By Hassan Kohen, lawyer at the Paris Bar.
“DWP targeted case reviews AI” is being searched in the United Kingdom. Behind the query sits a practical question for anyone who receives Universal Credit: if my award is picked for a review, what can the Department for Work and Pensions actually do, what do I have to send, and how can I challenge the result? This guide answers that question under the law of Great Britain, meaning England, Wales and Scotland, where Universal Credit decisions are governed by the Social Security Act 1998 and by regulations made in 2013. Northern Ireland has its own social security legislation, which is not analysed here.
The method set out here is of general scope. It describes no particular tool, trial or selection method, and draws no conclusion about how any claim is chosen or about any individual case. In each file, several facts still have to be established: what the review letter actually asked for, whether payment was suspended, which decision was finally made, on what date it was notified, and whether it was reached by an officer or by automated processing. “Targeted case review” is an administrative label: the phrase does not appear in the provisions discussed below, which speak instead of revision, supersession, suspension and requests for information. This is information on the law of Great Britain, written by a lawyer who practises in France and not in the United Kingdom. The texts discussed are the revised versions published on the official legislation website of the United Kingdom, as consulted on 19 November 2026.
I. What a review can change in a Universal Credit award
A. The legal powers behind a review: revision, supersession and suspension
A Universal Credit award is a decision of the Secretary of State for Work and Pensions. Section 8 of the 1998 Act gives the Secretary of State the task of deciding any claim for a “relevant benefit”, and the list of relevant benefits in section 8(3) expressly includes universal credit. Once that decision has been made, it is not frozen. The Act provides two distinct mechanisms for changing it afterwards, and a review of an existing award will, if it changes anything, almost always end in one of them. Knowing which one has been used is the first step in reading any letter that follows a review, because the two mechanisms do not take effect from the same date.
The first mechanism is revision. Section 9 of the 1998 Act allows a decision to be revised by the Secretary of State “either on an application made for the purpose or on his own initiative”. A review launched by the department is a clear case of action on the Secretary of State’s own initiative. Section 9(3) then fixes the timing: as a rule, a revision takes effect from the date on which the original decision took effect, or was to take effect. In other words, a revision reaches back to the start. Section 9(2) adds that, when revising, the Secretary of State need not consider any issue that was not raised by the application or did not prompt the action taken on his own initiative.
The revision power is framed in more detail by regulation 9 of the Decisions and Appeals Regulations 2013, whose full title covers Universal Credit, Personal Independence Payment, Jobseeker’s Allowance and Employment and Support Allowance. Regulation 8 states that the cases listed in that chapter allow a revision at any time. Regulation 9 covers a decision that arose from official error, and a decision that “was made in ignorance of, or was based on a mistake as to, some material fact” and, as a result, is more advantageous to the claimant than it would otherwise have been. This is the provision most directly engaged when a review concludes that the information on which an award was calculated was wrong or incomplete. Combined with section 9(3), it means that the corrected decision can apply from the beginning of the award, and that the payments already made under the old decision may then be treated as paid in excess of entitlement.
The second mechanism is supersession. Section 10 of the 1998 Act allows a decision, whether as originally made or as revised, to be replaced by a new decision of the Secretary of State, again on an application or on the Secretary of State’s own initiative. Supersession is the natural route where circumstances have changed since the award was made: a new job, a partner moving in, a change in housing costs. Section 10(5) provides that a superseding decision takes effect from the date on which it is made or, where applicable, the date of the application, subject to regulations that may fix another date in prescribed cases under section 10(6). The difference with revision matters in practice. A revision usually corrects the past; a supersession usually adjusts the award from a later point, according to the date rules set by the regulations.
Alongside those two powers, the 2013 regulations allow payment to be paused while questions are examined. Under regulation 44 of the Decisions and Appeals Regulations, the Secretary of State may suspend payment of a benefit, in whole or in part, where it appears that an issue arises whether the conditions of entitlement are or were fulfilled, whether a decision on the award should be revised or superseded, or whether an amount already paid is recoverable as an overpayment. A suspension may also follow where the last address notified is not the address at which the claimant actually lives. A suspension is not a decision ending entitlement. Regulation 46 requires the Secretary of State to pay the suspended benefit once satisfied that it is properly payable and that no outstanding issues remain to be resolved.
For a claimant, the practical reading is therefore simple to state, even if each case has its own facts. A review can end with no change at all. It can end with a revision, often from the start of the award, where the department concludes that an earlier decision rested on a mistaken or missing fact. It can end with a supersession from a later date, where circumstances changed. It can end with a separate determination that an amount is recoverable as an overpayment. Each of those outcomes is a decision. Each should come with a written notice, and each has its own route of challenge, explained in the second part of this guide.
B. Automated tools and the decision: what the law allows and what it requires
The query adds the words “AI”. The legal starting point on automation is older than any current technology. Section 2 of the 1998 Act provides that a decision, determination or assessment falling to be made by the Secretary of State under the social security legislation may be made not only by an officer acting under the Secretary of State’s authority but also “by a computer for whose operation such an officer is responsible”. A second limb covers a computer operated by a person providing services to the Secretary of State, for decisions that such a person may make. The official page for section 2 lists one change not yet applied to its text, concerning the definition of a war pension in subsection (3); it does not affect the point made here.
Two consequences follow from that wording. First, the 1998 Act has long accepted that a decision on a benefit may be produced by a computer. Second, a decision made that way remains a decision falling to be made by the Secretary of State. Nothing in sections 9, 10 or 12 of the Act, which govern revision, supersession and appeal, distinguishes between a decision made by an officer and one made by a computer. A claimant whose award is reduced or ended therefore uses the same routes of challenge whatever the means by which the decision was reached.
It is also important to separate the choice of a file for review from the decision that may follow. Selecting an award for a closer look does not, by itself, revise or supersede anything, and it is not one of the decisions on a claim or an award to which the appeal provisions apply. The legal consequences for the claimant begin later: with a requirement to provide information, with a suspension of payment, or with a decision that revises or supersedes the award. Those steps are where the rules discussed in this guide bite, whether or not any software was involved earlier in the process.
Data protection law adds a separate layer. Section 80 of the Data (Use and Access) Act 2025 replaced Article 22 of the UK GDPR with new Articles 22A to 22D on automated decision-making. Article 22A defines the key notions: “a decision is based solely on automated processing if there is no meaningful human involvement in the taking of the decision”. A decision is a “significant decision” if it produces a legal effect for the data subject or has a similarly significant effect. Article 22A(2) adds that, when considering whether human involvement is meaningful, account must be taken of the extent to which the decision is reached by means of profiling. According to the commencement information on the official page, section 80 has been fully in force since 5 February 2026, under regulation 2(j) of S.I. 2026/82, subject to a transitional provision in regulation 5 of those regulations which this guide does not analyse.
The core protection is in Article 22C, as inserted by the same section 80. Where a significant decision about a person is based entirely or partly on personal data and is based solely on automated processing, the controller must ensure that safeguards are in place. Those safeguards must include measures that give the person information about such decisions, enable the person to make representations about them, “enable the data subject to obtain human intervention on the part of the controller in relation to such decisions” and enable the person to contest them. Article 22B adds stricter limits where a significant decision relies entirely or partly on the special categories of personal data described in Article 9(1): such a decision may not be taken solely by automated processing unless it rests entirely on data for which explicit consent was given or, under the second condition, the decision is required or authorised by law and point (g) of Article 9(2) applies. Article 22D allows the Secretary of State to make regulations on what counts as meaningful human involvement and on additional safeguards.
The limits of those rules should be stated plainly. Article 22C applies to decisions taken solely by automated processing. If an officer examines the evidence and takes the decision with meaningful human involvement, the Article 22C safeguards are not triggered as such, although the question whether human involvement was meaningful is itself a matter of fact, to be assessed in the light of Article 22A(2). The text does not say whether a model that only ranks or selects files for review produces a “significant decision”; that point cannot be settled from the wording alone. By contrast, a decision that reduces an award, ends it or finds an overpayment produces a legal effect for the claimant. In practice, the data protection safeguards and the social security routes of challenge operate side by side. The second set is the one that can change the amount actually paid, and its time limits keep running whatever data protection questions are raised.
II. Responding to the review and challenging the outcome
A. During the review: information requests, deadlines and suspension
A review usually starts with a request for information or evidence. The duty to answer it comes from regulation 38 of the Claims and Payments Regulations 2013. Under regulation 38(2), a person entitled to benefit must supply, in the manner the Secretary of State determines, the information or evidence that the Secretary of State may require for determining whether a decision on the award should be revised under section 9 or superseded under section 10 of the 1998 Act. The deadline is not set in regulation 38 itself; it refers to the period in regulation 45(4)(a) of the Decisions and Appeals Regulations.
That deadline is short. Regulation 45 of the Decisions and Appeals Regulations 2013 first requires the Secretary of State to notify the person of its requirements. The person must then supply the information or evidence within “a period of 14 days beginning with the date on which the notification under paragraph (3) was given or sent to P”, or within such longer period as the Secretary of State allows in that notification. Two other outcomes are possible. The person may satisfy the Secretary of State that a longer period is necessary in order to comply. Alternatively, within the applicable period, the person may satisfy the Secretary of State that the information or evidence does not exist, or that it is not possible to obtain it.
The last point deserves attention, because it is often overlooked. A review letter may ask for a document the claimant has never had, such as a statement for an account that was closed years ago, or a letter from a third party who no longer answers. The regulation does not require the impossible: it treats an explanation, given in time, that the evidence does not exist or cannot be obtained as a way of meeting the requirement. That explanation should be in writing, specific, and accompanied by whatever partial evidence exists. Where the award includes housing costs, regulation 38(9) of the Claims and Payments Regulations also places a duty on the landlord to supply information or evidence required in connection with the award, within one month of being required to do so or such longer period as the Secretary of State considers reasonable.
Failure to meet the requirement has consequences that escalate. Regulation 45(6) allows the Secretary of State to suspend payment, in whole or in part, of a person who fails to satisfy the requirements of regulation 45(4). Regulation 46 then works in the claimant’s favour once the problem is solved: the suspended benefit must be paid when the Secretary of State is satisfied that it is properly payable and that the requirements of regulation 45(4) have been met. A suspension is therefore a pause, not an end, provided the claimant acts.
The most serious step is termination, under regulation 47 of the same 2013 regulations. It applies where payment has been suspended in full, either under regulation 44 followed by a failure to comply with a requirement for information when more than one month has elapsed since the requirement was made, or under regulation 45(6) when more than one month has elapsed since the first payment was suspended. In that case, unless entitlement has ended earlier on another ground, the Secretary of State “must decide that P ceases to be entitled to that benefit with effect from the date on which the payment of the benefit was suspended”. The word “must” matters: once the conditions are met, the regulation leaves no discretion as to that outcome. Termination is nevertheless a decision like the others, and it can be challenged through the routes described below.
From those rules, a working method can be drawn. The date on which the notification was given or sent should be noted at once, because the fourteen-day period runs from it. Every item requested should be listed and matched with a document, a written explanation, or a request for more time made before the period expires. Copies of everything sent, and proof of the date of sending, should be kept. If an item cannot be produced, the reason should be given in writing within the period, as regulation 45(4)(b) allows. If payment has already been suspended, the one-month marker in regulation 47 becomes the critical date, and the priority is to provide what was asked or to explain, in writing and in time, why it cannot be provided.
A review is also a moment to check whether the award still reflects the household’s situation. Regulation 38(4) of the Claims and Payments Regulations 2013 requires a person entitled to benefit to notify any change of circumstances which the person might reasonably be expected to know might affect entitlement, the amount of the award or its payment, and to do so as soon as reasonably practicable after the change occurs. Reporting a change late does not, on the wording of the overpayment provision discussed below, prevent recovery of amounts already overpaid. It does limit how long an incorrect award continues, and it puts the claimant’s own account of the facts and dates on the record before the decision is made.
B. After the decision: mandatory reconsideration, appeal and overpayments
Once the review leads to a decision, the order of the steps is fixed by law. For most Universal Credit decisions, the first step is not an appeal but a request for reconsideration. Regulation 7 of the Decisions and Appeals Regulations 2013 applies where the written notice of the decision states that there is a right of appeal only if the Secretary of State has considered an application for revision. In that case, a person has a right of appeal only if the Secretary of State “has considered on an application whether to revise the decision under section 9 of that Act”. The notice must state the time limit for applying for a revision and, where it does not include the reasons for the decision, must tell the person that written reasons may be requested within one month of the date of notification. Written reasons must then be provided within 14 days of receipt of the request or as soon as practicable afterwards.
The time limit for that reconsideration request is set by regulation 5(1)(b) of the same regulations: one month from the date of notification of the decision. It is extended by 14 days after the end of that month if written reasons were requested and supplied within the month, and runs for 14 days from the date the reasons were provided if they were requested within the month but supplied after it ended. Under regulation 7(5), where there is no right of appeal yet, an appeal sent too early may be treated as an application for revision.
A late request is not automatically lost. Regulation 6 allows the Secretary of State to extend the time limit if four conditions are met. The person must have applied for an extension. The application must explain why the extension is sought, identify the decision with enough detail, and be made within 12 months of the latest date on which the revision request should have been received. The Secretary of State must be satisfied that granting the extension is reasonable, and that special circumstances made it impracticable to apply in time. The regulation adds that the longer the delay, the more compelling those special circumstances must be. A refused application for an extension may not be renewed, so the first application should be complete.
The content of the reconsideration request matters as much as its timing. Section 9(2) of the 1998 Act provides that the Secretary of State need not consider any issue that is not raised by the application. Each disputed point should therefore be stated expressly: the facts that are said to be wrong, the period concerned, the figures used, the documents relied on, and, where relevant, whether the claimant was given the chance to respond before the decision. If there is reason to think that the decision was reached without meaningful human involvement, the request can also ask how it was reached, and the safeguards described in the first part can be invoked alongside the reconsideration.
If the reconsideration does not resolve the matter, the next step is the First-tier Tribunal. Section 12 of the 1998 Act applies to decisions of the Secretary of State under section 8 or 10, whether as originally made or as revised under section 9, made on a claim for or an award of a relevant benefit, unless the decision falls within Schedule 2 to the Act; it gives the claimant a right of appeal, which regulations may make conditional on prior reconsideration. The Tribunal works within a fixed frame. Under section 12(8), it need not consider any issue not raised by the appeal and “shall not take into account any circumstances not obtaining at the time when the decision appealed against was made”. Evidence should therefore be directed to the facts as they stood at the date of the decision under appeal. A change that happened afterwards is a matter for a new application, not for that appeal.
The time limit for the appeal is in rule 22 of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Social Entitlement Chamber) Rules 2008. Where mandatory reconsideration applies, the notice of appeal must reach the Tribunal “within 1 month after the date on which the appellant was sent notice of the result of mandatory reconsideration”. The notice must be in English or Welsh and signed, and it must give the appellant’s name and address, an address for documents, and the grounds relied on. It must be accompanied by a copy of the notice of the result of mandatory reconsideration, any statement of reasons the appellant has, and supporting documents not already supplied to the respondent. Under rule 22(8), an appeal brought late in a social security case is treated as made in time if it is made within 12 months of the time limit and no respondent objects, unless the Tribunal directs otherwise; the time cannot be extended by more than 12 months.
Two further rules from section 9 of the 1998 Act shape the timetable. Under section 9(5), where a decision is revised, the time for appealing runs from the date of the revision. Under section 9(6), an appeal against a decision generally lapses if the decision is revised before the appeal is determined, except in prescribed circumstances. A claimant who obtains a partial revision should therefore check whether the revised decision still needs to be challenged, and when the new time limit expires.
The financial consequence of a review is often an overpayment. Section 71ZB of the Social Security Administration Act 1992 provides that “The Secretary of State may recover any amount of the following paid in excess of entitlement”, and the first benefit listed is universal credit. The text of section 71ZB does not make recovery depend on any fault, misrepresentation or failure to disclose by the claimant. Section 71ZB(3) provides that an amount paid under a determination is not recoverable unless that determination has been reversed or varied on appeal, or revised or superseded under section 9 or 10 of the 1998 Act, except where regulations provide otherwise; the official page records that subsection (3) is excluded in certain cases by regulation 5 of the Social Security (Overpayments and Recovery) Regulations 2013, which this guide does not analyse. Where Universal Credit is awarded jointly, section 71ZB(6) allows an amount paid to one member of the couple to be regarded as paid to the other. Under section 71ZB(7), recovery may be made by deduction from benefit, by deduction from earnings, through the courts or by adjustment of benefit, without prejudice to other means. What is at stake at this stage is a civil liability to repay money; any question of an offence is a separate matter, governed by other provisions that this guide does not address.
The overpayment determination can be challenged separately from the entitlement decision. Section 12(4) of the 1998 Act provides that, where the Secretary of State has determined that an amount is recoverable under section 71ZB, any person from whom it has been determined to be recoverable has the same right of appeal to the First-tier Tribunal as a claimant. Two layers should therefore be checked: the decision that revised or superseded the award, and the determination of the amount, the period and the person from whom it is said to be recoverable. An error in the first layer will usually affect the second, but the second can also be wrong on its own, for example because of a miscalculated period or a figure taken from the wrong assessment.
One caution concerns recent legislation. The official page for section 71ZB lists, among the changes not yet applied to its revised text of the 1992 Act, several provisions inserted by the Public Authorities (Fraud, Error and Recovery) Act 2025, including new sections 109D to 109H and new Schedules 3ZC and 3ZD. A change that is not yet applied to the revised text is not necessarily in force, and one that is in force is not necessarily reflected in that text. Before relying on any of those provisions, their commencement has to be checked in the relevant commencement regulations. This guide does not describe them as current law.
This analysis concerns the law of Great Britain. The author’s English-language legal practice in Paris operates under French law, in a different jurisdiction. A Universal Credit file needs to be assessed under the British texts that govern it, on the basis of the actual notices, dates and documents described above.
Conclusion
Whatever means is used to choose an award for a closer look, a review of Universal Credit in Great Britain operates through powers set out in legislation. The department may require information or evidence, normally within 14 days of the notification, or a longer period it allows or accepts as necessary. It may suspend payment, and where payment has been suspended in full and the requirement is still not met after the period of one month set by the regulations, entitlement must be ended from the date of suspension. It may revise an award at any time where the decision was based on a mistake as to a material fact that favoured the claimant, with effect from the start, or supersede it from a later date.
The Social Security Act 1998 has long allowed decisions to be made by computer, and such decisions remain open to the same challenges. Written reasons can be requested within one month of notification; reconsideration must be requested within one month, subject to the extensions described; an appeal must reach the First-tier Tribunal within one month of the reconsideration notice, and the Tribunal looks at the circumstances at the date of the decision. Overpayments of Universal Credit are recoverable without any condition of fault in the text, but the determination can be appealed. Since 5 February 2026, a significant decision taken solely by automated processing must also come with safeguards, including a means of obtaining human intervention and of contesting the decision. In each case, the facts remain to be established: what the notice asked for, the dates of notification and suspension, which decision was made and how. Until those facts are known, no conclusion can be drawn about any particular review.