The European Court of Human Rights will hold a public hearing on 22 September 2026 in Ukrainian Helsinki Human Rights Union on behalf of ten Ukrainian children v. Russia, application no. 6719/23. The case concerns children who were living in Ukrainian state childcare institutions in Crimea when Russia asserted jurisdiction over the peninsula in 2014. The applicant association says that Russian nationality was imposed on them, that they were placed in adoption or foster-care systems, and that their whereabouts have not been disclosed despite repeated requests from Ukraine. Those are allegations before the Court, not findings already made against Russia. The hearing is nevertheless a major procedural test: it asks whether Strasbourg can determine complaints tied to conduct that began while Russia was bound by the Convention, even though Russia ceased to be a Convention party on 16 September 2022. It also raises a practical question for every lawyer handling a cross-border child-rights case: what can an international judgment achieve when the respondent State no longer participates in the Convention system? The answer depends on temporal jurisdiction, the legal character of the alleged detention and identity changes, the quality of the evidence, and the difference between a finding of responsibility and the recovery of a child. A French and European perspective is useful here because French courts already require an evidence-based proportionality review in extradition proceedings, while French criminal jurisdiction may offer a separate route if later evidence supports an international-crimes qualification.
I. Can the ECHR hear a case against Russia after 16 September 2022?
A. Why application no. 6719/23 is not extinguished by Russia’s withdrawal
Russia’s departure from the Convention does not create a single cut-off date that erases every dispute connected with Russia. The decisive question is when the alleged act or omission occurred and whether it falls within the Court’s jurisdiction over Russia. The ECHR’s own respondent-government guidance states that the Russian Federation ceased to be a party to the Convention on 16 September 2022, while the Court retains jurisdiction over acts or omissions capable of engaging Convention responsibility up to that date. That rule reflects Article 58 of the Convention, read with Article 1: the denunciation of a treaty does not release a State from responsibility for conduct that occurred before the denunciation became effective.
The application was lodged on 14 January 2023, but the filing date is not the same thing as the date of every alleged violation. The application describes children who were already in Crimean institutions in 2014, the imposition of a different citizenship, the alleged concealment of their whereabouts, and the inclusion of children in Russian adoption or foster-care systems. The Chamber must therefore separate the chronology. A complaint about a measure completed after 16 September 2022 may face a jurisdictional problem. A complaint about an act, omission, or continuing situation attributable to Russia before that date may still be examined, subject to the ordinary admissibility rules and the Court’s assessment of the evidence.
The broader Crimean context has already been examined by the Grand Chamber. In Ukraine v. Russia (re Crimea), applications nos. 20958/14 and 38334/18, judgment of 25 June 2024, the Court addressed alleged administrative practices after Russia asserted control over Crimea, including enforced disappearances, unlawful detention, restrictions connected with citizenship, and other Convention issues. The present application is not a shortcut to the findings in that interstate case. It concerns ten identifiable children and must be examined on its own admissibility, facts, and legal characterisation. The earlier judgment does, however, provide an authoritative framework for the Court’s assessment of the territorial and factual background.
That distinction matters for families and counsel. A Strasbourg case can remain legally live after a respondent State’s withdrawal, yet still produce a narrower judgment than the public narrative suggests. The Court may find that it has jurisdiction over some periods but not others, that one complaint is admissible while another is not, or that the evidence proves an interference with identity without proving the more serious allegation of enforced disappearance. The hearing on 22 September is scheduled for admissibility and merits. It is not a preliminary press conference and it does not predetermine the result.
The principal official sources should be read together: the ECHR case page for application no. 6719/23, the Court’s calendar confirming the 22 September Chamber hearing, the Convention provisions on jurisdiction and temporal responsibility, and the Grand Chamber judgment on Crimea. These sources are more reliable than a headline stating that Strasbourg has already ruled on the children’s fate. At this stage, the Court has decided to hear the case publicly and has communicated it; it has not made a final finding that the children were adopted, disappeared, or unlawfully detained.
The practical conclusion is precise. Russia’s withdrawal is a temporal and institutional constraint, not an automatic jurisdictional veto. The Court can still determine whether pre-16 September 2022 conduct violated the Convention. It cannot use the pending application to create responsibility for every later event merely because that event is connected to the same children. The legal work before the Chamber is therefore a reconstruction of dates, decision-makers, documents, and continuing effects rather than a general judgment on the war.
B. What the Court must establish about Crimea, citizenship and the children’s status
The complaints rely principally on Article 5 and Article 8 of the Convention. Article 5 protects the right to liberty and security. The applicant association says that the children were kept in institutions after Russia established effective control over Crimea, that information about their whereabouts was concealed, and that they were entered into Russian adoption or foster-placement systems. Article 8 protects private life, which includes personal identity and, in appropriate circumstances, the legal and social elements of a person’s identity. The association argues that the alleged change of citizenship and the presentation of the children for adoption failed to respect their identity as Ukrainian nationals.
Those legal labels do not prove the underlying facts. An institution is not automatically a prison, and a change recorded in a register is not automatically an Article 8 violation. The Court will have to identify the concrete conduct attributed to public authorities, establish whether the authorities exercised the relevant control, and decide whether the facts reached the threshold of an interference with liberty, security, private life, or identity. The question is particularly demanding because the children were minors, were represented by an association, and have allegedly been inaccessible to their representatives. Their absence makes ordinary witness evidence difficult and increases the importance of contemporaneous records.
The ECHR’s July 2026 press release records the applicant association’s central factual allegation in careful language:
“There has been no information on their whereabouts since 2014, despite the Ukrainian authorities’ repeated requests.”
The wording is important. It describes the state of the information available to the applicant association; it is not a judicial finding that the children have been killed, adopted, or permanently separated from their families. The same press release says that Russian nationality was imposed, that the children were put up for adoption and may have been adopted, and that the association alleges that the situation effectively amounts to enforced disappearance. Each proposition must remain attributed until the Chamber has ruled.
The Court’s earlier treatment of the interim-measure request illustrates the temporal difficulty. In February 2023, representatives asked the Court under Rule 39 to stop an imminent risk of adoption. The ECHR refused the request because it related to events connected with the adoption of the applicants after 16 September 2022, the date on which Russia ceased to be a Convention party. The Court’s public explanation also stressed that a Rule 39 decision does not prejudge later admissibility or merits. The refusal therefore does not answer the pending complaints about earlier conduct; it explains why the emergency measure requested at that moment fell outside the Court’s temporal jurisdiction.
Evidence will be decisive. A legally useful file would place Ukrainian birth records, institutional registers, guardianship decisions, citizenship entries, Russian administrative decisions, adoption or foster-placement records, website captures, requests made by Ukrainian authorities, replies or non-replies, and any later location evidence on a single chronology. The file must distinguish a document created by a Russian authority from a statement made by an NGO, distinguish a name disappearing from a website from proof of an adoption, and identify whether a measure was taken before or after 16 September 2022. It should also preserve metadata, certified translations, and the chain of custody for digital material. A dramatic allegation with an uncertain date is weaker than a narrower allegation supported by a dated administrative record.
The 2024 Crimea judgment may assist with context, but it cannot remove the need for individual proof. The Grand Chamber considered the operation of Russian authorities in Crimea and found violations in relation to specified administrative practices. The pending Chamber must still decide whether the ten applicants fall within the pleaded practice, whether the conduct was attributable to Russia, and whether each Convention complaint is admissible. The Court may use general background findings to assess effective control and institutional context, but the identity and fate of each child require a separate factual analysis.
The public hearing also has a protective dimension. The case was given priority, the applicants were anonymised, and the Court has used confidentiality measures that reflect the vulnerability of the children. A hearing can clarify disputed chronology and legal questions without exposing information that could put a child at further risk. The fact that Russia filed no observations after the case was notified does not entitle the applicant side to skip proof. It may affect how the Court assesses the material before it, but the burden of presenting a coherent and credible case remains real.
For that reason, the strongest legal theory is not simply that “Russia took Ukrainian children.” It is that specific public acts and omissions, identified by date and source, may have affected liberty, security, private life, social identity, and the possibility of family reunification. The Chamber’s task is to decide which of those propositions can be established within the Convention’s temporal limits. That disciplined formulation protects the children’s case from both denial and overstatement.
II. What could the 22 September hearing change for families and European procedure?
A. Why a public hearing is evidence-focused, not an automatic order to return the children
The hearing was requested under Rules 54 § 5 and 59 § 3 of the Rules of Court. The ECHR accepted that the case raised exceptional gravity, public importance, media interest, and a need for factual and legal clarification. That decision makes the hearing significant, but it does not convert the Chamber into a child-return authority. Strasbourg is a human-rights court. It determines whether a respondent State has breached the Convention and, when appropriate, awards just satisfaction or indicates measures connected with execution. It does not operate an international adoption registry, locate children through a police command, or replace domestic guardianship authorities.
The Rule 39 history is a warning against confusing urgency with jurisdiction. Interim measures are exceptional and are used to prevent a real risk of irreversible harm in proceedings before the Court. In this case, the Court explained its refusal in terms that lawyers should preserve accurately: “The Court decided to refuse the request on the basis that the events related to the adoption of the applicants took place after the date on which the Russian Federation ceased to be a Party to the Convention.” That decision did not approve an adoption and did not declare that the children had no rights. It marked the limit of what the Court could protect through Rule 39 against Russia after the relevant date.
A final judgment could still have important effects. If the Chamber finds a violation concerning pre-16 September 2022 conduct, the judgment would establish the Court’s legal assessment, identify the obligations engaged, and enter the Convention’s execution framework. Article 46 provides that the High Contracting Parties undertake to abide by final judgments in cases to which they are parties, under the supervision of the Committee of Ministers. Article 41 may permit just satisfaction where appropriate. A judgment could also clarify the facts for Ukrainian institutions, European governments, future national proceedings, and families seeking recognition or evidence.
But the judgment would not automatically order an official in Russia to disclose a location on the following morning. Russia’s withdrawal makes execution politically and institutionally difficult, even though it does not erase responsibility for prior conduct. The Court’s remedial language may identify steps required to redress a violation, while the Committee of Ministers’ supervision may continue to record non-execution. A finding of responsibility and physical recovery are therefore separate outcomes. The first can support the second, but it cannot guarantee it.
French case law helps explain the distinction between a Convention obligation and an individual procedural remedy. In Cour de cassation, criminal chamber, 2 December 2025, no. 24-80.893, the Court held, in an extradition-related argument about Article 46, that the provision governs relations between States and does not itself create rights that an individual can invoke in the same way as a domestic procedural entitlement. The decision is not a ruling on the Ukrainian children, and its factual setting was different. Its value here is conceptual: counsel must identify the domestic mechanism that can use a Strasbourg finding rather than assuming that Article 46 alone delivers a national enforcement order.
That mechanism may vary by objective. If the objective is to establish a violation, the evidence belongs before Strasbourg. If the objective is to locate a child, parallel requests to Ukrainian authorities, international organisations, diplomatic channels, and any jurisdiction holding relevant records may be necessary. If the objective is to challenge a later adoption or citizenship act in a forum with jurisdiction over the act or its consequences, a separate judicial or administrative proceeding may be required. If the objective is criminal accountability, investigators need a different evidentiary and jurisdictional analysis. A single ECHR application should not be made to carry every remedy.
The hearing can still change European procedure in three ways. First, it may define how the Court treats a continuing situation when the respondent State has withdrawn. Second, it may clarify how Article 8 protects the identity of children separated from the State that held their original records. Third, it may show what degree of documentary proof is required when the respondent does not participate. Those points matter beyond Crimea because they could affect cases involving displaced children, disputed nationality, occupation administrations, and records held by an uncooperative State.
B. What France and European lawyers can realistically do next
French counsel should start by separating the Convention route from French and European routes. Article 55 of the French Constitution gives regularly ratified and published treaties an authority above statutes, subject to the constitutional conditions stated in the provision. The official Légifrance text is the correct reference for that domestic status. It does not turn the ECHR into an EU institution, and it does not give a French lawyer power to enforce a judgment in territory controlled by Russia. It does mean that Convention reasoning must be treated seriously in French proceedings and that a Strasbourg judgment can have legal weight when a French authority later assesses a child’s status, a protection request, an extradition issue, or evidence of a human-rights violation.
The EU dimension must also be kept in its proper place. Article 88-1 of the Constitution concerns participation in the European Union. It does not replace the Convention’s jurisdictional rules. An EU sanctions file, an asylum or protection procedure, mutual legal assistance, and a Strasbourg application may concern the same conflict while relying on different sources, decision-makers, and remedies. The European arrest warrant system does not apply to Russia as though Russia were an EU Member State. Nor does a sanctions designation prove that a particular child was adopted or that a particular official is responsible for a Convention breach.
French lawyers should nevertheless preserve evidence with future proceedings in mind. A request to a French authority should identify the child, the alleged act, the date, the authority involved, the legal interest of the person requesting action, and the document sought. Generic statements that children were “taken” will not explain whether the proposed route is a Strasbourg complaint, a protection application, a criminal report, a civil-status challenge, or an international cooperation request. Counsel should also record the exact answer received from each authority. A refusal, a silence, and an inability to verify a record have different evidential meanings.
French extradition jurisprudence offers a useful procedural analogy. Article 696-4 of the Code of Criminal Procedure identifies circumstances in which extradition cannot be granted, including when the requested person would be tried by a tribunal that does not provide fundamental procedural guarantees and protection for the rights of the defence. Article 696-15 supplies the procedural framework for the instruction chamber’s extradition opinion and its review. In Cour de cassation, criminal chamber, 28 March 2023, no. 22-84.382, the Court required the instruction chamber to examine whether an extradition exposed the person sought to a flagrant denial of justice and to carry out a proportionality review where private and family life was engaged. In Cour de cassation, criminal chamber, 15 November 2016, no. 16-85.335, the Court quashed an extradition opinion because a general reference to the nature of extradition did not answer the applicant’s concrete argument about stable family ties and a disproportionate interference with Article 8. These judgments do not create a direct French remedy for children in Crimea. They show the level of reasoning expected when a cross-border measure affects fundamental rights: identify the facts, answer the essential arguments, and explain the proportionality assessment.
There is also a possible French criminal-law track, but it must not be oversold. At the time of this article, Article 689-11 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides a framework under which French courts may prosecute certain persons suspected of genocide, crimes against humanity, or war crimes committed abroad, subject to conditions including a sufficient link with France through habitual residence, a request from the national anti-terrorism prosecutor, and the absence of a competing request for surrender or extradition from an international or national jurisdiction. The official consolidated provision is on Légifrance. It is not a declaration that the facts in application no. 6719/23 constitute one of those crimes. Any such classification would require proof of the act, the context, the mental element, the identity of suspects, and the statutory conditions for French jurisdiction.
That route is most useful at the evidence-preservation stage. A person in France who holds records about institutional transfers, citizenship decisions, adoption listings, or communications with Russian and Ukrainian authorities should obtain legal advice before altering, circulating, or publishing them. Digital material should be preserved in its original form, with a record of when it was collected and by whom. Translations should identify the translator and preserve the source-language version. Public allegations about individual officials should be avoided unless the underlying documents support them and the proposed statement serves a legitimate legal purpose. The protection of children requires accuracy as much as urgency.
The four-week window for potential third-party interveners announced with the 10 July 2026 hearing notice has now passed. The immediate procedural task is therefore to prepare for the hearing, not to assume that another intervention request remains open. Organisations with relevant information should consider whether they can lawfully transmit a concise evidentiary record through an existing representative, a public authority, or another permitted channel. They should not treat media publication as a substitute for a filing accepted by the Court.
For the applicants, the most useful hearing preparation is a child-by-child chronology that makes three boundaries visible. The first is the Convention boundary: what happened before 16 September 2022, and what is alleged to have happened later. The second is the proof boundary: what is documented, what is inferred, and what remains unknown. The third is the remedy boundary: which request is directed to Strasbourg, which to a Ukrainian or French authority, and which would require cooperation from Russia. A file that respects those boundaries is more likely to generate a durable judgment than a file that merges every event into one accusation.
For French and European advisers following the hearing, the key question is not whether Strasbourg can issue a symbolic statement. It is whether the Court can formulate a legally enforceable finding about pre-withdrawal conduct, individual identity, and the State’s duties toward children whose location is unknown. That finding could influence later domestic proceedings and the historical record even if immediate execution is difficult. The lawyers’ role is to preserve that possibility by making every assertion traceable to a document, every legal conclusion traceable to a provision, and every requested remedy traceable to an institution capable of granting it.
Conclusion
The 22 September 2026 hearing in application no. 6719/23 is a live test of what remains legally possible after Russia’s withdrawal from the European Convention. The withdrawal does not automatically prevent the ECHR from examining alleged acts or omissions before 16 September 2022. It does, however, require a careful separation of pre-withdrawal conduct from later events, as the Court’s refusal of the 2023 interim-measure request already demonstrated. The Chamber must decide whether the evidence establishes violations of Articles 5 and 8 in relation to ten children, not simply whether the wider situation in Crimea is politically compelling.
A judgment could clarify the protection of children’s identity, the treatment of continuing situations, and the evidentiary consequences of a respondent’s non-participation. It could support future domestic and international action. It cannot, by itself, guarantee the location or return of a child. French lawyers should therefore work on parallel tracks: preserve dated and authenticated evidence, distinguish Strasbourg from EU and French criminal mechanisms, and frame every request around a remedy that a named authority can actually grant. The legal significance of this case will be measured not only by its outcome, but by whether the record allows each child’s identity, chronology, and rights to remain visible after the political headlines have moved on.