Searches for “cyberwarfare” have risen sharply in the United Kingdom. This article does not describe any particular incident, and it does not attribute any attack to a state, a group or a person. It answers a narrower question of United Kingdom law: when does a cyber operation linked to a foreign state become a criminal offence in the UK, who can be prosecuted for it, and what does the law expect from the organisations on the receiving end? The statutes discussed apply across the United Kingdom, in England and Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland, unless a difference is noted. Procedural examples refer to England and Wales. The law is stated as read on the official legislation website on 20 November 2026.
The method is of general scope. “Cyberwarfare” is not a term defined in any of the statutes discussed below. Criminal liability depends instead on specific elements: an unauthorised act in relation to a computer, a required state of mind, a link with the United Kingdom and, for the most serious national security offences, a connection with a foreign power or with a body designated by the Secretary of State. Whether those elements are present in a given case is a question of evidence. A search trend establishes nothing about who carried out an attack, on whose behalf or with what intention, and any allegation of that kind remains to be proved.
The first part sets out the offences that can apply. The second part deals with jurisdiction, lawful state authority and the obligations of those who are targeted.
I. The offences that can apply to state-linked cyber operations
A. The Computer Misuse Act 1990 sets the baseline
Every cyber operation, whatever its political label, is made of acts done to computers. The first statute to examine is therefore the Computer Misuse Act 1990. Section 1 of the Computer Misuse Act 1990 makes it an offence to cause a computer to perform any function with intent to secure access to any program or data held in any computer, where the access is unauthorised and the person knows that at the time. The intent does not need to be directed at a particular program, a particular kind of data or a particular computer. On conviction on indictment, the maximum sentence is two years’ imprisonment. On summary conviction, the limit is the general limit in a magistrates’ court in England and Wales and twelve months in Scotland.
The decisive word is “unauthorised”. Section 17 of the Act explains it. Access to a program or data is unauthorised when the person is not entitled to control access of that kind and does not have consent from someone who is entitled. An act in relation to a computer is unauthorised when the person is not someone with responsibility for the computer who is entitled to decide whether the act may be done, and does not have consent from such a person. Section 17 also gives “securing access” a wide meaning: altering or erasing a program or data, copying or moving it, using it, or having it output from the computer all count. None of these definitions refers to the motive of the person, to the cause they support or to the country in which the target sits. A patriotic or retaliatory purpose does not turn an unauthorised act into an authorised one.
Section 2 of the Act raises the stakes where unauthorised access is a step towards something else. A person commits this aggravated offence if they commit the section 1 offence with intent to commit, or to facilitate, a further offence of a serious kind: one for which the sentence is fixed by law, or one for which an adult with no previous convictions could be sentenced to five years’ imprisonment. The further offence may be intended for a later occasion, and it is no answer that it turned out to be impossible. The maximum sentence on indictment is five years. Intrusions carried out to gather material for extortion or fraud are the obvious illustrations of the kind of plan this section addresses.
Disruption, rather than access, is the concern of section 3 of the Act. It applies where a person does an unauthorised act in relation to a computer, knows at the time that the act is unauthorised, and either intends or is reckless as to whether the act will impair the operation of a computer, prevent or hinder access to a program or data, or impair the operation of a program or the reliability of data. The section states that impairing, preventing or hindering includes doing so temporarily, and that an “act” includes a series of acts. Flooding a service so that users cannot reach it, deleting or corrupting data, or making files unavailable are therefore all capable of falling within section 3 if the mental element is proved. The maximum sentence on indictment is ten years.
The most serious computer offence, inserted into the Act in 2015, measures an attack by its consequences. It covers four kinds of damage. Damage to human welfare in any place, damage to the environment of any place, damage to the economy of any country and damage to the national security of any country are each “of a material kind”. Damage to human welfare is limited to a closed list. It covers loss of human life, human illness or injury, disruption of a system of communication, disruption of facilities for transport and disruption of services relating to health. The list also includes “disruption of a supply of money, food, water, energy or fuel”, as section 3ZA of the Act puts it.
Under section 3ZA, the offence requires an unauthorised act that the person knows to be unauthorised, which causes or creates a significant risk of serious damage of a material kind, and which the person intends to cause such damage or is reckless about. It is immaterial whether the act causes the damage directly or whether it is the only or main cause. The maximum sentence is fourteen years’ imprisonment. It rises to imprisonment for life where the act causes or creates a significant risk of serious damage to human welfare in the form of loss of life, illness or injury, or serious damage to national security. In practical terms, section 3ZA is the provision of the 1990 Act that fits attacks on energy networks, water supply, payment systems, hospitals or transport, because it measures the offence by its consequences in the physical world as well as by the interference with a machine.
Cyber operations also rely on tools. Section 3A of the Act makes it an offence to make, adapt, supply or offer to supply any article intending it to be used to commit, or assist in, an offence under section 1, 3 or 3ZA. It is also an offence to supply or offer to supply an article believing that it is likely to be so used, and to obtain an article intending to use it for such an offence or with a view to its being supplied for that use. “Article” includes any program or data held in electronic form, so malicious code, stolen credentials and access kits are all within the definition. The maximum sentence on indictment is two years. For investigators, section 3A matters because it can reach the supply chain behind an operation even where the person who supplied a tool never touched the target system.
B. When a foreign state is behind the conduct: the National Security Act 2023 and the Terrorism Act 2000
The 1990 Act treats a state-backed intrusion in the same way as any other intrusion. The National Security Act 2023 adds a second layer, built around the link between the conduct and a foreign power. Section 31 of the National Security Act 2023 defines that link as the “foreign power condition”. It is met where the conduct, or a course of conduct of which it forms part, is carried out for or on behalf of a foreign power and the person knows, or having regard to other matters known to them ought reasonably to know, that this is the case. Conduct is in particular treated as carried out for or on behalf of a foreign power if it is instigated by that power, under its direction or control, carried out with financial or other assistance it provided for that purpose, or carried out in collaboration with it or with its agreement. The relationship may be indirect, for example through one or more companies. The condition is also met where the person intends the conduct to benefit a foreign power, and it is not necessary to identify a particular foreign power.
Section 32 of the Act defines “foreign power”. It includes the sovereign or other head of a foreign State acting in a public capacity, a foreign government or part of one, an agency or authority of a foreign government, an authority administering the affairs of an area within a foreign country or territory, and a political party that is a governing political party of a foreign government. A group of contractors working under the direction of a foreign intelligence agency can therefore bring its members within the condition, even if none of them is a state employee.
Since 8 July 2026, a second route has existed. Section 33A of the Act allows the Secretary of State, by regulations, to designate a body if the Secretary of State reasonably believes that the body is, or has been, involved in foreign power threat activity and considers that designation is necessary to protect the safety or interests of the United Kingdom. Section 33B of the Act then creates a “designated body condition” that mirrors the foreign power condition: conduct carried out for or on behalf of a designated body, or intended to benefit it, with the same tests of instigation, direction, assistance and collaboration. Whether a particular body has been designated, and from what date, is a matter to be checked in the regulations in force at the time of the conduct. This article does not list any designated body.
The central offence for destructive operations is sabotage. Under section 12 of the Act, a person commits an offence if their conduct results in damage to any asset, they intend that result or are reckless about it, their conduct is for a purpose that they know, or ought reasonably to know, is prejudicial to the safety or interests of the United Kingdom, and either the foreign power condition or the designated body condition is met. The definitions are written with cyber operations in mind. “Asset” covers assets of any kind, tangible or intangible, and expressly includes electronic systems and information. “Damage” includes alteration, interference, loss of or reduction in access or availability, and loss of or reduction in function, utility or reliability, whether permanent or temporary. The offence applies whether the conduct takes place in the United Kingdom or elsewhere, and whether the asset is in the United Kingdom or elsewhere. The maximum sentence is imprisonment for life.
Not every contribution to a state operation involves damaging a system. Section 3 of the Act makes it an offence to engage in conduct intended to materially assist a foreign intelligence service in carrying out UK-related activities. A second limb covers conduct that is likely to give that assistance where the person knows, or ought reasonably to know, that it is likely to do so. The section states that such assistance may include providing, or providing access to, information, goods, services or financial benefits, directly or indirectly. “UK-related activities” are activities in the United Kingdom, and activities outside it that are prejudicial to the safety or interests of the United Kingdom. It is not necessary to identify a particular foreign intelligence service. The maximum sentence on indictment is fourteen years. Renting out infrastructure, selling access to compromised networks or passing on credentials may, depending on the evidence of knowledge, raise a question under this section.
Payment is addressed separately. Section 17 of the Act makes it an offence to obtain, accept or retain a material benefit provided by or on behalf of a foreign intelligence service, where the person knows, or ought reasonably to know, where the benefit comes from. Agreeing to accept such a benefit is also an offence. Material benefits include financial benefits, anything with the potential to result in a financial benefit, and information. A benefit is excluded where it is reasonable consideration for goods or services whose provision is not itself an offence. The maximum sentence is fourteen years for obtaining, accepting or retaining, and ten years for agreeing to accept.
Some cyber operations aim to influence rather than to destroy. Section 13 of the Act creates the offence of foreign interference. It requires prohibited conduct, the foreign power condition or the designated body condition, and an intention to produce an interference effect, or recklessness as to whether it will be produced. Under section 15 of the Act, conduct is prohibited if it constitutes an offence, or would do so if done in the United Kingdom, if it involves coercion, or if it involves a misrepresentation, including a misrepresentation as to a person’s identity or purpose. Section 14 of the Act lists the interference effects, which include affecting the exercise of public functions, interfering with how a person uses public services, interfering with participation in elections and other political processes, and prejudicing the safety or interests of the United Kingdom. An intrusion followed by the release of material under false identities, if intended to affect an election, is the kind of course of conduct that section 13 is drafted to reach. The maximum sentence on indictment is fourteen years.
The criminal law also intervenes before the damage happens. Section 18 of the Act makes it an offence to engage in any conduct in preparation for acts that would constitute, among others, the sabotage offence, whether the preparation relates to specific acts or to such acts in general. It applies whether the conduct takes place in the United Kingdom or elsewhere, and the maximum sentence is imprisonment for life. Reconnaissance of a network with a view to a later destructive attack is the type of conduct that may be examined under this section.
Finally, a cyber operation can meet the statutory definition of terrorism. The definition covers action that “is designed seriously to interfere with or seriously to disrupt an electronic system”, in the words of section 1 of the Terrorism Act 2000.
Under that section, the use or threat of such action is terrorism where it is designed to influence the government or an international governmental organisation, or to intimidate the public or a section of the public, and is made for the purpose of advancing a political, religious, racial or ideological cause. The section specifies that “action” includes action outside the United Kingdom, that “the public” includes the public of another country and that “the government” includes the government of a country other than the United Kingdom. A disruptive operation run for a political cause can therefore fall within the definition, with the consequences that attach to that classification in the rest of the Act. Which statute applies to a given operation, and whether several apply at once, is a decision taken on the evidence by prosecutors and courts.
II. Jurisdiction, lawful authority and the duties of those targeted
A. Who can be prosecuted in the United Kingdom, and when state authority changes the answer
Cyber operations cross borders by design, so the territorial rules decide whether a United Kingdom court has any role. For the offences under sections 1, 3 and 3ZA of the 1990 Act, section 4 of the Computer Misuse Act 1990 states that it is immaterial whether the acts or events required for conviction took place in the home country concerned, or whether the accused was there at the time. At least one “significant link with domestic jurisdiction” must, however, exist. The “home country concerned” is England and Wales, Scotland or Northern Ireland, depending on where the Act is being applied.
Section 5 of the Act lists the significant links. For section 1, it is enough that the accused was in the home country concerned when they caused the computer to perform the function, or that the computer containing the targeted program or data was there. For section 3, it is enough that the accused was in the home country concerned when they did the unauthorised act, or that the act was done in relation to a computer there. For section 3ZA, a further link exists where the act caused, or created a significant risk of, serious damage of a material kind in the home country concerned. Where the accused was outside the United Kingdom, there is also a significant link for offences under sections 1, 3, 3ZA and 3A if the accused was a United Kingdom national at the time and the act was an offence under the law of the country where it occurred.
Two practical consequences follow. A person sitting in Manchester who joins an online campaign against computers in another country is within the territorial reach of the 1990 Act, because their presence in England is itself the link; the other elements of the offence still have to be proved. The provisions examined here contain no exception for conduct undertaken in support of a state engaged in an armed conflict, or of a cause the person considers legitimate. Conversely, an operator abroad who attacks a computer located in Scotland falls within the 1990 Act as it applies in Scotland, because the location of the computer supplies the link. Whether that person can ever be brought before a Scottish court is a separate question that the Act does not answer.
The 2023 Act has its own territorial rule. Section 36 of the National Security Act 2023 provides that where an offence under Part 1 can be committed by conduct outside the United Kingdom, it can be committed by an individual of any nationality, and by a body whether or not it is formed under United Kingdom law. That rule is subject to the narrower scope of the assistance and benefit offences in sections 3 and 17, which reach conduct wholly abroad only in defined cases, such as conduct by a “UK person” or by someone acting for the Crown. Proceedings for an offence committed abroad may be taken at any place in the United Kingdom.
Prosecution is also filtered. Section 37 of the Act provides that, for most Part 1 offences, including sabotage, assistance to a foreign intelligence service, foreign interference and preparatory conduct, proceedings may be instituted in England and Wales only with the consent of the Attorney General, and in Northern Ireland only with the consent of the Advocate General for Northern Ireland. In those two jurisdictions, the offences therefore cannot be prosecuted without a decision taken at the level of a Law Officer.
The status of the person who acted is addressed directly. Section 31 of the 2023 Act states that the foreign power condition may be met in relation to the conduct of a person who holds office in or under a foreign power, or who is an employee or other member of its staff, as it may be met for anyone else. The offences are therefore not limited to freelancers and intermediaries. Questions of immunity, where they are raised in a particular case, fall outside the provisions discussed in this article.
United Kingdom law takes a different approach to operations carried out on behalf of the United Kingdom itself. Under section 7 of the Intelligence Services Act 1994, a person who would otherwise be liable in the United Kingdom for an act done outside the British Islands is not liable if the act is authorised by the Secretary of State under that section. “Liable in the United Kingdom” means liable under the criminal or civil law of any part of the United Kingdom. The Secretary of State may give such an authorisation only if satisfied that the acts will be necessary for the proper discharge of a function of the Intelligence Service or GCHQ, and that arrangements exist to ensure that nothing is done beyond what is necessary and that the nature and likely consequences of the acts will be reasonable. The section extends to acts done in the British Islands in relation to apparatus believed to be outside them. An authorisation given under the Secretary of State’s hand lasts six months unless renewed. In an urgent case it may be given by a senior official, with the Secretary of State’s express authority, and it then lapses at the end of the fifth working day after it was given. The section removes domestic liability for authorised acts. It says nothing about the position under the law of other countries or under international law.
The analysis above concerns United Kingdom law only. Readers whose question concerns French law rather than United Kingdom law will find the firm’s English-language information on French law, which covers a separate legal system with its own offences and procedure.
B. What the law expects from those who are targeted
The first point for any organisation under attack is negative: the law does not authorise retaliation. Under section 17 of the 1990 Act, access to someone else’s program or data is unauthorised unless the person controls that access or has consent from someone entitled to give it. A company that breaks into the servers used by its attacker, to recover stolen data or to disable them, will usually lack both. The offence provisions examined in this article contain no defence of self-help, retaliation or recovery of one’s own property. Tools obtained for that purpose may also engage section 3A. The lawful response is to secure the organisation’s own systems, preserve logs and other evidence, and report the matter to the police and to any regulator concerned.
Some organisations have legal reporting duties of their own. The Network and Information Systems Regulations 2018 apply to operators of essential services and to relevant digital service providers. Under regulation 11, an operator of an essential service must notify its designated competent authority in writing about any incident that has a significant impact on the continuity of the essential service it provides. To judge significance, it must consider the number of users affected, the duration of the incident and the geographical area affected. The notification must give the operator’s name and services, the time and duration of the incident, information about its nature and impact and any cross-border impact, and any other information that may help the authority.
The deadline is set in regulation 11 itself. The notification must be provided “without undue delay and in any event no later than 72 hours after the operator is aware that a NIS incident has occurred”, according to the Network and Information Systems Regulations 2018.
Regulation 12 imposes a parallel regime on relevant digital service providers, meaning providers of an online marketplace, an online search engine or a cloud computing service. They must take appropriate and proportionate measures to manage risks to the security of their systems, and they must notify the Information Commission of any incident having a substantial impact on the provision of those services, without undue delay and in any event no later than 72 hours after first becoming aware of it. Where an operator of an essential service relies on such a provider and an incident at the provider significantly affects the continuity of its own service, regulation 12 requires the operator to notify its own competent authority without undue delay.
These duties are enforced through civil penalties rather than through the criminal courts. Regulation 18 allows the competent authority or the Information Commission to serve a penalty notice. The maximum is £1,000,000 for a contravention that is not material, £8,500,000 for a material contravention below the most serious category, and £17,000,000 for a material contravention that has or could have created a significant risk to, or significant impact on, the service provided. A regulated organisation that suffers an attack therefore faces two separate timetables: the criminal investigation of the attackers, over which it has no control, and its own notification duty, which runs from the moment it becomes aware of the incident.
Payments raise a third issue. Some cyber attacks are accompanied by a demand for payment, and where the recipient may be a designated person, sanctions law becomes relevant. The Cyber (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2020 exist, according to regulation 4, to further the prevention of relevant cyber activity. That includes activity that undermines, or is intended to undermine, the integrity, prosperity or security of the United Kingdom or another country, or that causes or is intended to cause economic loss to those affected. Regulation 11 freezes the funds and economic resources of designated persons.
The prohibition most relevant to a ransom is in regulation 12. A person “must not make funds available directly or indirectly to a designated person if P knows, or has reasonable cause to suspect, that P is making the funds so available”, under the Cyber (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2020.
Contravening that prohibition is an offence. Making funds available indirectly includes making them available to a person owned or controlled by the designated person. A United Kingdom person can contravene the prohibition by conduct wholly or partly outside the United Kingdom, under regulation 3. Regulation 30 sets the maximum sentence on indictment at seven years’ imprisonment. The prohibition is subject to the exceptions and licences in Part 5 of the Regulations, which include licences issued by the Treasury. The test of “reasonable cause to suspect” matters in practice, because those behind an attack rarely identify themselves reliably. An organisation considering any payment needs to check the identity of the recipient against the designations in force at the date of payment. The Regulations attach their prohibitions to designated persons. They do not, by themselves, settle whether a payment to someone else is lawful, which depends on the recipient and on other legislation.
Individuals are in a different position. The offences in sections 1 and 3 of the 1990 Act turn on what a person did and knew: causing a computer to perform a function, or doing an unauthorised act, while knowing that it is unauthorised. The fact that a person’s home router or laptop has been taken over and used by others in an attack is not, of itself, one of those elements. The practical priority for a household is to regain control of the device, keep a record of what happened and report any loss to the police and, where relevant, to the bank concerned.
Conclusion
United Kingdom law has no offence called “cyberwarfare”. It answers the question through several overlapping statutes. The Computer Misuse Act 1990 covers the acts themselves: unauthorised access, access with intent to commit further offences, disruption of systems, attacks causing serious damage to human welfare, the environment, the economy or national security, and the supply of tools. The National Security Act 2023 adds offences that depend on a link with a foreign power or, since 8 July 2026, with a designated body, including sabotage, assistance to a foreign intelligence service, the receipt of benefits from such a service, foreign interference and preparatory conduct. The Terrorism Act 2000 can apply where serious interference with an electronic system is used to advance a cause and to influence a government or intimidate the public.
The reach of these offences is wide. Presence in the United Kingdom, the location of the targeted computer, or the nationality of the person can each supply the necessary link. In England and Wales and in Northern Ireland, most of these national security prosecutions require the consent of a Law Officer. Acts done abroad under an authorisation given by the Secretary of State under section 7 of the Intelligence Services Act 1994 do not give rise to liability in the United Kingdom, while officials of foreign powers can meet the foreign power condition like anyone else.
For those targeted, the law sets three limits: no retaliation against the attacker’s systems, notification within 72 hours where the Network and Information Systems Regulations 2018 apply, and no payment that makes funds available to a designated person. The facts that would decide any individual case remain to be established: who acted, for whom, with what knowledge and with what intention. A search trend proves none of them, and attribution of an attack is a matter for evidence tested in proceedings.