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Bahrain Spyware Ruling: Can Victims Sue a Foreign State in France?

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Source: French Court of Cassation – Judilibre and Légifrance open data

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Bahrain Spyware Ruling: Can Victims Sue a Foreign State in France?

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A divided judgment from the United Kingdom’s highest court has turned a remote spyware operation into a live question for every jurisdiction that hosts the device of a targeted person. On 27 July 2026, in The Kingdom of Bahrain v Shehabi and another, [2026] UKSC 25, a three-to-two majority held that Bahrain could not rely on state immunity at the preliminary stage of a claim brought by two activists who said that FinSpy had infected their computers while they were in the United Kingdom. The court did not award damages, make a final finding that Bahrain was responsible, or decide the truth of every pleaded allegation. It decided that the claim could pass the immunity gateway and continue. That distinction matters for France. A French resident whose phone or laptop was targeted from abroad cannot treat the British judgment as an automatic cause of action. The person must still establish a French forum, serve a foreign state correctly, overcome France’s restrictive but real rules on state immunity, prove attribution and causation, and address enforcement as a separate problem. Yet the judgment supplies a powerful territorial argument: a cyber operation is not necessarily located only where an operator typed commands or where a control server sat. If the legally significant intrusion, surveillance, personal injury or property damage occurred in France, a French court would have a serious reason to examine the claim rather than dismiss it at the door. This is the cross-border lesson of the Bahrain ruling as at 29 August 2026.

I. Can a foreign state invoke immunity after spyware reaches a victim in France?

A. What did the UK Supreme Court actually decide in [2026] UKSC 25?

The case arose from a pleaded account of transnational surveillance. Dr Saeed Shehabi and Moosa Mohammed, activists living in the United Kingdom, alleged that servants or agents of Bahrain infected their computers with FinSpy. The alleged operators were outside the United Kingdom, the command-and-control server was in Bahrain, and the computers and victims were in the United Kingdom. The claim was framed around harassment and psychiatric injury after the victims learned that their devices had been compromised. Bahrain’s preliminary application was not a trial on whether the infection occurred. It asked the court to declare that the Kingdom was immune from the jurisdiction of the English courts.

The statutory starting point was section 1 of the United Kingdom’s State Immunity Act 1978. Foreign states generally receive immunity from the jurisdiction of United Kingdom courts, subject to exceptions. The relevant exception, section 5, concerns proceedings relating to death, personal injury or damage to tangible property “caused by an act or omission in the United Kingdom”. The European Convention on State Immunity supplied a related treaty context, but the majority’s task was to interpret the domestic words enacted by Parliament.

By a majority, Lord Lloyd-Jones, Lord Hamblen and Lady Simler dismissed Bahrain’s appeal. The court’s official summary records the core test in compact language: “a legally causative act is required”. The majority rejected the idea that the only relevant act had to be the first keystroke or the physical act of an operator at a foreign workstation. A causative act can include a remote or automated operation whose legally significant effects are produced in the forum.

The majority also rejected an additional requirement that the person responsible for the operation must have been physically present in the United Kingdom. The official summary states that the statutory exception contains no such express condition. On the assumed facts, the spyware did not merely create an abstract consequence in Britain. It entered computers located there, enabled surveillance of people located there and caused alleged psychiatric injury there. The territorial connection was therefore sufficient to prevent immunity from ending the claim before the evidence could be tested.

This is a procedural holding, not a merits verdict. The Supreme Court did not say that every remote intrusion is committed in the country where a device happens to be located. It did not decide that Bahrain’s agents in fact carried out the alleged operation. It did not determine the amount of any loss, the reliability of the technical evidence or the ultimate responsibility of the state. The result was narrower and more useful: when the pleaded facts disclose a legally causative intrusion and injury in the forum, a foreign state cannot necessarily win by saying that its personnel and servers were abroad.

The two dissenting judgments expose the boundary of the ruling. Lord Leggatt and Lord Burrows considered that the relevant acts occurred where the foreign agents acted, while the computer events in the United Kingdom were effects. Their concern was legal certainty. If the location of an act follows the location of a receiving device, a state could face proceedings in many countries without its agents ever crossing a border. The majority answered that the statute required causation, not an exclusive initiating act, and that remote technology cannot erase the territorial sovereignty of the state in which the surveillance takes place.

For practitioners, the split matters as much as the result. It shows that the state-immunity question is likely to turn on the pleaded chain of events, not on the label “cyberattack”. A claimant must explain what happened to the device, what data or function was accessed, where the device and user were located, which act caused the legally recognised harm and why the connection is more than accidental. A defendant will attack each link as too remote, technically unproven or attributable only to an unidentified third party.

The judgment also prevents a common analytical mistake. State immunity is not a defence on the merits in the ordinary sense. It is a jurisdictional protection that can stop a court from hearing the dispute at all. The British majority did not say that a foreign state has no sovereign interests in intelligence activity. It held that the domestic statutory exception was engaged on the pleaded territorial facts. The order of questions is therefore crucial: the court first decides whether it may hear the claim, then whether the alleged conduct is proved, unlawful and compensable.

That order will matter in France because France has no single statute that reproduces the United Kingdom’s State Immunity Act. French courts apply customary international law and their own case law. The British decision is persuasive comparative material, not a binding rule. A French judge would ask a different question under French law, even if the technical facts were identical. The British result nevertheless strengthens the argument that a remotely controlled operation can have a legally relevant location in the victim’s country.

B. Why remote hacking is treated as a territorial act in the forum state

The territorial issue becomes clearer when the technology is separated into stages. A spyware campaign may involve a phishing message, an exploit, an installation package, a command server, the activation of a microphone, the copying of files, the transmission of data and the victim’s later discovery of the surveillance. Those events can occur in several countries within seconds. A court that looks only for the operator’s keyboard will miss the operation’s most concrete part: the unauthorised alteration and use of a device in the territory where the victim lives or works.

The Supreme Court’s reasoning does not make every consequence legally sufficient. The act must be causative in the legal sense. A remote packet that never reaches the device, an attempted intrusion blocked by security software or a speculative allegation without a traceable injury may not meet that threshold. The claimant needs a factual bridge between the foreign operation and a protected interest in the forum. In the Bahrain case, that bridge was pleaded as infection, surveillance and personal injury involving computers and people in the United Kingdom.

Applied to France, the strongest case would identify a device physically located in France during the relevant operation, a person habitually resident or present in France, a French network or account that was actually accessed, and a loss or injury experienced in France. A French connection based only on nationality, a holiday months later or the location of a cloud provider would be more contestable. The closer the claimant can place the intrusion, the affected data and the harm in France, the more credible the territorial argument becomes.

Technical attribution remains the difficult bridge. The presence of a state-grade spyware signature does not by itself prove which state ordered an operation. A forensic report may identify the tool, a server infrastructure, a domain, a targeting pattern or a chain of commands. It may also show that the device was not compromised at all. Courts must distinguish a vendor’s product, an intermediary’s conduct and a state’s responsibility. Public reporting about the Bahrain case describes allegations made by the claimants; it should not be converted into a universal proposition that every FinSpy infection is state action.

Evidence preservation is therefore part of jurisdictional strategy. A potential claimant should keep the original device, record the time and location of relevant events, preserve system logs and network data, document symptoms and avoid actions that overwrite forensic material. A later expert must be able to explain what the device showed before remediation, what was changed during remediation and why the result supports a conclusion about access, surveillance or injury. A court deciding immunity may not conduct a full trial, but a vague pleading will make the territorial connection easier to reject.

The public-law character of the alleged operation creates a second boundary. A claimant may argue that covert access to a personal device is a tort producing injury in France. The foreign state may reply that intelligence gathering is an act of sovereign authority and that a domestic court cannot review the operational choices of another government. French law does not resolve that contest by asking only whether the conduct appears wrongful. It asks what act is actually in dispute, what its nature and purpose were, and whether the state is being asked to answer for sovereign conduct or for a separable private-law wrong.

The distinction between a state and its agents is equally important. A civil claim against Bahrain would raise state immunity. A criminal complaint or civil claim against an identified operator, contractor or intermediary would raise different questions, including personal immunity, attribution, service and evidence. The Cour de cassation’s 2025 press material on the immunity of foreign officials shows why status and function cannot be collapsed into one broad rule. It addressed criminal jurisdiction over individuals, not a damages claim against a foreign state, but the distinction is operationally decisive.

Finally, the Bahrain judgment should not be read as an enforcement shortcut. A claimant may win the right to proceed and still face a state that has no voluntarily available assets in France. Jurisdiction, liability and execution are three different stages. That is precisely why the British decision is newsworthy: it changes the first gate in a fact pattern that previously invited a simple “the operator was abroad” answer. It does not guarantee a judgment, and it does not guarantee that a judgment can be collected.

II. What would a French claim against Bahrain look like?

A. Which French court could hear a transnational spyware claim?

A French case would begin with jurisdiction and the identity of the defendant, not with the British majority’s conclusion. For a private-law claim framed around damage caused in France, Article 46 of the French Code of Civil Procedure gives the claimant an option, in tort matters, to sue at the place of the harmful event or the place where the damage was suffered. The text refers to “la juridiction du lieu du fait dommageable ou celle dans le ressort de laquelle le dommage a été subi” — the court of the place of the harmful event or the court in whose district the damage was suffered. A device operating in Paris, Lyon or another French location may therefore supply a serious forum connection, subject to the separate immunity analysis.

Nationality can sometimes provide an additional connecting factor. Article 14 of the French Civil Code allows an alien, even one not resident in France, to be summoned before French courts for obligations owed to a French person. That provision does not eliminate sovereign immunity and does not automatically make France the best forum. It may support jurisdiction where the claimant is French, but a court can still examine the nature of the dispute, the parties’ connections and the international rules governing a foreign state’s immunity.

Service is not a clerical afterthought. Article 684 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that an act intended to be notified to a foreign state or another beneficiary of jurisdictional immunity is delivered to the public prosecutor and transmitted through the Minister of Justice for diplomatic service, unless a European regulation or treaty permits another route. The official text says that the act is “transmis par l’intermédiaire du ministre de la justice aux fins de signification par voie diplomatique”. A claimant who serves Bahrain as if it were an ordinary private company risks an avoidable procedural challenge before the court ever reaches spyware, causation or damages.

The Cour de cassation has treated the service route as substantive protection for the foreign beneficiary. In its civil judgment of 19 March 2014, appeal No. 11-20.312, concerning a Taiwanese defence procurement body, the Court held that an entity benefiting from state immunity fell within the diplomatic-service rule and rejected the ordinary postal route. The case is not about cyber surveillance, but it gives a precise warning: the court will identify whether the defendant is a state or emanation of a state, and it will police the method by which the action is brought. The decision is available on Légifrance.

The next issue is the scope of immunity. In its civil judgment of 9 March 2011, appeal No. 09-14.743, the Cour de cassation described foreign-state immunity as a rule of customary international law but also as a relative rule. The judge must examine the nature and purpose of the act connected with the dispute. That decision, available on Légifrance, arose from a claim involving Libya and an alleged terrorist attack, not spyware. Its significance is methodological: French courts do not decide immunity from the country label alone. They classify the conduct placed before them.

Older case law supplies the other side of the equation. In the civil judgment of 27 April 2004, appeal No. 01-12.442, the Cour de cassation stated that foreign states and persons or bodies acting for them may benefit from immunity for acts of public authority and acts performed in the interest of a public service. The official decision is on Légifrance. A foreign intelligence service would rely on that principle. A claimant would answer that covertly installing spyware on a private device is not a request to review a diplomatic policy but a concrete intrusion producing personal injury in France. The classification would be fact-sensitive.

The court could therefore separate two questions that are often merged in public debate. First, did the alleged act occur, in the legally relevant sense, in France? Second, does the act, even if it occurred in France, attract immunity because its nature or purpose belongs to sovereign intelligence activity? The UK Supreme Court answered the first question in a claimant-friendly way under a particular statute. France would have to answer both questions under customary international law and French precedent.

A French claimant should also anticipate a challenge based on the defendant’s legal personality. The state may say that the alleged conduct is attributable only to unidentified officers, a private vendor or a foreign service with a separate legal identity. The claimant must plead the state’s role with enough detail to make the attribution issue intelligible without turning a preliminary hearing into a full intelligence trial. Corporate structures, procurement documents, technical indicators, prior targeting evidence and admissions may matter. So may the choice to sue an individual actor, a company or the state, because each path activates a different immunity and evidence framework.

If a judgment were eventually obtained abroad, recognition and enforcement in France would be another stage. Article 509 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that foreign judgments and foreign official instruments are enforceable in France in the manner and cases provided by law. The French court dealing with recognition is not simply a bailiff for the foreign judgment. In its civil judgment of 28 June 2023, appeal No. 21-19.766, the Cour de cassation addressed the limits of the exequatur judge’s review where a foreign court had rejected Iran’s immunity. The decision, on Légifrance, demonstrates that a foreign merits or immunity ruling does not remove the French court’s own legal analysis.

That is why a claimant should select the forum before investing in a narrative built around the British judgment. France may offer proximity to a victim, evidence, a bank account, an employer or a French service provider. The United Kingdom may offer the direct benefit of [2026] UKSC 25 if the facts fall within its statutory exception. Switzerland, Spain or the United States may offer other investigative or enforcement routes. A multi-country strategy can be coherent, but parallel proceedings create disclosure, privilege, lis pendens and inconsistent-attribution risks.

B. What can victims prove, and what remedies would remain?

The merits case would need more than a headline about spyware. The claimant would need to establish an actionable intrusion, a legally recognised injury, a causal link and a defendant responsible for the operation. Depending on the pleaded cause of action, the claim might address privacy, personal integrity, property, data access, harassment or consequential financial loss. French procedure can accommodate technical evidence, but the court still needs a comprehensible explanation of what the expert found and why the finding implicates the chosen defendant.

Forensic proof should be built around original material. A claimant should preserve the device and its chain of custody, retain relevant cloud and telecommunications records, identify the precise period of alleged compromise, record who had access to the device and obtain an independent technical assessment. Screenshots alone rarely answer whether a malicious process executed, whether data left the device or whether a third party could have produced the same artefact. The most useful report connects a technical indicator to a particular act, a particular device and a particular time in France.

Attribution requires a separate discipline. A spyware product can be sold to more than one government. Infrastructure can be rented, copied or routed through another country. A state may deny authorising an operation while a contractor or intelligence officer acts outside instructions. A French judge will not automatically treat political plausibility as proof. The claimant’s case should distinguish direct evidence, circumstantial evidence and expert inference. The article’s underlying news report should likewise be kept separate from judicial findings: the British Supreme Court’s judgment concerned the immunity gateway on assumed pleaded facts, not a final finding of Bahrain’s civil liability.

Personal injury may be real without being easy to prove. The two British claimants pleaded psychiatric injury after discovering the alleged surveillance. A French claim would need medical evidence, chronology and a causal account that separates the injury caused by the intrusion from ordinary distress caused by reading news about it. The same logic applies to lost income, reputational harm, business disruption and costs of replacing devices. Damages should be tied to evidence rather than to the geopolitical significance of the state defendant.

Criminal and civil strategies should be coordinated but not confused. A complaint in France against an identified operator or intermediary can generate investigative measures even if an action against Bahrain faces state immunity. Conversely, a civil claim against the state cannot be used as a substitute for an international arrest mechanism. An Interpol notice, an arrest warrant or an extradition request concerns surrender for criminal proceedings; it does not prove civil liability and does not itself authorise a French claimant to seize sovereign property.

French courts have also developed detailed extradition procedure, which helps illustrate how seriously the system treats cross-border process even though extradition is not the remedy in the Bahrain spyware dispute. The ordinary rules require a formal request and supporting judicial act under Article 696-8 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The provision says that “toute demande d’extradition est adressée au gouvernement français par voie diplomatique”. If a person is arrested, Article 696-10 requires presentation before the prosecutor general within forty-eight hours and information in a language the person understands. These rules do not convert a civil spyware claim into an extradition case; they show the difference between a request for a person and a claim against a state.

French extradition case law is also a reminder that treaty limits are read precisely. In its criminal judgment of 10 June 2026, appeal No. 26-82.138, the Cour de cassation stated that “le respect du principe de spécialité s’apprécie au regard de la décision de l’Etat requis” — compliance with specialty is assessed by reference to the decision of the requested state. The decision is available from the Court’s official case page. The principle has no direct application to a damages claim, but the analytical lesson is transferable: the legal effect of cross-border cooperation depends on the exact instrument, wording and decision that authorised it.

Remedies against a foreign state also divide into jurisdiction and execution. A court may allow the action to proceed, award damages and still require the claimant to identify assets that are not protected by execution immunity. Diplomatic premises, central-bank property and public assets are not interchangeable with commercial assets. Consent to jurisdiction may not equal consent to enforcement. A claimant who waits until the end of a long trial to investigate assets may discover that the judgment is symbolically important but practically difficult to collect.

Interim measures present their own risk. Preserving evidence on a French device, seeking orders against a private service provider or protecting a claimant from continuing harm may be legally different from freezing state property. The requested order should be matched to the defendant and the asset. A court may be more receptive to evidence-preservation or protective relief against a private intermediary than to a coercive measure directed at sovereign property. The procedural design should reflect that distinction from the first filing.

Recent French administrative case law offers a further lesson about deadlines and translation, even outside the spyware context. In Conseil d’État, 10 August 2026, No. 513087, the court rejected an extradition challenge as late and held that the notification had started the time limit; the decision records the words “Cette notification a fait courir le délai de recours”. The ruling does not decide civil jurisdiction, but it demonstrates how a strong substantive argument can disappear through a missed procedural clock.

The same decision is relevant to an international claimant’s working method. Every notice, translation, service receipt, expert instruction and court order should be dated and preserved. Article 696-15 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, for example, gives a person who opposes extradition a defined route before the investigating chamber. Article 696-18 provides for a one-month challenge to the government’s extradition decree and a one-month surrender period in the circumstances stated by the text. Article 696-19 provides a route to seek release. None applies directly to a spyware damages claim, but each illustrates the French system’s insistence that cross-border rights are exercised through exact procedural instruments.

There is also a human-rights dimension, but it must be argued with care. The UK Supreme Court majority did not need to decide whether immunity would violate the right of access to a court under Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights. A French claimant might invoke access to a court, privacy, effective remedy or freedom from transnational repression. A foreign state might answer that immunity protects sovereign equality and international comity. Neither side can treat Article 6 as a universal override. The French civil courts’ immunity jurisprudence, including the 2011 decision on Libya, requires the court to locate the dispute within the customary rule and its recognised limits.

For journalists, dissidents, executives and public officials who believe they were targeted, the practical conclusion is demanding but clear. The first file should contain a dated incident map, a technical preservation plan, a jurisdiction memo, a defendant map, a service route and an enforcement assessment. It should also identify what is known, what is inferred and what remains unknown. That structure gives a French court a reason to reach the evidence. It also prevents a compelling political story from being presented as if it were already a legally established fact.

Conclusion

The Bahrain judgment is important because it rejects a deceptively simple answer to a modern jurisdictional problem. A state cannot necessarily avoid a claim merely by placing its operator and command server abroad when the alleged spyware operation invaded devices and caused legally relevant harm in the forum. The majority in [2026] UKSC 25 opened the English courtroom at the immunity stage, but it did not find Bahrain liable and it did not create a worldwide rule.

In France, a victim may have a plausible path where the device, user, intrusion and injury are genuinely connected to French territory. The path still requires the claimant to select a proper forum under the Code of Civil Procedure, serve the foreign state through the legally required channel, confront customary state immunity, prove attribution and causation, and plan for execution separately from liability. French case law makes the immunity analysis relative, but it also protects acts that belong to sovereign authority. The classification of remote surveillance will therefore be the central battlefield.

The best reading of the ruling is neither that foreign governments are now exposed to automatic damages claims nor that cyber operations are legally borderless. It is that territoriality must be analysed at the point where the harmful operation becomes concrete. For a French victim, that may be the moment a device in France is infected, data is extracted, a microphone is activated or a documented injury is suffered. The legal result will depend on proof, not headlines. That is precisely why the decision deserves attention from anyone considering a cross-border action.

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