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5th Circuit proxy voting ruling: does the Pregnant Workers Fairness Act still apply in Texas?

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5th Circuit proxy voting ruling: does the Pregnant Workers Fairness Act still apply in Texas?

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The 5th Circuit proxy voting ruling behind this week’s searches is State of Texas v. Blanche, No. 24-10386 (5th Cir. Nov. 20, 2026) (en banc). Sitting as a full court, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that the House of Representatives could not count absent Members as present by proxy to reach the quorum the Constitution requires, so the House did not validly pass the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2023. Nine judges formed the majority and eight dissented. The judgment itself is narrow: it affirms a permanent injunction that bars the federal government from enforcing the Pregnant Workers Fairness Act (PWFA) against the State of Texas.

That leaves real questions for people who are pregnant at work and for the managers who answer their requests. Does the PWFA still require a Texas employer to accommodate morning sickness, a lifting limit or prenatal appointments? What changes for a state employee, for a private employee in Houston, or for a worker in Ohio? The short answer: the ruling does not erase the PWFA nationwide, but it gives employers sued in federal courts in Texas, Louisiana and Mississippi a published en banc holding to invoke, and it makes the older protections in Title VII and the Texas Labor Code more important. The next dated step is in Washington. Under 28 U.S.C. § 2101(c), a petition for certiorari in a civil case must be filed within ninety days after entry of the judgment. If the judgment was entered on November 20, 2026, the day the opinion was filed, that period runs to February 18, 2027, unless a Justice extends it.

I. What did the 5th Circuit proxy voting ruling decide, and who does it bind?

A. The holding: a quorum counted by proxy is not a quorum

The facts were not in dispute, which is why the case turned purely on law. In May 2020, at the start of the COVID-19 pandemic, the House adopted House Resolution 965. It allowed a Member designated as a proxy to cast the vote of another Member or to record that Member’s presence, and it provided that a Member whose presence was recorded by proxy would be counted for the purpose of establishing a quorum. The House kept the rule in the next Congress. On December 23, 2022, it used the rule to pass the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2023. According to the en banc opinion, the final tally was 225 yeas and 201 nays, with one Member voting present and four not voting, and 226 Members recorded their presence and their vote by proxy. Fewer than a majority of the Members were physically in the chamber. The Senate passed the bill, and the President signed it as Public Law 117-328.

The constitutional text at the center of the case is the Quorum Clause of Article I, Section 5, which provides that “a Majority of each shall constitute a Quorum to do Business” and that a smaller number may adjourn from day to day and may be authorized to compel the attendance of absent Members. The next clause gives each House the power to determine the rules of its proceedings. The federal government argued two things: first, that courts may not look behind an enrolled bill signed by the presiding officers of both Houses, and second, that the House’s rulemaking power allowed it to decide that a proxy makes a Member present.

The majority, written by Judge Cory T. Wilson, rejected both arguments. On the first, it read the enrolled-bill rule as a rule about evidence: a signed bill is conclusive proof that it is the bill Congress passed, so a litigant cannot use journals or committee reports to show that the text differs. Texas did not dispute any fact about the vote. It accepted the House’s own record and argued that counting proxies was legally insufficient, which the court treated as a question of constitutional law that judges must decide. On the merits, the court concluded that the Quorum Clause does not allow proxies to be included when establishing a quorum. It relied on the Clause’s own reference to compelling the “Attendance” of “absent” Members, on Founding-era dictionaries and debates, on the Privilege from Arrest Clause, which also uses the word attendance, and on the absence of any example, between 1789 and 2023, of either House counting proxies toward a quorum. The Rulemaking Clause, the majority wrote, cannot be read to subsume the Quorum Clause, because a House has no power to determine the rules of its proceedings until a quorum is first present.

Two limits on the holding matter for anyone trying to predict what comes next. The court said expressly that it was not deciding whether Members taking part by videoconference could count as present; the only question was presence by proxy. It also explained that the long congressional practice of acting by unanimous consent, which presumes a quorum until someone questions it, is consistent with its reading, because that presumption rests on an actual quorum and is defeated when a vote discloses the absence of a quorum or a Member makes a point of no quorum. Judge James E. Graves Jr., joined by six colleagues, dissented. He read the Clause as leaving to each House the method of establishing presence, pointed to unanimous consent and voice votes as long-standing practices that do not require a physical majority, and concluded that “the majority’s decision is illogical, inexplicable, and invalid.” Judge Haynes dissented separately. The dissent also questioned why, if the whole Act was passed unconstitutionally, the judgment reaches only one small part of it.

B. Who is covered by the judgment, and who is not

The scope of the judgment is set by what Texas asked for. Texas sued the Attorney General, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), its officials and the Department of Justice. After a bench trial, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas found that Texas had standing to challenge the PWFA as a regulated employer, because of compliance costs, the burden of defending investigations and litigation, and the abrogation of its sovereign immunity. That last point refers to 42 U.S.C. § 2000gg-4, which provides that a State is not immune under the Eleventh Amendment from an action for a violation of the PWFA. The district court enjoined the enforcement of the PWFA against Texas and nothing more. The en banc court emphasized that it was not undoing every provision of the Act for everyone across the country, observed that the district court enjoined only the enforcement of the PWFA, and only against Texas, and stated that “our decision extends no further than affirming the relief awarded by the district court.”

For a pregnant employee of a Texas state agency, this means the federal enforcers of the PWFA are barred from enforcing it against her employer. The opinion does not discuss what happens to a PWFA charge that such an employee files, or whether she could pursue the employer under the PWFA by another route. She should therefore not build her plan around the PWFA and should look first at the protections described in Part II, which do not depend on the 2022 vote.

For private employers, the analysis is different, and geography matters. The PWFA applies to a “covered entity,” which includes an employer engaged in an industry affecting commerce with 15 or more employees. Nothing in the November 20 judgment releases a private employer from that statute. But the holding that the House did not validly pass the Act is now a published en banc decision of the court of appeals for the circuit made up of Louisiana, Mississippi and Texas under 28 U.S.C. § 41. An employer sued under the PWFA in one of those courts can now cite it in support of a motion to dismiss. Whether a given district court treats that holding as decisive for a private claim is for that court to decide, but one federal court in Texas has already accepted the same argument against a private employee. The cases discussed in this article are described as the courts’ published decisions describe them; the practical checks that follow are general in scope and make no findings about the conduct of any party.

That case is McEachin v. CommuniCare Health Foundation, No. 5:24-cv-01108 (W.D. Tex. July 3, 2025), a report and recommendation of a magistrate judge of the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas in San Antonio. A former employee sued two health-care entities under Title VII, the Americans with Disabilities Act, the Rehabilitation Act, the Family and Medical Leave Act and the PWFA. The defendants argued that the PWFA claims failed because the statute was passed in violation of the Quorum Clause. Relying on the 2024 district court opinion in the Texas case, the magistrate judge agreed and wrote: “Because the enactment of the PWFA violated the Quorum Clause, Plaintiff’s PWFA claims should be dismissed.” The district judge accepted the recommendation on July 24, 2025, dismissing every claim except the Title VII and FMLA claims against one defendant, with the Rehabilitation Act claims dismissed without prejudice. For a worker in Texas, McEachin shows that a PWFA claim against a private employer can be dismissed on the quorum ground before any court examines whether an accommodation was owed, while the Title VII claim in the same complaint goes forward. That ruling came while the appeal in the Texas case was still pending; a divided panel of the Fifth Circuit later reversed the injunction in 2025, and the full court then vacated that panel opinion, reheard the case and has now sided with the district court.

Two further points help avoid overreading the ruling. First, the same Public Law 117-328 contains many other statutes. One of them, the lactation break rule in 29 U.S.C. § 218d, was added to the Fair Labor Standards Act by division KK of that law and requires an employer to provide a reasonable break time to express breast milk for one year after the child’s birth and a place, other than a bathroom, that is shielded from view and free from intrusion, subject to an undue hardship exemption for employers with fewer than 50 employees. Texas sought relief only against the PWFA and a $20 million appropriation, and the court of appeals affirmed relief only as to the PWFA. Second, federal courts outside Louisiana, Mississippi and Texas sit in other circuits, and the decisions discussed in Part II show courts elsewhere deciding PWFA claims on their merits in 2026.

II. What should pregnant workers and employers do now?

A. The protections that do not depend on the 2022 vote

The most important protection for a pregnant worker in Texas is older than the PWFA and was not passed by proxy. In 1978, Congress added subsection (k) to the definitions section of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the provision known as the Pregnancy Discrimination Act. Under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k), discrimination “because of sex” includes discrimination because of pregnancy, childbirth or related medical conditions, and “women affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions shall be treated the same for all employment-related purposes” as other persons similar in their ability or inability to work. Title VII defines an employer as a person with fifteen or more employees, and its definition of person includes governments, governmental agencies and political subdivisions.

The difference between the two statutes is practical. The PWFA imposes a stand-alone duty to make reasonable accommodations to known limitations related to pregnancy, unless the employer can show undue hardship. Title VII’s pregnancy rule is an equal-treatment rule: the question is how the employer treats other workers who are similar in their ability or inability to work. So if your employer lets employees with a back injury avoid heavy lifting, gives light duty after an on-the-job injury, or approves schedule changes for medical appointments, a refusal to do the same for a pregnant employee is the kind of difference Title VII addresses. If no one else receives the change you need, Title VII may not require it, and that is the gap a stand-alone accommodation duty like the PWFA’s covers.

Texas law follows the same pattern. Chapter 21 of the Texas Labor Code provides, in Texas Labor Code § 21.106, that discrimination because of sex includes discrimination because of pregnancy, childbirth or a related medical condition, and that “A woman affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or a related medical condition shall be treated for all purposes related to employment” in the same manner as another individual similar in ability or inability to work. Chapter 21 defines employer to include private employers with 15 or more employees and, regardless of size, a county, municipality, state agency or state instrumentality. The chapter’s reasonable accommodation duty, in § 21.128, is written for a known physical or mental limitation of an otherwise qualified individual with a disability. A pregnancy-related condition that also meets the chapter’s definition of disability may therefore support an accommodation request under state law; an ordinary pregnancy, by itself, is handled under the equal-treatment rule.

Deadlines are where many otherwise valid claims are lost, so check them first. Under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1), a charge of discrimination under Title VII must be filed with the EEOC within one hundred and eighty days after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred. The same subsection extends the period to three hundred days when the person aggrieved has initially instituted proceedings with a State or local agency with authority to grant or seek relief, or to thirty days after notice that the State or local agency has terminated its proceedings, whichever is earlier. The PWFA borrows these procedures: 42 U.S.C. § 2000gg-2(a)(1) gives PWFA claimants the powers, remedies and procedures of sections 705, 706, 707, 709, 710 and 711 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and section 706 is codified at § 2000e-5. Under Texas law, § 21.202 of the Labor Code provides that a complaint “must be filed not later than the 180th day after the date the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred,” and that the Texas Workforce Commission shall dismiss an untimely complaint. Nothing in the November 20 opinion addresses these filing periods.

For a worker who is nursing after the birth, the lactation break rule in 29 U.S.C. § 218d remains a separate source of rights. The statute requires a notice to the employer and ten days to comply before an employee sues over the absence of a suitable place, except where the employee was fired for asking or the employer has said it will not provide one. That pre-suit notice is easy to give and worth putting in writing.

B. Making and answering an accommodation request that holds up

Wherever the PWFA is applied, the claim starts with what the employer was told. The statute defines a “known limitation” as a “physical or mental condition related to, affected by, or arising out of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions that the employee or employee’s representative has communicated to the employer”, whether or not the condition is a disability. The EEOC’s regulation explains how that communication works. Under 29 C.F.R. § 1636.3(d), a limitation is communicated when the employee or a representative makes the employer aware of it by talking to a supervisor, a manager, someone who regularly directs the employee’s tasks, human resources personnel or another appropriate official, or by following the employer’s request procedure. “The communication may be made orally, in writing, or by another effective means,” and it need not use specific words or a specific form. The eCFR version history shows no change to that section since June 18, 2024. In other words, the rule is generous about form but strict about substance: the employer must actually be made aware.

Two 2026 decisions show what that means in court. In Etkins v. Dive North Hills, No. 2:24-cv-01474 (W.D. Pa. May 28, 2026), the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania granted the employer summary judgment on all of a former restaurant manager’s PWFA claims while sending her Title VII pregnancy discrimination claim to a jury. The court applied the statutory definition of a known limitation and held that to prevail on any PWFA claim the employee had to show that she communicated her need for pregnancy-related accommodations; her deposition testimony about conversations on no longer lifting kegs or moving a pool table, together with her answer that she could not necessarily say the reason was her pregnancy, was by itself insufficient to show such a request. The lesson of Etkins for a pregnant worker is concrete: a PWFA claim can fail even when a Title VII claim survives, simply because the record does not show that the limitation and the need for a change were communicated to the employer.

The opposite outcome came a few days later in Valencia v. New U Women’s Clinic, No. 4:25-cv-05095 (E.D. Wash. June 2, 2026). There, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Washington denied an employer’s motion for partial summary judgment on a receptionist’s PWFA claim. The employer argued that she never made a formal accommodation request. The court noted that, once a known limitation has been communicated, the employee and the employer must engage in an interactive process, and it held that genuine disputes of material fact remained over whether her statements at a July 3, 2024 meeting, where she disclosed the pregnancy and pregnancy-related illness and raised the clinic’s grace period for tardiness, were a request for accommodation or put the employer on sufficient notice. Valencia shows the other side of the same rule: no magic words or formal form are required, but the employee’s words at a specific meeting become the evidence, and a jury may have to decide what they meant.

Read together, these decisions translate into a short list of checks that work in any State, whether or not a court ultimately applies the PWFA.

For an employee: name the limitation and the change you need in the same message, for example a lifting restriction, more frequent breaks, a seat, time off for appointments or a temporary transfer away from a task. Send it to someone the regulation lists, such as a supervisor or human resources, and keep a dated copy even if you also said it aloud. If you are in Texas, add the comparison that matters under Title VII and § 21.106: who else at work received light duty, schedule changes or lifting limits, and when. Note the date of any refusal, discipline, schedule cut or termination, because the 180-day periods run from the alleged unlawful practice. If you work for a Texas state agency, keep in mind that the federal enforcers are barred from enforcing the PWFA against your employer, and plan around Title VII and Chapter 21.

For an employer, including one inside the Fifth Circuit: the en banc ruling gives a defense argument against PWFA claims, not a safe harbor against pregnancy claims. A refusal that treats a pregnant employee worse than others similar in their ability to work remains exposed under Title VII and, in Texas, under § 21.106. The practical course is to keep handling requests through a documented interactive process, record the options considered and the reasons for the choice, and apply light-duty and scheduling policies consistently. The PWFA itself rewards that diligence where it applies: under 42 U.S.C. § 2000gg-2(g), damages under § 1981a may not be awarded on an accommodation claim if the employer demonstrates good faith efforts, in consultation with the employee, to identify and make a reasonable accommodation. Multi-state employers should not run one policy in Texas and another elsewhere without legal review, because Etkins and Valencia show courts outside the Fifth Circuit deciding PWFA claims on the merits.

Finally, watch the docket. If the federal government seeks review, the petition is due within the ninety-day period of 28 U.S.C. § 2101(c), extendable by up to sixty days for good cause. A grant of certiorari would put the quorum question before the Supreme Court; a denial, or no petition at all, would leave the en banc judgment in place in the Fifth Circuit. Either way, the ruling did not change the text of the PWFA, the EEOC’s regulation, Title VII or the Texas Labor Code. What it changed is the legal risk of relying on the PWFA alone in the three States of the Fifth Circuit.

Conclusion

The full Fifth Circuit has held that the House could not reach a quorum by counting proxies when it passed the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2023, and it affirmed an injunction that stops federal enforcement of the Pregnant Workers Fairness Act against the State of Texas. The judgment is narrow by its own terms, but its reasoning now sits in a published en banc opinion that employers in Louisiana, Mississippi and Texas can cite, and a federal court in San Antonio had already dismissed a private employee’s PWFA claims on the same ground in 2025. Pregnant workers in those States should treat Title VII’s pregnancy rule and, in Texas, Chapter 21 of the Labor Code as their primary protections, keep a written record of every request, and file within the 180-day periods described above. Employers should keep accommodating through a documented process, because equal-treatment claims remain fully available. Outside the Fifth Circuit, courts continue to apply the PWFA, and the outcome turns on whether the limitation was clearly communicated. The next date to watch is the deadline for a certiorari petition, which runs to February 18, 2027 if counted from November 20, 2026.

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