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Trump Signed the Graham Act on 18 September 2026: 500% Duties on Russia, 100% Secondary Tariffs on Its Oil Buyers — What French and EU Companies Must Do Before 18 October

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Source: French Court of Cassation – Judilibre and Légifrance open data

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Trump Signed the Graham Act on 18 September 2026: 500% Duties on Russia, 100% Secondary Tariffs on Its Oil Buyers — What French and EU Companies Must Do Before 18 October

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On 18 September 2026, President Donald J. Trump signed into law the most aggressive American sanctions-and-tariffs package against Russia since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine: the Lindsey O. Graham Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act of 2026. The White House announcement states that on Friday 18 September 2026 the President signed H.R. 5334 into law, a text enlarging statutory sanctions, tariffs and prohibitions aimed at Russia while extending the existing Iran sanctions regime. Behind that announcement sits a mechanism French and European companies have never faced before — secondary tariffs of up to 100% imposed on third countries that keep buying Russian oil and gas, with the first designations due within 30 days of enactment, that is by 18 October 2026, and a rolling review every 180 days after that. Four days after signing, addressing the United Nations General Assembly on 22 September, the President declared that the Act confers vast new tariff powers which he would deploy if necessary, without naming countries, rates or a timetable. For a French group refining, trading, shipping, financing or insuring energy flows, the question is no longer whether American sanctions policy affects it, but how fast it can map its exposure, what European shields it can lawfully raise in Paris, and how it challenges a listing or unlocks frozen money if the machinery catches it. This analysis answers those three questions in order, with the exact texts, deadlines and procedures.

I. What Washington enacted on 18 September 2026 and who pays the price

Congress passed the Act with unusual bipartisan margins: the Senate approved it on 7 August 2026 by 86 votes to 11, with 36 Democrats joining nearly all Republicans, and the House followed on 16 September by 262 votes to 159, with 58 Democrats joining nearly all Republicans in support. Those numbers matter for a European reader because they signal durability: a statute adopted that widely cannot be undone by a change of mood in the executive, and much of what follows is framed in mandatory terms, even if practitioners observe that broad waiver authorities leave the Administration wide latitude over the timing, targets and levels of the measures. The core of the Act is two tariff sections, a codification of existing Russia sanctions, a shadow-fleet provision, and a five-year extension of the Iran sanctions regime.

A. How the 500% duties on Russia and the 100% secondary tariffs on its biggest oil and gas buyers work

Section 112 targets Russia directly. It directs the President, within 30 days of enactment, hence by 18 October, to raise the duty rate by up to 500%, on top of all other duties, fees, taxes and charges, on every good imported into the United States from Russia, including energy products apart from certain enriched uranium imports. Given the low volume of current American-Russian trade, that provision is largely symbolic. Section 113 is the provision that changes the lives of European compliance officers, because it targets third countries — and therefore, indirectly, every company operating from them.

Section 113 directs the President, within 30 days of enactment, to raise the duty rate on all goods imported from a covered third country, meaning any country other than Russia, up to 100% ad valorem in addition to otherwise applicable duties. Three categories of countries are covered. The first is the crude-oil category: a country that knowingly carried out new purchases of Russian-origin crude oil on or after the 30th day following enactment and ranked among the five largest importers by volume of Russian-origin crude over the preceding twelve months. The second mirrors it for natural gas. The third covers the five countries most involved in facilitating Russian oil sanctions evasion over the same twelve-month window. For that third category, the Act treats as facilitators the countries where foreign persons are located, operate or are organised where those persons knowingly take part in circumventing American oil sanctions — expressly including support for the purchase, loading or shipment of sanctioned Russian oil and any activity connected with a shadow-fleet tanker moving Russian oil under sanctions.

Two safety valves exist inside Section 113, and both matter for France. First, the natural-gas limb carries an exception: no additional tariff hits a gas-buying country where its Russian gas imports over the reference year represent less than 15% of total Russian gas exports and the country has taken significant steps to cut those imports. Second, the Act builds a permanent review machine: the United States Trade Representative must, within 180 days of the first tariff impositions and then every 180 days, redetermine the top-five importers on the most recent twelve-month data and raise, maintain or lower duties accordingly, with a written justification to Congress on methodology and rates. A French energy trader therefore cannot reason once and file the memo away; exposure must be re-measured twice a year against trade flows it does not control, because a supplier rerouting cargoes or a competitor country changing suppliers can move the ranking.

The practical consequence for a French company is indirect but severe. If the country where its factory, subsidiary or logistics hub sits is designated, every good it ships to the United States — entirely unrelated to Russia — can be surcharged by up to 100%. Supply contracts priced months ago, Incoterms allocations of duty risk, and American customers termination rights all activate at once. The only serious response is contractual and evidentiary: identify today which entities in the group buy, carry, finance or insure Russian-origin molecules; segregate those flows; insert price-and-termination clauses tied to a Section 113 designation; and keep the paper trail proving what the company knew and did, because knowledge of the purchases is an explicit trigger of the crude and gas limbs.

B. What the Act locks in beyond tariffs: codified Russia sanctions, shadow-fleet targeting and Iran sanctions extended to 2031

Tariffs are the headline; codification is the structure. The Act writes into statute key economic restrictions on Russia that until now rested on presidential executive orders, and it enlarges them. For European counsel, that carries a precise meaning: measures that previously lived and died by executive order — revocable, waivable, negotiable — now live in an Act of Congress. A future administration cannot lift them with a signature; only Congress can. Any French group building a multi-year investment case around Russian-adjacent markets, Central Asian transit routes or dollar clearing must price that permanence in.

The shadow-fleet language deserves separate attention because it reaches the maritime and insurance chain where French actors are present. By naming support for the purchase, loading or shipment of sanctioned Russian oil and any activity linked to a shadow-fleet tanker, the Act gives the Administration a statutory hook to pursue not only the cargo owner but the ecosystem: ship managers, protection and indemnity clubs, bunker suppliers, classification societies, and the banks that clear the freight. A Le Havre or Marseille operator that charters a vessel with an opaque ownership chain, or a Paris bank that confirms a letter of credit for a cargo with a doctored certificate of origin, now faces a double exposure it must model explicitly — American designation on one side, European listing on the other, as developed below.

Finally, the Act pushes back the expiry of the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996, the main source of American secondary sanctions on Iran, by five more years, through the end of 2031. French groups with legacy Iranian exposure — automotive, oil services, telecoms equipment — sometimes assume the American pressure on Iran belongs to a previous decade. It does not: the secondary-sanctions engine that forced the departure of major European groups in 2018 now has statutory fuel into the next decade. The compliance lesson of this whole first part is therefore single: Washington has converted discretionary pressure into durable statutory machinery with fixed clocks — 30 days for the first tariffs, 180 days for each review, five years for Iran — and every European exposure file must now be managed against a calendar rather than against rumours. Groups that sell into the United States from several countries should also model designation scenarios jurisdiction by jurisdiction, so that production, billing and shipment can be rerouted through unaffected entities without breaking sanctions, customs or tax rules.

II. What a French or EU company caught by American secondary pressure can do from Paris

American law does not apply in France by itself, but it bites in France through dollars, American territory, American persons, and the voluntary compliance of banks and insurers worldwide. European law answers with three instruments of its own: the EU Blocking Statute, which forbids EU operators from complying with designated foreign sanctions; the French asset-freeze regime in the Monetary and Financial Code, which executes European listings on national territory; and judicial review in Luxembourg against EU listings. Used together, from Paris, they form a coherent defensive posture — refuse unlawful foreign compliance, challenge unlawful European listing, and unlock what can lawfully be unlocked.

A. How to map exposure before the clock runs out and use the EU Blocking Statute without breaking French law

The EU Blocking Statute, Regulation (EC) No 2271/96, provides in substance that no EU operator may comply, whether directly or through a subsidiary or intermediary, by action or deliberate omission, with any foreign requirement or prohibition, including foreign court orders, that flows directly or indirectly from the American laws listed in its Annex. The personal scope covers EU nationals, residents, companies incorporated in the Union, and business conducted in whole or in part inside the Union — which is to say, any French company. The prohibition is therefore the mirror image of the American demand: where Washington requires a French bank to cut a client loose, Brussels forbids it from doing so on that ground alone. The Regulation adds that foreign court judgments and administrative decisions giving effect to the listed American laws are recognised nowhere in the Union and cannot be enforced by any means. And it gives the shield a sword: a protected EU operator may recover all damage caused by the application of the listed foreign laws, including legal costs, from whoever caused it, suable wherever that person holds assets in the Union, including through seizure and sale of those assets.

Three qualifications keep this shield lawful and practical. First, the Annex today lists specific American statutes on Cuba and Iran — a newly enacted Russia secondary-tariff law enters the European prohibition only if the Commission updates the Annex, which is a political decision to watch week by week. Counsel must therefore check the Annex as in force on the day advice is given, not as remembered. The interplay between American threats against European insurers and this exact Regulation was analysed on this site in the case of the ICC rupture with a French insurer under United States sanctions pressure, read through the EU Blocking Statute and French law, and that analysis remains the reference for the insurance angle. Second, the Regulation itself allows the Commission to authorise full or partial compliance where refusal would seriously harm the operator interests or those of the Union — the authorisation route exists and serious cases should file for it rather than quietly breach either side. Third, French domestic law doubles the prohibition: the Act of 26 July 1968 on the communication of economic, commercial, industrial, financial or technical documents to foreign persons punishes the transmission of sensitive business information to foreign authorities outside treaty channels, so a French compliance team that hands its customer files to a foreign regulator to buy leniency can violate French criminal law while trying to satisfy American law.

Concretely, before 18 October, a French group should run a four-step triage. First, list every touchpoint with Russian-origin crude, gas, refined products, shipping and marine insurance, including through intermediaries and traders. Second, identify which of those touchpoints run through dollars, American persons, American territory or American-origin goods, because only those give Washington direct jurisdiction; the rest is pressure, not law. Third, freeze any voluntary over-compliance — banks that close accounts at the mere suggestion of American displeasure, without any European listing, may themselves breach the Blocking Statute. Fourth, document everything: origin certificates, sanctions clauses, refusals and their grounds. If a designation lands, that file becomes the authorisation request to Brussels, the evidence in Luxembourg, and the defence in Paris. Dated screenshots of the Annex, official gazette printouts and board minutes recording each decision turn a narrative of good faith into proof that withstands judicial review.

B. How to challenge an EU listing in Luxembourg and unlock frozen money through the French release procedure

When the European Union itself lists a person, the freeze is immediate and directly applicable: banks block accounts, notaries refuse transfers, counterparties terminate. The listing criteria for the Russia regime sit in Article 3 of Regulation (EU) No 269/2014, under which the Council places on Annex I the persons it identifies as responsible for acts undermining the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, together with their associates, with the individual grounds of each listing published in the Annex itself. That publication requirement is the challenger first weapon: a listing with boilerplate reasoning, no individualised grounds, or evidence the Council never examined can be annulled by the General Court of the European Union, and recent delistings of prominent businessmen show the Court takes manifest-error and rights-of-defence pleas seriously — a development examined on this site in the analysis of the European Union delisting of sanctioned oligarchs and how to challenge a listing or a frozen account from France. The action for annulment must be filed within two months of notification or publication, it does not automatically suspend the freeze, and interim relief is granted only on urgency plus a prima facie case — so the file must be built while the money is still moving, not after it stops.

While the Luxembourg clock runs, French law governs what happens to the frozen assets day to day. The Monetary and Financial Code gives the Minister for the Economy a national freeze power: “Le ministre chargé de l’économie peut décider, pour une durée de six mois, renouvelable, le gel des fonds et ressources économiques : 1° Qui appartiennent à, sont possédés, détenus ou contrôlés par des personnes physiques ou morales, ou toute autre entité qui commettent, tentent de commettre, facilitent ou financent des actions sanctionnées ou prohibées par les résolutions adoptées dans le cadre du chapitre VII de la charte des Nations unies ou les actes pris en application de l’article 29 du traité sur l’Union européenne” (Article L562-3 du Code monétaire et financier). The terrorism freeze in Article L562-2 du Code monétaire et financier works the same way by joint order of the finance and interior ministers. The Code defines its own vocabulary in Article L562-1 du Code monétaire et financier, obliges every bank, insurer, notary and professional concerned to apply freezes and availability bans without delay under Article L562-4 du Code monétaire et financier, and prohibits them from making funds available directly or indirectly to designated persons under Article L562-5 du Code monétaire et financier, or from knowingly and voluntarily participating in circumvention activities under Article L562-6 du Code monétaire et financier.

Two provisions of that same chapter are the practitioner daily tools. Article L562-7 du Code monétaire et financier preserves the crediting of frozen accounts, so incoming payments are not lost but captured. Article L562-8 du Code monétaire et financier organises the review of freeze decisions and prohibitions. At European level, Article 4 of Regulation 269/2014 lets the competent authority of a Member State release frozen funds by derogation, under conditions it sets, for basic needs of listed persons and their dependent families — food, rent, medicines, taxes, insurance — for reasonable legal fees and service costs, and for extraordinary expenses with two weeks prior notice to the other Member States and the Commission. In France, that authorisation runs through the Treasury sanctions desk: the request must identify the funds, the ground, the supporting invoices, and the ring-fencing that prevents any benefit leaking to the designated person beyond the authorised purpose. Basic-needs, legal-fees and routine-maintenance releases are granted as a matter of course when properly documented; extraordinary expenses follow the heavier track.

French criminal law gives this whole architecture its teeth, in both directions. Evading a freeze is a standalone offence: on 29 November 2023 the Criminal Chamber of the Court of Cassation, appeal No. 22-85.867, ruled on convictions for evading asset-freeze measures imposed in counter-terrorism proceedings, confirming suspended custodial sentences alongside customs fines and confiscation, and recalling that the freezes had been ordered by four successive six-month joint orders of the finance and interior ministers under the Monetary and Financial Code. Professionals face their own penalty track under Article L574-4 du Code monétaire et financier. The message for a French director is therefore symmetrical: never move frozen money without an authorisation, and never accept a bank verbal claim of European compulsion without seeing the listing entry — because an unjustified freeze executed at an American bank request, absent any European measure, can itself be challenged before the Paris enforcement judge. The broader European debate on immobilised Russian sovereign assets and creditor remedies, including the reparations-loan mechanism, is examined on this site in the analysis of the European Union frozen Russian assets loan and what it means for holders and creditors in France.

Conclusion

The Graham Act replaces American discretion with American machinery: 500% duties on Russian goods and up to 100% on the goods of the countries that buy Russian energy or help evade the embargo, first designations by 18 October 2026, review every 180 days, Russia sanctions locked into statute, and Iran secondary sanctions funded through 2031. Against that machinery, a French or European company is not without weapons, but every weapon has a deadline and a forum: triage the flows and the contracts now, invoke the Blocking Statute properly and seek Commission authorisation where both sides squeeze, challenge listings in Luxembourg within two months with individualised pleas, and work the French release procedure invoice by invoice through the Treasury. The groups that treat 18 October as a starting gun for evidence-gathering will face the next 180-day review with a file; the groups that wait for the designation letter will face it with an excuse. In sanctions law, as in tariffs, the calendar now decides.

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