By Hassan Kohen, a lawyer at the Paris Bar.
The search parking rose sharply in the United Kingdom between 18 and 20 November 2026. The related search reported by Google concerns enforcement against unauthorised parking near an airport, and Google’s suggestions for airport parking fines include airport parking fine appeal and airport parking fine loophole. This article answers the legal questions behind those searches under the law of England and Wales (United Kingdom), as it stands on 22 November 2026: when a private operator can recover an unpaid parking charge from the registered keeper of a car, why land governed by airport byelaws is treated differently, how a charge can be challenged, and what planning and consumer law say about unofficial car parks set up near airports. Scotland and Northern Ireland are not covered, because the keeper-liability scheme discussed here extends to England and Wales only. The article does not describe any particular airport, operator or enforcement campaign: no official document establishing such facts was among the sources read for it, and those facts remain to be checked with the bodies concerned.
The core rule can be stated briefly. Schedule 4 to the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 allows a parking operator to pursue the keeper of a vehicle when it does not know who was driving, but only on what the Act calls relevant land and only if strict notice conditions are met. Land on which parking is already subject to statutory control, which can include land covered by airport byelaws, falls outside that scheme.
The method set out below is of general scope. It is information on English law written by a Paris law firm, not an assessment of any individual charge or car park.
I. Airport parking fines: who has to pay and when the keeper can be pursued
A. Airport parking fine appeal: the conditions for making the keeper pay
A private company cannot fine anyone. A fine is a criminal penalty imposed by a court. What a driver receives after parking on private land is a demand for a parking charge, and the vocabulary matters because it tells you which rules apply. The Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 gives effect, through section 56, to Schedule 4, which deals with the recovery of unpaid parking charges from the keeper or hirer of a vehicle. Paragraph 2 of that Schedule distinguishes two kinds of charge. Where the obligation arises under a contract with the driver, the parking charge is a sum in the nature of a fee or charge. Where there is no contract and the obligation arises from a trespass, it is a sum in the nature of damages, however the operator describes it, and it only counts as such if adequate notice of the sum was given to drivers, for example by signs that specify the sum as the charge for unauthorised parking and are adequate to bring it to drivers’ attention.
The Schedule applies whenever a driver is required to pay parking charges on relevant land and has not paid them in full. Paragraph 1(2) of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 adds: “It is immaterial for the purposes of this Schedule whether or not the vehicle was permitted to be parked (or to remain parked) on the land.” In other words, the scheme covers both the motorist who overstayed in a pay car park and the motorist who parked somewhere he or she was never allowed to park.
The heart of the Schedule is paragraph 4. Its first sub-paragraph reads: “The creditor has the right to recover any unpaid parking charges from the keeper of the vehicle.” That sentence is what makes the registered keeper the target of so many letters, and it is the provision on which the 2012 Act builds every condition that follows. The keeper is the person by whom the vehicle was kept when it was parked, which for a registered vehicle is presumed, unless the contrary is proved, to be the registered keeper. The right is not automatic. It applies only if the conditions in paragraphs 5, 6, 11 and 12 are met so far as applicable, and only if the vehicle was not stolen at the start of the parking period, a point on which the vehicle is presumed not to have been stolen unless the contrary is proved.
The first condition, in paragraph 5, is that the creditor has the right to enforce the charge against the driver but cannot do so because it does not know both the name of the driver and a current address for service for the driver. The keeper’s position therefore depends on what the operator knows. The notices addressed to the keeper must invite the keeper either to pay or, if the keeper was not the driver, to give the operator the name and a current address for service of the driver and to pass the notice on. The Schedule invites the keeper to do this; it does not itself impose a duty to name anyone. Timing matters, however. Under paragraph 5(2), once the creditor has begun proceedings against the keeper after the end of the 28 days beginning with the day on which the notice to keeper was given, the fact that the creditor does not know the driver’s details stops being a condition. A keeper who was not driving and wants to rely on that fact should say so within that 28-day window, not after a claim has been issued.
The second condition, in paragraph 6, concerns the notices themselves. There are two routes. In the first, the operator places a notice to driver on the vehicle and later sends a notice to keeper. Paragraph 7 requires the notice to driver to be given before the vehicle leaves the land at the end of the parking period and while it is stationary, by fixing it to the vehicle or handing it to the person who appears to be in charge of it. It must specify the vehicle, the land and the period of parking, describe the charges and the means by which they were brought to drivers’ attention, state the unpaid amount, mention any discount for prompt payment and the dispute arrangements available, identify the creditor and say how to pay, and state the time and date it was given. The later notice to keeper, governed by paragraph 8, must be delivered within the period of 28 days that follows the first 28 days after the day after the notice to driver was given. Put simply, a postal notice to keeper that follows a windscreen ticket cannot validly arrive before roughly the fifth week or after roughly the eighth week.
In the second route, common in camera-controlled car parks where no ticket is placed on the car, the operator sends only a notice to keeper under paragraph 9. That notice must be delivered within the period of 14 days beginning with the day after the day on which the period of parking ended. A notice sent by post is presumed, unless the contrary is proved, to have been delivered on the second working day after posting, and working days exclude Saturdays, Sundays and public holidays in England and Wales. A worked example shows how tight this is. If the parking period ended on Monday 2 November 2026, the 14-day period ran from Tuesday 3 to Monday 16 November. A notice posted on Thursday 12 November is presumed delivered on Monday 16 November, the last day. A notice posted on Friday 13 November is presumed delivered on Tuesday 17 November, one day too late, unless the operator proves that it actually arrived earlier.
The third condition, in paragraph 11, applies to registered vehicles. The operator must have applied for the keeper’s details within the relevant period and the Secretary of State must have provided them. The disclosure itself rests on regulation 27 of the Road Vehicles (Registration and Licensing) Regulations 2002, which allows particulars in the vehicle register to be made available “by any person who can show to the satisfaction of the Secretary of State that he has reasonable cause for wanting the particulars to be made available to him”. The same regulation allows a fee to be charged. The fourth condition, in paragraph 12, is that any requirements prescribed by regulations about the display of signs on the land were met at the start of the parking period, where such requirements apply.
Two further limits protect the keeper. Under paragraph 4(4), the right against the keeper can only be exercised after the end of the 28 days beginning with the day on which the notice to keeper is given. Under paragraph 4(5), the maximum the keeper can be made to pay through this right is the amount specified in the notice to keeper, less anything paid afterwards. Sums added later under other headings cannot be recovered from the keeper through the Schedule 4 right, although paragraph 4(6) preserves any other remedy the creditor may have, without double recovery. Hire vehicles follow a separate track: under paragraphs 13 and 14, a hire firm that supplies the operator, within 28 days, with a signed statement, a copy of the hire agreement and the hirer’s signed statement of liability shifts the claim to the hirer, who must then receive a notice to hirer within 21 days and is given 21 days before the right can be exercised.
How an appeal works follows from the notices themselves. Each notice must state the arrangements for the resolution of disputes or complaints that are available, and the Schedule says those arrangements include the operator’s own informal procedure for representations and any arrangement under which a dispute may be referred to independent adjudication or arbitration. In practice, the first step is to read the notice against the checklist above: the land, the period, the amount, the date of the notice, the date it was posted and the dispute information. Missing or late information is not a technicality when the keeper is being pursued, because the right in paragraph 4 depends on it. The second step is to use the routes the notice itself names, in writing, within the periods it states, and to keep copies.
Consumer law adds a further layer where the parking contract is a consumer contract between a trader and a consumer. Under section 62 of the Consumer Rights Act 2015, an unfair term of a consumer contract is not binding on the consumer, and the same applies to an unfair consumer notice. A term is unfair if, contrary to the requirement of good faith, it causes a significant imbalance in the parties’ rights and obligations to the detriment of the consumer, judged by reference to the subject matter and all the circumstances when it was agreed. If the charge reaches a courtroom, section 71 of the Consumer Rights Act 2015 requires the court to consider whether the term is fair even if neither party has raised the point, provided it has enough legal and factual material to do so.
B. Airport parking fine loophole: why land under airport byelaws is different
The word loophole, typed so often next to airport parking, describes a real feature of the statute, but one that is narrower than it sounds. Schedule 4 only applies on relevant land. Paragraph 3(1) excludes three categories: a highway maintainable at the public expense, a parking place provided or controlled by a traffic authority such as a council, and any other land on which the parking of a vehicle is subject to statutory control. Paragraph 3(3) of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 then explains that parking is subject to statutory control “if any statutory provision imposes a liability (whether criminal or civil, and whether in the form of a fee or charge or a penalty of any kind) in respect of the parking on that land” of vehicles generally or of the kind of vehicle concerned.
A statutory provision, for this purpose, means a provision of any Act or of any subordinate legislation, and the Schedule defines subordinate legislation as “an Order in Council or any order, regulations, byelaws or other legislative instrument”, in the wording of paragraph 3(4) of the 2012 Act. Byelaws are therefore expressly included. If byelaws impose a liability for parking on a given piece of land, that land is not relevant land and the keeper-liability route of Schedule 4 is not available there.
Airports are where this matters most, because many airports have byelaws. Section 63 of the Airports Act 1986 allows the operator of an airport that is designated for that purpose by an order of the Secretary of State, or managed by the Secretary of State, to make byelaws for regulating the use and operation of the airport and the conduct of everyone within it. Those byelaws may, among other things, regulate vehicular traffic within the airport and provide “for restricting or regulating the parking of vehicles or their use for any purpose or in any manner specified in the byelaws”, in the words of section 63(2)(d) of the Airports Act 1986. Byelaws made by an operator other than the Secretary of State do not take effect until the Secretary of State confirms them.
Breaching such byelaws is a matter for the criminal courts, not an invoice. Section 64(1) of the Airports Act 1986 provides that “Any person contravening any byelaws made under section 63 shall be liable on summary conviction to a fine” not exceeding the amount the byelaws specify, and section 64(2) caps that amount at level 4 on the standard scale. A byelaw case is therefore a prosecution of the person who contravened the byelaw, leading on summary conviction to a fine, and not a private demand addressed to whoever happens to be the registered keeper.
Put together, these provisions produce the result that circulates online: where an airport’s byelaws impose a liability for parking in the place where the car stood, an operator cannot use Schedule 4 to make the registered keeper liable for a parking charge there. Three qualifications prevent this from becoming a misleading shortcut.
First, everything turns on the exact land. Not every airport is designated, not every set of byelaws regulates parking, and section 63(2)(k) allows byelaws to restrict the area that counts as the airport for their purposes. Section 63(2)(d) also leaves out roads within the airport to which the road traffic enactments apply. A drop-off zone, a staff car park, a multi-storey and an access road can therefore fall under different regimes. The only reliable answer comes from the byelaws in force for that airport, read together with any plan defining their area.
Second, the driver is still exposed. Schedule 4 adds a route against the keeper; it does not abolish the operator’s claim against the driver. Paragraph 5 itself presupposes that the creditor has the right to enforce the charge against the driver, and paragraph 4(6) preserves other remedies. On byelaw land, the question in a dispute therefore shifts to who was driving and whether the operator can prove it.
Third, the byelaws themselves remain. Where parking is regulated by byelaws, the operator or the authorities may choose the byelaw route, which leads to prosecution of the person who contravened, rather than to a private demand. The so-called loophole closes one door to private operators; it does not make unauthorised parking at an airport lawful.
A recent amendment shows that Parliament treats these exclusions as a matter of policy. The text of paragraph 3(4) read on 22 November 2026 records that, since 26 December 2025, an order made in 2025 (S.I. 2025/1256) has excluded from the definition certain railway byelaws, namely byelaws made by the Strategic Rail Authority under section 219 of the Transport Act 2000 and preserved by section 46(4) of the Railways Act 2005. As a result, those railway byelaws no longer take railway land such as station car parks outside Schedule 4, and the keeper-liability route can now apply there if its conditions are met and no other statutory control applies. The same text contains no comparable exception for airport byelaws, so on 22 November 2026 the airport position described above is unchanged.
One last rule applies to all private land in England and Wales, airport or not. Section 54 of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 makes it an offence, without lawful authority, to immobilise a motor vehicle with a clamp or similar device, or to move or restrict its movement, with the intention of preventing its removal by a person otherwise entitled to remove it. The driver’s consent, express or implied, is not lawful authority, except where movement is restricted by a fixed barrier that was already in place when the vehicle was parked. The offence is punishable by a fine.
II. Illegal airport parking: unofficial car parks, council enforcement and drivers’ rights
A. Unofficial airport car parks and planning law: the 28-day allowance and council enforcement
The searches about enforcement against unauthorised parking near an airport concern a different problem: car parks set up without permission on fields or yards close to an airport, often operated as meet-and-greet services. Here the law in play is planning law, not Schedule 4, and the rules below apply to England.
Development requires planning permission: section 57(1) of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 provides that planning permission is required for the carrying out of any development of land.
What counts as development is defined in section 55(1) of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990: building, engineering, mining or other operations, or “the making of any material change in the use of any buildings or other land”. The Act does not list car storage as such. The question is whether the use actually made of a field, for example as a compound where travellers’ cars are kept for days or weeks in return for payment, amounts to a material change of use, and that turns on the facts.
Some temporary uses are permitted without an application. Class B of Part 4 of Schedule 2 to the Town and Country Planning (General Permitted Development) (England) Order 2015 permits the use of any land for any purpose for not more than 28 days in total in any calendar year, of which no more than 14 days may be for markets or motor racing, together with moveable structures for that use. Class B does not apply where the land is a building or within the curtilage of a building, nor to the siting of most caravans, to camping outside festivals, to the display of advertisements or to motor sports, clay pigeon shooting and war games within a site of special scientific interest. Once the 28 days have been used up in a calendar year, Class B no longer authorises the use, and permission is needed for any further use that amounts to development. This is the arithmetic behind the frequent references to a 28-day rule: it is an allowance, not a permanent exemption.
Carrying out development without the required permission is a breach of planning control under section 171A of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990, and the same section lists what counts as enforcement action, including, for land in England, an enforcement warning notice. Councils acting as local planning authorities have three main tools against an unofficial car park.
The quickest is the temporary stop notice. Under section 171E of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990, where the authority thinks that there has been a breach of planning control and that it is expedient for the activity to stop immediately, it may issue a written notice that specifies the activity, prohibits it and gives reasons. The notice may be served on the person carrying on the activity, an occupier or a person with an interest in the land, and a copy must be displayed on the land with a statement of its effect. It takes effect when the copy is first displayed and, for an authority in England, lasts for 56 days unless a shorter period is specified or it is withdrawn.
The longer-term tool is the enforcement notice. Section 172 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 allows the authority to issue one where it appears that there has been a breach of planning control and that it is expedient to do so, having regard to the development plan and other material considerations. A copy must be served on the owner and the occupier of the land and on others with a materially affected interest, not more than 28 days after the notice is issued and not less than 28 days before the date on which it is to take effect.
The owner or occupier can challenge it. Under section 174 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990, a person with an interest in the land or a relevant occupier may appeal to the Secretary of State on grounds that include that planning permission ought to be granted, that the matters alleged have not occurred, that they do not amount to a breach of planning control, that the notice was not properly served, or that the steps required or the period for compliance are excessive or too short. For land in England, the ground that permission ought to be granted is generally not available where the notice was issued after a related planning application had been made, subject to an exception once two years have passed after that application ceased to be under consideration.
Non-compliance is a crime. Section 179 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 makes the owner of the land guilty of an offence if any required step has not been taken, or any prohibited activity is still being carried on, after the compliance period has ended, subject to a defence of having done everything that could be expected to secure compliance. Anyone else who has control of or an interest in the land must not carry on the prohibited activity or cause or permit it. The penalty is a fine, on summary conviction or on indictment, and in fixing it “the court shall in particular have regard to any financial benefit which has accrued or appears likely to accrue to him in consequence of the offence”, as section 179(9) of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 provides. For a paid car park, that provision allows the profit made from the unlawful use to weigh on the fine.
Vehicles left on the land raise a further question. Section 55 of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 extended section 99 of the Road Traffic Regulation Act 1984, which deals with the removal of vehicles illegally, obstructively or dangerously parked, or abandoned or broken down, so that it reaches other land as well as roads. Residents affected by an unofficial car park can therefore expect the response to combine planning tools with the separate powers that concern vehicles. For anyone reporting a site to the planning authority, the most useful evidence is dated: the days on which cars were present, the number of vehicles and signs of a paid service, since the 28-day allowance is counted in days per calendar year.
B. Drivers who used an unofficial car park: damaged cars, missed collections and refunds
Travellers who booked one of these services are in a different position again. Whether or not the site has planning permission, the booking is normally a contract for a service between a trader and a consumer, and the Consumer Rights Act 2015 sets minimum standards that the trader cannot contract out of.
The first standard is care. Section 49(1) of the Consumer Rights Act 2015 states: “Every contract to supply a service is to be treated as including a term that the trader must perform the service with reasonable care and skill.” For a parking or meet-and-greet service, that duty covers how the car is driven, where it is kept and how it is returned. A car returned with new damage, with unexplained mileage or late enough to make the customer miss a connection raises an obvious question under that term, which the customer will need to support with evidence.
The second standard is honesty about the service. Under section 50 of the Consumer Rights Act 2015, anything said or written to the consumer by or on behalf of the trader about the trader or the service becomes a term of the contract if the consumer took it into account when deciding to enter into the contract or when making a later decision about the service. Statements on a booking site about a secure compound, patrols, insurance cover, approval by the airport or the location where cars are kept are typical examples. If they turn out to be untrue, the trader is in breach of contract. Screenshots taken at the time of booking are therefore valuable.
The remedies follow from section 54 of the Consumer Rights Act 2015. If the service does not conform to the contract, the consumer may require repeat performance or claim a price reduction, and section 54(7) confirms that other remedies remain available, including claiming damages, recovering money paid where the consideration has failed, treating the contract as at an end and relying on the breach as a defence to a claim by the trader. A consumer cannot recover twice for the same loss.
The trader cannot escape these duties through small print. Section 57 of the Consumer Rights Act 2015 provides that a term is not binding on the consumer to the extent that it would exclude the trader’s liability for failing to perform the service with reasonable care and skill, or exclude its liability for what it said about the service, and that a term restricting that liability is not binding where it would prevent the consumer, in an appropriate case, from recovering the price paid. Other restrictions remain subject to the general fairness test in section 62 described in Part I.
Finally, the two halves of this article can meet. If a car left with a parking service ends up parked on private land and a parking charge follows, the letter will usually go to the registered keeper, who is the traveller. Under Schedule 4, the notice to keeper must invite a keeper who was not driving to give the name and a current address for service of the driver. A traveller whose car was being driven by the service’s staff at the time can use that invitation, within the 28-day window described above, and keep the booking confirmation and handover records to show who had control of the car. The same records will support any claim against the service under the Consumer Rights Act 2015 for the charge and the time lost.
Conclusion
The searches about airport parking fines and loopholes in England and Wales lead to three distinct sets of rules. On private land that counts as relevant land, an operator can pursue the registered keeper for an unpaid parking charge only if it has met the conditions of Schedule 4 to the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012, in particular the content and timing of its notices, the 28-day waiting period and the cap on the amount recoverable; those conditions are also the backbone of any appeal. On land where parking is subject to statutory control, including land where airport byelaws made under the Airports Act 1986 impose a liability for parking, Schedule 4 does not apply, but the driver can still be pursued and the byelaws can still be enforced by prosecution. Since 26 December 2025, certain railway byelaws no longer have that effect, while airport byelaws still do.
Unofficial car parks near airports are governed by planning law. The 28-day allowance for temporary uses is limited to 28 days in a calendar year, after which councils can use temporary stop notices, enforcement notices and prosecutions in which the profit made counts towards the fine. Travellers who used such services keep the protection of the Consumer Rights Act 2015, which requires reasonable care and skill, makes the trader’s statements binding and prevents those duties from being excluded.
In any given case, the decisive facts still have to be established: which land the car was on, which byelaws or planning permissions applied there, who was driving, and what each notice said and when it arrived. This article is general information on the law of England and Wales on 22 November 2026 and does not report the facts of any particular airport, operator or enforcement operation.