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New York City ban on kettling: what rights do protesters have if police trap them?

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New York City ban on kettling: what rights do protesters have if police trap them?

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On November 16, 2026, Mayor Zohran Kwame Mamdani and Police Commissioner Jessica Tisch announced that the New York City Police Department’s Strategic Response Group is being disbanded. According to the City’s official release dated November 16, 2026, the reforms create new dialogue and patrol units and set new limits on crowd-control tactics, “including a formal prohibition on kettling, long guns and tear gas.” Kettling is the tactic of surrounding a crowd so that nobody can walk away, often as a prelude to mass arrests. That is why people are now searching for the “New York City ban on kettling” and asking a practical question: if officers close a ring around me at a protest, what are my rights?

The short answer for New York City is this. Since a 2023 federal court settlement, the NYPD may encircle only the specific people it has individualized probable cause to arrest, and anyone else caught inside must be allowed to leave. The November 16 announcement says it “codifies” that ban. Above that local rule sits federal constitutional law: federal appeals courts have refused immunity to officers who trapped and arrested an undifferentiated crowd without particularized probable cause, while also giving officers room when a group acts together against a police line, and protecting them through qualified immunity when the law was not clear. What follows explains the rules and the checks that matter in comparable situations; it makes no findings about any particular officer, protest or past incident.

I. Is kettling now illegal in New York City, and where does the rule come from?

A. What the November 16, 2026 directive and the 2023 settlement actually say

The November 16 release describes four structural changes. It creates a civilian-led Community Dialogue and De-escalation Division within the Mayor’s Office of Community Safety, which, according to the release, will not have weapons or arrest powers. It creates a First Amendment Support Team of 30 uniformed officers within the NYPD’s Community Affairs Bureau, trained in communication and de-escalation. It moves crowd-management work to a new Patrol Support Division inside the Patrol Services Bureau, whose officers will “conduct arrests at protests in rare instances, if necessary,” in the release’s words. And it consolidates the former unit’s counterterrorism functions, including heavy weapons deployments at critical infrastructure, inside the NYPD’s Intelligence and Counterterrorism Bureau. On tactics, the release states that the reforms codify the ban on kettling, prohibit long guns and tear gas during First Amendment activities, limit long-range acoustic devices to 90 decibels, and provide that pepper spray will not be used as a general crowd-management device. The release also says the new structure builds “on the reforms agreed to in the Payne protest settlement.”

That reference matters, because the kettling ban did not begin on November 16. On September 5, 2023, the parties to the consolidated federal cases known as In re New York City Policing During Summer 2020 Demonstrations, No. 20 Civ. 8924 (CM)(GWG), in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York, filed a joint motion asking the court to dismiss the remaining injunctive claims and to retain jurisdiction to enforce a stipulated agreement. The New York Attorney General’s release of September 5, 2023 explains that the agreement resolved lawsuits brought by the Attorney General, The Legal Aid Society, the New York Civil Liberties Union and private plaintiffs over the policing of the 2020 protests. The release describes those claims; a settlement of this kind is not a judicial finding that any particular arrest was unlawful.

The operative text is paragraph 68 of the stipulated agreement filed with the court. It provides that encirclement, when used as an arrest circle, cannot be used except to arrest one or more specific individuals on individualized probable cause. It then defines the forbidden practice: “Enclosing individuals with an intent to take police action against them without having individualized probable cause is what the Plaintiffs have defined as “kettling.”” The next sentence is short and unconditional: the NYPD shall not engage in such a tactic. The Attorney General’s summary puts the same rule in plain terms: “The NYPD can only encircle an individual or individuals within a crowd who are the target of a particular arrest.” If other people are inadvertently or mistakenly encircled, they must be allowed to exit immediately, and officers must help them do so.

The 2023 agreement also changed what must happen before police can clear a protest at all. According to the Attorney General’s release, the NYPD now works under a four-tier response system. Officers may move to the third tier only if there is individualized probable cause for an arrest, and arrests for certain lower-level offenses must be authorized by an officer holding at least the rank of captain. Dispersal belongs to the fourth tier, which the release limits to situations such as attempts to enter or block a sensitive location like a hospital, or widespread criminal conduct that targeted arrests cannot address. Even then, the release states: “Dispersal orders must be audible to the entire crowd, clearly identify exit points, and whenever possible, direct protesters to where they may continue to lawfully protest.” The NYPD must also document the specific basis for a decision to disperse.

Two features of the November 16 announcement deserve precision. First, the release presents the kettling ban as part of reforms announced by the mayor and the police commissioner; it does not say that the City Council has passed a law. A bill on the same subject does exist. Int. No. 796-2026, introduced by Council Member Chi Ossé on March 26, 2026 and referred to the Committee on Public Safety, would add a new section 14-198 to the city’s Administrative Code. The Council’s legislative record lists its status as “Committee,” with no enactment date and no law number, so it is a proposal, not law. The mayor’s statement in the release says the reforms “accomplish the key changes called for by Councilmember Chi Ossé’s CURB Act — a bill I am proud to support.”

Second, the definitions differ. The 2023 agreement targets enclosure “with an intent to take police action” without individualized probable cause. The bill, if enacted as introduced, would go further and treat as kettling any tactic in which officers “physically surround, encircle, or otherwise contain members of the public, removing meaningful routes of egress from crowded locations.” Under the bill’s broader wording, the question would be whether people still had a real way out; under the 2023 agreement, the question is whether police had individualized probable cause for the people they enclosed. For anyone reading coverage of the announcement, the practical point is that the rule in force today comes from the 2023 agreement and the reforms announced on November 16, and that a broader definition would apply only if the bill is enacted as written.

B. What the Constitution already forbids: trapping a crowd without particularized probable cause

Even without any settlement or city policy, the federal Constitution limits kettling. The Fourth Amendment protects “the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.” Courts treat the moment officers close a ring around you as the start of a seizure. From there, the legal question is whether police had a sufficient basis to hold and arrest each person inside the ring.

The clearest kettling decision comes from St. Louis. In Baude v. Leyshock, 23 F.4th 1065 (8th Cir. 2022), decided on January 27, 2022, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed an interlocutory appeal from officers sued over a September 17, 2017 operation. According to the allegations the court accepted as true at that early stage, officers formed perimeter lines around an intersection, refused requests by residents, protesters and passersby to leave, and then arrested more than 100 people. The court wrote that “When a person is surrounded by officers on all sides, he would reasonably believe that he is no longer free to leave and that he has been seized.” It then held that the officers’ assertion that some people had broken the law earlier and that many were refusing to disperse was not enough to establish, as a matter of law, a lawbreaking unit that could justify a mass arrest, and it affirmed the denial of qualified immunity. For a protester, the application is direct: being boxed in is itself a seizure, so the question becomes whether police had a lawful basis to hold you, not whether anyone had yet said the words “you are under arrest.”

Baude also addressed the officers who carry out such orders. The Eighth Circuit wrote that subordinate officers “cannot escape liability when they blindly follow orders,” while recognizing that an assisting officer may rely on a commander’s probable cause determination as long as the reliance is reasonable. That point keeps being cited. On April 15, 2024, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, in Perez v. City of Fresno, No. 22-15546, cited Baude v. Leyshock, 23 F.4th 1065, 1074 (8th Cir. 2022), for “the general principle that subordinate officers cannot simply defer to unlawful orders by their superiors,” before concluding that the principle did not resolve the medical-restraint case in front of it. In a kettling dispute, that line of authority means individual officers on the line remain answerable for whether their reliance on the order was reasonable.

The leading mass-arrest decision is older but still cited. In Barham v. Ramsey, 434 F.3d 565 (D.C. Cir. 2006), decided on January 13, 2006, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit reviewed the September 27, 2002 sealing of Pershing Park in Washington, D.C., where police arrested 386 people without first ordering anyone to disperse. The court affirmed the denial of qualified immunity to the official who ordered the arrests, because nothing in the record showed particularized probable cause for each person in the park, and it summarized its own case law this way: “when compelling circumstances are present, the police may be justified in detaining an undifferentiated crowd of protestors, but only after providing a lawful order to disperse followed by a reasonable opportunity to comply with that order.” Applied to a New York protest, the sequence is the test: a clear dispersal order and a real chance to leave come first, and a sweep of everyone present without them is the scenario Barham condemned. Barham binds federal courts in the District of Columbia, not New York, but other circuits have discussed it, including the Eighth Circuit in Bernini, described below.

Barham’s framework remains in use in its own circuit. On August 11, 2026, in Fishman v. District of Columbia, No. 25-7050, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit cited Barham v. Ramsey, 434 F.3d 565, 572 (D.C. Cir. 2006), for the standard that a right is clearly established only when its contours are sufficiently definite, and then held that officers who detained a father for about twenty-five minutes during a child-abuse investigation were entitled to qualified immunity. Fishman is not a protest case, but the citation shows how the same “clearly established” test that defeated immunity in Barham can protect officers when no earlier decision squarely covers the facts.

Police do have a counterargument, and it has prevailed on the right facts. In Bernini v. City of St. Paul, 665 F.3d 997 (8th Cir. 2012), decided on January 13, 2012, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit upheld qualified immunity for officers who encircled roughly 400 people in a park on the first day of the 2008 Republican National Convention in St. Paul, Minnesota. Relying on a D.C. Circuit decision, the court accepted that the Fourth Amendment can be satisfied when officers have grounds to believe that every arrested person was part of the group seen breaking the law. Video showed a group that had lined up across from a police line, many members wearing gas masks, with part of it advancing toward the officers; afterward, the officers sorted the crowd and released about 200 people. The application for protesters is a warning: the unit theory gives police room when a group acts together against a police line, and the best evidence that you were not part of that unit is where you were, when you arrived and what you did.

Courts continue to read Bernini narrowly. On September 30, 2026, in United States v. Party for Socialism and Liberation New Jersey, No. 25-cv-16049, the United States District Court, District of New Jersey, cited Bernini v. City of St. Paul, 665 F.3d 997, 1006 (8th Cir. 2012), and explained that it “addressed the reasonableness of officers’ use of force under the Fourth Amendment in response to a crowd that intended to penetrate a police line.” The court declined to turn that ruling into a broader statutory rule about demonstrators. Read alongside Baude, which refused to let officers justify the arrest of a whole crowd by pointing to the unlawful acts of a small group, Bernini is best understood as a fact-bound ruling about a group that confronted a police line, not a general license to arrest everyone nearby.

II. If police box you in at a protest, what should you do, and what can you claim afterward?

A. During the encirclement: dispersal orders, disorderly conduct and qualified immunity

The offense most often charged at New York protests is disorderly conduct. Under New York Penal Law § 240.20, a person commits disorderly conduct when, with intent to cause public inconvenience, annoyance or alarm, or recklessly creating a risk of it, he or she does any of several things, including obstructing vehicular or pedestrian traffic, or congregating with other persons in a public place and refusing “to comply with a lawful order of the police to disperse.” The same section states that disorderly conduct is a violation. Two consequences follow for anyone inside a police line. A dispersal order matters only if it is lawful and you actually had the chance to comply. And obstructing traffic in a roadway, with the intent or recklessness the statute requires, can supply the basis for an arrest under the traffic-obstruction subsection even if a dispersal order never reached you, as the Brooklyn Bridge case below illustrates.

The New York case every protester should know cuts against the marchers. In Garcia v. Does, 779 F.3d 84 (2d Cir. 2015), in an amended opinion dated February 23, 2015, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit ordered dismissal of false-arrest claims brought by Occupy Wall Street marchers who were among more than seven hundred people arrested on the Brooklyn Bridge roadway on October 1, 2011. The marchers alleged that officers had led them onto the roadway. The court held that, on the complaint and the videos, the officers’ retreat onto the bridge was at most ambiguous, that the officers had probable cause on the elements of disorderly conduct under Penal Law § 240.20(5), and that no clearly established law required them to credit an implied-permission defense. It stated the governing test: “Arguable probable cause exists if either (a) it was objectively reasonable for the officer to believe that probable cause existed, or (b) officers of reasonable competence could disagree on whether the probable cause test was met.” The lesson for New York protesters is concrete: an implied-permission argument based on ambiguous police conduct did not overcome qualified immunity in Garcia, so the safer course is to rely only on explicit instructions and to leave a roadway when told.

Garcia also shapes how quickly these lawsuits can end. On July 17, 2025, in Nat’l Rifle Ass’n of Am. v. Vullo, No. 21-0636-cv, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit cited Garcia v. Does, 779 F.3d 84, 97 (2d Cir. 2015), for the point that qualified immunity can be established by the facts alleged in a complaint and should be resolved, when possible, on a motion to dismiss. The court then reversed the denial of qualified immunity to a former state official in that First Amendment case. For a protester who later sues, the practical consequence is that the complaint itself must lay out specific facts, such as where you were standing, what orders were audible and whether any exit existed, because a vague pleading can end the case before any evidence is exchanged.

Put together, the cases and the New York rules suggest a short list of things to do and to notice while a line is closing. If you hear an order to disperse, follow it and move toward the exit police identify; under the 2023 agreement described by the Attorney General, dispersal orders must be audible to the entire crowd and must identify exit points. If you were not the target of an arrest and find yourself inside a ring, say clearly that you want to leave and ask an officer where to exit, because the agreement requires officers to let inadvertently encircled people out and to help them do so. Do not push through a police line: in Bernini, movement toward officers was part of what made the group look like a single unit. Note the time, the street corners and any announcement you heard or did not hear, since Baude turned in part on unresolved questions about who heard which declarations.

Recording is part of that list. According to the Attorney General’s release, the agreement requires the NYPD to update its training and Administrative Guide “to explicitly acknowledge that there is a clearly established right under the First Amendment to record police activity in public,” and it states that the NYPD cannot arrest a member of the press or public “solely for observing or recording police activity in a public place.” Recording from a lawful position, without interfering, preserves the facts that later decide whether an exit existed and whether an order was audible. If a Mass Arrest Processing Center is set up, the release states that people held there must receive clean water, food if held for more than two hours, personal protective equipment, prompt access to telephones, adequate medical care and restrooms. If you are released with a summons or a court date, keep every document; according to the allegations described in Baude, the plaintiff was held for fourteen hours and released with a court date that was later cancelled, and papers of that kind become evidence of what happened.

B. After the arrest: damages claims, deadlines and who can enforce the ban

The federal route for damages is 42 U.S.C. § 1983. It provides that every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage of any State, subjects or causes any person to be subjected to the deprivation of rights secured by the Constitution and laws “shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.” A person seized inside a kettle without probable cause can therefore sue the officers involved for an unreasonable seizure, and in some cases for excessive force, which is what the plaintiffs did in Baude and Barham.

Two defenses shape almost every such case. The first is qualified immunity for individual officers, which turns on whether the right was clearly established when the officers acted. Barham and Baude show that a mass arrest without particularized probable cause can defeat immunity; Garcia shows that officers who had at least arguable probable cause for a specific offense will usually keep it. The second is the separate standard for suing the City. In Bernini, the Eighth Circuit explained that a municipality can be liable under § 1983 when “action pursuant to official municipal policy of some nature caused a constitutional tort,” but it rejected the claim against St. Paul because the plaintiffs had not identified any provision of state or municipal law giving the field commander final policymaking authority. In Garcia, the Second Circuit noted that the district court had dismissed claims against the City of New York because the plaintiffs had not plausibly alleged a policy, practice or custom of trapping and arresting peaceful protesters. A claim against a city needs specific facts about policy, training or decisions made at the top, not just the conduct of officers on the street.

For state-law tort claims against the City, New York’s notice-of-claim rules are strict. General Municipal Law § 50-e provides that, in any case founded upon tort where a notice of claim is required by law as a condition precedent to suing a public corporation or its officers, the notice must be served “within ninety days after the claim arises.” The notice must be in writing and sworn, and it must state the claimant’s name and address, the nature of the claim, the time, place and manner in which it arose, and the damages or injuries claimed so far as then practicable. In a city of over one million people, the section allows service by electronic means in the form the city prescribes. If the ninety days have passed, the same section allows the court, in its discretion, to extend the time; the court must consider in particular whether the public corporation acquired actual knowledge of the essential facts within the ninety days or a reasonable time afterward, and whether the delay substantially prejudiced its defense.

General Municipal Law § 50-i then sets the timetable for suing a city for personal injury or property damage caused by the negligence or wrongful act of the city or its officers or employees: a notice of claim must have been served under § 50-e, at least thirty days must have passed since service without adjustment or payment, and the action must be commenced “within one year and ninety days after the happening of the event upon which the claim is based.” Those two sections govern state-law claims within their terms; they do not themselves set the deadline for a federal § 1983 claim, which is a separate question to confirm early with a lawyer rather than assume.

Many readers also want to know whether they can enforce the new ban themselves. The November 16 release describes new units and new restrictions on tactics; it does not describe any new right for individuals to sue when those restrictions are violated. The 2023 agreement has its own enforcement structure. According to the Attorney General’s release, an oversight committee that includes the Attorney General’s office, the Department of Investigation, the City’s Corporation Counsel, the NYPD’s senior executive for First Amendment activity and representatives of the plaintiffs monitors implementation over several years, and in the final phase the court retains jurisdiction for an additional 12 months, during which the Attorney General or the other plaintiffs may bring a violation back to court. The release does not describe a route for people who were not parties to that case to enforce the agreement directly, and any claim for personal damages still rests on the Fourth Amendment, § 1983 and state tort law.

A settlement paragraph or a department directive can still help an individual case. The agreement’s description of what officers must do, such as releasing people who were mistakenly encircled and giving audible dispersal orders with identified exits, gives a concrete benchmark for describing what happened. Barham made a related point about the police department’s own mass-demonstration manual: it treated the manual, framed as a response to court-ordered prescriptions, as further proof that the rights at stake were clearly established, while noting that an internal procedure standing alone might not be enough to defeat an officer’s qualified immunity.

Conclusion

The New York City ban on kettling is real, but it is older and more specific than the word “ban” may suggest. Since the stipulated agreement filed on September 5, 2023, the NYPD may encircle only people it has individualized probable cause to arrest and must let everyone else out, and the reforms announced on November 16, 2026 restate that ban alongside new units and new limits on tear gas, long guns, pepper spray and acoustic devices. The CURB Act would write a broader definition into city law, but it remains a bill in committee. Beneath all of this, the Fourth Amendment already limits the indiscriminate arrest of everyone inside a police perimeter, as Barham held and as Baude confirmed at the pleading stage, while Bernini and Garcia show how officers win when a group confronts a police line or when they had at least arguable probable cause for an offense such as blocking traffic. If you are ever inside a closing line, the decisive facts are simple and worth recording: whether an audible order was given, whether an exit existed, whether you asked to leave, and what you were doing when the ring closed. If you were arrested, the ninety-day notice-of-claim rule for state-law claims against the City is the first deadline to check.

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