On 15 October 2026, the Federal Bureau of Investigation added a 75-year-old woman from Missouri to its Most Wanted Fraudsters list for allegedly scamming banks in California out of nearly 30 million dollars in 2017 and 2018 while posing as the heiress of the McDonnell aircraft family, with a reward of up to 150,000 dollars offered for information leading to her arrest and conviction. Federal prosecutors charged Mary Carole McDonnell with bank fraud and aggravated identity theft in December 2018, an arrest warrant was issued at the same time, and she has been on the run ever since. What makes this story relevant in Paris is one sentence from the head of the FBI’s Los Angeles office: it is, he said, only a matter of time before she is caught, as agents work with international partners to locate her, and anyone with information is invited to contact the nearest American Embassy or Consulate. When the FBI says it is hunting a fugitive with its partners abroad, France is necessarily part of the map: a suspect located on French soil can be arrested, brought before the prosecutor general within forty-eight hours, and held under an extradition detention order while Washington’s request travels through diplomatic channels. This article explains, from the standpoint of a Paris criminal lawyer, exactly how that Franco-American machinery works, what the United States must prove, and where a person wanted by the American justice system can still resist surrender. Every procedural step described below comes from statutes and treaty provisions verified this week, and every defence point from recent rulings of the French Court of Cassation. One reserve applies throughout: Ms McDonnell is presumed innocent, no court has convicted her, and nothing below asserts her guilt or her presence in any particular country.
I. A fugitive wanted by the FBI is located in France: how the United States obtains surrender
The starting point is simple, and it surprises many American readers: there is no direct handover between police forces. Even when the FBI knows exactly where a fugitive is, the United States must file a formal extradition request, France examines it under its own law and under the bilateral treaty, and a French court gives a reasoned opinion before any minister signs anything. The two tracks that matter are the newspaper story, which creates the manhunt, and the judicial file, which alone decides the outcome.
A. From the Red Notice to the detention order: how a US request reaches a French judge
The hunt begins with paper, not handcuffs. When American prosecutors obtain an arrest warrant, as they did against Ms McDonnell in December 2018, the United States can circulate it worldwide through Interpol: the famous Red Notice is, in the words endorsed by the French Court of Cassation in a December 2025 ruling, the notice “assurant la diffusion du mandat d’arrêt”, the channel that broadcasts the warrant to police forces in every member country. A Red Notice is not itself an arrest warrant under French law, and French officers do not surrender anyone on its sole basis, but in practice it is the trigger: border controls, identity checks and targeted surveillance all feed on it, and the day the wanted person is found in France, the formal procedure starts.
That procedure is governed first by the treaty, then by the statute. Article 696 of the French Code of Criminal Procedure provides that “En l’absence de convention internationale en stipulant autrement, les conditions, la procédure et les effets de l’extradition sont déterminés par les dispositions du présent chapitre”, as the official text recalls at article 696 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Between France and the United States, the applicable convention is the extradition treaty signed in Paris on 23 April 1996 and published in France by Decree No. 2002-117 of 29 January 2002, whose Article 1 states the basic bargain, with each State undertaking to surrender to the other any person prosecuted or convicted by the competent authorities of the requesting State for a qualifying offence. The treaty therefore comes first, and the Code fills whatever the treaty does not regulate.
On the American side, the file must contain one of the documents listed in Article 696-8 of the Code of Criminal Procedure: “toute demande d’extradition est adressée au gouvernement français par voie diplomatique et accompagnée soit d’un jugement ou d’un arrêt de condamnation, même par défaut, soit d’un acte de procédure pénale décrétant formellement ou opérant de plein droit le renvoi de la personne poursuivie devant la juridiction répressive, soit d’un mandat d’arrêt ou de tout autre acte ayant la même force et décerné par l’autorité judiciaire”, with the precise facts and their date, as set out at article 696-8 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. A federal arrest warrant for bank fraud, accompanied by the indictment and the applicable American statutes, fits this definition directly, which is why the December 2018 warrant in the McDonnell case would already constitute the backbone of a request if she were found in France. The request travels by diplomatic note, is checked by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Justice, and is then forwarded to the territorially competent prosecutor general, as article 696-9 of the Code of Criminal Procedure describes.
The human part of the procedure starts at arrest. Article 696-10 requires that “Toute personne appréhendée à la suite d’une demande d’extradition doit être conduite dans les quarante-huit heures devant le procureur général territorialement compétent”, who verifies identity, notifies the person of the request in a language she understands, and informs her of the right to counsel of her choice or court-appointed counsel, with immediate and free communication between lawyer and client, as detailed at article 696-10 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The same article attaches a drastic sanction to any shortcut: “Mention de ces informations est faite, à peine de nullité de la procédure, au procès-verbal.” In Paris practice, this first appearance before the prosecutor general of the Paris Court of Appeal is the moment when the defence must already be present, because everything recorded or omitted in that report conditions the months that follow.
If the prosecutor general does not release the person, she is brought before the first president of the court of appeal, who, under Article 696-11, “ordonne l’incarcération et le placement sous écrou extraditionnel de la personne réclamée à la maison d’arrêt du siège de la cour d’appel”, unless her attendance at the proceedings is sufficiently guaranteed, in which case supervision measures can be ordered instead, as provided at article 696-11 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Extradition detention is therefore the default, liberty under supervision the exception, and release can be applied for at any time before the investigating chamber under article 696-19 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which states that “La mise en liberté peut être demandée à tout moment à la chambre de l’instruction”. For a 75-year-old person with no French ties and considerable alleged means, experience shows that prosecutors argue a flight risk almost systematically, while the defence relies on health, age, a fixed address and surrender of travel documents to obtain supervision measures.
One feature of American requests deserves emphasis because it is rarely known in the United States: the requesting State may ask to be heard. Article 696-16 of the Code of Criminal Procedure allows the investigating chamber, by a decision not subject to appeal, to authorise the requesting State to intervene at the hearing through a person empowered for that purpose, while specifying that the State does not thereby become a party to the proceedings, as the official text records at article 696-16 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. In a Franco-American case, that means American prosecutors or their French counterparts can explain the file to the Paris judges, but they cannot appeal, file motions or address the court as a party: the only parties are the person sought, her lawyers and the French ministère public.
B. Does a 30-million-dollar bank fraud qualify for extradition from France?
Once the person is before the court, the first substantive question is double criminality: France never surrenders anyone for conduct that French law does not itself punish as a crime or délit. Article 696-3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure sets the thresholds precisely: extradition is available for acts punished under the requesting State’s law with a maximum of at least two years’ imprisonment, or, for a convicted person, a sentence of at least two months, and it adds the absolute barrier, “En aucun cas l’extradition n’est accordée par le gouvernement français si le fait n’est pas puni par la loi française d’une peine criminelle ou correctionnelle”, as the official text states at article 696-3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The bilateral treaty is slightly broader on paper: its Article 2 sets the threshold at offences punishable under the laws of both States by deprivation of liberty with a maximum of at least one year, adding a remaining term of at least six months where enforcement of a sentence is sought, according to the treaty published at Decree No. 2002-117 of 29 January 2002. Where the two texts differ, the treaty prevails under Article 696, but both point in the same direction for serious fraud.
Crucially, neither text requires the two countries to call the offence by the same name. Article 2(3) of the treaty expressly provides that the test applies whether or not both States place the offence in the same category or describe it in identical terms. American federal bank fraud and aggravated identity theft therefore do not need a French twin with the same label; the Paris chamber asks only whether the underlying behaviour is punishable in France. And it plainly is. Article 313-1 of the French Criminal Code defines fraud as “le fait, soit par l’usage d’un faux nom ou d’une fausse qualité, soit par l’abus d’une qualité vraie, soit par l’emploi de manoeuvres frauduleuses, de tromper une personne physique ou morale et de la déterminer ainsi, à son préjudice ou au préjudice d’un tiers, à remettre des fonds, des valeurs ou un bien quelconque”, punishable by “cinq ans d’emprisonnement et de 375 000 euros d’amende”, as published at article 313-1 of the Criminal Code. Posing as the heiress of an aircraft fortune to extract millions from banks is, on its face, the textbook illustration of the use of a false identity and fraudulent manoeuvres to obtain funds, and five years’ imprisonment comfortably exceeds every applicable threshold, American or conventional.
The remaining qualification checks are formalities in a fraud file, but the chamber verifies each of them. Article 696-2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure allows France to surrender “toute personne n’ayant pas la nationalité française qui, étant l’objet d’une poursuite intentée au nom de l’Etat requérant ou d’une condamnation prononcée par ses tribunaux, est trouvée sur le territoire de la République”, whether the acts were committed on American soil by anyone or abroad by an American national, as stated at article 696-2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Bank transfers routed through Californian banks in 2017 and 2018 satisfy the territorial link without discussion, and attempt and complicity follow the same regime whenever they are punishable in both States. The treaty even anticipates multi-count American indictments: its Article 2(5) provides that when a request covers several distinct acts, extradition is also granted for those that do not individually meet the thresholds, so the defence cannot split a thirty-million-dollar scheme into smaller pieces to escape surrender.
Readers familiar with our earlier analysis of how France tests the threatened punishment before extraditing anyone will recognise the same architecture here: the chamber never asks whether the person is guilty, only whether the legal conditions for surrender are met. Guilt is for the American jury; the Paris judges check papers, thresholds and rights. That distinction explains why even overwhelming press coverage of a fugitive changes nothing in the hearing room, and why the real battles are fought on nationality, time limits and procedure, which is the subject of the second part.
II. Wanted by Washington, arrested in Paris: where surrender can still be blocked
French extradition law is not a rubber stamp. Between the arrest and the Prime Minister’s decree, the person sought passes through at least two hearings, can challenge detention, can appeal on points of form to the Court of Cassation, and can petition the administrative courts against the surrender decree itself. Added to the substantive bars, nationality, political offence, prior French judgment and time limits, this makes the Paris phase the decisive battlefield of every American request. The defences below are presented generally: they are the checks the investigating chamber performs in each file, and their outcome depends on the documents, not on newspaper headlines.
A. Consent or fight: the two tracks before the Paris investigating chamber
At the first appearance, the prosecutor general asks the person whether she consents to be extradited, and the answer splits the procedure in two. Consent leads to the fast track of Articles 696-13 and 696-14: the investigating chamber is seized immediately, the person appears within five working days, the court verifies identity, records the statements and, once it has informed her of the legal consequences of consent and confirmed that the legal conditions are met, records the consent within seven days of the appearance. The resulting order, as Article 696-14 bluntly states, “n’est pas susceptible de recours”, as published at article 696-14 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Consent is therefore quick and final, and experienced counsel never let a client give it without a complete file review, because there is no way back.
Refusal opens the contested track, which is where American files are usually fought. Under Article 696-15, the investigating chamber is seized without delay and “La personne réclamée comparaît devant elle dans un délai de dix jours ouvrables à compter de la date de sa présentation au procureur général”, then the court delivers its reasoned opinion within one month of the appearance unless further inquiries are ordered, and “Cet avis est défavorable si la cour estime que les conditions légales ne sont pas remplies ou qu’il y a une erreur évidente”, as set out at article 696-15 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The same article restricts the appeal: “Le pourvoi formé contre un avis de la chambre de l’instruction ne peut être fondé que sur des vices de forme de nature à priver cet avis”, meaning the Court of Cassation reviews only formal defects capable of vitiating the opinion, never the merits of the American prosecution.
That restriction makes the hearing itself the whole trial, and a recent ruling shows how seriously the Court of Cassation polices it. On 14 April 2026, in case No. 25-86.772, the criminal chamber held that when the investigating chamber rules on an extradition request, every argument, even on the merits and even previously examined during further inquiries ordered in a different composition, must be argued before the court and decided by it sitting in one identical composition (Cass. crim., 14 April 2026, No. 25-86.772). In plain terms, every argument must be pleaded and decided by the same judges sitting in the same composition: a ground examined earlier by different judges during further inquiries cannot simply be carried over. For the defence, the practical lesson is to re-plead every point at the final hearing and to check the bench’s composition on the record.
The opinion, once final, binds the government in one direction only. Article 696-17 provides that “Si l’avis motivé de la chambre de l’instruction repousse la demande d’extradition et que cet avis est définitif, l’extradition ne peut être accordée”, and the person, if not held for another reason, “est alors mise d’office en liberté”, as published at article 696-17 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. A favourable opinion, by contrast, merely opens the door: under Article 696-18, “l’extradition est autorisée par décret du Premier ministre pris sur le rapport du ministre de la justice”, and that decree can be challenged before the administrative courts, since “Le recours pour excès de pouvoir contre le décret mentionné à l’alinéa précédent doit, à peine de forclusion, être formé dans le délai d’un mois”, as stated at article 696-18 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Miss that one-month deadline and the decree becomes final; meet it and the Conseil d’Etat reviews the legality of the surrender, including the human-rights bars.
Time also protects the person sought after the decree. The same Article 696-18 provides that If the requesting State’s officers have not collected the person within one month of notification of the decree, she must, except in cases of force majeure, be released automatically and can never again be claimed on the same grounds. American authorities must therefore collect the person within one month of notification, failing which she walks free and can never be claimed again on the same grounds. During the whole procedure, detention itself remains litigable at any time under Article 696-19, and the defence typically files successive release motions as the months pass, pairing each with the one-month opinion deadline to keep pressure on the timetable.
B. Nationality, prior judgments and time limits: the shields that defeat a US request
The strongest substantive shield is nationality. Article 696-4 of the Code of Criminal Procedure opens its list of mandatory refusal grounds with the rule that “L’extradition n’est pas accordée : 1° Lorsque la personne réclamée a la nationalité française, cette dernière étant appréciée à l’époque de l’infraction pour laquelle l’extradition est requise”, as published at article 696-4 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The treaty says the same in its own words: Article 3 of the treaty published by Decree No. 2002-117 of 29 January 2002 provides that the requested State is not bound to surrender its own nationals, while adding, in paragraph 2, that where surrender is refused solely on nationality grounds, the requested State must, at the requesting State’s request, submit the case to its own prosecuting authorities. France never hands over its own nationals, but it can prosecute them at home on the American file: extradite or prosecute, with Paris choosing prosecution. The nationality test is frozen at the date of the offence, so acquiring French citizenship after the 2017-2018 transfers would change nothing, while holding it at the time would end the American request immediately. A person with dual French and American nationality is French for this purpose and cannot be surrendered.
Three further bars are checked in every file. The treaty excludes political offences: its Article 4 bars France from granting extradition where it regards the offence as political, connected with a political offence, or inspired by political motives, which has no application to bank fraud but closes the catalogue for completeness. It also bars double jeopardy: Article 8 of the treaty bars extradition where the person has already been finally acquitted or convicted in the requested State for the very offence cited in the request. And where several States claim the same person, Article 696-5 of the Code of Criminal Procedure gives preference to the State against whose interests the offence was directed or on whose territory it was committed, as published at article 696-5 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, a provision that could matter if another country filed a competing request for the same transfers.
Time limits deserve the longest development, because they are the defence most often misunderstood, including by lawyers trained outside France. Under the Franco-American treaty, the rule favours the person sought: Article 9(1) of the treaty published by Decree No. 2002-117 of 29 January 2002 requires refusal where prosecution or the sentence is time-barred under the law of the requested State, while Article 9(2) counts American interrupting or suspending acts only insofar as French law allows. Since the requested State here is France, it is French limitation law that decides: if prosecution or the sentence is time-barred under French law, surrender must be refused, while American interrupting acts count only insofar as French law accepts them.
That treaty rule must not be confused with the regime the Court of Cassation applied on 28 January 2026 in case No. 25-81.433, which concerned a Turkish request governed by the 1957 European Extradition Convention and its Fourth Additional Protocol, not the American treaty. In that decision the criminal chamber held that extradition is refused where prosecution or the sentence is time-barred under the requesting State’s law, and is not refused merely because it would be time-barred under French law, except where French courts themselves would have jurisdiction over the offences, with the sentence time-bar assessed as of the date of the arrest of the person sought (Cass. crim., 28 January 2026, No. 25-81.433). The contrast is instructive and must be stated exactly: under the 1957 Convention system, limitation is tested under the requesting State’s law as of the arrest date, whereas under Article 9 of the Franco-American treaty, it is tested under French law. A Paris lawyer therefore checks the calendar twice, under both laws, and pleads whichever bars surrender, without ever transposing the reasoning of one treaty onto the other. For facts dating from 2017 and 2018 with charges filed in December 2018, that double verification is the heart of the file, and its outcome turns on documents, indictments, tolling decisions and the precise French limitation rules applicable to fraud, not on intuition.
One further protection operates after surrender, and clients always ask about it: the specialty rule. Article 696-6 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides that “Sous réserve des exceptions prévues à l’article 696-34, l’extradition n’est accordée qu’à la condition que la personne extradée ne sera ni poursuivie, ni condamnée pour une infraction autre que celle ayant motivé l’extradition et antérieure à la remise”, as published at article 696-6 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and Article 19 of the treaty mirrors it by locking in specialty: a person surrendered under it may not be detained, tried, convicted, punished or otherwise restricted in liberty on the requesting State’s territory for any pre-surrender act other than the one that justified extradition, save stated exceptions. Once surrendered for the bank transfers, the person cannot be tried in the United States for an earlier unrelated matter unless France consents or she stays on American soil more than thirty days after final release. Finally, where the person sought is a European Union national requested by a non-member State, the investigating chamber must additionally verify, under the case law recalled by the Court of Cassation on 11 October 2022 in case No. 22-80.654, that the Member State of nationality was given a real opportunity to prosecute and to issue a European arrest warrant instead, a check that concerns European nationals and illustrates how many layers Paris piles onto a single American request.
Conclusion
The FBI’s announcement turns a nine-year manhunt into world news, but it changes nothing in a Paris hearing room: if a person wanted by the United States is found in France, surrender follows a strict sequence of treaty, statute and judicial control, from the Red Notice broadcasting the American warrant to the forty-eight-hour presentation, the extradition detention order, the investigating chamber’s reasoned opinion within one month, and the Prime Minister’s decree challengeable within one month before the administrative courts. Bank fraud on the scale alleged here easily clears the double-criminality thresholds on both sides of the Atlantic, since French law punishes fraud with five years’ imprisonment and neither system requires identical labels. The defences that actually decide such files are elsewhere: French nationality assessed at the date of the facts, with prosecution at home as the alternative; prior French judgments; competing requests; and above all the time limits, tested under French law for American requests by virtue of Article 9 of the 1996 treaty, under the requesting State’s law as of the arrest date in the 1957 Convention system recalled by the Court of Cassation in January 2026. Anyone learning that an American warrant may concern them should have counsel verify identity, preserve the forty-eight-hour nullity safeguards, re-plead every ground before the same chamber composition, and calendar the one-month deadlines for the opinion, the decree challenge and the physical handover. Procedure, not publicity, decides who boards the plane.