Search interest in Lindsay Clancy rose sharply this week as news outlets reported a Massachusetts court hearing about whether the Commonwealth will retry a homicide prosecution that ended without a verdict. Early reports describe a jury that could not agree, a mistrial, and defense arguments that a second trial should be barred. The discussion that follows is general in scope: it describes checks useful in comparable situations and makes no findings about Lindsay Clancy’s situation. Only a court deciding the actual case can determine what happened, who is responsible, and whether a retrial is lawful.
A hung jury raises two different legal questions that American readers often combine. The first is criminal: when the first trial ends in a mistrial because jurors deadlocked, does the Double Jeopardy Clause permit a second trial, and what does Massachusetts law add for homicide charges, including cases where mental health evidence is central? The second is civil: can a wrongful death lawsuit proceed in Massachusetts even when the criminal case produced no conviction, and what limits do courts enforce before any damages are paid? This guide answers both questions from primary sources: the controlling federal decisions on retrial after deadlock, the Massachusetts murder and wrongful death statutes, and the Massachusetts high court’s rulings on criminal responsibility and civil duty. A mistrial is a procedural event, not a finding of guilt or innocence, and a civil complaint contains allegations, not judicial findings.
I. Can Massachusetts retry a homicide case after a hung jury?
A. The federal baseline: a mistrial is not an acquittal
The starting point is federal, because the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution binds the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. Its text provides that no person shall “be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb;” as published in the official constitutional text at the Fifth Amendment (Constitution Annotated, Congress.gov). That single sentence produces two very different outcomes depending on how the first trial ended. A final acquittal bars any second trial for the same offense. A mistrial declared because the jury could not agree generally does not.
The Supreme Court of the United States drew that line clearly in Blueford v. Arkansas, 566 U.S. 599 (2012), decided May 24, 2012. The defendant faced capital murder, first-degree murder, manslaughter, and negligent homicide charges arising from a child’s head injury. During deliberations the foreperson reported that the jury was unanimous against guilt on capital and first-degree murder but deadlocked on manslaughter, and the court told the jury to keep deliberating. After further deliberation the jury announced it was hopelessly deadlocked, and the court declared a mistrial. The Court held that retrial was permitted, including on the greater offenses, because the foreperson’s interim report was not a final resolution of anything. In the Court’s words: “The Double Jeopardy Clause protects against being tried twice for the same offense. The Clause does not, however, bar a second trial if the first ended in a mistrial.” The opinion added that where “the trial court properly declared a mistrial and discharged the jury.” then “the Double Jeopardy Clause does not stand in the way of a second trial on the same offenses.” For a reader following a case that ended in deadlock, the practical consequence is direct: preliminary votes disclosed mid-deliberation do not equal an acquittal, and the prosecution may ordinarily seek a second trial on the same charges.
That reading was confirmed recently outside the Supreme Court. In State v. Spivey, 2024-Ohio-4492 (Court of Appeals of Ohio, September 12, 2024), the defendant appealed the denial of a motion to dismiss after a mistrial, arguing the record showed the jury had unanimously agreed to acquit on some counts. The Eighth District court applied Blueford and held that “a jury’s preliminary agreement on some counts is not tantamount to an acquittal for the purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause.” citing 566 U.S. at 606, and affirmed the trial court’s order so the retrial could proceed. Spivey comes from an Ohio intermediate court, so it binds no Massachusetts judge, but it shows how courts outside the Supreme Court apply Blueford to the exact argument a defense team raises after deadlock: that interim agreement should count as an acquittal. The answer remains no unless the record shows a final, formal verdict of acquittal.
A companion Supreme Court decision answers the related question of what an acquittal actually settles. In Yeager v. United States, 557 U.S. 110 (2009), decided June 18, 2009, by the Supreme Court of the United States, the jury acquitted the defendant on fraud counts but hung on insider trading counts, the court entered judgment on the acquittals and declared a mistrial on the hung counts, and the government reindicted on the hung counts. The Court framed the issue this way: “The question presented in this case is whether an apparent inconsistency between a jury’s verdict of acquittal on some counts and its failure to return a verdict on other counts affects the preclusive force of the acquittals under the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment. We hold that it does not.” The judgment was reversed and remanded. In plain terms, hung counts drop out of the analysis: only what the jury necessarily decided by acquitting can block specific issues at a second trial, and a party asserting that block faces what the case law calls a demanding standard.
A recent federal application gives the Yeager test practical shape. In United States v. Cole, No. 23-7566 (2d Cir., October 27, 2025), the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit asked “whether the first jury’s verdict acquitting Cole of conspiracy […] factual questions that were essential to the government’s case against Cole at the second trial” explaining that “If so, the Double Jeopardy Clause’s […] function should have prohibited Cole’s retrial” citing Yeager, 557 U.S. at 119. On the facts there the court concluded the conspiracy acquittal had rejected the government’s theory, so “the Double Jeopardy Clause barred Cole’s retrial, and his convictions must be reversed.” Cole is a 2025 decision from one federal circuit, so it does not control Massachusetts state courts, yet it demonstrates the check that matters after a mixed verdict: compare each count of the planned second trial against what the first jury necessarily decided, and discard only the issues the acquittal truly resolved.
A 2024 federal order shows how courts handle a Yeager argument raised outside a direct appeal. In In re Gary R. Thompson, Jr., No. 24-6051 (10th Cir. Apr. 4, 2024), decided April 4, 2024, by the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, an Oklahoma prisoner sought authorization to file a successive habeas application invoking the Yeager line of authority. The court explained that when a jury acquits on one count and hangs on another, retrial on the hung count is barred only if the government must prove something the jury likely decided against it, and it treated the cited passage as background from Bravo-Fernandez summarizing Yeager v. United States, 557 U.S. 110, 121-22 (2009). The court then stated: “We could liberally construe Thompson’s motion to be relying on Yeager, rather than Bravo-Fernandez, but he does not meet the authorization standard either way.” Thompson comes from a federal circuit in a successive-petition posture, so it does not control Massachusetts trial courts, but it confirms the limited office of the Yeager test: it screens specific issues the first jury necessarily decided, and it does not supply a general second-trial bar.
One more federal precedent governs how judges declare the mistrial itself. In Renico v. Lett, 559 U.S. 766 (2010), decided May 3, 2010, by the Supreme Court of the United States, the Supreme Court reviewed a Michigan murder case in which the trial judge declared a mistrial after the jury reported deadlock, and the defendant argued the mistrial lacked manifest necessity. The Court reversed the grant of habeas relief, holding that “Because we conclude that the Michigan Supreme Court’s application of federal law was not unreasonable, we reverse.” and reiterated that “[…] decision whether to grant a mistrial is reserved to the […] of the trial judge” The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts applied that framework to a Massachusetts deadlock case in the habeas order in Read v. Norfolk County Superior Court, No. 25-cv-10399 (D. Mass., March 13, 2025), concerning petitioner Karen Read, who was tried beginning April 16, 2024, and whose trial ended when “after the jury reported that it was deadlocked, the trial judge declared a mistrial” on July 1, 2024. The order recites that “[…] mistrial premised upon the trial judge’s belief that the jury is unable to reach a verdict […] long considered the classic basis for a proper mistrial” citing Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 509 (1978), along with Renico and Blueford, and denied the habeas petition. The order binds only its parties, but its reasoning maps the exact sequence a Massachusetts reader should watch for: deadlock finding, mistrial order, motion to dismiss on double jeopardy grounds, state appellate review, and only then a federal challenge.
A 2026 federal report applying habeas law in an Ohio case shows Renico’s continued use as the measure for deadlock mistrials. In Petition of Matthew B. Alexander, No. 4:25-cv-00770 (N.D. Ohio Sept. 25, 2026), a report and recommendation dated September 25, 2026, by the United States District Court, Northern District of Ohio, through Magistrate Judge Jonathan D. Greenberg, addressed a state prisoner’s habeas petition. The report stated: “Clearly established federal law is to be determined by the holdings (as opposed to the dicta) of the United States Supreme Court.” citing Parker v. Matthews, Renico v Lett, 559 U.S. 766, 130 S.Ct. 1855, 1865-1866 (2010), and Williams v. Taylor among the governing holdings. The report recommended that the petition be denied. A magistrate judge’s recommendation is not a final judgment and binds no Massachusetts court, but the passage records the uncontroversial point on which a deadlock retrial question turns: deadlock-mistrial review runs through the holdings described in Renico, not through commentary about them.
B. What Massachusetts law adds to the retrial question
Massachusetts defines the underlying homicide offense by statute, and the statute matters because the jury, not the judge, fixes the degree. Section 1 of chapter 265 of the Massachusetts General Laws, published on the legislature’s official site, provides: “Murder committed with deliberately premeditated malice aforethought, or with extreme atrocity or cruelty, or in the commission or attempted commission of a crime punishable with death or imprisonment for life, is murder in the first degree. Murder which does not appear to be in the first degree is murder in the second degree.” The same section adds that “The degree of murder shall be found by the jury.” That allocation explains why deadlock often centers on degree or on lesser included offenses: twelve jurors must agree not only that an unlawful killing occurred but on the mental state and circumstances that fix first-degree murder, and disagreement on those points can hang the case even when the underlying death is undisputed.
Massachusetts also has its own long-standing doctrine for cases in which the defense is lack of criminal responsibility. In Commonwealth v. McHoul, 226 N.E.2d 556, 352 Mass. 544 (1967), decided May 16, 1967, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, the Commonwealth’s highest court, addressed the test for criminal responsibility after the trial judge admitted expert testimony framed only in terms of the older single cognitive test. McHoul states the historic formulation of the Massachusetts test; later decisions restate and apply it, so any current charging or instructional question must be checked against the present pattern instructions and the latest Supreme Judicial Court guidance rather than against McHoul alone. The court restated the governing definition this way: “A person is not responsible for crimi[…]nal conduct if at the time of such conduct as a result of mental disease or defect he lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate the criminality […] of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law.” The bracketed word reflects the opinion’s own usage. McHoul therefore gives Massachusetts readers the two questions that define the defense: substantial capacity to appreciate wrongfulness, and substantial capacity to conform conduct to the law, each assessed at the time of the conduct and caused by mental disease or defect. Where expert evidence conflicts on either question, unanimity can be difficult, which is one reason mental-health-centered homicide trials sometimes end with a hung jury rather than a verdict.
The current application of that standard appears in Commonwealth v. Sanders, No. SJC-13552 (Mass., August 6, 2026), a decision of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court issued August 6, 2026. The sole issue before the jury had been whether the defendant lacked criminal responsibility, and the jury convicted on two counts of murder in the first degree on theories of deliberate premeditation and extreme atrocity or cruelty. On appeal the court reviewed the criminal-responsibility instruction, which told the jury the Commonwealth must prove the defendant did not lack “substantial capacity either to appreciate the criminality or wrongfulness of her conduct or to conform her […] conduct to the requirements of the law” citing McHoul, 352 Mass. at 546. Sanders shows the modern shape of the doctrine in practice: the Commonwealth bears the burden once the defense is raised, the judge instructs in McHoul’s dual terms, and appellate review examines whether evidentiary or instructional rulings impaired the defense. For a reader comparing any Massachusetts homicide case that turned on mental-health evidence, the concrete check is the written charge: did the instruction state both prongs, capacity to appreciate wrongfulness and capacity to conform conduct, rather than a single knowledge-only test.
Pulling these threads together, a Massachusetts retrial analysis runs in a fixed order. First, identify how the first trial ended for each count: final acquittal entered as a judgment, conviction, or mistrial after deadlock. Under Blueford, only a final acquittal triggers the double-jeopardy bar; interim reports of agreement do not. Second, for any acquitted count, apply the Yeager question to each issue the prosecution wants to relitigate: did the first jury necessarily decide that fact in the defendant’s favor. Third, examine the mistrial order itself under the Renico standard: whether the judge found genuine deadlock, considered the circumstances, and acted within the broad discretion trial judges hold over deadlocked juries, with the Read order illustrating how Massachusetts deadlock cases move through state appeal before any federal review. Fourth, for homicide charges, confirm the degree theory the Commonwealth pursues on retrial under chapter 265, section 1, and whether the criminal-responsibility instruction will again be the center of the case under McHoul and Sanders. Each step depends on documents, not assumptions: the docket entries showing which counts produced verdicts, the transcript of the deadlock colloquy, the written mistrial declaration, and the final judgments entered, if any. No commentary, however detailed, can substitute for those entries, and only the court in the actual case can rule on them.
II. Can a wrongful death case follow when a criminal case ends without a verdict?
A. Who may sue and what the statute allows
The criminal and civil systems answer different questions under different burdens, so a hung jury in the criminal case does not decide the civil case in either direction. An acquittal, a conviction, or a mistrial reflects what happened under the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard in that prosecution. A wrongful death action asks instead whether a preponderance of the evidence shows that negligence or willful, wanton, or reckless conduct caused a death, and it is filed by the persons the statute designates. Either side’s outcome in one forum therefore leaves the other forum’s question open, and families sometimes file civil claims while a prosecution is still pending or after it ends without a verdict.
Massachusetts answers the who and what of those claims in a single provision. Section 2 of chapter 229 of the Massachusetts General Laws, on the legislature’s official site, begins: “A person who (1) by his negligence causes the death of a person, or (2) by willful, wanton or reckless act causes the death of a person under such circumstances that the deceased could have recovered damages for personal injuries if his death had not resulted,” and continues through common-carrier and warranty cases, “shall be liable in damages.” The recoverable damages, as the section states them, are “(1) the fair monetary value of the decedent to the persons entitled to receive the damages recovered, as provided in section one, including but not limited to compensation for the loss of the reasonably expected net income, services, protection, care, assistance, society, companionship, comfort, guidance, counsel, and advice of the decedent to the persons entitled to the damages recovered; (2) the reasonable funeral and burial expenses of the decedent; (3) punitive damages in an amount of not less than five thousand dollars in such case as the decedent’s death was caused by the malicious, willful, wanton or reckless conduct of the defendant or by the gross negligence of the defendant; […]” Three features deserve attention. First, the statute reaches both negligence and aggravated fault, with punitive damages reserved for the aggravated tier and a stated floor of five thousand dollars. Second, recovery runs to the persons entitled under section one, not to whoever files first, so identifying the statutory beneficiaries is a threshold step. Third, the section carves out categories it does not govern, including employer liability to a person in the employer’s employment, which the statute expressly leaves to other law, along with railroad and street-railway situations the section addresses separately.
The same section makes one point that surprises non-lawyers: the defendant in the civil case is whoever the evidence shows caused the death under one of the listed theories, and that person need not be the defendant in any criminal prosecution. A civil complaint may name private parties, institutions, or professionals whose alleged conduct contributed to the death, and each must be evaluated on the evidence against that party, not on the criminal docket. Because a complaint contains allegations rather than findings, the filing of a civil case proves nothing about responsibility; it opens a process in which each element, duty, breach, causation, and damages, must be proved. Signed contracts, treatment records, employment files, and insurance policies govern the actual relationships among the people and entities involved, and only a court applying the statute to admitted evidence can fix liability and amounts.
B. The limits courts enforce before damages change hands
Massachusetts courts enforce a demanding threshold before any wrongful death claim reaches a jury: the plaintiff must establish that the defendant owed a duty to the decedent. Duty is a question of law for the court, and courts have been cautious about extending it, particularly where the claim asks one party to have prevented another person’s act. In Nguyen v. Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 96 N.E.3d 128, 479 Mass. 436 (2018), decided May 7, 2018, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court reviewed claims arising from a student’s suicide and held that the university defendants were entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The court’s reasoning acknowledged that “in certain circumstances not present here, a special relationship and a corresponding duty to take reasonable measures to prevent suicide may be created between a university and its student,” while affirming summary judgment on the record before it. The holding therefore cuts in both directions, and that is precisely its practical value: a special relationship capable of supporting a duty to prevent self-harm exists only in defined circumstances, and the plaintiff must show the case fits them rather than assuming that any institutional connection suffices.
A 2026 federal decision applying Massachusetts law shows how courts test that fit on current facts. In M.C. v. Curriculum Associates, LLC, No. 25-13942 (D. Mass. Sept. 30, 2026), decided September 30, 2026, a putative class action over alleged collection and sharing of schoolchildren’s information, the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts discussed duty in the school context and cited Dzung Duy Nguyen v. Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 479 Mass. 436, 453 (2018), alongside Helfman v. Northeastern University, for the proposition that “universities and students have a special relationship giving rise to a duty to prevent suicide and serious harm resulting from intoxication, for example.” The court then analyzed the different duty theory actually pleaded, illustrating the discipline Nguyen requires: identify the exact relationship, the exact harm, and the exact precedent recognizing a duty between those parties for that harm, rather than invoking a general obligation to keep people safe. For families evaluating a wrongful death claim connected to a homicide prosecution, the parallel check is to ask which defendant owed which duty to the decedent directly, under what recognized relationship, and what Massachusetts authority establishes it, because claims that skip that step commonly end at summary judgment or on a motion to dismiss.
Two further limits shape expectations. The first is that criminal and civil findings do not transfer. A criminal conviction does not automatically establish civil liability, since the civil plaintiff must still prove each statutory element, and a criminal mistrial or acquittal does not extinguish a civil claim, since the civil burden is lower and the parties may differ. What one proceeding can contribute to the other is evidence: testimony, documents, and admissions developed in one forum may be usable in the other under the applicable evidence rules, but each tribunal decides what they prove. The second limit is practical and financial. Wrongful death damages under chapter 229 compensate the statutory beneficiaries for the decedent’s fair monetary value plus funeral expenses, with punitive damages available only on the aggravated showing the statute describes. Collecting any judgment depends on the defendant’s assets and applicable insurance, and claims against employers, public entities, or professionals face additional statutes and immunities the general wrongful death section does not displace. A careful early review therefore examines the correct defendants, the recognized duty for each, the evidence of breach and causation, the governing filing periods, and the realistic sources of recovery, before weighing the cost and burden of litigation. Filing periods and procedural requirements change, so the applicable dates must be taken from the current statute and the docket of the court where filing is contemplated, not from summaries.
Conclusion
A hung jury in a Massachusetts homicide prosecution ordinarily permits a retrial: federal double-jeopardy law treats a deadlock mistrial as a non-event rather than an acquittal, allows reprosecution on the same charges, reserves only what an acquittal necessarily decided, and leaves the mistrial decision to the trial judge’s broad discretion, with Massachusetts courts applying those principles alongside the murder-degree statute and the McHoul criminal-responsibility test. Separately, a wrongful death action may proceed under chapter 229 regardless of the criminal outcome, but only for the statutory beneficiaries, only against defendants shown to have owed and breached a recognized duty, and only for the categories of damages the statute authorizes. Anyone facing either situation should read the actual docket entries, the written mistrial order, the jury instructions given, and the current text of the cited statutes, and should measure every option against what those documents say rather than against what the last headline seemed to imply.