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Supreme Court Leaves UC Research Grant Ruling in Place: Where Can Researchers Challenge a Terminated Federal Grant?

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Sources: U.S. court opinions and official U.S. government publications, read for this article

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Supreme Court Leaves UC Research Grant Ruling in Place: Where Can Researchers Challenge a Terminated Federal Grant?

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On Monday, November 16, 2026, the Supreme Court of the United States released an order list that placed No. 26-210, Trump v. Thakur, under the heading “Certiorari Denied,” and no Justice noted a dissent. That single line explains why “supreme court” jumped in U.S. searches this afternoon. The federal government had asked the Justices to review Thakur v. Trump, No. 25-4249 (9th Cir. May 26, 2026), a decision about research grants held by University of California researchers, and the answer was no: certiorari denied on November 16, 2026, so the appeals court’s decision stays in place and the case goes on in the trial court. The Ninth Circuit had kept an order requiring three agencies to reinstate grants that, in its view, were terminated because of the recipients’ perceived expression of diversity, equity and inclusion viewpoints, while reversing the same order for a second group of researchers whose challenge rested on form termination letters and the Administrative Procedure Act. The discussion that follows is general in scope: it describes checks useful in comparable situations and makes no findings about the situation of any researcher, university or agency involved in that litigation. It explains what a denial of certiorari does and does not do, then answers the practical question behind the headlines for anyone who holds a federal research award: when a grant is terminated, which court can hear the challenge, what the federal grant rules require in the termination notice, and which kinds of claims can still bring the funding back.

I. What did the Supreme Court decide on November 16, 2026, and what did it leave in place?

A. A denial of certiorari ends the government’s request for review without a written decision

The official order list for November 16, 2026 lists No. 26-210 among the many cases under the heading “Certiorari Denied.” The Supreme Court’s docket for No. 26-210 shows how the case got there. The government’s petition was filed on August 18, 2026. After an extension of the time to respond, the researchers filed their brief in opposition on October 19, 2026. The government’s reply was filed on October 27, 2026, and the case was distributed for the Justices’ conference of November 13, 2026. The docket entry for November 16, 2026 reads “Petition DENIED.” The order gives no reasons. On the same order list, individual Justices wrote separately in other cases, including a dissent from the denial of review in a different First Amendment dispute, but nothing of the kind appears next to No. 26-210.

What the government asked the Court to decide matters for reading the denial correctly. According to the government’s petition for a writ of certiorari, the single question presented was whether the First Amendment prohibits the government from considering the viewpoints furthered by academic research projects when it decides whether to grant or terminate funding for those projects through competitive grant programs. The petition argued that the Ninth Circuit’s ruling conflicts with Supreme Court precedent on government subsidies. It also described the stakes in concrete terms: when terminated, the National Science Foundation and National Endowment for the Humanities grants at issue “had approximately $59 million remaining on them, with expiration dates as late as November 2029.” The same petition reports that the researchers had reached a settlement in principle of their claims with the Environmental Protection Agency, but not with the other two agencies, and that the government’s appeal of a later injunction covering grants from other departments was being held in abeyance in the Ninth Circuit under No. 25-7342. Those are the government’s own descriptions of the litigation, filed in August 2026, not findings by any court.

The Court’s own rules explain why a denial is not a ruling on that question. Under Rule 10 of the Rules of the Supreme Court of the United States, adopted on February 17, 2026 and effective on March 16, 2026, “Review on a writ of certiorari is not a matter of right, but of judicial discretion.” The same rule states that “A petition for a writ of certiorari will be granted only for compelling reasons,” and lists the kinds of reasons the Court considers, such as a conflict between federal courts of appeals or an important federal question decided in a way that conflicts with the Court’s own decisions. Rule 16 separates two outcomes. After considering a petition, the Court may enter “a summary disposition on the merits,” and the November 16 order list shows what that looks like: at the top of the list, the Court granted, vacated and remanded two other cases for further consideration in light of its recent decisions. No. 26-210 received no such treatment. It was simply denied. A reader should therefore not describe the order as the Supreme Court approving the Ninth Circuit’s First Amendment analysis. The accurate description is narrower: the Court declined to take the case, and the Ninth Circuit’s published opinion remains that court’s governing decision.

The rules also say what happens next on the Supreme Court side. Under Rule 16.3, when the Court denies a petition, the Clerk enters the order and notifies counsel and the court whose judgment was sought to be reviewed, and “The order of denial will not be suspended pending disposition of a petition for rehearing except by order of the Court or a Justice.” Rule 44.2 allows a petition for rehearing of an order denying certiorari, but it must be filed “within 25 days after the date of the order of denial,” its grounds are limited to “intervening circumstances of a substantial or controlling effect” or other substantial grounds not previously presented, and the rule states that the time for filing it will not be extended. In practice, the litigation now continues in the lower courts under the Ninth Circuit’s decision, which affirmed the preliminary injunction for one class of researchers and reversed it for the other.

B. What Thakur v. Trump decided, and why two groups of researchers ended up in different places

The facts set out by the Ninth Circuit are short. In April 2025, according to the opinion, the Environmental Protection Agency, the National Science Foundation and the National Endowment for the Humanities sent form letters to UC Berkeley that purported to terminate research grants. The letters said, in slightly different words, that the awards no longer served the agencies’ goals or priorities, and the court described them as implementing several executive orders issued in January and February 2025, including two orders directed at diversity, equity and inclusion programs. Six UC researchers filed a class action on June 4, 2025. On June 23, 2025, the district court in the Northern District of California entered a preliminary injunction and provisionally certified two classes: a “Form Termination Class” of researchers whose grants were ended by form letter without a grant-specific explanation, and a “DEI Termination Class” of researchers whose grants were ended because of the executive orders on diversity, equity and inclusion. The district court ordered the three agencies to reinstate the terminated grants.

In Thakur v. Trump, No. 25-4249 (9th Cir. May 26, 2026), the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded, in a per curiam opinion with a concurrence by Judge Christen. The panel first rejected the government’s standing argument, holding that the loss of grant funding, together with alleged harm to reputation, disruption of projects and the cost of seeking replacement funding, was enough. It then split the two classes. For the Form Termination Class, which challenged the terminations as arbitrary and capricious under the Administrative Procedure Act, the panel concluded that “the district court likely lacks jurisdiction over the Form Termination Class’s APA claim,” because, following the Supreme Court’s August 2025 order on National Institutes of Health grants, a claim based on research grants that seeks relief designed to enforce an obligation to pay money is at its essence a contract claim. For a researcher whose only complaint is that a form letter gave no reasons, the practical lesson of Thakur is that an Administrative Procedure Act suit in district court seeking reinstatement of the grant is now unlikely to succeed in the Ninth Circuit, and the money claim points toward the Court of Federal Claims instead.

The researchers had tried to avoid that result by arguing that they were not themselves parties to the grant agreements, which run between the agencies and the university. The panel was not persuaded, noting that the plaintiffs in the Supreme Court’s National Institutes of Health case also included non-parties and that the Court’s reasoning did not turn on privity. Judge Christen’s concurrence spelled out the point: in her view, “the identity of the party bringing a claim is immaterial to whether the claim is contractual in nature.” She added that a researcher’s lack of privity with the government may be a separate obstacle to suing in the Court of Federal Claims, and that the waiver of sovereign immunity in the Administrative Procedure Act does not guarantee a federal forum for every claim. That observation is the uncomfortable part of the opinion for individual scientists: the person whose work was cut may not be the person who can sue for the money.

The DEI Termination Class came out the other way. The panel held that this class was likely to succeed on its First Amendment claim. It accepted that the government may choose which programs to fund and may define a subsidy program to reflect its preferences, citing the Supreme Court’s decisions on selective funding, but it drew a line between creating or ending a program and discriminating against disfavored speakers inside a program. The panel relied on the record as the district court found it: an agency policy that first identified open grants that promoted “environmental justice,” diversity, equity and inclusion, or “gender ideology”; an agency announcement that it had cancelled grants related to diversity, equity and inclusion and environmental justice; and keyword searches used to select grants for termination. Its conclusion was stated plainly: “Because the agencies’ termination of grants is aimed at the suppression of viewpoints with which the government disagrees, it likely violates the First Amendment.” The panel rejected the government’s argument that viewpoint neutrality does not apply to competitive grants, and its argument that funding decisions are constrained only when the government tries to regulate speech outside the funded program.

On the remaining preliminary-injunction factors, the panel acknowledged that both sides would suffer some harm either way. It noted the Supreme Court’s recognition that the government is harmed when grant money that cannot be recouped is paid out, but held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in favoring the researchers, given the irreparable nature of a likely First Amendment violation and the non-monetary harms to research teams and projects. It also held that the district court acted within its discretion in concluding that “reinstatement of the terminated grants was necessary to provide complete relief.” The disposition line is the one the Supreme Court has now left undisturbed: “We affirm the preliminary injunction with respect to the DEI Termination Class, reverse the preliminary injunction with respect to the Form Termination Class, and remand for further proceedings.” Because that judgment concerns a preliminary injunction, it is interim relief. The merits of the First Amendment claim, the scope of the classes and the claims that were not reached, including the claim that the terminations were contrary to the agencies’ statutory directives, remain for the district court and any later appeal.

II. If your federal grant is terminated, which court can hear the challenge, and what should you check first?

A. Claims for the grant money go to the Court of Federal Claims under the Tucker Act

Two federal statutes frame every grant-termination case, wherever the grantee is located. The first is the waiver of sovereign immunity in the Administrative Procedure Act. Under 5 U.S.C. § 702, a person suffering legal wrong because of agency action may sue for “relief other than money damages,” but the section states that nothing in it “confers authority to grant relief if any other statute that grants consent to suit expressly or impliedly forbids the relief which is sought.” The second is the Tucker Act. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1), the United States Court of Federal Claims has jurisdiction over claims against the United States founded on the Constitution, a statute, a regulation, or “upon any express or implied contract with the United States.” The courts have read those two provisions together: when a claim is really a contract claim, the Tucker Act sends it to the Court of Federal Claims and impliedly forbids the district court from granting relief under the Administrative Procedure Act.

The Supreme Court applied that framework to terminated grants in Department of Education v. California, No. 24A910 (Apr. 4, 2025). A federal district court in Massachusetts had issued a temporary restraining order that blocked the termination of education-related grants and required the government to pay past-due grant obligations. In a per curiam order, the Supreme Court of the United States treated that order as a preliminary injunction and stayed it, reasoning that the government was likely “to succeed in showing the District Court lacked jurisdiction to order the payment of money under the APA.” The Court added that the respondents, who had said they could keep their programs running, “can recover any wrongfully withheld funds through suit in an appropriate forum.” For a grantee deciding where to sue, Department of Education v. California means that a district court order forcing an agency to keep paying under a terminated grant is unlikely to survive, and the forum for recovering the money itself is the Court of Federal Claims. The decision was not unanimous: the Chief Justice would have denied the application, Justice Kagan dissented, and Justice Jackson, joined by Justice Sotomayor, dissented as well. Both the Ninth Circuit in Thakur and the First Circuit in a January 2026 decision discussed below later cited the order as 604 U.S. 650 and applied it to new grant disputes.

The Court refined the rule four months later in National Institutes of Health v. American Public Health Association, No. 25A103 (Aug. 21, 2025). There, a district court had vacated both internal guidance documents announcing new research-funding priorities and the grant terminations that followed. The Supreme Court of the United States granted the government’s application in part and denied it in part. The order states that the Administrative Procedure Act’s limited waiver “does not provide the District Court with jurisdiction to adjudicate claims” based on the research grants or to order relief designed to enforce an obligation to pay money under them, but the application was “otherwise denied,” which left in place the district court’s judgment vacating the guidance. The vote was fragmented: four Justices would have denied the application in full, four would have granted it in full, and Justice Barrett cast the deciding vote. Her concurrence explains the result: “the District Court likely lacked jurisdiction to hear challenges to the grant terminations, which belong in the Court of Federal Claims (CFC),” while a challenge to agency guidance can stay in district court because “Vacating the guidance does not reinstate terminated grants.” The practical application of National Institutes of Health v. American Public Health Association for a researcher or university is a split strategy: the termination of a specific award is pursued as a money claim in the Court of Federal Claims, and an agency-wide policy that will govern future funding decisions can be challenged under the Administrative Procedure Act in district court. When the Ninth Circuit decided Thakur, it cited this order as 145 S. Ct. 2658 and treated it as binding, which is how the Form Termination Class lost its injunction.

Justice Barrett also addressed the obvious objection that two courts for one dispute is unfair. She wrote that “Each forum has the authority to fully adjudicate the claims over which it has jurisdiction,” and she pointed to a federal statute that can force a choice about timing. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1500, the Court of Federal Claims “shall not have jurisdiction of any claim for or in respect to which the plaintiff or his assignee has pending in any other court any suit or process against the United States.” Justice Barrett noted that if the guidance challenge and the termination challenge overlap enough under that statute, which she said she was not sure they did, “the plaintiffs will have to proceed sequentially rather than simultaneously.” For a grantee, the takeaway is to decide the order of filings deliberately. Filing a district court suit first about the same grant can create a jurisdictional problem for a later money claim on that grant in the Court of Federal Claims.

Timing has a second statutory anchor. Under 28 U.S.C. § 2501, every claim within the jurisdiction of the Court of Federal Claims “shall be barred unless the petition thereon is filed within six years after such claim first accrues.” The statute itself does not say when a claim arising from a grant termination first accrues, and none of the decisions read for this article decides that question. The safe reading is the literal one: six years from accrual is the outer limit set by Congress, and nothing in these sources supports waiting in the expectation that a later date will be used. Agency objection procedures and internal appeals, discussed below, run on their own timetables, set by each agency’s written procedures.

The privity problem identified in Thakur is the next practical check. In Thakur, the termination letters were sent to UC Berkeley, and the researchers argued that they were not parties to the grant agreements at all. The same question arises whenever an award names an institution, rather than the individual investigator, as the recipient. Judge Christen’s concurrence warned that a researcher who is not in privity with the government may face a separate jurisdictional hurdle in the Court of Federal Claims. For an individual scientist, that makes the institution’s decision central. Before anything else, find out who the recipient of record is, whether the institution intends to object or sue, and whether it has already signed anything, such as a closeout document or a mutual termination under the federal grant rules, that could affect a later claim.

B. Policy challenges, constitutional claims and the termination rules agencies must follow

A useful appellate application of the two-track approach is Massachusetts v. National Institutes of Health, No. 25-1343 (1st Cir. Jan. 5, 2026). That case did not involve terminated grants. It involved supplemental guidance by which the National Institutes of Health announced, in February 2025, that it would cap reimbursement of the indirect costs of funded research at 15 percent. The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment permanently enjoining and vacating that guidance. On jurisdiction, the court wrote that “a straightforward application of APHA resolves the jurisdictional inquiry,” because Justice Barrett’s concurrence “plainly distinguishes between challenges to agency-wide policies, which belong in district court, and challenges to the withholding of contractually awarded funds that result from those policies, which belong in the CFC.” In doing so, the First Circuit cited Department of Education v. California as 604 U.S. 650 and the National Institutes of Health order as 145 S. Ct. 2658, and explained that the plaintiffs did not challenge any withholding of funds promised under grant agreements. For a university or research association, Massachusetts v. National Institutes of Health shows that a forward-looking, agency-wide funding policy can still be challenged in district court under the Administrative Procedure Act, as long as the relief sought is setting aside the policy rather than paying out a particular grant.

The constitutional track is different again, and Thakur shows how it works in the Ninth Circuit. The DEI Termination Class did not win because the letters were poorly reasoned; it won its preliminary injunction because the panel concluded that the terminations were likely aimed at suppressing particular viewpoints, and the government did not dispute that the grants were selected because of the recipients’ perceived expression on diversity, equity and inclusion or environmental justice. That is why the record mattered so much. A grantee who believes an award was singled out for its viewpoint, rather than because a program was ended or redefined, should preserve the documents that show how the grant was selected: the termination letter, any list or announcement that names the category of grants being cut, correspondence with program officers, and anything indicating that keywords or topics drove the choice. The Supreme Court’s denial does not turn Thakur’s First Amendment holding into a nationwide rule, and the government’s petition shows it considers that holding wrong, so the strength of such a claim depends on where it is filed and on the specific record.

Whatever the forum, the federal grant rules themselves are the starting point for evaluating a termination. The Uniform Guidance, in 2 CFR 200.340, lists the ways an award may be terminated. The ground at issue in many of the 2025 letters is paragraph (a)(4), which allows termination by the agency “pursuant to the terms and conditions of the Federal award, including, to the extent authorized by law, if an award no longer effectuates the program goals or agency priorities.” Two qualifications in that text deserve a careful reading. The ground operates through the award’s own terms and conditions, and paragraph (b) adds that the agency “must clearly and unambiguously specify all termination provisions in the terms and conditions of the Federal award.” The eCFR page read for this article shows that the current text of section 200.340 dates from the revision effective October 1, 2024. The first document to pull is therefore the award itself, including the terms and conditions and the version of the Uniform Guidance that it incorporates, to see whether a priorities-based termination clause was actually included.

The next two sections govern the notice and the response. Under 2 CFR 200.341, the agency must provide written notice of termination, and “The written notice of termination should include the reasons for termination, the effective date, and the portion of the Federal award to be terminated, if applicable.” When a termination is for the recipient’s material failure to comply, the notice must also explain the reporting of the decision in SAM.gov. Under 2 CFR 200.342, each agency must maintain written procedures for objections, hearings and appeals, and upon initiating a remedy such as termination, “the Federal agency must provide the recipient with an opportunity to object and provide information challenging the action.” Section 200.340(c) adds a specific point for terminations based on a material failure to comply: the agency does not report the termination in SAM.gov until the recipient has exhausted its opportunities to object, or has not, within 30 calendar days after being notified, told the agency that it intends to appeal. That 30-day period is tied to the SAM.gov reporting of compliance-based terminations; it is not a general deadline for every grant dispute, and the time limits for an objection come from the agency’s own written procedures.

Put together, these sources give a researcher or grants office a practical sequence. First, obtain the full award file: the notice of award, the terms and conditions, any incorporated agency policy statement and the termination letter. Second, compare the letter with 2 CFR 200.340 and 200.341: which ground is cited, whether that ground appears in the award terms, and whether the notice states reasons, an effective date and the portion terminated. Third, use the agency objection procedure required by 2 CFR 200.342 promptly, and keep proof of what was submitted and when. Fourth, separate the remedies you want, because they lead to different courts: payment under the grant points to the Court of Federal Claims under the Tucker Act; setting aside an agency-wide policy points to a district court under the Administrative Procedure Act; and a claim that the government targeted a viewpoint is a constitutional claim whose strength currently depends heavily on the circuit. Fifth, plan the order of filings with 28 U.S.C. § 1500 and the six-year limit in 28 U.S.C. § 2501 in mind. Sixth, for University of California researchers specifically, check the class definitions recorded in the Ninth Circuit opinion and the government’s petition, since the part of the injunction that the Ninth Circuit affirmed concerns members of the DEI Termination Class whose grants from the three named agencies were terminated under the two executive orders on diversity, equity and inclusion.

Two limits keep this analysis honest. The Supreme Court orders in Department of Education v. California and National Institutes of Health v. American Public Health Association were rulings on emergency applications, not final decisions after full briefing and argument. Even so, the First Circuit and the Ninth Circuit both treated their reasoning as controlling for the jurisdictional question, and the Ninth Circuit described the August 2025 order as binding on it. Thakur, for its part, reviewed a preliminary injunction: it decided what is likely, not what is finally proven. A grantee planning litigation should expect the forum rules to be applied strictly and the constitutional question to remain contested.

Conclusion

The November 16, 2026 order in Trump v. Thakur did one thing: it refused to take up the government’s challenge to the Ninth Circuit’s May 26, 2026 decision. It did not adopt that decision’s reasoning, and it did not resolve the broader dispute about viewpoint and competitive grants that the government’s petition presented. What it leaves in place is a clear map for anyone whose federal research funding has been cut. Claims for the money promised under a specific grant belong in the Court of Federal Claims under the Tucker Act, as the Supreme Court indicated in Department of Education v. California and in National Institutes of Health v. American Public Health Association, and as the Ninth Circuit applied to the Form Termination Class. Challenges to agency-wide policies can stay in district court, as the First Circuit held in Massachusetts v. National Institutes of Health. A claim that a grant was ended to suppress a viewpoint is a separate constitutional claim, and in the Ninth Circuit it has, for now, produced an order to reinstate grants. The first practical steps are the same in every case: obtain the award terms, test the termination letter against 2 CFR 200.340 and 200.341, use the objection procedure under 2 CFR 200.342, confirm who the recipient of record is, and choose the order and forum of any lawsuit with the jurisdictional and timing statutes in view.

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