On 18 September 2026, Colombia informed the International Court of Justice that it was withdrawing the declaration of intervention it had filed on 5 April 2024 in the case concerning the Application of the Genocide Convention in the Gaza Strip, brought by South Africa against Israel. The Court announced the move in Press Release 2026/24 on 22 September 2026, and the news travelled around the world within hours: Bogota is walking away from the biggest genocide case of the decade. The political signal is loud. A new Colombian president, in office since August 2026, is reversing the pro-Palestinian line of his predecessor — restoring diplomatic and economic ties with Israel, reopening an embassy in Jerusalem, and pulling Colombia out of The Hague. But the legal question matters more than the political noise, and it is the one international readers keep asking: does Colombia’s exit weaken South Africa’s case, and what can a country that never intervened — France in particular — still do? The short answer is that the main proceedings continue untouched, the provisional measures ordered by the Court remain binding, a crowd of intervening States remains in the room, and the Article 63 door Colombia just walked out of stays wide open for France. This analysis explains what Bogota filed and withdrew, what changes on the merits, and which concrete levers exist in Paris for States, victims, and lawyers who want to act.
I. Did Colombia Quitting the ICJ Gaza Case End South Africa’s Claim?
A. What Colombia Filed in April 2024 and Withdrew in September 2026
Colombia never sued anyone in this case, and it never defended anyone either. On 5 April 2024 it filed a declaration of intervention under Article 63 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, a procedural device reserved for States that are parties to a convention whose interpretation is at stake before the Court. The mechanism turns on a single bargain set out in Article 63, paragraph 2, of the Court’s Statute: every notified State “right to intervene”, and in exchange the reading the Court gives the treaty is “equally binding upon it”. The provision gives a third State a right, not a duty: it may step into the proceedings to be heard on how the treaty should be read, and in exchange the Court’s reading of the treaty binds it too. Colombia’s President at the time, Gustavo Petro, had staked out one of the strongest pro-Palestinian positions of any head of state in the Americas. In May 2024 he severed Colombia’s diplomatic relations with Israel, declaring that his government could not maintain ties with what he called a genocidal government, and in August 2024 he halted Colombian coal exports to Israel on the ground that the coal fed a war machine operating in Gaza. Filing the Article 63 declaration in April 2024 was the judicial leg of that policy: Bogota, invoking its status as a party to the Genocide Convention, asked to be heard on the interpretation of the treaty at the heart of South Africa’s claim.
The withdrawal follows the same logic in reverse. After Abelardo de la Espriella took office as president in August 2026, his government moved to restore diplomatic and economic ties with Israel, announced plans to reopen Colombia’s embassy in Jerusalem and to set up a bilateral economic commission, and scheduled a Colombian delegation visit to Israel for October. Pulling the ICJ declaration is part of that reset. The Court’s own record states the facts dryly — on 18 September 2026 Colombia informed the Court that it decided to “withdraw the Declaration of intervention” filed under Article 63 on 5 April 2024 in the case concerning the Application of the Genocide Convention in the Gaza Strip (South Africa v. Israel) — as published on the Court’s official homepage and detailed in Press Release 2026/24 of 22 September 2026. The full docket of the case, with every pleading, order, and declaration, is kept on the Court’s case page for South Africa v. Israel. Two points of procedure deserve emphasis because they are constantly misunderstood in press coverage. First, an Article 63 intervener never becomes a party to the main dispute; Colombia’s presence never added a claim and its absence removes none. Second, withdrawal of a declaration is a unilateral act that takes effect when notified; the Court does not grant permission to leave, it simply records the exit. That is why the press release is short: there is nothing to decide, only something to register.
The context of September 2026 at the Peace Palace makes the timing even more telling. While Colombia was notifying its exit, the Court had just held four days of public hearings, from 7 to 10 September 2026, on Germany’s preliminary objections in the parallel case brought by Nicaragua over German arms transfers and support connected with the same Gaza conflict. The Hague is therefore handling two Gaza-related State-responsibility cases at once, at different procedural stages, and governments are visibly calibrating their litigation posture in both. Colombia chose disengagement. Other States are choosing the opposite: the case file shows declarations of intervention filed by Belgium in December 2025, by Paraguay in March 2026, by the Netherlands and Iceland in March 2026, and by Namibia, the United States, Hungary, and Fiji in March 2026, alongside filings by Belize and Palestine. The room Colombia leaves is still full.
B. What the Exit Changes on the Merits — and What It Leaves Intact
Start with what does not change, because that is most of the case. South Africa instituted proceedings against Israel in December 2023, alleging violations of obligations under the Genocide Convention in relation to Palestinians in Gaza. The jurisdictional anchor of the whole dispute is Article IX of the Genocide Convention, which sends disputes over the treaty’s interpretation, application or fulfilment — including State responsibility for genocide — to be “submitted to the International Court of Justice” at the request of any party to the dispute. That clause binds South Africa and Israel as the parties; Colombia was never inside it. The substantive duties South Africa invokes flow from the opening articles of the Convention. Article I confirms that genocide, in peace or in war, is a crime under international law which the parties undertake to “prevent and to punish”. Article VIII adds a collective lever that interveners often cite: any party may call upon the “competent organs of the United Nations” to take Charter action it considers appropriate to prevent and suppress genocide. None of these provisions moves when an intervener departs. The claims, the parties, the treaty, and the Court’s jurisdiction over the dispute are exactly where they were on 17 September 2026.
The provisional measures stay put as well. Since January 2024 the Court has issued a series of binding orders in this case — the Order of 26 January 2024 indicating provisional measures, the Order of 28 March 2024 reaffirming and extending them, and the Order of 24 May 2024 adding new measures — each recorded on the case docket and each addressed to the parties, not to the interveners. An intervener’s exit cannot lift measures it was never subject to, and it cannot erase the Court’s prior findings that the rights asserted by South Africa were plausible and that there was urgency. Israel continues to reject the allegations and to deny that its operations in Gaza amount to genocide, and that denial will now be tested at the merits stage without Colombia in the gallery. The written observations Colombia may have filed while its declaration was active remain physically on the record, but they lose their procedural carrier: no counsel will rise in the Great Hall of Justice to defend them at the oral hearings on the merits, and the Court will owe them no response in its reasoning. For South Africa’s legal team the practical loss is therefore narrow but real — one fewer friendly voice on treaty interpretation, in a case where the construction of the Convention will decide everything.
What Colombia’s exit genuinely affects is the politics of intervention, and here the effect cuts both ways. A withdrawal by a State of the Global South, reversing a high-profile pro-Palestinian stance, will be read in capitals and newsrooms as a cooling of international appetite for the case. Opponents of the proceedings will cite it; media hostile to the Court already are. But the docket tells a cooler story: the wave of Article 63 declarations filed between December 2025 and March 2026 — Belgium, Paraguay, the Netherlands, Iceland, Namibia, the United States, Hungary, Fiji — shows that State interest in shaping the Convention’s interpretation is accelerating, not fading, and it comes from every regional group and both sides of the underlying dispute. Washington intervening on treaty construction in the same case Bogota just left is itself a measure of how central this litigation has become. For practitioners, the lesson is procedural rather than emotional: interventions under Article 63 are reversible, low-cost signals of treaty interest, and their coming and going does not move the merits needle. The merits needle moves when the Court construes “prevent and punish,” complicity, and State responsibility — questions on which every remaining intervener, and every State still entitled to intervene, will be heard.
II. Can France Still Intervene at the ICJ in the Gaza Genocide Case?
A. The Article 63 Door That Stays Open for Paris
France is in the exact legal position Colombia occupied in April 2024, with one difference: Paris has never used it. France signed the Genocide Convention on 11 December 1948 and ratified it on 14 October 1950, and it appears in the International Committee of the Red Cross treaty database as a State party, a status confirmed on the official State-parties page for the Convention kept by the International Committee of the Red Cross. As a party to the treaty whose construction is in question, France belongs to the circle of States the Registrar notifies under Article 63, paragraph 1, and it therefore holds the same right Colombia exercised — to intervene and be heard on the treaty’s construction, accepting that the judgment’s reading will bind it too. As of 24 September 2026, France does not appear among the declarants listed on the Court’s case page — Belgium, Paraguay, the Netherlands, Iceland, Namibia, the United States, Hungary, Fiji, Belize, and Palestine are there; France is not. That absence is a policy choice, not a procedural bar. Nothing in the Statute sets a scenery in which a State that stayed silent in 2024 cannot speak in 2026 or 2027, before the merits hearings close. Governments file Article 63 declarations late in proceedings routinely; the recent March 2026 cluster proves the window is practically open more than two years after the case began.
Paris has a second, narrower door if it wants its own grievance heard rather than the treaty’s meaning: Article 62 of the Statute, which lets a State claiming “an interest of a legal nature” that the decision could affect ask to be permitted to intervene. Unlike Article 63, an Article 62 request requires the Court’s permission — the decision is “for the Court to decide” — and it demands proof of a legal interest that the judgment could affect. France would have to articulate such an interest, for example in the interpretation of Convention duties that also bind French authorities, rather than a general political preference. The two routes can also be combined in sequence, as Palestine and Belize have shown by pairing requests for permission with declarations. For the French government, the calculus around either route is familiar from every major ICJ case of the last decade: intervening buys a seat at the interpretation table and signals treaty seriousness, at the price of being bound by the construction the judgment gives — the exact bargain Article 63, paragraph 2, spells out. Colombia just demonstrated that the bargain is terminable by walking away. That precedent lowers the perceived cost of entering: a State that intervenes today knows the exit was used yesterday.
Whether France should walk through either door is where a Paris litigator’s view of the file matters. An Article 63 declaration lets France put on record its reading of the duties to prevent and punish, of complicity, and of the relationship between arms-transfer controls and Convention obligations — readings that would then echo in French export-licensing litigation and in European courts. It also lets France shape the standard the Court will set for every future Gaza-type case, including cases in which French conduct could itself be scrutinised, as the Nicaragua proceedings against Germany show is no longer hypothetical. The counterweight is diplomatic: intervening in South Africa v. Israel positions Paris on treaty interpretation in the most polarised case on the planet, with Washington already in the room on one construction and a different coalition on the other. But neutrality has a price too. The March 2026 declarations mean the Convention will be construed with or without a French voice; silence simply lets others write the dictionary France will later have to use. For a State that signed the Convention in Paris in 1948, in the very city where the text was adopted, that is an odd posture to hold by default.
B. What French Courts and French Law Already Put on the Table in Paris
Whatever the government decides at The Hague, French domestic law already gives victims, associations, and prosecutors tools that map directly onto the questions the ICJ will decide — and a Paris lawyer reaches for them first. The flagship is universal jurisdiction. Article 689-11 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides: “Hors les cas prévus au sous-titre Ier du titre Ier du livre IV pour l’application de la convention portant statut de la Cour pénale internationale, ouverte à la signature à Rome le 18 juillet 1998, peut être poursuivie et jugée par les juridictions françaises toute personne soupçonnée d’avoir commis à l’étranger l’une des infractions suivantes : 1° Le crime de génocide défini au chapitre Ier du sous-titre Ier du titre Ier du livre II du code pénal” In plain terms, a person suspected of genocide abroad can be prosecuted and tried by French courts, under conditions the rest of the article details — habitual residence on French soil, ICC subsidiarity mechanics, and prosecutorial initiative. The provision is the domestic twin of the Convention’s “prevent and punish” promise, and complaints invoking it have already been filed in Paris in connection with the Gaza conflict by associations and lawyers testing its reach. Each filing forces the specialised war-crimes unit of the Paris prosecutor’s office to take a position, building the very case law on genocide and command responsibility that an Article 63 intervention would discuss at The Hague.
France’s cooperation machinery with international criminal justice runs on a separate, purpose-built track that must not be confused with the ICJ. The International Criminal Court in The Hague prosecutes individuals; the International Court of Justice settles disputes between States — and Colombia’s exit concerns only the second. For the first, Article 627 of the Code of Criminal Procedure sets the frame: “Pour l’application du statut de la Cour pénale internationale signé le 18 juillet 1998, la France participe à la répression des infractions et coopère avec cette juridiction dans les conditions fixées par le présent titre.” The articles that follow organise surrender in detail. Article 627-5 requires: “Toute personne appréhendée en vertu d’une demande d’arrestation aux fins de remise doit être déférée dans les vingt-quatre heures au procureur de la République territorialement compétent.” And Article 627-8 gives the decision to the investigating chamber: “Lorsque la chambre de l’instruction constate qu’il n’y a pas d’erreur évidente, elle ordonne la remise de la personne réclamée et, si celle-ci est libre, son incarcération à cette fin.” These are ICC-surrender rules, distinct from classic extradition between States, which lives under Article 696 — “En l’absence de convention internationale en stipulant autrement, les conditions, la procédure et les effets de l’extradition sont déterminés par les dispositions du présent chapitre” — with its famous bars in Article 696-4: “L’extradition n’est pas accordée : 1° Lorsque la personne réclamée a la nationalité française, cette dernière étant appréciée à l’époque de l’infraction pour laquelle l’extradition est requise ; 2° Lorsque le crime ou le délit à un caractère politique ou lorsqu’il résulte des circonstances que l’extradition est demandée dans un but politique” A Paris defence or victims’ practice therefore works on two chessboards at once: State responsibility at the ICJ, individual responsibility through the ICC cooperation channel and universal jurisdiction — and confusing the two is the most common error in press commentary on Colombia’s move.
The third Paris lever is the one Nicaragua is currently testing against Germany: arms-export control. French law prohibits unlicensed exports in blunt terms. Article L2335-2 of the Defence Code states: “L’exportation sans autorisation préalable de matériels de guerre et matériels assimilés vers des Etats non membres de l’Union européenne ainsi que des territoires exclus du territoire douanier de l’Union européenne est prohibée.” Article L2335-3 organises the licensing itself: “I.-L’autorisation préalable d’exportation, dénommée licence d’exportation, est accordée par l’autorité administrative, sous l’une des formes suivantes” Every licence to a belligerent can be challenged before the French administrative judge, and every challenge invites the judge to read European criteria — including the EU Common Position on arms exports — in light of the Genocide Convention duties the ICJ is construing right now. On the criminal side, the complicity frame is supplied by Article 121-7 of the Criminal Code: “Est complice d’un crime ou d’un délit la personne qui sciemment, par aide ou assistance, en a facilité la préparation ou la consommation.” Whether that domestic complicity lens has any parallel in State responsibility for assisting genocide is precisely one of the interpretive questions the remaining interveners will argue in The Hague — and one on which a French Article 63 declaration could carry unusual weight, coming from the jurisdiction that wrote both texts.
Conclusion
Colombia’s withdrawal from South Africa v. Israel, notified on 18 September and announced on 22 September 2026, is a significant political event and a minor procedural one. It removes a friendly voice on treaty interpretation, hands a talking point to the case’s opponents, and illustrates how cheaply Article 63 interventions can be reversed when governments change. It does not touch the parties, the claims, the jurisdictional basis in Article IX, the provisional measures in force, or the merits hearings to come — and it leaves the intervention room more crowded than Colombia found it, with a transatlantic spread of States having filed declarations through March 2026. For France, the episode is a mirror as much as news. Paris holds the same Convention party status Bogota used, faces the same open Article 63 window, disposes of the same Article 62 alternative, and runs a domestic system — universal jurisdiction, ICC cooperation, extradition bars, arms-licensing controls, complicity law — whose key provisions will be read, sooner or later, through the dictionary this case is writing. The question is not whether France is entitled to speak in The Hague. It is whether it will let others finish the sentence it started signing in Paris in December 1948. Victims, associations, and companies with exposure to these proceedings do not have to wait for the government’s answer: complaints under universal jurisdiction, challenges to export licences, and cooperation filings can be prepared in Paris now, while the merits phase is still ahead.