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South Africa v. Israel at the ICJ: Colombia Walks Out as America Walks In — and What a French Court Would Do With a Genocide File

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South Africa v. Israel at the ICJ: Colombia Walks Out as America Walks In — and What a French Court Would Do With a Genocide File

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On 22 September 2026, the International Court of Justice published a short press release with long implications: Colombia had informed the Court, on Friday 18 September 2026, that it was withdrawing the declaration of intervention it had filed under Article 63 of the Court Statute on 5 April 2024 in the case concerning the Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide in the Gaza Strip (South Africa v. Israel). One State steps back. Six months earlier, several others stepped forward: on 11 March 2026 the Netherlands and Iceland filed declarations of intervention, followed on 12 March 2026 by Namibia, the United States of America, Hungary and Fiji, all under Article 63. The crowd around this case already included Spain, Mexico, Libya, Türkiye, Ireland, Cuba, Chile, Bolivia, the Maldives, Brazil and Palestine. The merits — whether Israel breached the Genocide Convention in Gaza — will not be decided for years. But the corridor leading to that judgment is being built now, order by order and intervention by intervention. For the international reader, the pressing question is not only who wins in The Hague. It is what happens the day after, in national courts, Paris included. France operates one of the most structured universal-jurisdiction systems in Europe, and its highest court clarified the operating rules in two plenary rulings on 12 May 2023. This analysis sets out where South Africa v. Israel stands in October 2026 and what French law would do with a genocide file.

I. How South Africa brought Israel before the World Court and where the case stands

The case opened on 29 December 2023, when South Africa filed an application instituting proceedings against Israel concerning alleged violations of obligations under the Genocide Convention in relation to Palestinians in the Gaza Strip. That single filing activated three layers of international procedure that every practitioner should distinguish: jurisdiction over the dispute, interim protection while the case runs, and the growing circle of third States intervening in the proceedings. Each layer has produced concrete acts in 2024, 2025 and 2026, and each one is documented on the Court official case page for case number 192.

A. Article IX of the Genocide Convention: the clause that opens the door of the Court and the provisional measures that freeze the situation

The jurisdictional key of the whole case is one sentence of the Genocide Convention. Article IX provides: “Disputes between the Contracting Parties relating to the interpretation, application or fulfilment of the present Convention, including those relating to the responsibility of a State for genocide or for any of the other acts enumerated in article III, shall be submitted to the International Court of Justice at the request of any of the parties to the dispute.” That compromissory clause is the bridge between the treaty and the Court Statute, whose Article 36, paragraph 1, states: “The jurisdiction of the Court comprises all cases which the parties refer to it and all matters specially provided for in the Charter of the United Nations or in treaties and conventions in force.” South Africa and Israel are both parties to the Genocide Convention, so the dispute about the interpretation and application of that treaty falls, in principle, within the clause both accepted. The Court still has to rule definitively on jurisdiction and admissibility at a later stage, and nothing in this article prejudges that ruling. What matters for now is that Article IX is the hook on which the entire proceedings hang, and every State that intervenes under Article 63 intervenes precisely because the construction of that Convention is in question.

The substantive core underneath is Article II of the Convention, which defines the crime the Court will eventually have to measure the facts against: “In the present Convention, genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such: (a) Killing members of the group; (b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; (c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; (d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; (e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.” Around that definition, Article I sets the undertaking — “The Contracting Parties confirm that genocide, whether committed in time of peace or in time of war, is a crime under international law which they undertake to prevent and to punish” — while Article III lists the punishable acts beyond the completed crime, namely “(a) Genocide; (b) Conspiracy to commit genocide; (c) Direct and public incitement to commit genocide; (d) Attempt to commit genocide; (e) Complicity in genocide.” Two companion provisions shape the enforcement architecture: Article IV punishes the authors “whether they are constitutionally responsible rulers, public officials or private individuals,” and Article VI sends the accused “by a competent tribunal of the State in the territory of which the act was committed, or by such international penal tribunal as may have jurisdiction.” For extradition lawyers, Article VII adds a decisive detail: “Genocide and the other acts enumerated in article III shall not be considered as political crimes for the purpose of extradition. The Contracting Parties pledge themselves in such cases to grant extradition in accordance with their laws and treaties in force.” A genocide allegation can therefore circulate between national courts without hitting the classic political-offence shield, a point that connects the Hague proceedings directly to the extradition practice examined in the analysis of how France tests American extradition requests.

Because a genocide case takes years, the Convention system would be toothless without interim protection. South Africa application included a request for the indication of provisional measures under Article 41 of the Court Statute and Articles 73, 74 and 75 of the Rules of Court. Article 41, paragraph 1, gives the Court “the power to indicate, if it considers that circumstances so require, any provisional measures which ought to be taken to preserve the respective rights of either party.” The Court delivered its first Order on 26 January 2024. South Africa returned on 6 March 2024 seeking additional measures or a modification of that Order, and the Court indicated additional provisional measures on 28 March 2024. On 10 May 2024 South Africa filed a further request, and by an Order dated 24 May 2024 the Court reaffirmed its previous provisional measures and indicated new ones. Three rounds of binding interim orders in five months: that tempo tells practitioners that the Court considered the threshold of plausible rights met at the provisional stage, while the merits — the only place where responsibility for genocide can be established — remain entirely ahead. Readers familiar with the parallel criminal track in The Hague will find the distinction between State responsibility before the ICJ and individual criminal liability before the ICC explained in the account of the ICC confirmation proceedings and the relocation debate, and the institutional pressure on both Hague courts set out in the report on sanctions against the ICC and the Assembly response.

B. Article 63 interventions: why Colombia walked out just as the United States walked in

Intervention is the procedural device that turns a bilateral dispute into a multilateral courtroom. The Statute offers two doors. Article 62, paragraph 1, provides: “Should a state consider that it has an interest of a legal nature which may be affected by the decision in the case, it may submit a request to the Court to be permitted to intervene.” Paragraph 2 adds: “It shall be for the Court to decide upon this request.” Permission is therefore discretionary. Article 63 works differently: “1. Whenever the construction of a convention to which states other than those concerned in the case are parties is in question, the Registrar shall notify all such states forthwith. 2. Every state so notified has the right to intervene in the proceedings; but if it uses this right, the construction given by the judgment will be equally binding upon it.” Every party to the Genocide Convention holds a ticket of admission as of right; the price of the ticket is that the Court interpretation of the Convention in the final judgment will bind the intervener too. That binding effect is what makes Article 63 declarations strategic acts of legal positioning, not mere expressions of sympathy.

The attendance sheet of case 192 shows how seriously States take that bargain. Libya filed under Article 63 on 10 May 2024, Mexico on 24 May 2024, Palestine under Articles 62 and 63 on 31 May 2024, Spain on 28 June 2024, Türkiye on 7 August 2024, Chile on 12 September 2024, the Maldives on 1 October 2024, Bolivia on 8 October 2024, Ireland on 6 January 2025, Cuba on 10 January 2025, Belize on 30 January 2025, Brazil on 17 September 2025, and then the March 2026 wave: the Netherlands and Iceland on 11 March 2026, Namibia, the United States of America, Hungary and Fiji on 12 March 2026. Read that last line twice. Washington, which is not a party to the case and has consistently contested international proceedings against its partners, chose to enter the courtroom through the front door, accepting that the construction of the Convention given by the judgment will be equally binding upon it. The Netherlands and Iceland, two States with long records of supporting international justice institutions, entered the same day from the opposite political direction. An intervener does not become a party and does not ask the Court for relief; it argues about how the treaty should be read. When the United States and the Netherlands argue about the same treaty in the same case, the transcript becomes a reference for every national judge who will later apply the Convention at home.

Against that crowded background, the two withdrawals stand out. Nicaragua, which had filed an application for permission to intervene under Article 62, withdrew it, as recorded in the Court press release of 4 March 2025. Then came the September 2026 event: on 18 September 2026 Colombia withdrew the Article 63 declaration it had filed on 5 April 2024, with the Court announcing the withdrawal on 22 September 2026. Withdrawal of an Article 63 declaration is rare and always read politically, but its legal mechanics are simple: the withdrawing State steps outside the intervener circle, in the sense that it will not be bound by the construction given in the judgment and will not file observations, while the case continues unaffected between the parties and the remaining interveners. No reason was published with the announcement, and no inference about the merits can be drawn from a State strategic calendar. Governments adjust their litigation posture for diplomatic, domestic or coalition reasons that have nothing to do with the strength of the Application. What can be said with certainty is arithmetic: the circle of interveners remains historically wide even after Colombia departure, the March 2026 entries more than offset the exits, and the judgment, when it comes, will bind each remaining Article 63 intervener on the reading of the Convention. For counsel advising governments, companies or individuals with exposure to the region, that binding construction will matter far beyond The Hague, because national courts — French courts included — construe the same treaty when they handle genocide files.

II. What a French court would do with a genocide file: crimes, courts and gatekeepers

France cannot rule on South Africa v. Israel; only the International Court of Justice can. But France can do something the World Court cannot: put a natural person on trial in a Paris courtroom for genocide, crimes against humanity or war crimes committed abroad. That power rests on a complete chain — treaty undertaking, domestic definitions, jurisdictional statutes and two plenary rulings that settled the two hardest questions, the scope of torture liability and the meaning of dual criminality. The chain is worth examining in full, because it shows how a Hague judgment on the Convention would land in a national system already equipped to apply it.

A. How French criminal law defines genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes

Article V of the Genocide Convention requires each Contracting Party to enact the necessary legislation to give effect to the treaty and to provide effective penalties. France did so in its Criminal Code, and the French definitions track the Convention while adding national characteristics that practitioners must know. Article 211-1 of the Criminal Code, available at the official Légifrance page of article 211-1 of the Criminal Code, provides: “Constitue un génocide le fait, en exécution d’un plan concerté tendant à la destruction totale ou partielle d’un groupe national, ethnique, racial ou religieux, ou d’un groupe déterminé à partir de tout autre critère arbitraire, de commettre ou de faire commettre, à l’encontre de membres de ce groupe, l’un des actes suivants : – atteinte volontaire à la vie ; – atteinte grave à l’intégrité physique ou psychique ; – soumission à des conditions d’existence de nature à entraîner la destruction totale ou partielle du groupe ; – mesures visant à entraver les naissances ; – transfert forcé d’enfants. Le génocide est puni de la réclusion criminelle à perpétuité. Les deux premiers alinéas de l’article 132-23 relatif à la période de sûreté sont applicables au crime prévu par le présent article.” Three features deserve attention. First, the French text requires a concerted plan aimed at total or partial destruction, mirroring the Convention special intent. Second, it extends the protected groups beyond the four Convention categories to any group defined by any arbitrary criterion, which widens the net for domestic prosecutions. Third, the penalty is life imprisonment with the safety period of article 132-23, which provides, at the official Légifrance page of article 132-23 of the Criminal Code: “En cas de condamnation à une peine privative de liberté, non assortie du sursis, dont la durée est égale ou supérieure à dix ans, prononcée pour les infractions spécialement prévues par la loi, le condamné ne peut bénéficier, pendant une période de sûreté, des dispositions concernant la suspension ou le fractionnement de la peine, le placement à l’extérieur, les permissions de sortir, la semi-libe” — the classic French mechanism that keeps the most serious offenders inside for a fixed minimum period.

Beside genocide, French law punishes crimes against humanity in terms that will sound familiar to anyone who read the Convention definition above. Article 212-1 of the Criminal Code, at the official Légifrance page of article 212-1 of the Criminal Code, states: “Constitue également un crime contre l’humanité et est puni de la réclusion criminelle à perpétuité l’un des actes ci-après commis en exécution d’un plan concerté à l’encontre d’un groupe de population civile dans le cadre d’une attaque généralisée ou systématique : 1° L’atteinte volontaire à la vie ; 2° L’extermination ; 3° La réduction en esclavage ; 4° La déportation ou le transfert forcé de population ; 5° L’emprisonnement ou toute autre forme de privation grave de liberté physique en violation des dispositions fondamentales du droit international ; 6° La torture ;” and the list continues with sexual violence, persecution, enforced disappearance and apartheid-type acts. The contextual element — a concerted plan against a civilian population within a widespread or systematic attack — is what separates these crimes from ordinary offences, and it is precisely that contextual element that generated the hardest case law on dual criminality discussed below. War crimes complete the triptych: article 461-1 of the Criminal Code, at the official Légifrance page of article 461-1 of the Criminal Code, provides: “Constituent des crimes ou des délits de guerre les infractions définies par le présent livre commises, lors d’un conflit armé international ou non international et en relation avec ce conflit, en violation des lois et coutumes de la guerre ou des conventions internationales applicables aux conflits armés, à l’encontre des personnes ou des biens visés aux articles 461-2 à 461-31.” Commission during an armed conflict and in connection with it, in breach of the laws and customs of war: that is the jurisdictional trigger that links any battlefield — Gaza included — to the French courtroom, provided the further locks of universal jurisdiction are opened.

B. Universal jurisdiction in France: who can be tried in Paris and under which locks

Definitions without a forum are literature. France gives its courts jurisdiction over these crimes even when committed abroad, through two concentric regimes. The outer ring is conventional jurisdiction. Article 689 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, at the official Légifrance page of article 689 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, provides: “Les auteurs ou complices d’infractions commises hors du territoire de la République peuvent être poursuivis et jugés par les juridictions françaises soit lorsque, conformément aux dispositions du livre Ier du code pénal ou d’un autre texte législatif, la loi française est applicable, soit lorsqu’une convention internationale ou un acte pris en application du traité instituant les Communautés européennes donne compétence aux juridictions françaises pour connaître de l’infraction.” Each international convention then designates its offences. Article 689-1, at the official Légifrance page of article 689-1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, states: “En application des conventions internationales visées aux articles suivants, peut être poursuivie et jugée par les juridictions françaises, si elle se trouve en France, toute personne qui s’est rendue coupable hors du territoire de la République de l’une des infractions énumérées par ces articles.” Presence on French soil is the key that turns this first lock. For torture, article 689-2, at the official Légifrance page of article 689-2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, adds: “Pour l’application de la convention contre la torture et autres peines ou traitements cruels, inhumains ou dégradants, adoptée à New York le 10 décembre 1984, peut être poursuivie et jugée dans les conditions prévues à l’article 689-1 toute personne coupable de tortures au sens de l’article 1er de la convention.” The reference to the New York Convention of 10 December 1984 imports both the definition of torture and, as the courts clarified, its concept of the perpetrator.

The inner ring is the autonomous universal jurisdiction created for the gravest crimes. Article 689-11 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, at the official Légifrance page of article 689-11 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, provides that, outside the cases covered by the Rome Statute cooperation regime, “peut être poursuivie et jugée par les juridictions françaises toute personne soupçonnée d’avoir commis à l’étranger l’une des infractions suivantes : 1° Le crime de génocide défini au chapitre Ier du sous-titre Ier du titre Ier du livre II du code pénal ; 2° Les autres crimes contre l’humanité définis au chapitre II du même sous-titre Ier ; 3° Les crimes et les délits de guerre définis aux articles 461-1 à 461-31 du même code.” Three cumulative locks then apply. First, habitual residence: “La personne soupçonnée doit avoir une résidence habituelle sur le territoire français,” assessed through a sufficient connecting link such as the length of presence, its conditions and reasons, the willingness to settle, and family, social, material or professional ties. Second, prosecutorial monopoly with subsidiarity: “La poursuite de ces crimes ne peut être exercée qu’à la requête du procureur de la République antiterroriste et si aucune juridiction internationale ou nationale ne demande la remise ou l’extradition de la personne,” with the prosecution verifying that the International Criminal Court is not seized and that no competent international court seeks surrender and no State seeks extradition. Third, for the version of the text in force from 2010 to 2019, dual criminality: the acts had to be punishable where committed. Each lock has generated litigation, and the two plenary rulings of 12 May 2023 settled the two points that matter most to foreign observers.

The first plenary ruling, appeal number 22-82.468, ruling number 669, arose from the Syrian file of a former spokesman of the armed group Jaysh al-Islam, investigated in Paris for torture, complicity in enforced disappearances, war crimes and participation in a group formed to prepare war crimes. The accused challenged the jurisdiction of the French courts, arguing that the 1984 Convention covers only torture by public officials. The Court of Cassation, sitting in plenary assembly, rejected the appeal and held, at paragraph 11: “Selon l’article 689-1 du code de procédure pénale, peut être poursuivie et jugée par les juridictions françaises, si elle se trouve en France, toute personne qui s’est rendue coupable, hors du territoire de la République, de l’une des infractions énumérées par les articles suivants.” It then ruled, at paragraph 17, that “la notion de personne ayant agi à titre officiel, au sens du renvoi fait par le texte national à la Convention précitée, doit être comprise comme visant également une personne agissant pour le compte ou au nom d’une entité non gouvernementale, lorsque celle-ci occupe un territoire et exerce une autorité quasi gouvernementale sur ce territoire.” A member of a non-State armed group controlling territory and exercising quasi-governmental authority can therefore answer for torture before the French courts. Any analysis of accountability for acts committed by organized armed groups in Gaza or elsewhere must reckon with that holding: French universal jurisdiction does not stop at the uniforms of a regular army.

The second plenary ruling, appeal number 22-80.057, ruling number 668, decided the dual-criminality question for crimes against humanity and war crimes. The text applicable at the time, in the version created by Law number 2010-930 of 9 August 2010 and in force from 11 August 2010 to 25 March 2019, allowed prosecution of “toute personne qui réside habituellement sur le territoire de la République et qui s’est rendue coupable à l’étranger de l’un des crimes relevant de la compétence de la Cour pénale internationale en application de la convention portant statut de la Cour pénale internationale signée à Rome le 18 juillet 1998, si les faits sont punis par la législation de l’État où ils ont été commis ou si cet État ou l’État dont elle a la nationalité est partie à la convention précitée.” The criminal chamber had read that condition strictly: because crimes against humanity and war crimes contain a contextual element — a concerted plan within a widespread or systematic attack, or commission during an armed conflict — only a foreign law punishing that exact contextual combination could satisfy dual criminality. The plenary assembly overturned that reading. Tracing the parliamentary debates before the 9 August 2010 law, it recalled the words of the National Assembly Laws Committee rapporteur during the sitting of 13 July 2010: “Cette condition n’est jamais que la traduction du principe de légalité des peines. Elle vise à conférer une légitimité juridique à l’intervention des juridictions françaises. Elle n’implique en revanche pas qu’il faille que les faits aient une incrimination identique dans les deux États. Les faits doivent effectivement être réprimés dans l’autre pays même s’ils sont qualifiés différemment ou si on leur applique des peines différentes. […] Aucun pays au monde ne laisse le meurtre ou les faits de barbarie impunis dans sa législation pénale. On ne peut donc pas arguer qu’en maintenant la condition de double incrimination, on laisserait impunis les auteurs d’un génocide par exemple.” The operative rule follows: it suffices that the underlying acts are punished where committed, even under a different qualification or penalty. The Court declared the civil-party association admissible in its opposition, declared null and void the criminal-chamber judgment of 24 November 2021 that had quashed the Paris investigating-chamber ruling, and rejected the appeal. For practitioners, the message is that the dual-criminality lock of the former article 689-11 almost always opens where murder and barbarity are punished — which is everywhere — and that the current habitual-residence and subsidiarity locks are now the real battleground for getting a foreign atrocity file admitted in Paris.

Conclusion

South Africa v. Israel is entering its decisive corridor. The provisional-measures phase produced three binding Orders between January and May 2024. The intervention phase produced the widest circle of third States in the history of genocide litigation, with the Netherlands, Iceland, Namibia, the United States, Hungary and Fiji joining in March 2026 and Colombia stepping back in September 2026. The merits phase, which alone can establish — or exclude — State responsibility for genocide, is still ahead, and no finding of liability has been made by any court to date. Only the International Court of Justice will decide that question, under the definitions of Articles I through III and the jurisdictional clause of Article IX, with its construction binding every remaining Article 63 intervener. In parallel, the national track is already fully armed: French law defines genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes in articles 211-1, 212-1 and 461-1 of the Criminal Code, opens its courts to foreigners present or habitually resident in France through articles 689 to 689-11 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and applies that machinery through the anti-terrorism prosecution with the subsidiarity check against the ICC and extradition requests. The two plenary rulings of 12 May 2023 — quasi-governmental authority for torture liability, and no identical qualification required for dual criminality — removed the two doctrinal obstacles most likely to block a foreign atrocity file. A Hague judgment construing the Genocide Convention will therefore land in Paris on prepared soil. Whatever the World Court ultimately says about Gaza, counsel with cross-border exposure should read the March 2026 interventions, the September 2026 withdrawal and the French plenary case law as one single picture: international justice moves slowly, but it moves on every level at once.

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