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DNO Yemen at the CJEU: When Paying an Arbitration Award Counts as Funding a Sanctioned Person

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Source: French Court of Cassation – Judilibre and Légifrance open data

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DNO Yemen at the CJEU: When Paying an Arbitration Award Counts as Funding a Sanctioned Person

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On 12 October 2026, UNCITRAL Working Group III opens its 55th session in Vienna on investor-State dispute settlement reform, while the trade press reported on 9 October 2026 that the EU General Court has dismissed fresh challenges by Russian investors against the investor-State provisions of EU sanctions legislation. In Luxembourg, a quieter but potentially more consequential case is awaiting judgment: on a reference from the French Cour de cassation, the Court of Justice must decide whether paying an arbitration award to Yemeni public entities can count as indirectly making funds available to sanctioned persons. The Advocate General has proposed a striking test: a reasonable risk that designated persons benefit is enough to trigger the prohibition. Ten days ago, on 1 October 2026, the Cour de cassation itself published a ruling that annulled a seizure of frozen Libyan assets for want of prior Treasury authorisation. This article explains, from the Paris proceedings to the Luxembourg questions, when enforcing an award in France now collides with EU sanctions, and what award creditors, debtors and banks must do about it. For international businesses, banks and award creditors operating through Paris, the stakes are immediate: the wrong payment can breach EU sanctions, while the wrong refusal can breach the award.

I. When does paying an arbitration award breach EU sanctions?

A. How did a Yemeni oil arbitration award end up before the CJEU?

The story begins with production-sharing agreements for Yemeni oil and gas. The Ministry of Oil and Minerals of the Republic of Yemen and Yemen Oil and Gas Corporation, a company wholly owned by the Yemeni State, signed exploitation agreements containing an arbitration clause with four private operators: DNO Yemen AS, Petrolin Trading, MOE Oil & Gas Yemen and Dove Energy. When the companies moved to withdraw in 2014, the Ministry and the corporation launched ICC arbitration, and an award made in Paris on 15 July 2019 ordered three of the operators to pay damages. The debtors then did something unusual: instead of resisting on the merits, they asked the Paris Court of Appeal to annul the award on the ground that paying it would indirectly make funds available to persons listed under the EU Yemen sanctions regime, within the meaning of Article 2(2) of Council Regulation (EU) No 1352/2014. By a judgment of 5 October 2021, the Paris court dismissed the annulment action. It held that the verification it had to carry out under the sanctions regulation had to be assessed as of the date of its own ruling and had to rest on serious, specific and consistent evidence of a breach. To show an indirect making available, the court required proof that the Yemeni Ministry and corporation were in fact acting on behalf of, under the control of or on the instructions of designated persons, and that they intended to use the funds for those persons’ benefit, drawing on the criteria in paragraph 55b of the EU Guidelines on restrictive measures. The court found that none of the evidence showed the Ministry, a representative of the internationally recognised government backed by the World Bank and the IMF, acting under the control or instructions of designated persons. As for the corporation, although control over it was claimed by both the legitimate government and the Houthi movement, a situation described as one of competing influences, the court held that it had in no way been established that the two sides were acting in concert or that the corporation was under Houthi control. Dove Energy, the fourth operator, later went into liquidation and plays no part in the Luxembourg reference. The Paris court also gave weight to the EU Guidelines criteria for attributing control, requiring conduct on behalf of, under the control of or on the instructions of listed persons, rather than mere commercial contact with a country in conflict. On further appeal, the Cour de cassation stayed the proceedings on 27 November 2024 and referred three questions to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling in Case C-842/24, DNO Yemen AS v Petrolin Trading Ltd and others: first, the precise scope of the prohibition on indirect making available where designated persons exercise an influence competing with that of the legitimate government inside a non-designated public entity; second, the standard of proof required for the prohibition to apply; and third, who bears the burden of proof. A hearing was held on 19 November 2025, and the Advocate General has since delivered his Opinion. The Court’s judgment is now pending, and it will bind every enforcement judge in the Union, starting with the Paris courts that handle a large share of the world’s enforcement litigation. Readers looking for the broader Russia-sanctions counterpart to this analysis can consult the related analysis of EU sanctions against arbitration awards and their enforcement in France.

B. What does Article 2(2) of the Yemen sanctions regulation actually prohibit?

Article 2 of Regulation No 1352/2014, adopted on the basis of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2140 (2014), provides in its first paragraph for the freezing of all funds and economic resources belonging to, owned, held or controlled by anyone listed in Annex I. Its second paragraph then bars making any funds or economic resources available, directly or indirectly, to or for the benefit of listed persons. The Annex lists persons identified by the UN Sanctions Committee as engaging in or supporting acts threatening the peace, security or stability of Yemen. The regulation was adopted on the basis of Article 215 TFEU and Council Decision 2014/932/CFSP, published in OJ 2014 L 365, and Article 3 channels UN Sanctions Committee designations of persons supporting acts that threaten Yemeni peace and stability straight into Annex I. Two features of this prohibition matter for arbitration practice. First, the Court of Justice has always read the ban on making funds available broadly. In Möllendorf (C-117/06), a German reference concerning anti-terrorist sanctions, the Court held that even the final registration in the Land Register of a property sale concluded and paid for before the buyer was listed was prohibited, ruling that even completing the land-register entry for a sale agreed and paid for before the buyer was listed was prohibited. If registering a fully performed private sale counts as making an economic resource available, then paying several million euros under an arbitration award plainly falls within the potential scope of the ban, and the only real question is to whom the funds flow and who can dispose of them. Second, the freeze and the making-available ban can catch entities that are not themselves listed, through ownership or control. In EM SYSTEM (C-84/24), its judgment of 12 March 2026 on the Belarus sanctions regulation, the Court ruled that money held in the accounts of a non-listed company 50%-owned by a listed person must be presumed to be funds held or controlled by that person and frozen as such. The same judgment immediately added a procedural safeguard: such a company such a company must, to safeguard its right to effective judicial protection, be able to challenge the freeze before the national authorities and then the national courts, and obtain its lifting by showing the funds are not actually held or controlled by the listed person. The DNO Yemen reference sits exactly at the intersection of these two lines of case law: a non-designated payee, the Yemeni State’s oil apparatus, over which designated persons may exercise a competing influence, and a payment, the award damages, that the debtors say would travel, in whole or in part, into sanctioned hands. The regulation also contains a safety valve worth knowing: Article 11 provides that freezing funds or refusing to make them available in good faith on the basis that the action complies with the regulation gives rise to no liability, unless negligence is proven. A bank or debtor that withholds payment in genuine reliance on the sanctions regime is therefore protected, which is precisely why debtors now raise the sanctions defence to resist enforcement.

II. What will the Luxembourg answer change for enforcement in France?

A. Will a reasonable risk of benefiting a sanctioned person be enough to block enforcement?

The Advocate General proposes three answers that, if followed by the Court, would reshape enforcement litigation across the Union. On the scope of the ban, he proposes that paying an award to an entity subject to competing influences from designated and non-designated actors can fall within the ban wherever the funds may be passed on to the designated persons or those persons can dispose of them. The test is therefore functional, not formal: listing status of the payee does not end the inquiry; what counts is whether sanctioned persons down the chain can receive or direct the money. On the standard of proof, the Opinion draws a calibrated scale. Annulment of an award is not a listing decision: it does not target anyone individually and carries no public stigma, so the standard must sit below the standard the EU courts apply to listing challenges, but above the caution expected of businesses outside any court proceedings. Between those two poles, the Opinion endorses the referring court’s suggested threshold: a reasonable risk that designated persons will benefit from all or part of award funds paid to a non-designated entity triggers the prohibition. A merely hypothetical future risk remains insufficient, but the word reasonable itself filters out speculation unsupported by specific, precise and consistent evidence. The Opinion is explicit about why courts must accept imperfect evidence: evidence proving or ruling out such a breach is hard for outsiders to obtain, especially amid civil war. Following General Court case law on listings, it accepts that press reports may corroborate facts where they are specific, precise and consistent in what they describe noting it would be excessive to require on-the-ground investigation of facts relayed by numerous media. On the burden of proof, the Opinion refuses both extremes. Competing influence does not equal control: competing influence by designated persons inside a non-designated public body does not allow any presumption that they control it. Yet leaving the whole burden on the party resisting enforcement would make the prohibition ineffective, so a shift applies: where all the material before the annulment court points to a reasonable risk of benefit, the payee must prove to the required standard that no such risk exists. For French practice, the landing zone is familiar but stricter. Under Article 1514 of the Code of Civil Procedure, awards are recognised and enforced in France unless recognition or enforcement is manifestly contrary to international public policy, and Article 1520, 5° opens annulment where recognition or enforcement would breach that same public policy. EU sanctions prohibitions belong to EU public policy and, through it, to French international public policy, as the Court confirmed for the Brussels Ia context in Real Madrid (C-633/22). The French starting point that the party alleging the breach must prove it, an application of Article 1353 of the Civil Code, under which whoever claims performance of an obligation must prove it and whoever claims discharge must prove payment, will therefore survive, but with the Luxembourg corrective: once the file as a whole points to a reasonable risk, the award creditor must affirmatively dispel it. The French Government, intervening at the 19 November 2025 hearing, defended the national starting point that the party alleging a manifest breach of international public policy must clearly demonstrate it, a position the Opinion preserves as the default before applying the Luxembourg corrective described above. Concretely, creditors seeking enforcement in Paris should now build, from day one, an evidence pack on who controls the payee’s accounts and who can dispose of the funds, because press reports, official communiques and UN panel findings, if specific and consistent, can suffice to shift the burden onto them.

B. How do you enforce an award against frozen assets in Paris today?

French enforcement runs through two doors, and sanctions now guard both. The first door is exequatur: under Article 1514 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the award creditor proves the award exists, and enforcement follows unless it is manifestly contrary to international public policy. Since the DNO Yemen reference, any award whose payment chain passes near a designated person invites the debtor to plead Article 2(2) at this stage, and judges must assess the reasonable-risk test on the evidence before them, seeking guidance from the specialised authorities where needed. A related case to watch is Ciekuri-Siski (C-480/24), where the Advocate General suggested that a court hearing a case must verify of its own motion, where it holds indicia, whether a party is a designated person, using all its powers of inquiry including requests to the competent sanctions authorities. The second door is seizure of frozen assets, and here the Cour de cassation has just spoken. On 1 October 2026, the Second Civil Chamber rejected the appeal of a Kuwaiti construction group that had seized funds of the Libyan Investment Authority held at Societe Generale in Paris to enforce a 2013 arbitration award against Libya. The Court approved the Paris Court of Appeal’s holding that, absent prior authorisation from the Directorate General of the Treasury, the seizure was void, endorsing the view that such authorisation must come before the seizure and not only at the payment stage, in line with the Court of Justice’s reading of the similarly worded Iranian freeze regulation. In the Court’s words, the court of appeal correctly decided that without authorisation issued by the Directorate General of the Treasury, the enforcement was void (unofficial translation from the French original). The practical sequence for creditors is therefore fixed: obtain exequatur, identify assets, apply to the Treasury for release authorisation before seizing, and only then serve the attachment. In practice, Paris banks served with an attachment over sanctioned property now routinely demand sight of the Treasury authorisation before releasing a euro, and enforcement judges expect the creditor’s file to contain it. Starting the Treasury application in parallel with the exequatur request, rather than after the seizure, has become the only safe timetable. Award creditors should therefore open three tracks at once: the exequatur case on the merits, the Treasury release file with full tracing of the payment chain, and the evidence pack on control of the payee, so that each forum sees a consistent story. Debtors resisting payment should mirror the exercise in reverse, assembling the specific and consistent public material, official designations, UN reports and reputable press investigations, capable of establishing a reasonable risk of diversion. Banks and paying agents in the chain, for their part, should document every withholding decision contemporaneously, since the good-faith shield protects only action genuinely taken in reliance on the sanctions regime. Skipping the authorisation step does not merely delay recovery; it voids the seizure and exposes the creditor to costs, as the 1 October ruling confirmed with a 3,000 euro order under Article 700 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Seizure mechanics add their own traps: Article L.211-1 of the Code of Civil Enforcement Procedures allows any creditor with an enforceable title for a liquidated and due claim to attach its debtor’s monetary claims in a third party’s hands, but Article R.211-3 requires denunciation of the seizure to the debtor by a commissioner of justice within eight days, on pain of lapse, and the Al-Kharafi litigation shows that seizures against State emanations must in addition be denounced to the foreign State itself. The effect of service is immediate: Article L.211-2 of the Code of Civil Enforcement Procedures provides that the attachment at once assigns the seized claim to the seizing creditor and renders the third party personally liable as a debtor (unofficial translation from the French original). Debtors and banks, symmetrically, hold strong cards: the Article 11 no-liability shield protects good-faith withholding, banks routinely freeze first and ask questions later, and a debtor that can assemble specific, precise and consistent material showing a reasonable risk of diversion can now credibly invite the enforcement judge to refuse exequatur or annul the award. Do not confuse EU freezes, which apply directly in France, with national freezes ordered jointly by the finance and interior ministers under Article L.562-2 of the Monetary and Financial Code, a separate terrorism-focused regime with its own six-month renewable logic. The week ahead will sharpen every one of these points: the Vienna session from 12 to 16 October 2026 addresses the structural future of investor-State arbitration, the General Court’s 9 October dismissals signal that sanctions shields survive direct challenge, and the pending C-842/24 judgment will set the evidentiary rules for the collision between the two. The French referral that triggered it all, Cour de cassation, First Civil Chamber, 27 November 2024, appeal No 22-13.596, recounted in the Advocate General’s Opinion in Case C-842/24, remains the essential starting point for any file where an award and a sanctions list meet.

Conclusion

The DNO Yemen reference asks the oldest question in sanctions law in its newest form: when money changes hands lawfully, at whose hands does the law stop looking. The Advocate General’s answer is functional and demanding: trace where the funds can go, accept a reasonable risk proven by consistent public material, presume no control from mere competing influence, but make the payee disprove the risk once the file points toward it. Combined with the Cour de cassation’s 1 October 2026 Al-Kharafi ruling on prior Treasury authorisation, the message for Paris practice is coherent: awards remain enforceable in France, but the creditor must map the payment chain, clear the sanctions screen before seizing, and be ready to prove a negative. Watch for the Court of Justice’s judgment in C-842/24, the parallel Swedish reference in Reibel (C-802/24) on the no-claims clause, and the outcomes of the Vienna ISDS reform week: together they will fix, for years, the price of enforcing awards in a sanctioned world. Until Luxembourg rules, the prudent course in Paris is to treat every award touching a sanctioned environment as a sanctions file first and an enforcement file second.

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