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ICC Unseals Four Taliban Arrest Warrants: Can Paris Try Gender Persecution as a Crime Against Humanity?

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ICC Unseals Four Taliban Arrest Warrants: Can Paris Try Gender Persecution as a Crime Against Humanity?

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On 5 October 2026, Pre-Trial Chamber II of the International Criminal Court unsealed four arrest warrants against four of the most powerful men in Afghanistan, and in the same decision handed down a legal finding that scholars will be quoting for years. The warrants target the Taliban’s supreme leader and three of his ministers for the crime against humanity of gender persecution. The finding redefines the word gender in international criminal law. For the Afghan women and girls now living in exile in France, and for the French prosecutors who receive their complaints in Paris, the decision raises an immediate practical question: with the ICC claiming the case, can French courts still try these crimes themselves? The answer runs through two different doors of French universal jurisdiction, and one of them is now partially locked by the very warrants that made the news.

I. What did the ICC decide on 5 October 2026 against four Taliban leaders?

A. Which Taliban leaders are named in the unsealed ICC arrest warrants and what are the charges?

In a press release dated 5 October 2026, the Court announced that Pre-Trial Chamber II had unsealed four arrest warrants issued in the Afghanistan situation: two dated 8 July 2025 against Haibatullah Akhundzada and Abdul Hakim Haqqani, whose existence had already been made public that July, and two dated 9 September 2025 against Habibullah Agha and Neda Mohammad Nadim, whose reasoning stayed under seal until October. The four men sit at the very top of the Taliban hierarchy: Akhundzada is the supreme leader, Haqqani heads the judiciary, Agha held the education portfolio and Nadim the higher-education portfolio at the relevant time. Naming sitting rulers of a country in an international arrest warrant is rare. Unsealing the reasoning behind it is rarer still, and the reasoning is where the decision breaks new ground.

The charge is persecution as a crime against humanity under article 7(1)(h) of the Rome Statute, the provision that criminalises persecution of an identifiable group on political, racial, national, ethnic, cultural, religious or gender grounds, or other universally condemned grounds, where it connects to another crime within the jurisdiction of the Court. The Rome Statute in PDF carries the same text. The Chamber found reasonable grounds to believe that the four suspects ordered, induced or solicited that persecution: on gender grounds against girls, women and others who did not conform to Taliban policy on gender, gender identity or expression, and on political grounds against people seen as allies of girls and women. The alleged conduct spans the period since the Taliban seized power on 15 August 2021 and continued until at least 20 January 2025, through decrees and edicts stripping girls and women of education, movement, expression and privacy, and through a governmental policy of murder, imprisonment, torture, rape and enforced disappearance directed at the civilian population. Two features deserve attention from any French reader. First, the victims expressly include persons targeted for their gender identity or expression and for opposing the policy, even passively, the so-called allies of girls and women pursued on political grounds. Second, the underlying acts listed by the Chamber, murder, imprisonment, torture, rape and enforced disappearance, are each crimes that French courts know how to prosecute on their own soil when the jurisdictional conditions are met, as Part II explains.

None of this means a trial is near. The four men are in Afghanistan, which is not a State Party cooperating with the Court, and they do not travel to countries that would arrest them. An unsealed warrant works differently from a sealed one: it is a public arrest order that every State Party must execute on its territory, and a travel ban in practice, since any transit through a State Party, including a simple airport connection in Paris, can trigger an arrest. France is a State Party to the Rome Statute, and its Code of Criminal Procedure is laid down by article 627 of the Code of Criminal Procedure: “Pour l’application du statut de la Cour pénale internationale signé le 18 juillet 1998, la France participe à la répression des infractions et coopère avec cette juridiction dans les conditions fixées par le présent titre”. Concretely, article 627-4 of the same Code provides that “Les demandes d’arrestation aux fins de remise délivrées par la Cour pénale internationale sont adressées, en original et accompagnées de toutes pièces justificatives, aux autorités compétentes en vertu de l’article 87 du statut qui, après s’être assurées de leur régularité formelle, les transmettent au procureur général près la cour d’appel de Paris et, dans le même temps, les mettent à exécution dans toute l’étendue du territoire de la République”. In other words, an ICC arrest request is executed across the whole French territory and channelled to the prosecutor general at the Paris Court of Appeal. The step-by-step of what happens after such an arrest in France, from detention to the surrender hearing, has been described in detail in our analysis of what happens when a person wanted by the ICC is arrested on French soil, and the same logic applies to any of the four Taliban leaders the day one of them lands within reach of French police.

B. Why does the ICC’s new definition of gender matter for future trials?

The most consequential paragraph of the 5 October decision is not the list of names but the definition of a single word. Article 7(3) of the Rome Statute, adopted in 1998, defined gender narrowly by reference to the two sexes, male and female, within the context of society, adding that the term carried no meaning beyond that. For years, prosecutors, defence teams and scholars disagreed over whether that sentence froze gender persecution into a purely biological reading or left room for persecution based on socially imposed roles. The Pre-Trial Chamber has now chosen. It held that the Statute definition of gender calls for an interpretation reaching past purely biological sex, one that takes in the socially built roles, behaviours, expectations and hierarchies traditionally tied to individuals on the basis of sex, treating those gender norms as part of the lens through which gender-based persecution under article 7(1)(h) must be read. That is the first time an ICC Chamber states this reading in a warrants decision, and it matters far beyond Afghanistan: every future gender-persecution case, and every national court applying equivalent domestic provisions, will have to position itself against this paragraph.

For France, the echo is direct. The French Criminal Code punishes as a crime against humanity, carrying life imprisonment, acts committed under a concerted plan against a civilian population in a widespread or systematic attack, and article 212-1, 8° of the Criminal Code expressly lists: “La persécution de tout groupe ou de toute collectivité identifiable pour des motifs d’ordre politique, racial, national, ethnique, culturel, religieux ou sexiste ou en fonction d’autres critères universellement reconnus comme inadmissibles en droit international”. The French statute speaks of sexist grounds, and French judges interpreting that provision in a Taliban-type case will now read it alongside the ICC’s expanded lens. The two texts do not match word for word, and no French court has yet ruled that a morality-code regime against women meets article 212-1, so advocates should present the ICC reasoning as persuasive authority, not as binding French law. But the direction of travel is set in The Hague, and Paris will hear the argument. The same comparison applies one rung lower on the ladder of crimes: genocide under article 211-1 of the Criminal Code covers the destruction of a national, ethnic, racial or religious group, since article 211-1 of the Criminal Code punishes: “en exécution d’un plan concerté tendant à la destruction totale ou partielle d’un groupe national, ethnique, racial ou religieux, ou d’un groupe déterminé à partir de tout autre critère arbitraire, de commettre ou de faire commettre, à l’encontre de membres de ce groupe, l’un des actes suivants”, a definition that does not fit gender-based targeting, which is precisely why persecution, not genocide, is the charge in The Hague and the workable qualification in Paris.

II. Can Afghan victims bring Taliban crimes before French courts in Paris?

A. How can torture committed in Afghanistan be prosecuted in France when the suspect is on French soil?

French universal jurisdiction has two doors, and the first one is wide open. Article 689-1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides: “En application des conventions internationales visées aux articles suivants, peut être poursuivie et jugée par les juridictions françaises, si elle se trouve en France, toute personne qui s’est rendue coupable hors du territoire de la République de l’une des infractions énumérées par ces articles.” Mere presence on French soil is enough; no lasting residence, no prior complaint abroad, no link to France is required. The next article extends that door to torture: article 689-2 states that “Pour l’application de la convention contre la torture et autres peines ou traitements cruels, inhumains ou dégradants, adoptée à New York le 10 décembre 1984, peut être poursuivie et jugée dans les conditions prévues à l’article 689-1 toute personne coupable de tortures au sens de l’article 1er de la convention.” An Afghan exile who was tortured in a Taliban prison and who later identifies their torturer living in France, even on a short stay, can therefore bring the facts to the Paris prosecutor, and the courts have jurisdiction from the moment the suspect is found in France.

The decisive precedent for Taliban-type facts was set by the Cour de cassation sitting in plenary assembly on 12 May 2023, in pourvoi no 22-82.468 (ECLI:FR:CCASS:2023:PL90669, published in the Bulletin), a case about torture committed in Syria by a member of a non-state armed group. The Court first recalled the limit, holding that universal jurisdiction for torture under article 689-2 covers only torture imputable to a public official, a person acting in an official capacity, or someone acting at their instigation or with their express or tacit consent. It then opened the decisive extension, ruling that acting in an official capacity also covers a person acting for or on behalf of a non-governmental entity where that entity occupies territory and exercises quasi-governmental authority over it (Assemblée plénière, 12 May 2023, pourvoi no 22-82.468, ECLI:FR:CCASS:2023:PL90669, rejet, §§16–17). A movement that holds a country, runs ministries, courts, prisons and a morality police, and issues binding edicts, fits that description without strain. Any defence argument that Taliban torturers cannot be authors of torture because they are not officials of a recognised state runs straight into this paragraph, and the paragraph was written for exactly this configuration.

Paris has already shown it will take such cases to trial. On 24 May 2024 the Paris criminal court sentenced three senior officials of the Syrian regime to life imprisonment in absentia for complicity in crimes against humanity and war crimes, after a landmark universal-jurisdiction trial, and a sister plenary decision of the same day, 12 May 2023, pourvoi no 22-80.057 (published in the Bulletin), confirmed the Paris track in a Syrian complicity case that began with an OFPRA decision of 18 December 2017 excluding a Syrian national from international protection and referring him to the Paris specialised prosecutor, followed by a judicial investigation opened on 15 February 2019 on charges of torture, crimes against humanity and complicity, an indictment for complicity in crimes against humanity committed in Syria between March 2011 and late August 2013, and ultimately a rejection of the appeal (Assemblée plénière, 12 May 2023, pourvoi no 22-80.057, rejet). The pattern is established and repeatable for Afghanistan: an OFPRA exclusion or a victim complaint alerts the specialised Paris prosecutors, the national anti-terrorism prosecutor’s office and the crimes-against-humanity unit investigate, and Paris judges try the case. For torture strictly speaking, the only territorial hook the victim needs to prove is that the suspect is in France.

B. Why does an ICC arrest warrant block a French crimes-against-humanity case, and what remains possible?

The second door is narrower, and the ICC warrants have just narrowed it further for four men. Crimes against humanity, genocide and war crimes committed abroad fall under article 689-11 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which opens with the scope: “Hors les cas prévus au sous-titre Ier du titre Ier du livre IV pour l’application de la convention portant statut de la Cour pénale internationale, ouverte à la signature à Rome le 18 juillet 1998, peut être poursuivie et jugée par les juridictions françaises toute personne soupçonnée d’avoir commis à l’étranger l’une des infractions suivantes : 1° Le crime de génocide défini au chapitre Ier du sous-titre Ier du titre Ier du livre II du code pénal ; 2° Les autres crimes contre l’humanité définis au chapitre II du même sous-titre Ier ; 3° Les crimes et les délits de guerre définis aux articles 461-1 à 461-31 du même code.” Three cumulative locks then apply. First, residence. As article 689-11 of the Code of Criminal Procedure states: “La personne soupçonnée doit avoir une résidence habituelle sur le territoire français, celle-ci se définissant par un lien de rattachement suffisant avec la France.” A passing traveller is not enough here, unlike the torture door; the suspect must be settled, with the duration, reasons and conditions of presence, family, social, material or professional ties all weighed. Second, monopoly of prosecution. The same article 689-11 provides: “La poursuite de ces crimes ne peut être exercée qu’à la requête du procureur de la République antiterroriste et si aucune juridiction internationale ou nationale ne demande la remise ou l’extradition de la personne.” Only the anti-terrorism prosecutor can trigger the case, and only if no court anywhere is claiming the person. Third, verification. The same article 689-11 adds: “A cette fin, le ministère public s’assure de l’absence de poursuite diligentée par la Cour pénale internationale et vérifie qu’aucune autre juridiction internationale compétente pour juger la personne n’a demandé sa remise et qu’aucun autre Etat n’a demandé son extradition.” The prosecutor must actively check with the ICC before moving.

Applied to the four men named on 5 October 2026, the third lock bites. The ICC is not merely competent in the abstract; it has issued public arrest warrants and is diligently seeking exactly these suspects for exactly this conduct, gender and political persecution in Afghanistan. A French prosecutor verifying the absence of ICC proceedings, as the statute commands, would find present proceedings, and the statutory no-competing-request condition would fail for Akhundzada, Haqqani, Agha and Nadim as long as the ICC warrants stand and the Court seeks their surrender. France must then choose cooperation over competition: arrest and surrender to The Hague under articles 627 and following, not a parallel French trial for the same men on the same facts. That is not a flaw in the system; it is the system working as designed, with the ICC taking the leaders and national courts taking the cases the ICC cannot or does not take. Note the asymmetry the statute creates: the torture door of articles 689-1 and 689-2 contains no equivalent no-competing-request lock in its text, so a torture prosecution against a suspect found in France does not face the same statutory barrier, though prosecutors will in practice coordinate with The Hague rather than collide with it.

What remains possible in Paris is therefore substantial, and victims should understand the map precisely. First, the four ICC warrants cover four leaders, not the apparatus: prison directors, interrogators, morality-police commanders and judges who ordered lashings and detentions and who now live in France with a genuine settled link can still be prosecuted for crimes against humanity in Paris, provided the anti-terrorism prosecutor finds no competing surrender or extradition request concerning them. Second, the torture track stays open on mere presence, with the quasi-governmental-authority reading of the 2023 plenary decision neutralising the not-a-state defence. Third, procedure protects complainants against silence: a victim or association files a report with the anti-terrorism prosecutor, and if the case is closed without action, article 40-3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure allows that “Toute personne ayant dénoncé des faits au procureur de la République peut former un recours auprès du procureur général contre la décision de classement sans suite prise à la suite de cette dénonciation”, while article 689-11 adds, for such an appeal against the anti-terrorism prosecutor’s closure: “Lorsque, en application de l’article 40-3 du présent code, le procureur général près la cour d’appel de Paris est saisi d’un recours contre une décision de classement sans suite prise par le procureur de la République antiterroriste, il entend la personne qui a dénoncé les faits si celle-ci en fait la demande”. A closed door can be appealed, and the appellant has the right to be heard. If you are an Afghan exile in France documenting what was done to you or your family, the practical sequence is therefore: preserve everything, dates, places, names, photographs, messages, medical records, witness contacts; report to the specialised Paris prosecutors with that file; and if the ICC warrants ever fall or the suspects fall outside them, the French file is ready. For suspects already under an ICC warrant, the parallel French track is the surrender procedure on arrest, described in our guide to provisional arrest in France on a foreign warrant, not a second trial.

Conclusion

The 5 October 2026 unsealing does two things at once. It puts four names, Akhundzada, Haqqani, Agha and Nadim, on the public arrest list of every ICC State Party, France included, with a gender-persecution charge built on a landmark reading of the word gender as social roles, behaviours, expectations and hierarchies rather than biology alone. And it redraws the map for Afghan victims living in France: the four leaders now belong to The Hague, and any French case against them runs into the ICC’s priority, while the men below them, the torturers and enforcers who settled in France, remain fully exposed to Paris judges, through the torture door on simple presence and through the crimes-against-humanity door on settled residence, with the 2023 plenary case law closing the we-are-not-a-state defence. That division of labour, the Court for the architects and Paris for the operatives within reach, is how impunity actually shrinks: one unsealing in The Hague, and a hundred files ready in Paris.

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