KOHEN AVOCATS FIRM · PARIS 16
Phishing Scam in France? Your Bank Must Refund You First, Says the EU Top Court (15 October 2026 Ruling)

Hassan KOHEN acts in urgent matters, from the police station to the assize court. Initial strategic analysis: €80 incl. VAT, personal reply within 24 hours.

100% confidential · Legal professional privilege · No obligation

Article generated by artificial intelligence, through a process designed and supervised by the firm

Source: French Court of Cassation – Judilibre and Légifrance open data

Paris Bar Police custody, investigation, assize court CNB listing avocat.fr
Maître Hassan KOHEN, avocat au Barreau de Paris
Hassan KOHEN
Attorney at the Paris Bar

Phishing Scam in France? Your Bank Must Refund You First, Says the EU Top Court (15 October 2026 Ruling)

Speak to a lawyer 06 89 11 34 45

On 15 October 2026, the Court of Justice of the European Union handed down a ruling that changes the balance of power between scammed account holders and their banks across the whole European Union, France included. In case C-70/25, N.O. v PKO BP S.A., on a reference from the regional court of Koszalin in Poland, the First Chamber held that a bank cannot refuse to refund a victim immediately simply by accusing the victim of gross negligence. The refund must come first; the argument about who was at fault comes later. For the thousands of residents in France who lose money every year to phishing emails, fake text messages and telephone spoofing, that distinction is worth real money, because French banks routinely rely on exactly that accusation to reject repayment claims.

The pattern is familiar to any lawyer practising in Paris. A client receives a call that displays the genuine telephone number of their bank. The caller warns of suspicious transactions and talks the client through so-called security checks. The client validates several transfers on their own telephone. When the money is gone, the bank answers that the client authorised the operations, or that the client handed the fraudsters the keys through gross negligence, and refuses to pay back a single euro. Until this month, that refusal often ended the conversation. The Luxembourg ruling of 15 October 2026, read together with two recent French decisions that this article examines in detail, gives victims a precise legal route to force the bank to pay first and prove fault afterwards. This article explains, step by step and with the exact legal texts, what the new ruling says, who has to prove what, when a French court still sides with the bank, and the practical sequence that turns a refusal into repayment.

I. Can Your Bank Refuse to Refund You by Calling You Grossly Negligent?

The short answer since 15 October 2026 is no, not as a reason to withhold the immediate refund. The Court of Justice drew a sharp line between two different questions that banks constantly mix together: whether the money must be returned at once, and who ultimately bears the loss. Confusing the two is now unlawful. The first question is governed by the immediate-refund rule; the second is governed by the later allocation of liability, where gross negligence can still matter. Understanding that sequence is the key to every successful claim in France.

A. What the EU Court of Justice Ruled on 15 October 2026

The dispute before the Court concerned a Polish account holder, N.O., and the bank PKO BP S.A. Unauthorised payment transactions had been debited, and the bank resisted repayment on the ground that the payer had made the transactions possible through gross negligence, in breach of the duties that payment service users owe under Article 69 of Directive (EU) 2015/2366 on payment services in the internal market, usually called PSD2. The Polish court asked Luxembourg whether European law allows a bank to behave that way. The answer, given by the First Chamber in its judgment of 15 October 2026 in case C-70/25, is a clear negative, and it is formulated as an interpretation binding on every national court, including the French courts that will apply it to claims brought in Paris.

The operative part of the judgment, as summarised in press release No 147/2026 of the Court, interprets Articles 73(1) and 74(1) of Directive (EU) 2015/2366 as meaning that a payment service provider cannot refuse the immediate refund of an unauthorised transaction on the ground that the payer made it possible through gross negligence in breach of the user duties of Article 69 of that directive. In plain terms, gross negligence is not a door the bank may close before paying. It is, at most, a defence the bank may raise afterwards, in the framework that decides who finally bears the loss, and it is the bank that must establish it with evidence rather than assertion.

This reading follows directly from the structure of the directive. Article 73(1) organises the immediate refund of unauthorised transactions, while Article 74 organises the possible contribution of the payer, capped and conditioned, where loss or theft of the instrument is combined with fraud or gross negligence. The Court refused to let the second provision swallow the first. A bank that suspects its customer of carelessness may investigate, may report a suspected fraud by the user to the Banque de France in writing as French law provides, and may then litigate the allocation of the loss, but it may not sit on the money in the meantime. For victims in France, the practical translation is found in the French transposition of Article 73, which is even more explicit about speed.

French law requires the refund at once. Under Article L. 133-18 of the Monetary and Financial Code, where an unauthorised transaction is reported by the user, "le prestataire de services de paiement du payeur rembourse au payeur le montant de l’opération non autorisée immédiatement après avoir pris connaissance de l’opération ou après en avoir été informé, et en tout état de cause au plus tard à la fin du premier jour ouvrable suivant" (the payer’s payment service provider refunds the payer the amount of the unauthorised transaction immediately after becoming aware of it or being informed of it, and in any event no later than the end of the next business day). The only immediate escape route offered to the bank is a genuine suspicion of fraud by the user personally, notified in writing to the Banque de France, which is a far narrower situation than the routine allegation of carelessness. The same article adds that the debited account must be restored to the state it would have been in if the transaction had never occurred, and it attaches automatic late-payment penalties that grow with delay: "1° Les sommes dues produisent intérêt au taux légal majoré de cinq points ; 2° Au-delà de sept jours de retard, les sommes dues produisent intérêt au taux légal majoré de dix points ; 3° Au-delà de trente jours de retard, les sommes dues produisent intérêt au taux légal majoré de quinze points" (sums due bear interest at the statutory rate plus five points, plus ten points beyond seven days of delay, and plus fifteen points beyond thirty days).

Two consequences follow for anyone whose French bank answers a claim with a lecture about vigilance. First, the bank owes the money by the end of the next business day after the dispute is reported, and every week of stalling increases the interest it will ultimately owe. Second, a letter stating that the customer was grossly negligent does not suspend that deadline. If the bank believes the customer behaved fraudulently or with gross negligence, it must pay and then prove its case, not prove its case and then pay. That reversal of the usual balance of power is precisely what makes the 15 October 2026 ruling significant for English-speaking residents in France, who are frequent targets of English-language phishing and who often accept a refusal letter as final.

B. Who Must Prove What When You Deny Authorising the Payment

The second pillar of the victim’s position is the burden of proof, and here European and French law speak with one voice: the bank proves, the customer denies. Article 72 of Directive 2015/2366 (PSD2), headed Evidence on authentication and execution of payment transactions, places the burden of proof on the payment service provider whenever the user denies having authorised an executed transaction or claims it was incorrectly executed: the provider must show the transaction was authenticated, accurately recorded, entered in the accounts and unaffected by any technical breakdown or other deficiency of its service. The same article then closes the argument banks use most often, namely that the correct codes were entered and therefore the customer must have paid or been at fault: use of a payment instrument as recorded by the provider is not in itself sufficient to prove either that the payer authorised the transaction or that the payer acted fraudulently or with intent or gross negligence in breach of the user duties of Article 69. the directive.

French law reproduces that shield word for word. Article L. 133-23 of the Monetary and Financial Code states: "L’utilisation de l’instrument de paiement telle qu’enregistrée par le prestataire de services de paiement ne suffit pas nécessairement en tant que telle à prouver que l’opération a été autorisée par le payeur ou que celui-ci n’a pas satisfait intentionnellement ou par négligence grave aux obligations lui incombant en la matière." The same article continues: "Le prestataire de services de paiement, y compris, le cas échéant, le prestataire de services de paiement fournissant un service d'initiation de paiement, fournit des éléments afin de prouver la fraude ou la négligence grave commise par l’utilisateur de services de paiement" (the use of the payment instrument as recorded by the provider is not necessarily sufficient in itself to prove that the transaction was authorised by the payer or that the payer did not intentionally or through gross negligence fail in their obligations; the provider must supply material proving the fraud or gross negligence of the user).

The Cour de cassation has applied that principle to phishing with striking firmness. In a ruling of 28 March 2018, appeal no. 16-20.018, the Commercial Chamber held that while the user must take reasonable steps to preserve the security of personalised security devices, "c’est à ce prestataire qu’il incombe, par application des articles L. 133-19, IV, et L. 133-23 du même code, de rapporter la preuve que l’utilisateur, qui nie avoir autorisé une opération de paiement, a agi frauduleusement ou n’a pas satisfait intentionnellement ou par négligence grave à ses obligations ; que cette preuve ne peut se déduire du seul fait que l’instrument de paiement ou les données personnelles qui lui sont liées ont été effectivement utilisés" (it is for the provider, under Articles L. 133-19, IV and L. 133-23, to prove that the user who denies having authorised a payment acted fraudulently or intentionally or through gross negligence failed in their obligations; that proof cannot be deduced from the mere fact that the payment instrument or the related personal data were actually used). The full text of the ruling is available through the official Judilibre open-data record of appeal no. 16-20.018.

In that 2018 case, the victim had answered successive emails bearing a perfectly imitated bank logo, filled in a so-called security certificate, and even asked the bank for a new personal key card to complete the fraudsters’ form, which the lower court described as showing complete naivety. Yet naivety is not gross negligence in the eyes of the law, and a bank that contents itself with hypothesising a phishing attack, without proving how the customer concretely breached a defined security obligation, loses. The lesson for victims is concrete: deny the authorisation in writing, and force the bank to produce real evidence of a precise fault, because system logs showing that the right codes were typed are, by statute, not enough.

II. How Do You Get Your Money Back From a French Bank After a Phishing Scam?

Knowing the law is one thing; converting it into repayment is another. French banks reject a large share of first claims, betting that customers will not pursue the matter. The procedure below reflects how these files actually move in France, from the blocking of the instrument to the courtroom, and it incorporates the two most recent French decisions on the subject, one of which shows exactly when the bank wins. Readers should note the strict time limit first, because everything else depends on it: Article L. 133-24 of the Monetary and Financial Code requires the user to report an unauthorised or incorrectly executed transaction "signale, sans tarder, à son prestataire de services de paiement une opération de paiement non autorisée ou mal exécutée et au plus tard dans les treize mois suivant la date de débit sous peine de forclusion" (without delay, and no later than thirteen months after the debit date, failing which the claim is foreclosed). Thirteen months is generous, but it is a guillotine: once it passes, and unless the bank never provided the required transaction information, the claim is dead regardless of its merits.

A. When a French Court Still Lets the Bank Keep Your Money

The Luxembourg ruling does not abolish gross negligence; it postpones its examination to the stage where liability is finally allocated. And at that stage, French courts do sometimes find against the victim. The clearest recent illustration is a judgment of the Nîmes Court of Appeal dated 27 August 2026, RG no. 25/00158, whose reasoning every claimant should read before filing, because it shows the exact behaviours that courts punish. The official record is published in the Judilibre open-data decision 6a915424195da062e033b118.

The facts were a textbook telephone-spoofing fraud. Between 12 and 17 July 2023, Mr E., an account holder with a French mutual bank, carried out seven transfers totalling 9,550 euros after being called by persons posing as bank advisers whose number displayed on his telephone was genuinely that of his bank. After being told of suspicious transactions, he created provisional accounts in his own name using IBANs dictated over the telephone, validated the addition of each new payee with his telephone password, and transferred 2,000 euros on 12 July, 2,000 euros on 13 July, 950 and 1,100 euros on 14 July, then 800 and 1,000 euros on 17 July. A transfer of 1,800 euros to a Belgian account was separately refunded. He filed a criminal complaint on 19 July 2023, the bank rejected his repayment request, and on 9 September 2024 the Avignon judicial court ordered the bank to repay the 9,550 euros with statutory interest. The bank appealed, and the Court of Appeal reversed.

The appeal court’s legal analysis is instructive in two stages. First, it held that the operations were unauthorised despite the customer having typed every validation himself, because his consent had been vitiated: the bank itself acknowledged that its client had been the victim of spoofing, the usurpation of its telephone number, with callers impersonating its advisers. A consent obtained by such stratagems is not consent to the amount and the payee, so the transfers were fraudulent operations that could not be regarded as authorised. Second, however, the court applied Article L. 133-19, IV of the Monetary and Financial Code, under which "Le payeur supporte toutes les pertes occasionnées par des opérations de paiement non autorisées si ces pertes résultent d’un agissement frauduleux de sa part ou s’il n’a pas satisfait intentionnellement ou par négligence grave aux obligations mentionnées aux articles L. 133-16 et L. 133-17" (the payer bears all losses from unauthorised transactions where they result from fraudulent conduct on their part or from intentional or grossly negligent failure to meet the obligations of Articles L. 133-16 and L. 133-17).

Gross negligence was established on precise, documented grounds that went far beyond the mere use of the codes. The bank’s general conditions, in force since 10 May 2023, warned in plain terms that the bank would never call to request security data or to validate a transaction, and described the exact spoofing method used against Mr E., instructing customers in such a case to hang up immediately and validate nothing. Those conditions had been brought to his attention by an email he received and read on 12 May 2023, so they were binding on him. Moreover, he had not received a single call but four, spread over six days, each time repeating the same manipulations despite the written warning. On that combination of a precise prior warning actually received and repeated validations over several days, the court found gross negligence and dismissed the 9,550-euro claim, ordering the customer to bear the costs of both instances. The contrast with the 2018 Cour de cassation case is illuminating: there, the bank proved no concrete breach of a defined obligation and lost; here, the bank proved a documented warning plus repeated conduct and won.

The second recent decision pulls in the opposite direction and shows the bank’s strongest card being trumped. On 22 October 2025, the Commercial Chamber of the Cour de cassation, appeal no. 24-19.749, rejected a bank’s appeal against a judgment that had ordered repayment even though the customer’s gross negligence was established. The customer had answered an email showing obvious anomalies that should have attracted attention and had communicated confidential data, including the codes used to validate the addition of a payee and the transfer. Yet the bank had not required strong authentication of the customer. The Court held, in a passage now central to every phishing file: "Il résulte des articles L. 133-44, I et L. 133-19, V du code monétaire et financier que le prestataire de service de paiement doit appliquer l’authentification forte du client définie au f) de l’article L. 133-4 du même code en cas d’opération de paiement à distance et qu’à défaut, il doit rembourser au payeur le montant de l’opération non autorisée, sauf agissement frauduleux du payeur" (it follows from Articles L. 133-44, I and L. 133-19, V that the provider must apply the strong customer authentication defined in Article L. 133-4(f) for remote payment transactions, and that failing that, it must refund the payer the amount of the unauthorised transaction, except where the payer acted fraudulently). The ruling, ECLI:FR:CCASS:2025:CO00525, is available in the official Judilibre record of appeal no. 24-19.749.

The underlying statutory rule is Article L. 133-19, V: "Sauf agissement frauduleux de sa part, le payeur ne supporte aucune conséquence financière si l’opération de paiement non autorisée a été effectuée sans que le prestataire de services de paiement du payeur n’exige une authentification forte du payeur prévue à l’article L. 133-44" (except where the payer acted fraudulently, the payer bears no financial consequence where the unauthorised transaction was carried out without the provider requiring the strong authentication of Article L. 133-44). And Article L. 133-44, I imposes that strong authentication "lorsque le payeur : 1° Accède à son compte de paiement en ligne ; 2° Initie une opération de paiement électronique" (when the payer accesses their online payment account or initiates an electronic payment transaction), with paragraph II adding a dynamic link between the transaction, its amount and its payee for remote electronic payments.

Taken together, the three French decisions and the Luxembourg ruling form a coherent map. Unauthorised means without genuine consent, and consent extracted by spoofing does not count. The bank must refund by the next business day and prove any gross negligence with concrete evidence, not with system logs alone. Gross negligence can still defeat the claim, but only where the bank demonstrates a precise breach, such as ignoring a documented warning describing the exact fraud method and repeating validations over several days. And where the bank itself failed to require strong authentication for a remote transaction, even proven gross negligence by the customer does not save it: it refunds, except in the narrow case of the customer’s own fraud. For completeness, where the unauthorised transaction follows the loss or theft of the instrument and is reported before the blocking notification, the customer’s exposure is capped: Article L. 133-19, I limits it to "un plafond de 50 €" (a ceiling of 50 euros), subject to stated exceptions.

B. The Exact Steps That Turn a Refusal Into Repayment in France

With the law clarified, the procedure is methodical, and each step creates the evidence the next one needs. The first hour matters most. Block the compromised instrument immediately through the bank’s dedicated blocking channel, because the 50-euro ceiling for lost or stolen instruments runs until the blocking notification, and because a prompt block demonstrates diligence that rebuts any later suggestion of negligence. Then dispute every transaction in writing, ideally by registered letter with acknowledgment of receipt and simultaneously by message through the online banking system, stating expressly that the operations were not authorised, identifying each debit by date and amount, and invoking the next-business-day refund duty of Article L. 133-18. Keep copies of everything, including screenshots of the fraudulent messages, the displayed caller number, and the exact wording of any validation screen, since the bank will later argue that its alerts were clear.

File a criminal complaint without waiting. In France, complaints for online fraud can be filed through the official online-reporting system for internet offences, in addition to a complaint at a police station or gendarmerie brigade, and the complaint receipt becomes a standard exhibit in the civil file. It also protects against the bank’s most damaging insinuation, namely that the customer was complicit: a prompt complaint filed before any dispute with the bank is powerful evidence of good faith. Note the related safeguard built into the statute: the bank’s only fast-track excuse for not refunding is a well-founded suspicion of fraud by the user personally, communicated in writing to the Banque de France, and a customer who has immediately filed a complaint and cooperated is poorly positioned as a fraud suspect.

If the bank maintains its refusal beyond the next business day, escalate in the order French practice expects. Send a formal complaint to the bank’s customer-complaints department, distinct from the branch adviser, restating the chronology and citing the 15 October 2026 Court of Justice ruling alongside Articles L. 133-18 and L. 133-23. If that complaint is rejected or left unanswered, seize the bank mediator, the independent ombudsman every French bank must offer for unresolved disputes, whose procedure is explained on the official service-public.fr page on recourse to the bank mediator and on the Ministry of the Economy’s consumer-rights page. Mediation is free, written, and produces a reasoned opinion that banks follow in a significant share of cases; even where it fails, the opinion frames the subsequent court action.

Before the judicial court, which has jurisdiction over such claims regardless of the amount at stake in consumer matters, the pleading structure follows directly from the authorities examined above. Open with the absence of authorisation, relying on the vitiated-consent analysis of the Nîmes judgment for spoofing cases and on the statutory definition of authorisation. Demand the immediate refund with the increased statutory interest for delay. Shift the burden expressly onto the bank under Article L. 133-23 and Article 72 of PSD2, and challenge it to produce evidence of a concrete breach of a defined security obligation rather than logs of code entries. Then neutralise the gross-negligence defence in advance: demonstrate diligence such as a single isolated solicitation, absence of any prior specific warning received, immediate complaint and cooperation, and, decisively wherever available, the absence of strong authentication for the remote transactions within the meaning of Article L. 133-44, which under the Cour de cassation’s 22 October 2025 ruling requires repayment even where negligence is shown. Conversely, prepare honestly for the bank’s strongest reply: if the file shows that the customer received, read and ignored a precise written warning describing the exact fraud method and then validated a series of transactions over several days, the Nîmes precedent shows the claim can fail, and in that configuration a negotiated settlement for part of the loss is often more realistic than a full trial.

A final comparative point helps English-speaking readers measure what France now offers. In the United Kingdom, the Payment Systems Regulator imposed from 7 October 2024 a mandatory reimbursement regime for authorised push-payment scams, under which victims are in principle refunded within five business days of their claim, up to a cap of 85,000 pounds per claim, as described on the regulator’s official consumer page. The British regime goes further in one respect, since it covers cases where the victim personally instructed the payment under manipulation, whereas the French and European framework analysed here turns on the absence of valid authorisation. But the direction of travel is the same on both sides of the Channel: regulators and courts have concluded that faster, more automatic repayment is the only response commensurate with industrial-scale social engineering, and the burden of prevention now rests primarily on payment firms rather than on isolated individuals. Victims in France should therefore treat a first refusal letter as the opening of the procedure, not its end.

Conclusion

The ruling of 15 October 2026 settles the question that decided most phishing files in France: a bank cannot refuse the immediate refund of an unauthorised transaction on the ground that the customer was grossly negligent. It must repay by the end of the next business day and restore the account, and only then may it attempt to prove, with concrete evidence, a fraud or a grossly negligent breach of a defined security obligation by the customer. French courts apply the same architecture: system logs alone prove nothing, naivety is not gross negligence, and where the bank failed to require strong authentication for a remote transaction, it refunds even against a negligent customer. The one durable exception is the customer who ignores a precise, received warning describing the exact fraud and repeats validations over several days. Anyone targeted in France should therefore block, dispute in writing immediately, complain to the police, escalate to the mediator, and plead the burden of proof exactly where the statutes place it. Handled in that order, and within the thirteen-month deadline, most refusal letters do not survive.

📄 Official circular