medical consent. The plenary assembly’s Strasbourg citations give counsel the exact paragraphs to plead: Mennesson paragraphs 46 and 96 on identity as private life, D v. France paragraph 54 on the required path to recognition for both intended parents, C v. Italy paragraph 53 on disproportionate interference, and the advisory opinion’s paragraph 55 on effectiveness and speed.
The third lock — procedural public policy — is where files fail, and the plenary rulings give it a precise shape. Assemble, translate by sworn translator, and file together: the foreign judgment itself; the application or petition filed before the foreign court, showing who each named person is — intended parents, surrogate, and where relevant the gamete donor’s role in the project; the surrogacy agreement in full, showing the surrogate’s consent to its terms and to the surrender of parental rights; and any reasons, findings or approvals the foreign court recorded, even briefly. Where the foreign order is laconic, as Ontario parentage declarations often are, these companion documents are not optional extras — they are, in the Court’s phrase, the equivalent the applicant must produce for the missing reasoning. One caution from the second plenary case: where the carrying arrangement involves a couple rather than a single surrogate, document every adult party’s consent, since the Court requires verification for the parties in the plural, beginning with the surrogate mother.
Two further practical points deserve emphasis. First, mind the child’s right to know their origins. The prosecutor general’s suggested objection — that enforcing these orders sidesteps the legislative concern for access to origins information — was set aside only because no equivalent domestic procedure exists, not because the concern is irrelevant. A file that identifies the donor arrangement transparently, preserves what the foreign record says about gamete provenance, and shows the child will be able to access that information stands on firmer ground than one that obscures it. Second, think about timing and forum shopping honestly. The Court insists, echoing Strasbourg, that filiation proceedings be conducted with exceptional diligence so that legal questions are not decided on the basis of a fait accompli — Ahrens v. Germany of 22 March 2012, application No. 45071/09, paragraph 78, and A. L. v. France of 7 April 2022, application No. 13344/20, paragraph 54, both cited in the rulings. Years of limbo weaken everyone: the Ontario fathers waited from 2011 and 2013 births to a 2023 first-instance defeat, a 2024 appeal victory, and a 2026 plenary finale. File early, file completely, and do not ask the French judge for more than the foreign court granted — the adoption-effects request added a round of litigation that bought the families nothing.
American intended parents should note that nothing in the reasoning is Canada-specific. The three conditions apply to any foreign judgment in the absence of a treaty, whether it comes from Ontario, California or Illinois. What varies is the paperwork: American pre-birth parentage orders are often richly reasoned and therefore easier to enforce, while bare-bones declarations demand heavier companion files. Either way, the surrogate-consent core is identical, and the prohibition on converting parentage into adoption binds every forum equally.
Conclusion
The plenary assembly of 3 July 2026 settles, at the highest judicial level, the question that has divided French courts for a decade: a foreign judgment establishing the filiation of a surrogacy-born child with both intended parents can and must be enforced in France when the file proves who everyone is and that the surrogate consented, in full knowledge, to the arrangement and to the surrender of her parental rights. The French ban on surrogacy survives on domestic soil; it no longer follows the child home. Recognition runs as filiation, never as adoption, and ends — for those who complete the course — with transcription for both fathers on the French civil-status registers. For the boy born in Ontario in 2011, the twins born in 2013, and the thousands of children whose families live between two legal systems, the plenary rulings replace a decade of contradictory appeal decisions with a single, demanding, but navigable test: a lawful foreign judgment, a complete file, and a consent that can be shown, not merely asserted.