KOHEN AVOCATS FIRM · PARIS 16
Banque Misr UAE Sanctions: What Section 311 Means for French Banks and the EU

Hassan KOHEN acts in urgent matters, from the police station to the assize court. Initial strategic analysis: €80 incl. VAT, personal reply within 24 hours.

100% confidential · Legal professional privilege · No obligation

Article generated by artificial intelligence, through a process designed and supervised by the firm

Source: French Court of Cassation – Judilibre and Légifrance open data

Paris Bar Police custody, investigation, assize court CNB listing avocat.fr
Maître Hassan KOHEN, avocat au Barreau de Paris
Hassan KOHEN
Attorney at the Paris Bar

Banque Misr UAE Sanctions: What Section 311 Means for French Banks and the EU

Speak to a lawyer 06 89 11 34 45

On 28 August 2026, the U.S. Treasury Department announced a measure that sounds like a bank sanction but has a more precise legal effect. FinCEN proposed using Section 311 of the USA PATRIOT Act against Banque Misr UAE, defined in the proposal as five United Arab Emirates branches of the Egyptian state-owned bank. The proposed rule would cut those branches off from U.S. correspondent banking and require screening of transactions that try to reach the dollar system through another foreign bank. Treasury says its analysis identified approximately $1.8 billion in transactions involving 103 companies potentially linked to Iranian shadow-banking networks. Those are governmental assessments, not findings by a criminal court.

The first legal answer for a French bank is therefore not “freeze every Banque Misr account.” The immediate question is whether a transaction touches the specific UAE perimeter, a U.S. correspondent account, a person designated by OFAC, a French or European asset-freeze measure, or only a higher-risk relationship requiring enhanced vigilance. The proposed rule is not yet a final Federal Register rule, and Banque Misr’s non-UAE operations are expressly outside the definition used by FinCEN. At the same time, a proposal aimed at correspondent banking can create operational consequences before a final rule is published because banks, payment institutions and intermediaries reassess their exposure as soon as a credible U.S. enforcement signal appears.

This analysis follows the official Treasury, FinCEN, OFAC, European Commission, Court of Justice and Légifrance materials available on 29 August 2026. It addresses the practical question searched by international businesses and compliance teams: what should a French or EU operator do when a U.S. dollar-access proposal collides with European anti-money-laundering duties and the EU Blocking Statute?

I. What did the Banque Misr UAE Section 311 action actually do?

A. Is Banque Misr UAE sanctioned, frozen, or only facing a proposed dollar cut-off?

The headline must be read carefully. The official U.S. Treasury announcement of 28 August 2026 says that FinCEN proposed a rule to revoke Banque Misr UAE’s correspondent banking access to U.S. financial institutions. The official FinCEN release describes the action as a notice of proposed rulemaking, or NPRM. The distinction matters because an NPRM is a proposal submitted through a regulatory process. It is not the same thing as a final prohibition already in force in the form described by the proposal.

The legal authority is Section 311 of the USA PATRIOT Act, codified at 31 U.S.C. § 5318A. In the Banque Misr UAE NPRM, RIN 1506-AB76 and docket FINCEN-2026-0232, FinCEN quotes the statutory threshold as “reasonable grounds exist for concluding” that a foreign financial institution is “of primary money laundering concern.” The proposal relies on special measure five under 31 U.S.C. § 5318A(b)(5), which permits the U.S. Treasury Secretary to prohibit or condition the opening or maintenance in the United States of a correspondent account or payable-through account for a foreign bank when that account involves the institution identified as a money-laundering concern.

That is a channel measure. A correspondent account is the bridge through which a foreign bank can access services provided by a U.S. bank, including dollar clearing and related payment activity. The rule proposed for Banque Misr UAE would operate in three connected ways. First, a covered U.S. financial institution could not open or maintain a correspondent account for, or on behalf of, Banque Misr UAE. Second, it would have to take reasonable steps not to process a transaction for another foreign bank’s U.S. correspondent account if the transaction involves Banque Misr UAE. Third, it would need risk-based procedures designed to detect that use across its foreign correspondent relationships and notify certain correspondent account holders of the restriction.

The proposed regulatory text is 31 C.F.R. § 1010.667. FinCEN’s document says that its proposed definition covers all subsidiaries, branches and offices of Banque Misr operating as a financial institution in the UAE. It names two Dubai branches, in Deira and Business Bay, and branches in Abu Dhabi, Sharjah and Ras Al Khaimah. That definition is narrower than “Banque Misr worldwide.” The same text says that Egypt-based Banque Misr, and branches and operations in countries other than the UAE, are expressly excluded for the purposes of the NPRM. A Paris operation would therefore not fall within the defined Banque Misr UAE perimeter merely because it belongs to the same banking group. The final publication and the institution’s legal organization should still be checked before a French bank relies on a group-wide conclusion.

The proposal is also not the same as an OFAC designation of Banque Misr itself. The OFAC action published on 28 August 2026 identifies Reza Mohammad Taeedi, described as the manager of Bank Melli’s Dubai branch, and Kameng Trading Limited, a Hong Kong company. Those two entries are separate SDN List designations under Executive Order 13224, as amended, and Executive Order 13902. Treasury’s release explains that property and interests in property of the designated persons in the United States or within the possession or control of U.S. persons are blocked, subject to applicable authorization or exemption. The 50 Percent Rule may extend blocking to entities owned, directly or indirectly, at least 50 percent by blocked persons.

That difference produces two distinct legal maps. The first map asks whether the counterparty, owner, signatory, intermediary or beneficial owner is an OFAC-designated person, or whether a blocked-person ownership chain applies. The second asks whether a payment, even without a named SDN, uses a correspondent account that the proposed Section 311 rule would prohibit from processing a transaction involving Banque Misr UAE. A bank can face a correspondent-banking problem without Banque Misr appearing as a newly designated SDN. Conversely, a person can be blocked under OFAC rules even when the person’s bank is not itself the subject of the Section 311 proposal.

Treasury estimates that Banque Misr UAE processed approximately $1.8 billion for 103 companies potentially part of Iranian shadow-banking networks between January 2024 and June 2026. The NPRM identifies particular transactions and entities and relies on public and non-public information. A responsible legal analysis must preserve the word “potentially.” The allegation is the basis for an administrative proposal. It is not a conviction, a judgment that every transfer was illicit, or a finding that every customer of the branches participated in sanctions evasion. That distinction protects both accuracy and the procedural rights of affected institutions.

The proposal also has a timing problem that will matter for every legal opinion issued today. The NPRM states that it was submitted to the Office of the Federal Register and was pending placement on public display. The proposed comment deadline is thirty days after publication in the Federal Register, not thirty days after the Treasury press release. The exact closing date must therefore be taken from the published notice. A bank assessing whether a payment may proceed should record the status as “NPRM issued; final publication and effective date to be confirmed,” unless a later official notice changes that status.

The NPRM is unusually direct about its intended reach. FinCEN says that Banque Misr UAE accesses U.S. dollars through three direct correspondent relationships and that the proposal is designed to close that access. It also says that legitimate business in other foreign currencies should not automatically be prevented where a covered financial institution is not involved. That statement is not a safe harbour for a French bank. It is a description of FinCEN’s expected effect, not a ruling on French law, EU law, the law of the UAE or the contract between a French bank and its customer.

Finally, the proposal should not be confused with a French or EU asset freeze. A Section 311 measure is a U.S. financial-system restriction. A French asset freeze is based on a French or directly applicable European legal act. A bank may decide to suspend or reject a payment because of its contractual policy, risk assessment or inability to satisfy its compliance obligations, but that internal decision is not proof that the French State has frozen every asset connected with Banque Misr. The vocabulary used in a client notice should follow the instrument actually identified: “proposed correspondent-account prohibition,” “OFAC designation,” “French or EU asset freeze,” or “enhanced review.”

B. Why do the five UAE branches matter to a French or European bank?

The French point of entry is the transaction, not the political label attached to the news. A French bank may encounter the proposal through a dollar transfer, a correspondent relationship, a trade-finance document, a corporate group, an intermediary in Hong Kong, a beneficiary in the UAE or a customer whose account receives funds from one of the five named branches. The first task is to reconstruct the payment chain with enough precision to distinguish a direct Banque Misr UAE transaction from a payment that merely contains a similar name or passes through a separate Banque Misr operation.

The French anti-money-laundering framework applies to the financial institutions listed in Article L. 561-2 of the French Monetary and Financial Code. The provision begins, in the official text, with “Sont assujettis aux obligations prévues par les dispositions des sections 2 à 7 du présent chapitre.” In practical English, banks and other listed institutions are subject to the obligations in the relevant LCB-FT sections. The rule is not triggered only by a final foreign conviction. It is a preventive system built around knowledge of the customer, beneficial ownership, the purpose of the relationship and the coherence of transactions.

That preventive logic begins with risk classification. Article L. 561-4-1 requires vigilance measures to be applied “en fonction de l’évaluation des risques présentés par leurs activités.” The official text expressly includes the country or territory of origin or destination of funds among the factors used to identify and assess risk. A UAE branch linked in an official U.S. proposal to Iranian shadow-banking allegations will normally require a documented geographic and transactional reassessment. It does not, by itself, answer the separate question whether a specific payment is prohibited.

Customer identification and beneficial ownership are not formalities that can be postponed until a regulator asks questions. Under Article L. 561-5, the institution must “Identifient leur client et, le cas échéant, le bénéficiaire effectif” before entering into the business relationship or assisting with the preparation or completion of a transaction. The grammar of the statutory French reflects the provision’s numbered subject, but the operative requirement is clear: identify and verify the customer and, where relevant, the beneficial owner. In this case, a file should not stop at the account name Banque Misr. It should identify the exact branch, the relevant legal entity, the role of the branch in the payment, the originator, the beneficiary, the intermediary banks and any corporate ownership chain.

During the relationship, Article L. 561-6 requires “une vigilance constante” and an attentive examination of operations for consistency with updated knowledge of the relationship. The news event can therefore be a change in risk information even where the customer and account have not changed. Compliance teams should not simply copy an alert into a case file. They should record what changed, which transactions were reviewed, which branch was involved, whether the U.S. proposal was legally effective at the time, and whether a separate French or EU restriction applied.

The enhanced-vigilance provisions are especially relevant to payment patterns. Article L. 561-10 refers to “mesures de vigilance complémentaires” when a product, operation, client or geography presents a particular risk. Article L. 561-10-1 requires “mesures de vigilance renforcées” where the relationship, product or operation appears to carry a high risk of money laundering or terrorist financing. The bank must calibrate the review; it need not treat every UAE-related customer as guilty, but it should be able to explain why the intensity and frequency of its checks match the facts.

Large, complex or economically unclear transfers have their own rule. Article L. 561-10-2 requires an enhanced examination of “une opération particulièrement complexe ou d’un montant inhabituellement élevé.” The institution must ask about the origin and destination of funds, the purpose of the operation and the identity of the person benefiting from it. That provision translates the headline into a file plan: obtain the underlying invoice, contract, shipping or services evidence, ownership explanation, payment instructions, relationship between the parties, and reason the funds travel through the particular branch and correspondent route. A generic statement that a transfer is “commercial” is rarely enough when the route is unusually complex.

Where the facts create a statutory suspicion, Article L. 561-15 requires a report when the institution knows, suspects or has good reason to suspect that sums derive from an offence punishable by more than one year’s imprisonment or are linked to terrorist financing. The phrase “dont elles savent, soupçonnent ou ont de bonnes raisons de soupçonner” is the statutory threshold quoted from the official text. Article L. 561-15-1 separately addresses information about operations “présentant un risque élevé de blanchiment ou de financement du terrorisme” because of the origin or destination country, the nature of the operation or the structures involved. The legal response can therefore involve reporting and enhanced review, not only a binary decision to pay or refuse.

If the institution cannot satisfy its identification duties, Article L. 561-8 says that “elle n’exécute aucune opération,” does not establish or continue the business relationship, and may transmit the required report. This is a different situation from a bank that has complete identification but chooses, after a documented risk analysis, to pause a payment pending clarification. In both situations, the decision and its reasons need to be preserved. The record should also show that a false-positive review was performed, especially where names, branches or group entities are similar.

The French asset-freeze rules are a separate layer. Under Article L. 562-4, persons and institutions within the provision’s scope must “appliquer sans délai les mesures de gel” and inform the Minister for the Economy. Under Article L. 562-5, they may not “mettre à disposition directement ou indirectement” funds or economic resources for persons whose funds are subject to a freeze. Those provisions are powerful, but their trigger is a measure of freezing under the French statutory chapter or the directly referenced legal instruments. The existence of a U.S. NPRM does not automatically insert Banque Misr UAE into a French asset-freeze list.

The operational conclusion is narrow but important. A French bank should first test the exact branch and transaction, then test the OFAC and EU/French lists, then assess the U.S. correspondent exposure and finally apply French LCB-FT duties. It should not jump from “Iran-related” to “all Banque Misr entities are frozen.” That jump can create an inaccurate client communication, an unjustified contractual termination and a failure to distinguish the legal systems involved.

II. What must French banks and EU companies do next?

A. Does the EU Blocking Statute stop a French bank from following the U.S. proposal?

The EU Blocking Statute is relevant, but it is not a universal answer to every U.S. sanctions announcement. The European Commission’s official explanation states that Council Regulation (EC) No 2271/96 protects EU operators against the extraterritorial application of the third-country laws specified in the Annex. The consolidated EUR-Lex text of Regulation 2271/96 frames the purpose in the same way: it protects against and counteracts the effects of listed extraterritorial laws and actions based on them or resulting from them.

Article 5 is the central provision. In broad terms, an EU operator may not comply, directly or through a subsidiary or intermediary, with a requirement or prohibition based on the specified foreign laws, unless the European Commission has authorized compliance. The Commission’s current public page says that the Annex consists of U.S. measures concerning Cuba and Iran. That description does not mean that every newly announced U.S. measure referring to Iran automatically falls inside the Annex. The identity of the U.S. instrument, the provisions it relies on, the manner in which it operates outside the United States and the current Annex must be compared.

That comparison is essential here. The Banque Misr proposal is made under the Bank Secrecy Act and Section 311, and it restricts access to U.S. correspondent accounts. It is connected to Treasury’s assessment of Iranian shadow banking, but its legal mechanism is not simply a conventional OFAC designation under a named Iran sanctions executive order. The U.S. notice is also a proposal rather than a final rule. A French or EU operator should therefore avoid two opposite errors: assuming that the Blocking Statute instantly neutralizes the U.S. proposal, or assuming that U.S. compliance pressure automatically overrides EU law.

The best-known judicial reference is the Court of Justice judgment in Bank Melli Iran v Telekom Deutschland, Case C-124/20, ECLI:EU:C:2021:1035. The Court’s official materials summarize the holding in these words: the prohibition imposed by EU law on complying with U.S. secondary sanctions against Iran “may be relied on in civil proceedings.” The case concerned an Iranian bank and a German telecommunications company. The Court held that the EU prohibition could apply even without a specific order from a U.S. administrative or judicial authority, but it also required the national court to address the freedom to conduct a business and the risk of disproportionate economic loss.

Bank Melli is powerful guidance, not a shortcut. It does not turn every U.S. restriction into a provision covered by the Annex. It does not tell a French bank to process a transaction that would violate a directly applicable EU financial-sanctions regulation. It does not eliminate French LCB-FT duties. Nor does it resolve, without an analysis of the instrument and the facts, whether a proposed Section 311 correspondent-account prohibition is the same type of extraterritorial Iran measure addressed by the particular Annex entry.

The first question for counsel is therefore classification. Is the U.S. action directed at a person’s property, at a bank’s access to U.S. correspondent accounts, at dealings with Iran, or at a transaction involving a designated person? Is the legal pressure applied to a non-U.S. operator because it trades with an Iranian entity, or is it a U.S. bank’s domestic decision about which foreign correspondent account it will maintain? The answers affect the Blocking Statute analysis. The fact that a payment is denominated in dollars may create U.S. jurisdictional exposure without, by itself, proving that an EU operator is complying with an extraterritorial U.S. law.

The second question is whether the measure is listed. The Annex is not a concept; it is a legal list. A compliance memorandum should preserve the version consulted, the date of consultation, the U.S. provision identified and the conclusion on whether the provision is included. If the answer is uncertain, the file should identify the uncertainty and consider whether a request for authorization under Article 5 is appropriate. The European Commission’s guidance explains that authorization is available where non-compliance would seriously damage the interests of an EU operator or the Union. A French operator should not treat an authorization as automatic or as a substitute for a transaction-specific risk assessment.

The third question is the exposure created by the European operator’s own decision. The Court of Justice’s Bank Melli reasoning shows why a bank’s internal note saying “we terminated the relationship because of U.S. sanctions” can matter in later civil litigation. If the decision was driven solely by an extraterritorial requirement listed in the Annex, Article 5 may be raised. If the decision rests on independent French LCB-FT obligations, a directly applicable EU freeze, inability to identify a beneficial owner, or a genuine contractual and prudential risk, the analysis may be different. The wording of the notice, the evidence reviewed and the legal basis stated should all match the actual decision.

For an EU group, the problem can be multiplied by branch governance. A UAE, French, German or Luxembourg entity may be exposed to different combinations of U.S., EU, national and local rules. A group policy that simply says “follow the strictest rule” can conceal a conflict rather than solve it. The policy should route the case to legal review when the U.S. instruction and EU obligations point in opposite directions, and it should identify who can seek a Commission authorization, who can approve a temporary hold, and who can communicate with the customer.

The Blocking Statute also does not prevent a French bank from identifying and reporting a genuine suspicion under the French Code. The statutory reporting regime protects the integrity of the financial system and is not the same as voluntary compliance with a foreign prohibition. A bank can investigate the origin and destination of funds, ask for documents, report a suspicion to Tracfin where the legal threshold is met, and refuse to proceed because it cannot meet French duties. What it cannot safely do is use the phrase “EU law requires a freeze” when it has only identified a foreign proposal and no French or EU freeze measure.

A defensible opinion on 29 August 2026 should therefore state a provisional conclusion: the U.S. proposal creates a serious correspondent-banking and screening risk; OFAC separately designated two persons; Banque Misr UAE is defined by reference to five UAE branches; the U.S. proposal does not itself establish a blanket French asset freeze; and the EU Blocking Statute must be tested against the actual U.S. instrument and the current Annex. That conclusion can be updated when the NPRM is published, comments are filed, a final rule is issued, or the Commission changes the Annex or grants an authorization.

B. What evidence, screening and decision trail should a French compliance team keep?

The quality of the file will decide whether a bank can later explain a payment hold, a refusal, a report or a continued relationship. The file should be constructed in stages, with each stage answering a different legal question.

First, preserve the news event and its legal status. Save the Treasury press release, the FinCEN NPRM, the OFAC recent-action page and the date each document was accessed. Record that the NPRM states that the comment period runs for thirty days after publication in the Federal Register and that the proposed rule was pending publication at the time of the announcement. Do not overwrite a “proposal” label with “sanction” in the internal register. A later final rule may change the answer, but the file must show what was known when the transaction was reviewed.

Second, map the entities. The FinCEN document identifies two Dubai branches and one branch in each of Abu Dhabi, Sharjah and Ras Al Khaimah. Record the exact branch name, address, account number, BIC or other identifier, legal owner, signatory and role in the payment. Compare that data with the Egyptian head office and non-UAE branches. A screening hit on Banque Misr as a group name is not enough to prove that the named UAE perimeter is involved. A customer assertion that “this is not the UAE branch” is not enough either. The decision should rest on documents and reliable payment data.

Third, reconstruct the payment chain. Identify the originator, beneficiary, ordering institution, intermediary banks, correspondent banks, currency, payment message, invoice or contract, goods or services, shipping route and any stated Iran connection. A payment in euros through banks with no U.S. correspondent may raise a different question from a dollar payment that enters the United States through a U.S. bank. The currency is a clue, not the entire jurisdictional analysis. The absence of a named SDN is also not the end of the review, because the proposed Section 311 mechanism targets transactions involving the defined institution through correspondent accounts.

Fourth, separate screening outcomes. The file should contain one result for exact name and identifier screening, one result for ownership screening, one result for branch and payment-route analysis, one result for French and EU asset-freeze lists, and one result for the U.S. proposal. This structure avoids a common error: a broad alert is converted into a conclusion that does not identify which legal instrument made the transaction impermissible. Where the alert is a false positive, preserve the reason. Where the alert remains unresolved, explain what document is missing and why the transaction cannot yet proceed.

Fifth, apply the French risk rules. Article L. 561-4-1 requires risk systems to account for the country or territory of origin or destination of funds. Article L. 561-10 covers complementary vigilance for particular risks, and Article L. 561-10-1 covers enhanced vigilance when the risk is high. The bank should state whether the risk arises from the UAE branch, a suspected Iranian nexus, a high-risk corporate structure, an unusual payment route, a designated person or a combination of factors. Each factor should be linked to evidence.

Sixth, examine complex or unusually large transactions under Article L. 561-10-2. A useful document request is not an indiscriminate demand for every record. It is a targeted request for the information that tests the economic story: why this counterparty, why this branch, why this currency, why this intermediary, why now, and who ultimately benefits? If the customer cannot answer, record the inconsistency. If the answer is credible and supported, record the corroboration. The goal is a decision that can be understood by another lawyer or regulator months later.

Seventh, decide whether a report is required. Under Article L. 561-15, a suspicion is not the same as a proven laundering offence. The statutory language captures knowledge, suspicion and good reasons to suspect. Under Article L. 561-15-1, certain high-risk operations may require information to be sent because of their country, structure or nature. The compliance record should identify the applicable route and avoid disclosing the existence or contents of a confidential suspicious-transaction report to the customer. A customer-facing refusal should give the lawful level of explanation without revealing protected reporting information.

Eighth, distinguish a reporting decision from a freeze decision. Article L. 562-4 addresses the immediate application of French freezing measures, while Article L. 562-5 prohibits direct or indirect provision of funds to a person whose assets are frozen. If a French or directly applicable EU listing is present, the bank must follow the relevant freeze and notification process. If only the U.S. NPRM is present, the bank should document the U.S. exposure and the French LCB-FT analysis rather than inventing a French freeze.

Ninth, assess possible criminal exposure without overcharging the facts. Article 324-1 of the French Criminal Code states that “Constitue également un blanchiment” the act of assisting an operation involving placement, concealment or conversion of the direct or indirect proceeds of a crime or offence. Article 324-2 provides aggravated penalties when laundering is habitual, uses the facilities of a professional activity, or is committed by an organized group; the official text refers to “en utilisant les facilités que procure l’exercice d’une activité professionnelle.” These provisions do not convert every compliance alert into laundering liability. An individual or company assessment would require proof of the relevant act, knowledge and legal elements. The provisions do explain why a bank must take unusual payment patterns seriously and preserve its decision trail.

Tenth, test the contract and civil-law consequences. A bank that terminates a relationship after a U.S. alert may face a dispute about notice, good faith, discrimination, or the actual legal reason for termination. Bank Melli shows that EU Blocking Statute issues can arise in civil proceedings and that a national court may examine the balance between the EU prohibition and the operator’s economic exposure. The internal note should therefore distinguish a mandatory legal prohibition, a prudential decision, a contractual right, a risk-based temporary suspension and a business decision. The same wording should not be used for all five categories.

Eleventh, control group communications. A Paris compliance team should send the UAE branch a precise request for branch identifiers and payment history, not a global instruction to freeze all activity. A French relationship manager should tell the customer that the payment is under review because of an official U.S. proposal and French compliance obligations, if that explanation can be given without breaching confidentiality. A public statement should attribute Treasury’s allegations and avoid saying that Banque Misr has been convicted or that all its international operations are blocked. This is not merely a public-relations concern. An inaccurate statement can affect civil claims, regulatory correspondence and future evidence.

Twelfth, preserve data for later review. Retain the payment message, screening logs, list versions, source documents, beneficial-ownership documents, customer answers, legal opinion, approval trail and reason for the final decision. Mark whether each source is public or confidential. Record translations and the identity of the person who reviewed them. If an English Treasury document is used to make a French legal decision, preserve the relevant English wording and the French explanation. If a name is transliterated from Arabic or Persian, preserve the original form and the transliteration rules used by the screening system. This is how a bank demonstrates that it addressed false positives rather than relying on a broad keyword.

The practical decision tree can be stated in plain terms. If the file identifies a person subject to a French or EU freeze, apply the freeze regime. If it identifies a designated person or blocked ownership chain under applicable U.S. rules, block or reject within the relevant U.S. perimeter and seek legal advice on non-U.S. conduct. If it identifies a Banque Misr UAE branch in a dollar or correspondent transaction, analyze the proposed Section 311 rule, the effective date and the U.S. bank’s instructions. If the facts are suspicious but no listing applies, use enhanced vigilance and the French reporting rules. If identity or beneficial ownership cannot be established, consider the prohibition in Article L. 561-8. If the only fact is that the group is called Banque Misr, investigate the false-positive risk before taking a group-wide action.

The next external event is equally important. FinCEN’s proposed rule asks for comments about the choice of special measure five, the scope of notices to correspondent account holders and the due-diligence requirements. Once the notice appears in the Federal Register, the comment period and any final effective date should be entered into the monitoring calendar. The bank should also check whether the European Commission issues guidance or authorizes compliance under Regulation 2271/96, whether the Annex is amended, and whether the French Treasury or ACPR publishes an interpretation relevant to the action. Until then, the legal file should remain capable of being updated without rewriting its factual history.

The broader lesson is that modern financial sanctions often operate through infrastructure rather than a single frozen account. A U.S. correspondent-account prohibition can affect a foreign branch, a second bank and a customer whose name is absent from an SDN list. French law responds through risk-based vigilance, reporting, customer identification and asset-freeze duties. EU law adds a possible conflict rule when a listed extraterritorial U.S. measure presses on an EU operator. The compliance answer must preserve all three layers and state which one drove the decision.

Conclusion

The Banque Misr UAE action is best described, on 29 August 2026, as a Section 311 notice of proposed rulemaking aimed at five UAE branches and their access to U.S. correspondent banking. It is not a final rule merely because Treasury announced it. It is not a blanket OFAC freeze of Banque Misr worldwide. OFAC’s separate designations of Reza Mohammad Taeedi and Kameng Trading Limited create their own blocking analysis, but they do not erase the distinction between a designated person and a bank-access proposal.

For a French bank, the correct response is an instrument-by-instrument review: map the precise branch and payment route, identify customers and beneficial owners, apply risk-based and enhanced vigilance, report where the statutory threshold is met, and apply French or EU freezes where an actual freeze measure exists. The EU Blocking Statute must be tested against the U.S. instrument and its Annex; Bank Melli is a serious precedent, not a universal exemption from U.S. or French compliance. The final rule, Federal Register publication, Commission guidance and the evidence in each transaction will decide the next legal step.

📄 Official circular