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America Used Its Secret Terror Court for the First Time: The Haji Zada Removal of 11 September 2026 and What France Would Test

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Source: French Court of Cassation – Judilibre and Légifrance open data

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America Used Its Secret Terror Court for the First Time: The Haji Zada Removal of 11 September 2026 and What France Would Test

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On 11 September 2026, the United States Department of Justice announced that it had deported an Afghan woman through a court that had never decided a single case in thirty years of existence. Nazira Haji Zada, 47, accused of helping her son and son-in-law prepare a foiled Islamic State-aligned plot aimed at the 2024 American election, was removed to Afghanistan after conceding that she was an “alien terrorist” and waiving her right to appeal. The forum was the Alien Terrorist Removal Court, created by Congress in 1996 so the government could deport suspected terrorists without exposing classified secrets in ordinary immigration proceedings, and left dormant until the current administration activated it this summer. The chief judge of that court, Joan Ericksen, had given an initial green light earlier this summer; by 20 August the case was over by agreement, with the major questions about secret evidence left unanswered. Attorney General Todd Blanche called it a win for national security and the rule of law, while FBI Director Kash Patel promised the tool would be used more often. For an international audience, and especially for anyone who could one day face a removal file in France, the case raises the exact questions French law answers differently: who decides, what the accused gets to see, which residents are shielded, and how a criminal terrorism file connects to the border.

I. America Deported an Accused Terrorist Through a Court That Never Sat: How the First ATRC Case Worked

A. Who Is Nazira Haji Zada and Why Did She Concede She Was an Alien Terrorist?

Nazira Haji Zada lived near Dallas, Texas. She did not speak English and could not read or write, according to the court filings unsealed around the 11 September announcement. The Justice Department accused her of assisting two close relatives, her son and her son-in-law, in planning a terrorist attack that was ultimately foiled before the 2024 presidential election. In the sparse public filings submitted to the Alien Terrorist Removal Court, prosecutors described her as indoctrinating her family with ISIS ideology and taking concrete steps to support the plans of her sons, as the filings put it. Her son is now serving a fifteen-year federal sentence after pleading guilty to obtaining firearms in support of a terrorist organisation. Her son-in-law, described in the filings as the driving force behind the ISIS-aligned plot, has reached a plea deal with prosecutors but had not been sentenced at the time of her removal.

What makes the file remarkable is not only the charge but the way it ended. Rather than litigating the secret-evidence machinery to a judgment, Haji Zada reached an agreement with the Department of Justice: by 20 August 2026 she accepted deportation, conceded the statutory designation of alien terrorist, and waived her right to appeal the removal order. The concession matters because the designation is a term defined in American immigration law, and contesting it would have forced the court to rule, for the first time, on how much of the classified case the accused and her cleared counsel are entitled to test. That ruling will now have to wait for the next case. The public record therefore contains the government’s narrative, an agreement, and a removal, but no judicial stress-test of the procedure. Anyone reading the case as a precedent should keep that limit in mind: the first use of the court produced an order, not a reasoned validation of its most controversial features.

The political framing was unambiguous. Attorney General Todd Blanche presented the removal as a landmark victory for national security and the rule of law, stating that people who support terrorism should not be living in the United States and that this first case showed the Department would use every available tool to protect the country, as reported by CNN. FBI Director Kash Patel likewise described the case as historic and vital for the protection of the homeland, noting that the removed woman had supported a family plot aligned with ISIS sympathisers, according to the same reporting. Administration officials made clear this was a beginning rather than an experiment, promising that the court would be used more often. For foreign nationals living in the United States, the message is that a parallel removal track now exists beside the ordinary immigration courts, reserved for terrorism-labelled files and built around secrecy.

Three practical features of the American track deserve attention from a French lawyer’s perspective, because each has a French counterpart that works differently. First, the case is heard by Article III federal judges rather than by the executive-branch immigration judges who handle routine deportations, which the administration presents as a guarantee of independence. Second, the government may keep classified information hidden not only from the public but from the non-citizen herself, with only security-cleared counsel bridging the gap. Third, the statute was designed for speed: removal without a full criminal trial, on the basis of a terrorist designation, with the ordinary immigration avenues set aside where secrecy is at stake. France knows each of these problems, secret evidence, specialisation of the bench, and speed in terrorism removals, and answers them through the administrative expulsion regime, the criminal terrorism chapters of the Penal Code, and review by the administrative courts. The comparison is where the real lesson of the Haji Zada case lies for readers exposed to French procedure.

B. Secret Evidence the Accused Never Sees: Can That Survive an Appeal?

The most debated feature of the Alien Terrorist Removal Court is its handling of classified material. Under the court’s procedures, the Justice Department may shield from the public, and even from the immigrant facing removal, the classified information underlying the alien-terrorist designation. In ordinary American removal proceedings, the non-citizen sees the evidence and answers it. Before the ATRC, the accused may never learn why, in detail, the government considers her a terrorist, because disclosing the material could compromise sources and methods. Congress accepted that trade-off in 1996 precisely for cases where a normal immigration hearing would force the government to choose between protecting secrets and removing the suspect. That is the forum’s entire reason for existing, and also the reason no administration touched it for three decades: every use invites a constitutional confrontation over due process and the right to confront the case against you.

In the Haji Zada file, that confrontation never happened. The newly unsealed documents give no sign that Judge Ericksen, after authorising the case to proceed in the tribunal earlier this summer, subjected the administration’s arguments to further adversarial testing before the August agreement ended the matter. The woman’s illiteracy and lack of English, documented in the filings, sharpen the question: a system built on cleared counsel and summaries must work hardest for the accused least able to follow it, and here the file closed by consent before any judge had to decide whether the summaries were enough. Future respondents may refuse to concede, and then the court will have to answer the questions this case dodged: what level of disclosure satisfies due process, whether the judge must review the full classified record on her own motion, and what remedy follows if the secret core of the file cannot be shared even in summary form. The administration’s promise to use the court more often guarantees those answers will come, in a contested case, sooner rather than later.

There is a second unanswered question with direct consequences for families: the relationship between the removal track and the parallel criminal cases. Haji Zada’s son was already convicted and sentenced to fifteen years; her son-in-law had pleaded but awaited sentence. The mother’s removal does not decide their files, but it reshapes them: a deported witness who conceded a terrorist designation cannot easily be called by the defence, and the narrative fixed in the removal filings will hover over any sentencing or cooperation discussion. American prosecutors often run criminal and immigration tracks in parallel, and the ATRC adds a fast lane that can outpace the criminal docket. Defence lawyers in the coming cases will have to decide very early whether to fight the designation, seek the same kind of negotiated departure Haji Zada accepted, or attack the classified foundation and force the first real ruling on the procedure. Each choice carries a different price, and the twenty-day-style urgency of a removal calendar compresses the time to make it.

The European reader should also register what the American system does not require here and what France would never skip. There was no finding by a criminal court of guilt against Haji Zada herself, no adversarial hearing on the facts in open court, and no second-level review, because appeal was waived as part of the deal. The removal rests on a designation plus consent. French administrative law allows removals without a prior criminal conviction too, but it surrounds that power with a collegial pre-removal hearing, a reasoned order, and review by the administrative judge, with the European Convention on Human Rights operating as a backstop against return to torture or inhuman treatment. That contrast sets up the second half of this analysis: if a Haji Zada-type file landed on a French prefect’s desk, which rules would frame it, and which shields could the person invoke?

II. What France Would Test Before Deporting a Terror Suspect

A. Expulsion for Terrorism in France: Who Decides and What Shield Do Long-Term Residents Keep?

In France, the removal of a foreign national for terrorism-related reasons runs first through administrative expulsion, ordered by the State rather than by a criminal court. The statutory key is Article L. 631-1 of the Code on the Entry and Stay of Foreigners and Asylum, which provides: “L’autorité administrative peut décider d’expulser un étranger lorsque sa présence en France constitue une menace grave pour l’ordre public, sous réserve des conditions propres aux étrangers mentionnés aux articles L. 631-2 et L. 631-3.” The doctrine is deliberately broad: a serious threat to public order, assessed on behaviour, associations, and intelligence, without waiting for a criminal conviction. Supporting an ISIS-aligned family plot of the kind described in the American filings would fall squarely within the conduct the text targets, and the prefect could act on police and intelligence reporting even while criminal proceedings were still running.

But the French system pairs that breadth with a procedural lock that has no equivalent in the ATRC’s secret track. Article L. 632-1 of the same Code states: “L’expulsion ne peut être édictée que dans les conditions suivantes : 1° L’étranger est préalablement avisé dans des conditions fixées par décret en Conseil d’Etat ; 2° L’étranger est convoqué pour être entendu par une commission qui se réunit à la demande de l’autorité administrative”, a panel chaired by the president of the local judicial court alongside a second judge and an administrative-court judge. The person is summoned, heard, assisted by counsel, and given access to the file on which the expulsion would rest. The only statutory bypass is stated in the same article: “Le présent article ne s’applique pas en cas d’urgence absolue.” Absolute urgency allows the minister to sign first and hear later, but it is an exception the administrative judge polices closely, and it must be justified by facts, not asserted as a label. An illiterate foreign woman who cannot read French would, in this framework, be entitled to interpretation and to a lawyer who sees the file, two guarantees the American secret-evidence model structurally weakens.

The third French lock is the shield granted to settled residents, and here terrorism is the legislator’s chosen exception. Article L. 631-3 of the Code protects foreigners rooted in France, those who arrived before thirteen, long-term regular residents, spouses of French nationals, parents of French children, by providing that they may only be expelled for conduct “de nature à porter atteinte aux intérêts fondamentaux de l’Etat, dont la violation délibérée et d’une particulière gravité des principes de la République énoncés à l’article L. 412-7, ou liés à des activités à caractère terroriste, ou constituant des actes de provocation explicite et délibérée à la discrimination, à la haine ou à la violence contre une personne déterminée ou un groupe de personnes”. In plain terms: deep roots raise the bar, but terrorism-linked activity clears it. A French court reviewing a Haji Zada-type expulsion would therefore ask two ordered questions. First, does the person belong to a protected category, and second, does the file establish terrorist-linked behaviour capable of lifting that protection. Indoctrinating relatives into ISIS ideology and materially supporting an attack plan would be argued by the administration as exactly the kind of terrorist-linked conduct the exception was written for, while the defence would attack the proof, the individual’s real role as opposed to her family’s, and the proportionality of removal measured against private and family life.

Above the statutes sits the European backstop that American procedure does not have to satisfy. A removal from France to a country where the person faces torture, inhuman treatment, or a flagrant denial of justice can be blocked by the administrative judge applying the European Convention on Human Rights, and in imminent cases by interim relief suspending the flight. Afghanistan, the country of destination in the American case, is precisely the kind of destination that would trigger that review in a French file, with the judge examining prison conditions, the documented treatment of returned terrorism suspects, and the personal risk profile of the individual. The French file would also have to survive review of the reasoning itself: the order must state the facts, not merely repeat the word terrorism, and the judge verifies that the facts support the qualification. Secret intelligence may inform the file, but the person must be put in a position to discuss the substance, if necessary through procedures that protect sources while disclosing the gist. That is the structural difference with the ATRC: France accepts intelligence-driven removals but refuses designation-plus-consent removals without a judge checking the designation.

B. From Criminal Conviction to Removal: How France Links Terror Sentences to the Border

The American file shows the other half of the machinery: criminal punishment first, removal second. Haji Zada’s son drew fifteen years for firearms support to a terrorist organisation, and the mother’s removal followed the family’s criminal exposure. French law organises the same sequence explicitly, and more severely for the convicted person. The definition of the terrorist offence itself is broad. Article 421-1 of the Penal Code provides: “Constituent des actes de terrorisme, lorsqu’elles sont intentionnellement en relation avec une entreprise individuelle ou collective ayant pour but de troubler gravement l’ordre public par l’intimidation ou la terreur, les infractions suivantes : 1° Les atteintes volontaires à la vie, les atteintes volontaires à l’intégrité de la personne, l’enlèvement et la séquestration ainsi que le détournement d’aéronef, de navire ou de tout autre moyen de transport, définis par le livre II du présent code”. Ordinary violent offences become terrorist offences once tied to an enterprise aimed at seriously disturbing public order through intimidation or terror, which is exactly how prosecutors would frame family support for an election attack plot. And the net widens further with Article 421-2-1 of the Penal Code: “Constitue également un acte de terrorisme le fait de participer à un groupement formé ou à une entente établie en vue de la préparation, caractérisée par un ou plusieurs faits matériels, d’un des actes de terrorisme mentionnés aux articles précédents.” Participation in a group formed to prepare, evidenced by concrete material acts, is itself terrorism. Acquiring weapons, scouting a target, transferring funds, or hosting plotters can each qualify without waiting for the attack.

Conviction then opens the border sanction that French criminal courts impose directly. Article 131-30 of the Penal Code allows that “La peine d’interdiction du territoire français peut être prononcée, à titre définitif ou pour une durée de dix ans au plus, à l’encontre de tout étranger coupable d’un crime”, and adds that “L’interdiction du territoire entraîne de plein droit la reconduite du condamné à la frontière, le cas échéant, à l’expiration de sa peine d’emprisonnement ou de réclusion.” The criminal judge weighs the length of presence and the depth of ties to France before imposing it, but once imposed, removal at the end of the sentence follows by operation of law. Had the Haji Zada facts been prosecuted in France, each convicted family member could have left prison with a pre-ordered ticket to the border, decided in open court, reasoned in the judgment, and appealable with the conviction itself. That is the French answer to the American sequencing problem: the border consequence is debated during the criminal trial, with full defence rights, rather than in a separate secret forum afterwards.

France also knows the third-country handover problem that runs through every terrorism file with branches abroad, and its courts have drawn hard lines around it. When a person surrendered by one European state is then wanted for extradition to a non-European state, French law requires the consent of the state that surrendered her. The Cour de cassation said so unequivocally on 2 December 2020 in case No. 19-87.428, quashing a refusal to extradite precisely because the lower court had added a consent condition the statute does not contain for that configuration, while recalling the governing rule that “la chambre de l’instruction donne un avis défavorable à l’extradition si elle estime que les conditions légales ne sont pas remplies ou qu’il y a une erreur évidente.” The operative text it applied, Article 695-21, II of the Code of Criminal Procedure, states that a person surrendered under a European arrest warrant “ne peut être extradée vers un Etat non membre de l’Union européenne sans le consentement de l’autorité compétente de l’Etat membre qui l’a remise.” The dispositif was blunt: “CASSE et ANNULE, en toutes ses dispositions, l’arrêt susvisé de la chambre de l’instruction de la cour d’appel de Douai, en date du 15 novembre 2019”. The lesson for any multi-state terrorism file is that France treats onward surrender as a consent-gated act, checked by the chambre de l’instruction and then by the Cour de cassation, never as an administrative shortcut. And where extradition itself is requested, Article 696-4 of the Code of Criminal Procedure lists the bars that protect the person, opening with the rule that “L’extradition n’est pas accordée : 1° Lorsque la personne réclamée a la nationalité française”, continuing through political offences, prior French judgment, time bars, and penalties contrary to French public order. Each bar is examined in open proceedings, on a file the defence can read.

Put the two systems side by side and the trade becomes visible. The American ATRC buys speed and secrecy at the price of adversarial testing: a designation, a cleared counsel, a consent, a plane. The French regime buys adversarial testing at the price of complexity: a collegial hearing before removal, a criminal trial that can itself order the ban from the territory, administrative-judge review of the facts and the reasoning, and European human-rights review of the destination. Neither system leaves the terrorism suspect untouched. But only one of them lets the accusation travel from intelligence file to tarmac without a judge ever ruling on what the accused was not allowed to see. The next contested ATRC case will decide whether that economy survives contact with an accused who refuses to concede. Until then, the Haji Zada removal stands as a demonstration of power and a warning about proof: the faster the track, the more the consent that ends the file looks like the product of the secrecy that framed it.

Conclusion

The first use of the Alien Terrorist Removal Court will be remembered for what it did and for what it avoided. It removed Nazira Haji Zada to Afghanistan within weeks of activation, on a conceded designation, without a single ruling on the secret-evidence procedures that define the forum. The administration presents that as efficiency and promises repetition. A French lawyer reads the same file as a checklist of everything domestic law would have demanded: a heard defence, a reasoned order, a collegial commission except in proven absolute urgency, criminal qualification debated in open court, a territorial ban pronounced with the sentence, and a judge verifying both the facts and the safety of the destination. Readers facing any cross-border terrorism allegation, in America or in France, should draw the same practical lesson from both systems: act in the first days, secure counsel cleared to see the whole file, challenge the designation before consenting to anything, and build the private-life and country-risk record early, because once the plane is chartered, no court un-flies it.

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