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Arrested in France on a UK Warrant After Brexit: How the EU-UK Surrender Procedure Decides Your Case

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Source: French Court of Cassation – Judilibre and Légifrance open data

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Hassan KOHEN
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Arrested in France on a UK Warrant After Brexit: How the EU-UK Surrender Procedure Decides Your Case

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On 2 May 2024, the criminal chamber of the Cour de cassation rejected the appeal of an Irish national arrested in France in December 2023 under a British arrest warrant issued for cocaine, heroin and crack-trafficking charges. On 16 July 2026, the same chamber partly annulled a Paris surrender order enforcing a Spanish European arrest warrant in an ETA-leadership case. On 6 October 2026, it annulled a favorable extradition opinion concerning North Macedonia because the court below had failed to check time bars under both legal systems. Three rulings, three different procedures, one practical lesson for anyone arrested on French soil at the request of a foreign state: the regime that applies to you — European arrest warrant, post-Brexit EU-UK surrender deal, or classic extradition — decides which defences can save you, which hearing matters most, and which checks the judges must run on their own motion. This guide explains, step by step, what happens after an arrest in France on a British warrant, what the first hearing before the chambre de l’instruction decides, and which three lines of defence actually work in French surrender litigation, with the exact holdings French courts issued between 2024 and 2026.

I. Arrested in France on a British warrant: what happens in the first days?

A. Which procedure applies to you: European arrest warrant, EU-UK surrender or classic extradition?

Since the end of the Brexit transition period, the United Kingdom no longer participates in the European arrest warrant system. A person arrested in France at the request of London is not subject to a European arrest warrant at all. The procedure is governed solely by the surrender title of the EU-UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement of 24 December 2020. The Cour de cassation said so expressly when it upheld the surrender of the Irish national wanted by the British authorities: “la procédure de remise est régie par les seules dispositions de l’Accord de commerce et de coopération entre l’Union européenne et le Royaume-Uni du 24 décembre 2020” (Cass. crim., 2 May 2024, no. 24-82.116). That single sentence carries a direct practical consequence: arguments built for the European arrest warrant case law do not automatically transfer to a British file, and arguments built for classic extradition do not transfer either. Each regime has its own closed list of refusal grounds.

Three regimes coexist on French territory. First, the European arrest warrant, available between France and the other EU Member States, is implemented by articles 695-22, 695-24 and following of the Code of Criminal Procedure. It rests on mutual recognition: the French executing judge enforces the issuing judge’s decision and may only refuse surrender on the listed grounds. The Spanish ETA case decided in July 2026 is a textbook illustration: a European arrest warrant issued on 3 December 2025 for leading a terrorist organisation between the suspect’s flight from Spain in 2002 and his arrest in France on 16 May 2019 (Cass. crim., 16 July 2026, no. 26-83.852). Second, the EU-UK surrender procedure, derived directly from the 2020 Agreement, applies whenever the requesting state is the United Kingdom — as in the May 2024 case, where a British warrant dated 9 March 2022 led to an arrest in France on 14 December 2023 for conspiracy to supply class-A drugs. Third, classic extradition, governed by the European Convention on Extradition of 13 December 1957 and article 696-15 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, applies to requesting states outside both frameworks — North Macedonia in the October 2026 ruling (Cass. crim., 6 Oct. 2026, no. 26-80.296), South Korea in the May 2025 ruling on allegedly disproportionate life sentences for large-scale financial fraud (Cass. crim., 6 May 2025, no. 24-85.773).

The opening sequence looks similar in every file but its legal meaning differs. The person is arrested, then the warrant or the extradition request is formally notified by the procureur général — on 11 December 2025 in the Spanish case, on 30 November 2025 with a formal request following on 5 January 2026 in the Macedonian case. At that stage the person is asked whether they consent to surrender and whether they waive the specialty rule. Refusing consent, as all four defendants in these rulings did, does not block the procedure; it sends the case to the chambre de l’instruction and usually means detention under an extradition committal order, the écrou extraditionnel, while the court examines the file. In the Spanish case the court chose judicial supervision instead, which shows that custody is an individual decision, not an automatic consequence of the foreign request. Whatever the custody outcome, the days after notification are when counsel must identify the applicable regime, because every deadline, every refusal ground and every evidentiary request flows from that classification.

B. What does the first hearing before the chambre de l’instruction decide?

The hearing before the chambre de l’instruction — in Paris, the fifth section handles these files — is the center of gravity of the whole case. Its function is narrower, and therefore more technical, than most defendants expect. Ruling on a Romanian European arrest warrant file in July 2026, the Cour de cassation recalled that questioning the wanted person “ne vise qu’à constater son identité, à recevoir ses observations sur le déroulement de la procédure dont elle fait l’objet et à lui permettre de consentir ou non à sa remise, de sorte que cette formalité est préliminaire à tout débat” (Cass. crim., 29 July 2026, no. 26-84.072). Identity, observations on the proceedings, consent or refusal: that is the purpose of the first appearance, and it must come before any substantive debate, with the reporting judge’s report also delivered before the debate opens, as article 695-30 of the Code of Criminal Procedure requires. That provision adds three concrete guarantees worth knowing: the hearing is public unless publicity would harm the proceedings, a third party’s interests or the person’s dignity; the person is heard with counsel and, where needed, an interpreter; and the issuing Member State may be allowed to intervene through an authorized representative but never becomes a party to the case.

What the court decides at or shortly after that hearing depends on the quality of the foreign file. If the warrant’s description of the facts is too thin to rule on a refusal ground, the chambre de l’instruction does not guess — it asks. Article 695-33 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides that “la chambre de l’instruction estime que les informations communiquées par l’Etat membre d’émission dans le mandat d’arrêt européen sont insuffisantes pour lui permettre de statuer sur la remise, elle demande à l’autorité judiciaire dudit Etat la fourniture, dans le délai maximum de dix jours pour leur réception, des informations complémentaires nécessaires.” The ten-day supplementary-information request therefore runs from the executing court’s assessment of insufficiency, and the issuing authority must supply what is needed for reception within ten days at most, as the same article states. In classic extradition, the tempo is set by article 696-15: once the person tells the procureur général they do not consent, the chambre de l’instruction is seized without delay, and “comparaît devant elle dans un délai de dix jours ouvrables à compter de la date de sa présentation au procureur général”, with the reasoned opinion due, absent supplementary inquiries, within one month of that appearance, as the same article provides. An opinion that ignores the essential arguments in the parties’ briefs fails the formal conditions of its legal existence, and an appeal against it can only attack formal defects capable of depriving it of those essential conditions, as the final paragraph of the same article states.

Two practical consequences follow. First, the defence must put its refusal grounds and its requests for additional information on the record in writing from the outset, because an unreasoned or evasive surrender order is annulled: every ruling of the chambre de l’instruction must carry its own reasons and answer the essential points of the parties’ submissions. Second, consent strategy matters enormously. Consenting accelerates surrender and closes several defences; refusing preserves them but prolongs detention. There is no universally right answer — it depends on whether a serious refusal ground exists, which is the subject of the second part of this guide.

II. Can France refuse to hand you over to the United Kingdom?

A. Whole-life and heavy sentences: the defence that fails under the EU-UK deal but can work elsewhere

Defendants wanted by the United Kingdom regularly argue that the sentence awaiting them — frequently life imprisonment for drugs, murder or terrorism conspiracies — is grossly heavier than anything French law would impose for the same facts, and therefore contrary to French public policy and to European fundamental rights. Under the EU-UK surrender deal, that argument fails as a matter of principle. In the May 2024 Irish-national case, the defence invoked Article 49(3) of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, whose verified text states that “l’intensité des peines ne doit pas être disproportionnée par rapport à l’infraction”, contrasting ten years’ imprisonment under French criminal law with a possible life sentence under British law. The Cour de cassation approved the Paris court’s rejection: “le caractère éventuellement disproportionné de la peine encourue dans l’État d’émission ne figure pas parmi les motifs de non-exécution d’un mandat d’arrêt décerné en application de l’Accord de commerce et de coopération entre l’Union européenne et le Royaume-Uni du 24 décembre 2020” (Cass. crim., 2 May 2024, no. 24-82.116). The Trade and Cooperation Agreement contains an exhaustive list of non-execution grounds, and sentence proportionality is not on it. A comparative severity table between British and French sentencing therefore cannot, by itself, stop a surrender to London.

The only sentence-related lever the Agreement offers is Article 604(a), and it is a faculty, not an obligation. Its verified wording, as restated by the Cour de cassation, is that “l’État d’exécution peut notamment subordonner l’exécution du mandat d’arrêt à la condition que l’État d’émission garantisse, d’une manière suffisante, qu’il réexaminera la peine infligée ou la mesure imposée, sur demande ou au plus tard après vingt ans” (Cass. crim., 2 May 2024, no. 24-82.116). In the 2024 case the Paris court had ordered preliminary inquiries into British review, suspension, commutation and release mechanisms; satisfied by the answers and comforted by Strasbourg case law holding that a British life sentence is not irreducible and that executive-led review arrangements comply with the Convention, it granted surrender outright, without conditions. The Cour de cassation confirmed that the judges had simply not used a faculty they were offered, which made the complaint of a missing executive guarantee inoperative. For context, the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights held in January 2017 in Hutchinson that the British whole-life review mechanism was compatible with the Convention — which is why French courts treat British life sentences as reducible and therefore surrender-compatible. Anyone facing a classic extradition request, outside the EU-UK deal, should compare this outcome with the parallel French test for death-penalty and irreducible-sentence files, explained in this firm’s analysis of how France tests the punishment before extraditing.

Outside the EU-UK framework, the disproportionality argument is admissible but narrow. The controlling statement comes from the May 2025 South Korea case: “l’extradition doit être refusée lorsque la personne concernée démontre qu’elle est exposée à un risque réel de voir prononcer contre elle une peine manifestement disproportionnée dans l’Etat requérant, cette notion devant faire l’objet d’une interprétation stricte et ne pouvant être retenue que dans des cas très exceptionnels”, under Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights, which provides that which prohibits torture and inhuman or degrading punishment (Cass. crim., 6 May 2025, no. 24-85.773). The chambre de l’instruction must assess the alleged excess against the nature and gravity of the facts and the conditions under which the foreign court will sentence, knowing that “le seul fait que la peine encourue dans l’Etat requérant soit plus sévère que celle qui serait appliquée dans l’Etat requis n’étant pas opérant”. In that case the court upheld a favorable opinion because the Seoul file involved economic offences worth tens of billions of won with a five-billion-won statutory threshold for life imprisonment, parole available after one-third of the term — twenty years for lifers — and no provision for irreducible life sentences. The lesson for defence strategy is sharp: under the EU-UK deal, do not spend the file on proportionality; document reviewability and concrete sentencing mechanics instead. In classic extradition, meet the strict Article 3 test with the requesting state’s actual sentencing statutes and release machinery, not with a France-versus-abroad comparison table.

B. Already judged, still prosecuted in France, or time-barred: the checks the court must run

The second family of defences turns on what has already been judged and what time has extinguished. Start with double jeopardy. Under article 695-22, 2° of the Code of Criminal Procedure, surrender under a European arrest warrant is mandatorily refused where “la personne recherchée a fait l’objet, par les autorités judiciaires françaises ou par celles d’un autre Etat membre que l’Etat d’émission, d’une décision définitive pour les mêmes faits que ceux faisant l’objet du mandat d’arrêt européen”, provided that, in case of conviction, the sentence has been served, is being served, or can no longer be enforced under the law of the sentencing state, as the rest of the same provision requires. Refusal is merely optional where French proceedings are pending or were discontinued for the same facts, under article 695-24, 1°, and the same article adds further optional grounds that practitioners underuse: French nationality or residence with enforceability of the sentence on French territory, partial commission on French soil, and time bars. The decisive question is what “the same facts” means, and French courts apply the autonomous Union-law definition recalled in the July 2026 ETA ruling: the phrase covers only the materiality of the acts, an inseparable set of concrete circumstances, irrespective of legal classification or protected interest, following the Court of Justice’s Mantello ruling of 16 November 2010.

That definition is demanding for issuing authorities, and vagueness backfires on them. The Spanish warrant described seventeen years of alleged ETA leadership essentially as acting as one of the principal leaders of the terrorist group ETA between the 2002 flight and the 2019 arrest, without materiality, dates, places or concrete circumstances. The Paris court tried to bridge the gap with its own reasoning and invoked mutual recognition to refuse further inquiries; the Cour de cassation held that, faced with such a warrant, the chambre de l’instruction had a duty to request supplementary information within the ten-day channel and had not legally justified its decision, then partly annulled the surrender order while preserving the rest (Cass. crim., 16 July 2026, no. 26-83.852). Two refinements complete the picture. Where a first European arrest warrant has already been finally refused, a second identical warrant cannot succeed without a post-decision change of circumstances altering the situation previously recognized by the courts, following the Court of Justice’s Breian ruling of 29 July 2024, as recalled in the Romanian-file decision of the same month (Cass. crim., 29 July 2026, no. 26-84.072). And where the requesting state sits outside both the warrant and the EU-UK systems, prescription must be verified twice: “l’extradition n’est pas accordée si la prescription de l’action ou de la peine est acquise d’après la législation soit de la partie requérante, soit de la partie requise”, and the chambre de l’instruction must check, if necessary of its own motion, whether, at the date of the person’s arrest, the penalty had become time-barred under both the requesting state’s law and French law — the Macedonian file was annulled precisely because the court below had examined limitation only under the requesting state’s legislation (Cass. crim., 6 Oct. 2026, no. 26-80.296).

For a person arrested in France on a British warrant, the checklist that emerges is therefore concrete. Identify the regime first: the Trade and Cooperation Agreement governs alone, so frame every argument inside its grounds. Challenge the file’s precision early and in writing, demanding the ten-day supplementary-information procedure whenever the warrant’s factual account is too vague to test double jeopardy or specialty. If a life sentence looms, do not plead bare disproportionality; invoke the Article 604(a) reviewability faculty with evidence about British review, suspension and release mechanics, and keep the Article 3 irreducible-sentence case law in reserve for its narrow exceptional-test role. If French proceedings exist or a final decision covers the same material facts, plead them with dates, places and files attached, because the Mantello materiality test rewards concrete circumstances and punishes generic labels. And in any extradition outside the warrant and EU-UK systems, force the double time-bar verification as of the arrest date under both legal systems, since the October 2026 ruling makes it a condition of the opinion’s very legal existence that the court may raise on its own motion.

Conclusion

An arrest in France on a British warrant opens a procedure that belongs to neither the European arrest warrant nor classic extradition: the EU-UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement of 24 December 2020 governs alone, the chambre de l’instruction controls identity, observations and consent before any debate, and surrender can only be refused on the Agreement’s own grounds. French case law from 2024 to 2026 draws the map with unusual clarity. Sentence severity compared with French law does not stop a surrender to London, while the reviewability of a future life sentence, tested through the Article 604(a) faculty and Strasbourg reducibility case law, is the serious battleground. Vague warrants trigger a duty to seek supplementary information within ten days, prior final decisions and pending French proceedings must be measured by the materiality of the facts rather than their labels, a second warrant after a final refusal needs changed circumstances, and classic-extradition time bars must be checked under both laws as of the arrest date. Anyone concerned should have these points tested on their own file from the first days after notification, because consent, custody and supplementary-information requests are decided early, and what is not placed on the record at the hearing stage is rarely recovered later.

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