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Nicaragua v. Germany at the ICJ: Can Arms Exports Be Tried as Genocide Facilitation — and What a French Court Would Do

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Nicaragua v. Germany at the ICJ: Can Arms Exports Be Tried as Genocide Facilitation — and What a French Court Would Do

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From 7 to 10 September 2026, the Peace Palace in The Hague hosted one of the most closely watched hearings in the recent history of the International Court of Justice. Nicaragua asked the World Court to keep alive its case against Germany over German arms exports to Israel during the war in Gaza; Germany asked the Court to throw the case out before any trial on the merits. Two rounds of oral argument, two heavyweight agents — Julia Monar for Berlin, Carlos José Argüello Gómez for Managua — a written question from Judge Charlesworth answered by both sides on 16 and 22 September, and now silence while the judges deliberate. The decision, to be delivered at a public sitting on a date still to be announced, will determine whether an arms-supplying State can be hauled before the ICJ for alleged facilitation of genocide. For readers in France, the case matters twice over. France is itself a major arms exporter with its own licensing machinery, and French criminal courts claim some of the widest universal jurisdiction in Europe for genocide, crimes against humanity and torture. This analysis explains what Managua alleges, how Berlin defends itself, and what a Paris court would do with the same file — from challenging an export licence to filing a complicity complaint before a French investigating judge.

I. Can Germany Be Tried at the ICJ for Its Arms Exports to Israel?

A. What Nicaragua Accuses Germany of Before the World Court

Nicaragua filed its application in 2024, asking the Court to declare that Germany breached the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide and its obligations under international humanitarian law by supplying arms to Israel for use in Gaza. As reported by Al Jazeera with AP and Reuters on 8 September 2026, Managua maintains that German arms exports to Israel violate the Genocide Convention and humanitarian law because the weapons were used in what Nicaragua characterises as a genocidal war on Gaza. Germany is, by Nicaragua’s account, the second-largest supplier of arms to Israel after the United States, and the figures put before the Court are stark: court documents show that export licences worth 378 million dollars were issued in the last three months of 2023, compared with 45 million dollars in the first three months of that year. Nicaragua says German sales rose significantly after the war began on 7 October 2023, and its counsel told the judges that it is impossible Germany was unaware of the serious risk that acts amounting to genocide were being committed by Israel.

The procedural setting matters as much as the rhetoric. The September 2026 hearings did not concern whether genocide occurred or whether German weapons caused specific strikes. They concerned only Germany’s preliminary objections — the set of jurisdictional and admissibility hurdles a respondent State raises to stop a case before the merits. The Court’s Press Release No. 2026/23 of 10 September 2026 records that the hearings opened on Monday 7 September 2026, comprised two rounds of oral argument, and concluded with Nicaragua’s final submissions. Germany’s delegation was led by Ms Julia Monar, Legal Adviser and Director-General for Legal Affairs at the Federal Foreign Office, and Nicaragua’s by Ambassador Carlos José Argüello Gómez. Verbatim records published on the Court’s case page cover all four sittings from 7 to 10 September, with President Iwasawa presiding, and the docket shows an unusual post-hearing step: a written question put by Judge Charlesworth, answered in writing by Nicaragua on 16 September 2026 and by Germany on 22 September 2026. The press release closes with the news every litigator waits for: deliberation has now begun, and the ruling will be handed down at a future public sitting.

Two factual threads will dominate the merits if the case survives. The first is knowledge. Nicaragua must show that Berlin knew, or could not plausibly have ignored, that a serious risk existed that transferred weapons would serve genocidal acts — hence the emphasis on licence volumes, on press coverage of Gaza, and on the argument that no government in Berlin’s position could claim surprise. The second is the conduct of the exports themselves. Germany suspended all military exports to Israel in August 2025, then resumed them a few months later by reference to the stability of the ceasefire between Israel and Hamas, while deadly attacks continued daily in Gaza after the ceasefire according to the same reporting. Back in April 2024, a German lawyer had told the Court that 98 percent of arms exports to Israel since October 2023 consisted of general equipment such as vests, helmets and binoculars. The contrast between that characterisation and the licence values, and between the suspension and the resumption, is the evidentiary core of Nicaragua’s file — and a preview of the document fights, export-licence by export-licence, that any court hearing such a claim must arbitrate.

B. Why Germany Says the Case Should Be Thrown Out Before Trial

Germany’s answer, delivered on the opening day of the hearings, is that the case was improperly filed and should be dismissed without reaching the merits. Its lead argument is procedural rather than factual: States bringing a dispute to the ICJ are ordinarily expected to show that a genuine legal dispute exists and to have attempted to resolve it through diplomacy first. Ms Monar told the judges that Nicaragua had shown no genuine interest in hearing Berlin’s position and had simply sought to haul Germany before the Court, as reported by Al Jazeera with AP and Reuters on 8 September 2026. Nicaragua’s lawyers denied this, pointing to documents sent to the German foreign ministry as well as press releases describing the dispute. Whether those exchanges satisfy the Court’s test for the existence of a dispute at the date of filing is precisely the kind of question preliminary objections exist to answer, and the judges will scrutinise dates, notes verbales and public statements line by line.

Berlin’s second line of defence goes to the substance of what was transferred and when. The 98-percent general-equipment figure from April 2024 serves to shrink the causal bridge between German licences and any unlawful strike: helmets and binoculars do not bomb neighbourhoods. The August 2025 suspension serves a different purpose — evidence, Germany will say, of a licensing system that reacts to risk assessments rather than ignoring them. Nicaragua’s reply is that the suspension itself proves Berlin saw the risk, and that resuming exports a few months later, while attacks continued, destroys the good-faith narrative. Readers should understand the asymmetry of this phase: at the objections stage, Germany does not need to prove that every licence was lawful, only that the Court lacks jurisdiction or that the claim is inadmissible; Nicaragua does not need to prove genocide, only that its claim is fit to be heard.

The possible outcomes frame everything that follows. If the Court upholds Germany’s objections, the case ends here — a judgment future respondent States will cite whenever an applicant’s pre-filing diplomacy looks thin. If the Court rejects them, the case moves to written pleadings and hearings on the merits, a phase measured in years, during which export licences, end-use certificates, risk assessments and ministerial minutes become exhibits. A third path exists in theory — partial admissibility — but the binary structure of Germany’s request for outright dismissal makes a clean yes-or-no outcome the most likely. Either way, the judgment will clarify how the Genocide Convention’s duties to prevent and punish apply to third States that arm a belligerent, a question the Court touched on in earlier decades but has never answered in the arms-transfer setting with a full evidentiary record. Our companion analysis of South Africa v. Israel at the ICJ, where Colombia withdrew its intervention as America stepped in, shows the same Convention being tested from the opposite side — against the State accused of committing genocide rather than the State accused of facilitating it — and the two cases together map the full perimeter of genocide litigation at The Hague. Our 5 October analysis of the September hearings and the universal-jurisdiction route covers the oral arguments as they unfolded; the present analysis picks up what happened next — written answers to Judge Charlesworth on 16 and 22 September, the opening of deliberations, and the Paris toolkit for acting while the judgment is awaited.

II. What a French Court Would Do With the Same Arms-Export File

A. How France Authorises Arms Exports — and Who Can Challenge a Licence

Suppose the same fact pattern landed in Paris: a French manufacturer seeks to ship military equipment to a State engaged in an intense urban conflict, and critics allege the weapons may serve atrocities. The first French judge seized would not be a criminal judge but the administrative judge, because exports of war material leave France only through prior State authorisation. Article L2335-2 of the Defence Code, in force, provides: “L’exportation sans autorisation préalable de matériels de guerre et matériels assimilés vers des Etats non membres de l’Union européenne ainsi que des territoires exclus du territoire douanier de l’Union européenne est prohibée.” The administrative authority defines the list of controlled materials and the exemptions, which means every lawful shipment to a non-EU destination rests on a paper trail — application, classification, licence, end-use documentation — that a court can later review.

The licences themselves come in several forms. Article L2335-3 of the Defence Code states: “L’autorisation préalable d’exportation, dénommée licence d’exportation, est accordée par l’autorité administrative”, before distinguishing general export licences, which authorise any qualifying exporter established in France to ship listed materials to categories of recipients, from global licences granted on request to an identified exporter for specific materials and identified recipients. Individual licences complete the range. In practice, each application passes through an interministerial examination in which foreign-affairs, defence and economic assessments are weighed, and the file records the risk analysis conducted at the time — the very documents that become decisive years later when a court asks what the government knew and when.

Above domestic law sits the European control grid that binds France exactly as it binds Germany. Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP defines the EU-wide rules for military exports, and its second criterion, on respect for human rights and international humanitarian law in the country of final destination, is written in mandatory terms. After assessing the recipient country’s attitude to the relevant principles, Member States “refusent l’autorisation d’exportation s’il existe un risque manifeste que la technologie ou les équipements militaires dont l’exportation est envisagée servent à la répression interne” — they must refuse any export licence where a clear risk exists that the equipment would serve internal repression — and likewise “refusent l’autorisation d’exportation s’il existe un risque manifeste que la technologie ou les équipements militaires dont l’exportation est envisagée servent à commettre des violations graves du droit humanitaire international”, the same refusal where a clear risk exists of use in grave breaches of international humanitarian law. The clear-risk test is the hinge of every European arms-export dispute: it is assessed at the date of the licensing decision, on the information then available, and a licence granted despite documented warnings — UN reports, ICRC statements, embargo debates, press investigations — is exposed both to annulment before the administrative courts and to later use as evidence of knowledge in a criminal file.

For companies, the practical lesson is documentation in both directions. An exporter should keep the licence, the classification analysis, the end-use certificates and every instruction on re-export or diversion, because that file is the first line of defence if the destination’s conduct is later questioned. Competitors, NGOs and associations, conversely, scrutinise the Official Journal and parliamentary reports for the aggregate figures — values, categories, destinations — that reveal trends comparable to the 378-million-dollar spike Nicaragua brandished at The Hague. A licensing decision is an administrative act: it can be challenged within the standard time limits by interested parties, and even when a challenge fails, the litigation forces the administration to disclose the reasoning it relied upon. In a future complicity case, that disclosed reasoning may matter more than the outcome of the administrative dispute itself.

B. How Genocide Complicity Reaches a Paris Investigating Judge

The criminal path starts with the definitions. Article 211-1 of the Criminal Code provides: “Constitue un génocide le fait, en exécution d’un plan concerté tendant à la destruction totale ou partielle d’un groupe national, ethnique, racial ou religieux, ou d’un groupe déterminé à partir de tout autre critère arbitraire, de commettre ou de faire commettre, à l’encontre de membres de ce groupe, l’un des actes suivants : – atteinte volontaire à la vie ; – atteinte grave à l’intégrité physique ou psychique”, followed by further listed acts. Article 212-1 mirrors the structure for crimes against humanity, punishing with life imprisonment acts “commis en exécution d’un plan concerté à l’encontre d’un groupe de population civile dans le cadre d’une attaque généralisée ou systématique”, including wilful killing, extermination, torture, deportation and persecution of an identifiable group on political, racial, national, ethnic, cultural, religious or gender grounds. An arms supplier is never the principal author of such acts; the charge, if any, is complicity. Article 121-7 of the Criminal Code states: “Est complice d’un crime ou d’un délit la personne qui sciemment, par aide ou assistance, en a facilité la préparation ou la consommation.”

French case law has given that spare sentence formidable reach in atrocity cases. In its landmark ruling of 7 September 2021 on the Lafarge affair — Criminal Chamber, appeal No. 19-87.367, ECLI:FR:CCASS:2021:CR00868, published in the Bulletin — the Court of Cassation quashed the Paris investigating chamber’s annulment of the cement group’s indictment for complicity in crimes against humanity. The reasoning deserves quotation because it governs every future case of economic or logistical support to perpetrators of mass crimes: “l’article 121-7 du code pénal n’exige ni que le complice de crime contre l’humanité appartienne à l’organisation, le cas échéant, coupable de ce crime, ni qu’il adhère à la conception ou à l’exécution d’un plan concerté à l’encontre d’un groupe de population civile dans le cadre d’une attaque généralisée ou systématique, ni encore qu’il approuve la commission des crimes de droit commun constitutifs du crime contre l’humanité.” The Court added the decisive sentence: “Il suffit qu’il ait connaissance de ce que les auteurs principaux commettent ou vont commettre un tel crime contre l’humanité et que par son aide ou assistance, il en facilite la préparation ou la consommation.” No membership in the criminal organisation, no adherence to its plan, no approval of its crimes — knowledge plus facilitating aid suffices. A company that keeps shipping, financing or servicing a customer after learning that the customer commits crimes against humanity with its products sits squarely inside that formula, whatever its commercial motives.

Jurisdiction is the next lock, and French law opens it in two stages. For torture and the treaty crimes listed under the classical universal-jurisdiction provisions, mere presence in France suffices. Article 689-1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides: “En application des conventions internationales visées aux articles suivants, peut être poursuivie et jugée par les juridictions françaises, si elle se trouve en France, toute personne qui s’est rendue coupable hors du territoire de la République de l’une des infractions énumérées par ces articles.” Article 689-2 extends that competence, for the New York Convention against torture of 10 December 1984, to “toute personne coupable de tortures au sens de l’article 1er de la convention”. The Assemblée plénière confirmed the architecture on 12 May 2023 — appeal No. U 22-82.468, ECLI:FR:CCASS:2023:PL90669, published in the Bulletin and the Report — restating that “peut être poursuivie et jugée par les juridictions françaises, si elle se trouve en France, toute personne qui s’est rendue coupable, hors du territoire de la République, de l’une des infractions énumérées par les articles suivants”, and that the torture-convention referral covers “toute personne coupable de tortures au sens de l’article 1er de la Convention”.

For genocide and crimes against humanity, the dedicated provision is stricter. Article 689-11 of the Code of Criminal Procedure allows French courts to try “toute personne soupçonnée d’avoir commis à l’étranger” genocide, other crimes against humanity and war crimes, but adds three cumulative filters: “La personne soupçonnée doit avoir une résidence habituelle sur le territoire français”, assessed through length of presence, reasons for it and family, social, material or professional ties; “La poursuite de ces crimes ne peut être exercée qu’à la requête du procureur de la République antiterroriste”; and the prosecutor must verify that no international court seeks surrender and no State seeks extradition — “le ministère public s’assure de l’absence de poursuite diligentée par la Cour pénale internationale et vérifie qu’aucune autre juridiction internationale compétente pour juger la personne n’a demandé sa remise et qu’aucun autre Etat n’a demandé son extradition.” A victim whose complaint is dismissed is not without recourse: when the Paris prosecutor-general hears an appeal against a dismissal, “il entend la personne qui a dénoncé les faits si celle-ci en fait la demande”, and a rejection must be reasoned in writing.

Victims and associations therefore have a concrete procedural ladder in Paris. The entry point is a complaint to the prosecutor or the police, followed if necessary by a complaint with civil-party petition before the investigating judge. Article 85 of the Code of Criminal Procedure opens that door: “Toute personne qui se prétend lésée par un crime ou un délit peut en portant plainte se constituer partie civile devant le juge d’instruction compétent”, once the prosecutor has declined to prosecute or three months have passed since the initial complaint. In atrocity matters the file goes to the dedicated crimes-against-humanity unit of the Paris judicial court, working under the antiterrorism prosecutor’s exclusive initiative for Article 689-11 cases. Evidence should be assembled as a prosecutor would assemble it: export licences and their dates, end-use certificates, UN and NGO reports available at each licensing date, ministerial statements, press investigations, and any internal document showing the supplier followed the destination’s conduct after delivery. The Lafarge precedent teaches that knowledge is the battlefield — date-stamped proof that the supplier knew, or received information it could not ignore, while continuing to supply. The limits are real: subsidiarity means Paris yields if the ICC or another competent court claims the person; habitual residence must be demonstrated for genocide and crimes-against-humanity charges; and such cases run for many years. But the door is open, and it opens onto investigating judges with experience of exactly these files.

Conclusion

The judges at The Hague are deliberating, and the coming judgment on Germany’s preliminary objections will be read in every foreign ministry with an arms-export ledger. If Nicaragua’s case proceeds to the merits, the Court will for the first time test a supplier State’s Genocide Convention duties against a full record of licences, volumes, suspensions and resumptions — the 378-million-dollar quarter against the 45-million one, the August 2025 halt against the return to business a few months later. If the case falls at the threshold, the judgment will still define the diplomatic homework future applicants must complete before seizing the Court, and exporters will study the reasoning for what it reveals about the paper trail a diligent government keeps.

Neither outcome leaves French actors where they were. The licensing grid of Articles L2335-2 and L2335-3, read with the European “clear risk” test, already obliges Paris to refuse any export that might serve internal repression or grave breaches of humanitarian law — and obliges exporters to keep the files that prove their diligence. The criminal grid of Articles 211-1, 212-1 and 121-7, sharpened by the Lafarge ruling’s knowledge-plus-aid formula and backed by universal jurisdiction under Articles 689-1, 689-2 and 689-11, already allows Paris judges to hear complicity cases the rest of the world declines. Between The Hague’s deliberation room and the investigating judges of Paris, the message of this autumn is consistent: arms transfers are no longer a purely political act beyond judicial reach, and the evidence that will decide tomorrow’s cases is being filed, licensed and shipped today.

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