On 3 September 2026, Nicolás Maduro and his wife, Cilia Flores, asked a federal judge in Manhattan to dismiss the drug-trafficking indictment against them on immunity grounds. Maduro’s lawyers invoked the protection claimed by a foreign head of state; Flores filed a separate motion asserting that she, too, benefits from sovereign immunity as Venezuela’s “first lady”. The Associated Press reported that oral argument is scheduled for 17 November and that the criminal trial is currently set for 1 June 2027. Those are procedural facts, not findings of guilt: both defendants have pleaded not guilty and the allegations remain allegations.
The legally decisive question for an international audience is narrower than the headline. Does being the spouse of a president create a personal immunity from criminal jurisdiction? French law provides a useful answer because the Cour de cassation has recently drawn an unusually precise line between personal immunity, functional immunity, state sovereignty and the jurisdiction of international courts. That line does not decide the Manhattan motion, which is governed by United States law. It does show why the words “first lady” are not, by themselves, a legal status equivalent to “head of state”.
This analysis focuses on Cilia Flores’s distinct claim rather than repeating the wider discussion of Maduro’s motion. The present article asks what a French court would test if a comparable spouse-immunity argument were raised in France, and what a foreign lawyer should preserve before asking a court to dismiss proceedings.
I. Does Cilia Flores have immunity as Venezuela’s first lady?
A. What did Maduro and Flores actually ask the New York court to do?
The motions reported by AP seek dismissal before trial. Maduro’s lawyers argue that a foreign leader recognised by his own country as its sitting head of state should not be subjected to the criminal process of another national court. Flores’s papers make a different move: they assert a protection attached to Venezuela’s sovereignty and ask the court to treat her position as a first lady as a sufficient basis to end the case against her. That difference matters. A court should not collapse two claims merely because they were filed by a married couple in the same indictment.
Personal immunity, usually described as immunity ratione personae, is a protection attached to a very limited public office while the office is held. Functional immunity, usually described as immunity ratione materiae, is attached to an official act performed on behalf of a state and may continue after the office ends. State immunity is different again: it concerns the legal position of the foreign state itself, not an automatic personal privilege for every person connected with its government. A spouse may invoke one of these doctrines only by identifying the doctrine, its source and the facts that place the spouse within it.
The leading French ruling is the decision of the full bench of the Cour de cassation, 25 July 2025, appeal no. 24-84.393. Its official text states that “L’immunité pénale de juridiction procède de l’égalité souveraine des États.” The same decision then gives the decisive enumeration: “L’immunité personnelle, distincte de l’immunité fonctionnelle, est reconnue aux seuls chef d’État, chef du gouvernement et ministre des affaires étrangères, en exercice.” The phrase “aux seuls” is not decorative. It identifies the holders of the status. A spouse is not listed; a ceremonial title does not become one of the three offices through political custom or public visibility.
The Court also held that personal immunity covers “tous les actes accomplis, tant à titre privé qu’à titre officiel” during the relevant period. That breadth explains why the doctrine is powerful for an incumbent head of state. It does not broaden the list of people who possess it. A first lady may travel with a president, appear at diplomatic events, participate in political life or be described by the executive branch as part of a presidential delegation. None of those facts, taken alone, makes the spouse a head of state, head of government or foreign minister.
French constitutional law reinforces the office-specific logic, although Article 67 of the Constitution concerns the French President and does not directly govern a Venezuelan defendant. The current text says that the President “n’est pas responsable des actes accomplis en cette qualité” and cannot, during the mandate, be subjected before French courts to an action, investigation or prosecution. It does not create an immunity for the President’s spouse. The provision is useful as a structural comparison: immunity is defined by constitutional or customary office, not by marriage to the office-holder. The full text of Article 67 of the Constitution should therefore be read as a rule about the person who holds the office, not as a family-status rule.
The Cour de cassation reached the same kind of conclusion in an earlier case involving a second vice-president of a republic. In criminal decision no. 15-83.156, it refused to extend personal criminal immunity where the defendant was not a head of state, head of government or foreign minister and where the alleged acts were personal and pre-dated his later functions. The analogy is not that a spouse is a vice-president; it is that a senior political connection cannot replace the legal category that triggers personal immunity.
This is why the sentence reported from Flores’s filing — that immunity is “an attribute of the sovereignty of Venezuela” and that only Venezuela may surrender it — does not answer the first question. It may describe the rationale of state immunity. It does not establish that a spouse is a protected organ of the state for every criminal allegation. The court would still have to ask whether Flores held a recognised state office, whether the alleged conduct was performed in that office, whether an applicable treaty changes the result, and whether the claim concerns immunity from jurisdiction or a different rule about the state’s own property.
The French Court has also warned that recognition is not the gateway to personal immunity. In no. 24-84.393, it held that the protection of an incumbent head of state does not depend on France recognising that government or maintaining diplomatic relations with it. That proposition helps Maduro more than it helps Flores. It protects the defined office-holder against a foreign court’s political decision to withdraw recognition. It does not turn the spouse of that office-holder into a defined office-holder.
B. Why does a spouse’s public status not create head-of-state immunity?
The first lady label is politically intelligible but legally unstable. In some systems it identifies a private spouse with no public appointment. In others it describes a public representative who receives an office, budget, security detail or delegated mission. The label can therefore be evidence of the factual context, but it cannot by itself determine the legal category. A court needs a constitutive instrument: a constitution, statute, appointment, diplomatic accreditation, treaty-based mission or a concrete act showing that the person acted as an organ of the state.
The distinction is especially important in a criminal case. Personal immunity protects the continuity of representation. Functional immunity protects acts attributable to the state. A spouse who attends a diplomatic reception may be present in an official setting without performing a sovereign act. A spouse who carries a written governmental mandate may present a different question. A spouse who allegedly participates in a private commercial or criminal network cannot simply point to proximity to the president and end the court’s jurisdiction. The court must examine the alleged conduct, not the family photograph.
French case law supplies a procedural safeguard against both overclaiming and premature rejection. In criminal decision no. 18-84.682, the Court held that a complaint directed only at an incumbent foreign head of state could be stopped once the facts showed that personal immunity applied; “aucun acte d’information n’est nécessaire” where the immunity is clear on the face of the case. That shortcut follows from the status of the incumbent head of state. It should not be copied mechanically for a spouse whose status is disputed. For a spouse, the court may need to examine appointment documents, the alleged acts, the relationship between the acts and a state function, and any separate diplomatic protection before it can decide.
The 2025 full-bench ruling also separates national and international courts. It says that immunity “ne peut être opposé devant les juridictions internationales, dont les statuts écartent expressément toute immunité, et qui agissent au nom de la communauté internationale.” That passage does not mean that every international court can prosecute every spouse. Jurisdiction, the court’s statute, the person’s alleged conduct and the applicable cooperation rules remain necessary. It means that national-court immunity cannot be assumed to answer a case before an international tribunal.
Functional immunity is the next possible route, but it is narrower than the motion’s wording may suggest. In full-bench decision no. 24-84.071 of 25 July 2025, the Cour de cassation stated: “L’immunité de juridiction fonctionnelle, distincte de l’immunité personnelle, est reconnue aux agents de l’État agissant dans l’exercice de leurs fonctions.” It added that functional immunity is not limited in time and can continue after the function ends. The operative words are “agents” and “dans l’exercice de leurs fonctions”. A spouse must first prove an official function and then prove that the alleged acts fall within it. The marriage itself proves neither point.
That same ruling recognises an important but limited exception. Subject to international conventions, functional immunity cannot be invoked for prosecutions alleging genocide, crimes against humanity or war crimes. The Court described the change as an evolution of customary law. It did not abolish immunity for ordinary offences. Nor did it say that every act connected to a government is automatically private. In a narcotics indictment, a French court would still have to classify the alleged conduct under the nature-and-purpose test used in its immunity decisions. The fact that prosecutors call conduct criminal does not resolve whether an act was sovereign; the factual record does.
The earlier criminal ruling no. 20-80.511 shows why this analysis must remain exact. In that case, the Court stated that acts alleged against a former United States President and other officials “ne peuvent être assimilés à de simples actes de gestion mais constituent des actes relevant de l’exercice de la souveraineté de l’Etat.” It held that the customary rule of immunity applied on the facts then before it, even though the allegations concerned grave conduct. That precedent is not a licence for impunity. It is a warning that a national criminal court must distinguish the jurisdictional question from the merits.
For Flores, the practical consequence is clear. Her lawyers would need to move from the title “first lady” to a legally provable role. Was she an accredited diplomatic agent? Was she a member of a special mission? Did a Venezuelan constitutional or statutory provision make her a state organ? Was the alleged conduct an official act, or does the indictment describe private conduct carried out for personal or criminal purposes? Did Venezuela expressly waive any immunity, and was the waiver made by an authority competent to do so? These questions can affect the result, but none is answered by marriage alone.
The timing of the status also matters. In no. 24-84.393, the Cour de cassation held that the legality of an arrest warrant under immunity rules is assessed against the factual situation on the date the warrant was issued; a later loss of head-of-state status does not automatically invalidate that warrant. A defence team should therefore obtain the indictment, the warrant, the date of the alleged acts, the date of any change of government and every document relied on to establish recognition or official appointment. A court cannot apply a moving political label to a fixed procedural act.
II. What would French law do with a foreign first lady accused abroad?
A. How do French courts separate jurisdiction, immunity and evidence?
French procedure treats jurisdiction as a threshold question, but not as a substitute for immunity analysis. Full-bench decision no. 24-84.071 says expressly that “La question de la compétence de la juridiction est préalable à celle de l’immunité.” In practical terms, a French judge first asks whether French law gives the courts a route into the case. If the answer is no, the immunity argument may be unnecessary. If the answer is yes, the judge then asks whether an immunity rule prevents the exercise of that jurisdiction.
The general starting point is Article 689 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. It provides that perpetrators or accomplices of offences committed outside France may be prosecuted and tried by French courts where French law applies or where an international convention or European instrument gives French courts jurisdiction. Its opening rule is broad but not self-executing: “Les auteurs ou complices d’infractions commises hors du territoire de la République peuvent être poursuivis et jugés” only through one of the jurisdictional hooks stated in the article.
Nationality can supply one of those hooks. Article 113-6 of the Criminal Code states that French criminal law applies to any crime committed abroad by a French national and to an overseas offence committed by a French national when the conduct is also punishable in the country where it occurred. The article does not make Flores subject to French jurisdiction simply because a French victim, bank or witness exists. It does show how a French-national participant could become exposed to French proceedings even when the principal conduct occurred abroad.
Complicity creates a second international-law route. Under Article 121-6 of the Criminal Code, “Sera puni comme auteur le complice de l’infraction, au sens de l’article 121-7.” Article 121-7 then defines complicity through knowing assistance, facilitation, orders, threats, abuse of authority or instructions. The 2025 ruling no. 24-84.071 applied the combined effect of Articles 689, 113-6 and 121-6 to hold that French courts can hear foreign acts of complicity by a French national even when the principal offender is foreign. That is a jurisdictional rule, not a conclusion about Flores or any other defendant.
Universal jurisdiction is narrower and more conditioned. Article 689-11 of the Code of Criminal Procedure covers genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes, but requires a habitual residence in France, a sufficient connection with France, a request from the national anti-terrorism prosecutor and the absence of a competing request for surrender or extradition from an international or national jurisdiction. The text says that the prosecution can proceed only if no international or national court seeks the person’s surrender or extradition. This is why the presence of a foreign political figure in France does not automatically open a universal-jurisdiction case.
The procedural protection is real even at the asset stage. In criminal decision no. 22-82.235, the Cour de cassation held that an investigating chamber hearing an appeal against a special seizure order had to examine the defendant’s immunity argument in a preliminary investigation concerning crimes committed abroad. The Court explained that a valid immunity could deprive the French courts of the jurisdiction relied on and end the investigation. The decision’s official summary is a useful reminder for international defendants: immunity is not a slogan reserved for the trial; it can affect a seizure, a warrant, an investigation and the admissibility of evidence.
A foreign spouse facing a comparable French proceeding should therefore organise the defence in separate folders. The first folder proves the jurisdictional hook: French nationality, residence, territorial conduct, a treaty, a victim connection or a statutory offence. The second proves the claimed immunity: office, appointment, accreditation, delegation, treaty and waiver. The third reconstructs the alleged conduct with dates and communications, because the nature and purpose of the act may decide whether functional immunity exists. The fourth addresses competing jurisdictions, extradition requests and any international court proceeding. Mixing those folders makes it easier for a political title to obscure a missing legal element.
French courts also distinguish a procedural immunity from the merits. In no. 20-80.511, the Court explained that the right of access to a tribunal under Article 6 of the European Convention is not absolute and may be limited by an immunity recognised by international law. That does not declare the alleged conduct lawful. It says that a national court may lack power to decide it. For Flores, the correct argument would have to identify whether she claims a personal bar, a functional bar, diplomatic protection, state immunity or a defect in the indictment. Each carries a different test and a different answer.
B. When can France prosecute international crimes despite a foreign official’s status?
The most important distinction for the present news story is between ordinary narcotics allegations and international crimes. The 2025 French decisions create a significant exception to functional immunity for genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes. They do not convert every serious transnational crime into a crime against humanity, and they do not make an incumbent head of state prosecutable in a French national court merely because prosecutors use a grave description.
French law defines the domestic category of crimes against humanity in Article 212-1 of the Criminal Code. The provision requires one of the listed acts to be committed “en exécution d’un plan concerté” against a civilian population as part of a widespread or systematic attack. That definition is not a label that can be attached to any international news story. It requires a legal classification supported by facts. A drug-trafficking indictment, as reported in the Maduro case, is not transformed into an international crime by the fact that the defendants once held public office.
The French constitutional bridge to the International Criminal Court is Article 53-2 of the Constitution, which states: “La République peut reconnaître la juridiction de la Cour pénale internationale dans les conditions prévues par le traité signé le 18 juillet 1998.” The provision illustrates the difference between national and international jurisdiction. The personal immunity described in no. 24-84.393 operates before national courts. The Rome Statute and the ICC’s own cooperation rules govern the international forum. A spouse cannot assume that losing a national immunity argument automatically produces ICC jurisdiction; conversely, a national immunity claim does not answer a properly constituted international case.
The 2025 decision no. 24-84.071 made the functional-immunity exception explicit for international crimes. The Court relied on the development of customary law and held that, subject to treaty rules on diplomatic and consular relations, functional immunity cannot be opposed in prosecutions for genocide, crimes against humanity or war crimes. The quotation is precise: “le principe d’immunité fonctionnelle de juridiction en matière pénale ne peut pas être opposé en cas de poursuites des chefs de génocide, crimes contre l’humanité et crimes de guerre.” The decision concerns agents who acted in an official capacity. It does not create a general rule that a spouse has no rights, nor does it create a general rule that the spouse has rights.
For a former head of state, the result is different from the result for an incumbent head of state. Personal immunity is temporary. Functional immunity may survive the end of office, but the 2025 exception can remove it for the most serious international crimes. The 24-84.393 decision nevertheless held that, under the law as it stood, crimes against humanity and war crimes did not create an exception to the personal immunity of an incumbent head of state before a national court. The same case described immunity as a procedural obstacle and said plainly that “L’immunité n’équivaut pas à l’impunité.” The point is both technical and important: a person may remain criminally responsible while a particular national court cannot prosecute at a particular time.
That distinction gives a French-law answer to the Flores motion. If the allegation remains an ordinary drug-trafficking case, the international-crime exception in 24-84.071 does not decide it. The court would examine whether Flores personally held an office protected by personal immunity, whether she was an agent acting in a sovereign function, and whether the alleged conduct was sufficiently connected to that function. If she cannot establish an official role beyond being the president’s spouse, the personal-immunity category identified in 24-84.393 is not available on that basis. If she can prove a formal state mission, the court would still examine the acts and any applicable convention rather than grant an automatic family privilege.
The relevant questions can be stated without prejudging the American case. First, what exact office did the defendant hold on the date of the alleged acts and on the date of the warrant? Second, which legal instrument created that office or mission? Third, does the indictment describe conduct performed for the state or conduct allegedly performed for a private network? Fourth, is the claim personal immunity, functional immunity, diplomatic immunity or state immunity? Fifth, does a treaty, an international court statute or a competing extradition request alter the national court’s power? French jurisprudence treats those as legal questions supported by evidence, not as a vote on the political legitimacy of a government.
That method also protects the state from an overbroad theory of extraterritorial prosecution. It prevents a court from converting a first lady into a head of state merely because the public sees the couple as a unit. It also prevents prosecutors from defeating a genuine official-act claim by using the word “criminal” before proving that the act was private or outside the state’s sovereign functions. The French cases show a court testing status, conduct, timing and jurisdiction in sequence.
There is a final practical point for counsel, banks and journalists following the case from Europe. A French court would not treat the Manhattan motion as a judgment on immunity everywhere. A United States ruling would bind the American proceedings; it would not automatically decide what happens if Flores travels to France, holds assets in France, faces a French investigation or is requested by another state. The reverse is also true. The French decisions are persuasive evidence of how one national legal system separates a head of state from a spouse, but they do not replace the forum court’s own law.
Conclusion
Cilia Flores’s motion is legally significant because it tests an often-assumed proposition: that the spouse of a president inherits the president’s immunity. French law does not begin there. The Cour de cassation’s 24-84.393 ruling protects personal immunity for only an incumbent head of state, head of government or foreign minister, while 24-84.071 protects functional acts by state agents and removes that protection for the most serious international crimes. Neither decision treats marriage as a public office.
The result is not that Flores must lose in New York. The result is that her lawyers must prove a legal status or an official function, not simply a public title. The court must then separate jurisdiction from immunity, immunity from the merits, and ordinary transnational crime from international crimes. That is the French and European lesson with wider reach: sovereignty can justify a procedural bar, but sovereignty is not a family inheritance.
We can review the status documents, warrant, indictment, extradition request and cross-border jurisdiction issues before the next procedural hearing.