On 18 September 2026, a Croatian court approved the extradition to Germany of a Ukrainian man suspected of helping to blow up the Nord Stream gas pipelines in the Baltic Sea four years ago. The ruling, reported by international media on 24 September, concerns the very same man whom a Polish court refused to surrender to Germany in October 2025. His lawyer immediately announced an appeal, so the handover is suspended while the challenge runs its course. In parallel, a second suspect arrested in Italy in the summer of 2025 has already been surrendered to Germany, formally charged, and told by Germany’s highest criminal court that no form of combatant privilege will shield him from prosecution. Three European Union countries, three different answers, one set of German European Arrest Warrants arising from the same underwater explosions of 26 September 2022. For the international reader the story can look like judicial chaos. For a French criminal lawyer it reads instead like a live demonstration of how the European Arrest Warrant really works: a single European instrument, the Council Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA on the European Arrest Warrant, applied by national judges who retain different margins of review and different readings of the same refusal grounds. This article reconstructs the Nord Stream surrender saga strictly from public sources, all of them cited, and then answers the question that matters to anyone arrested in France on a foreign warrant: what would the investigation chamber of a French court of appeal do with a file like this, which checks would it run, and which defences could still block surrender.
I. Why Three EU Courts Gave Three Different Answers to the Same German Warrants
A. How Poland Refused to Surrender the Diver Suspect in the Nord Stream Case
The German investigation is conducted at the highest prosecutorial level. Because the acts were capable of undermining the internal security of the Federal Republic of Germany, the files are handled by the Federal Public Prosecutor General. According to the account published by the European criminal-law journal eucrim, the German authorities are investigating seven Ukrainian nationals suspected of having chartered a yacht, placed explosive devices on the Nord Stream 1 and Nord Stream 2 pipelines in the Baltic Sea in September 2022, and caused explosions that damaged both pipelines so badly that gas could no longer be transported from Russia to Europe. The German arrest warrants characterise the conduct as anti-constitutional sabotage committed together with causing an explosion and with destruction of buildings and structures, under Sections 88, 305 and 308 of the German Criminal Code. The suspects allegedly used a yacht rented from a German company with forged identity documents and intermediaries, sailing from the German port of Rostock, a factual setting reported consistently by the Associated Press and Reuters.
The first European Arrest Warrant test came in Poland. On 17 October 2025, the Regional Court in Warsaw refused to extradite a 46-year-old Ukrainian national identified by the Polish authorities as Volodymyr Zhuravlov, whom the German prosecutors call Vladimir Z. and describe as a trained scuba diver who, together with others, planted explosives on the pipelines near the Danish island of Bornholm. The Warsaw court also lifted his pre-trial detention. Its reasoning, reproduced in the eucrim report, rested on two pillars. First, any action taken would have fallen within the framework of a just defensive war waged on behalf of Ukraine, so the suspect had committed no crime under Polish law and double criminality was therefore not established, by reference to Article 607r section 1 point 1 of the Polish Code of Criminal Procedure. Second, Germany had no jurisdiction to prosecute any person for blowing up the pipelines; jurisdiction would belong to an international tribunal for armed conflicts at sea or to an ad hoc tribunal appointed by the United Nations. Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk publicly stated that the case was closed and that it was not in his country’s interest to prosecute or extradite the man.
Both pillars are remarkable to a French lawyer, and both would be unavailable in Paris, as will be shown below. Double criminality is normally a standard check, and jurisdiction is normally taken for granted when the issuing state is Germany and the damage struck German energy supplies. Yet the Warsaw court turned each into a wall. The decision shows how much room an executing judge can claim when the underlying facts sit on the border between ordinary criminal sabotage and acts connected with an international armed conflict. It also created the factual paradox that drives the news of September 2026: the man Poland set at liberty was arrested again in August 2026 in the northern Croatian town of Pula on the same German European warrant, and this time a court said yes. Under European Union law, the Polish refusal does not bind Croatia; each executing authority rules on the warrant before it, and a refusal in one Member State has no authority of decided matter in another. That is why the same suspect can lose his liberty in Pula for the same warrant that left him at liberty in Warsaw, and why his lawyer’s appeal against the Croatian ruling of 18 September 2026 matters so much: the appellate court in Croatia will now conduct its own review, with its own reading of double criminality, jurisdiction and fundamental rights.
The Polish episode also carries a lesson about politics around extradition. A prime minister declaring a file closed does not change the law, but it signals the political temperature in which judges decide. In France, the surrender procedure is deliberately insulated from the executive: since the reform that Europeanised the procedure, it is the investigation chamber of the court of appeal that grants or refuses surrender, not the government, and the government’s view of the diplomatic opportunity is not a ground listed anywhere in the statute. The contrast will matter when this article turns to the French checks.
B. How Italy Surrendered the Alleged Coordinator After Two Supreme Court Rulings
The Italian branch of the saga followed the opposite path and illustrates the other face of the European Arrest Warrant: mutual recognition with narrow, strictly supervised refusal grounds. The suspect in Italy, identified in public sources as Serhij or Serhii K. and described by investigators as the suspected coordinator of the operation, was detained in August 2025 in an Italian village where officers raided the bungalow in which he was staying with his family. The Court of Appeal of Bologna first authorised his surrender to Germany. On 15 October 2025, the Italian Supreme Court quashed that decision. The defect identified by the Supreme Court was procedural but revealing: the Bologna court had reclassified the offence stated in the German warrant so as to apply the tighter procedural rules reserved for terrorism cases in extradition proceedings, and in doing so it had exceeded the powers of the executing authority in proceedings where surrender is in principle mandatory. After the case was sent back, the Bologna Court of Appeal ordered the surrender again on 23 October 2025, this time curing the procedural defect but without substantively re-examining the defence arguments on functional immunity, on the prohibition of double prosecution, or on the risk of a violation of Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights. A second appeal was dismissed by the Italian Supreme Court on 19 November 2025, which confirmed the surrender order, and the suspect was effectively handed over to Germany on 27 November 2025.
The German phase then moved quickly. In July 2026, the German federal prosecution charged the former Ukrainian army officer in connection with the explosions, and on 15 January 2026 the Federal Court of Justice dismissed his challenge against the arrest order imposed after his arrival, confirming both the strong suspicion of an offence within the jurisdiction of the Federal Public Prosecutor General and the risk of flight. The same ruling rejected the arguments based on immunity and on combatant privilege as a justification for the act. As reported by Deutsche Welle on 23 January 2026, the court held that the pipelines were civilian infrastructure, that the international law of armed conflict does not cover covert operations conducted without any outward sign of state authority such as a military uniform or documented orders, and that the suspect would therefore stand trial for violating the internal security of the federal republic and German sovereignty, with even a possible additional examination of whether attacking civilian equipment could amount to a war crime. The court added that Germany had territorial jurisdiction because the result of the offence, the pipelines being rendered unusable, also occurred on German territory, where the pipelines came ashore. For the purposes of this article, the German rulings are taken strictly as reported by these public sources; the legal assessment that follows is conducted under French and European Union surrender law, not under German substantive criminal law.
Italy and Poland therefore embody the two poles between which every executing judge in Europe must navigate. Warsaw conducted a full substantive review of criminal responsibility and jurisdiction and refused. Bologna, supervised twice by the Supreme Court, confined itself to the procedural regularity of the warrant and surrendered. Both courts applied the same Framework Decision. The Framework Decision provides that the executing judicial authority may refuse to execute a European Arrest Warrant, and enumerates the situations in which it may do so, stating for example that refusal is possible where the person is being prosecuted in the executing Member State for the same act as that on which the warrant is based. It also preserves fundamental rights, recalling that nothing in the instrument may be interpreted as prohibiting refusal to surrender where objective material shows such a risk. The engine of the system remains mutual recognition: surrender is the rule, refusal the exception, and each exception must fit one of the listed grounds. Seen from Paris, the Italian reading is the orthodox one, and the Polish reading is the outlier that a French investigation chamber could not reproduce, for reasons that belong to French statute law.
II. What a French Investigation Chamber Would Check Before Surrendering Anyone in a Case Like This
A. Would France Test Double Criminality or Skip It for Sabotage and Terrorism
French surrender law starts from a definition that mirrors the Framework Decision. Under Article 695-11 of the French Code of Criminal Procedure, and the wording must be quoted exactly because it governs everything that follows: Le mandat d’arrêt européen est une décision judiciaire émise par un Etat membre de l’Union européenne, appelé Etat membre d’émission, en vue de l’arrestation et de la remise par un autre Etat membre, appelé Etat membre d’exécution, d’une personne recherchée pour l’exercice de poursuites pénales ou pour l’exécution d’une peine ou d’une mesure de sûreté privative de liberté. The issuing authority must be a judicial authority, and the warrant must contain a series of particulars set out in Article 695-13 of the same code, including l’identité et la nationalité de la personne recherchée, the precise designation of the issuing judicial authority, the nature and legal classification of the offence, and la date, le lieu et les circonstances dans lesquels l’infraction a été commise ainsi que le degré de participation à celle-ci de la personne recherchée. In a Nord Stream type file, the German warrant would therefore be examined first for completeness: identity of the person, issuing prosecutor or judge, classification of the sabotage and explosives charges, dates and places including the Baltic Sea coordinates and the German landing point, and the degree of participation attributed to each suspect, diver or coordinator. A warrant that fails this completeness test can be sent back for additional information, but incompleteness alone rarely ends the case.
The decisive check is double criminality, and here French law differs sharply from the Polish approach. Article 695-23 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides, first, that L’exécution d’un mandat d’arrêt européen peut également être refusée si le fait faisant l’objet dudit mandat d’arrêt ne constitue pas une infraction au regard de la loi française. Standing alone, that sentence could have supported a Warsaw-style refusal. But the same article immediately adds the exception that governs serious organised crime, and it must be quoted in full: un mandat d’arrêt européen est exécuté sans contrôle de la double incrimination des faits reprochés lorsque les agissements considérés sont, aux termes de la loi de l’Etat membre d’émission, punis d’une peine privative de liberté d’une durée égale ou supérieure à trois ans d’emprisonnement ou d’une mesure de sûreté privative de liberté d’une durée similaire et entrent dans l’une des catégories d’infractions prévues par l’article 694-32. The list in Article 694-32 contains thirty-two categories, and two of them decide the Nord Stream question in a French courtroom. The list includes, at point 2, Terrorisme, and at point 32, Sabotage. The German charges of anti-constitutional sabotage, causing an explosion and destroying structures carry custodial sentences well above the three-year threshold, so a French investigation chamber seized with the same warrant would in all likelihood hold that no double-criminality review is permitted at all. The Polish court’s finding that a defensive war removes criminal character under the law of the executing state is exactly the kind of substantive re-examination that the French text forbids in this configuration, since the same article specifies that where the exception applies, the legal classification and the applicable penalty are a matter for the issuing authority alone.
Even if the exception did not apply, French law would still criminalise the underlying conduct, which closes the second door the Warsaw court opened. The destruction of property belonging to another by means of an explosive substance is punishable under Article 322-6 of the French Criminal Code, which states that La destruction, la dégradation ou la détérioration d’un bien appartenant à autrui par l’effet d’une substance explosive, d’un incendie ou de tout autre moyen de nature à créer un danger pour les personnes est punie de dix ans d’emprisonnement et de 150 000 euros d’amende. And where such destruction is intentionally connected with an individual or collective enterprise aimed at seriously disturbing public order by intimidation or terror, it can be classified as terrorism, since Article 421-1 of the same code provides that Constituent des actes de terrorisme, lorsqu’elles sont intentionnellement en relation avec une entreprise individuelle ou collective ayant pour but de troubler gravement l’ordre public par l’intimidation ou la terreur, les infractions suivantes. The French court would therefore not need to decide whether the attack was an act of war or an act of terrorism in the abstract; it would only need to observe that explosive destruction of underwater infrastructure is an offence under French law, so double criminality, if tested, would be satisfied. The militant question of whether Ukrainian state authorities initiated the operation, which the German Federal Court of Justice treated as an assumption and which one German commentator quoted by Deutsche Welle called dangerous for public acceptance of the verdict, would be legally irrelevant at the surrender stage in Paris: the executing judge does not try the merits, does not arbitrate between competing intelligence narratives, and does not rule on who truly ordered the explosion.
Practice confirms this restraint. The Criminal Chamber of the Court of Cassation held on 29 May 2024 that the executing judges are not required to examine double criminality of their own motion where no plea based on the optional refusal ground has been raised, in a ruling numbered 24-82.747 concerning the extension of the effects of Polish European Arrest Warrants granted by the investigation chamber of the Rennes Court of Appeal, a case in which M. [J] [W] a formé un pourvoi contre l’arrêt de la chambre de l’instruction de la cour d’appel de Rennes, en date du 9 juin 2023, qui, sur demande des autorités judiciaires polonaises, a accordé l’extension des effets de mandats d’arrêt européens décernés à son encontre. More recently, on 12 August 2026, the same chamber rejected a challenge against surrender to the Cypriot authorities granted by the Aix-en-Provence investigation chamber, in case 26-84.479, where Mme [Z] [S] a formé un pourvoi contre l’arrêt de la chambre de l’instruction de la cour d’appel d’Aix-en-Provence, en date du 1er juillet 2026, qui a autorisé sa remise aux autorités judiciaires chypriotes en exécution d’un mandat d’arrêt européen. The message of both rulings is consistent: the investigation chamber checks the listed statutory grounds when they are properly put before it, and the Court of Cassation polices the reasoning, but neither court re-tries the facts or invents new refusal grounds. Anyone arrested in France on a sabotage warrant carrying more than three years of custody should therefore expect the double-criminality battle to be lost before it begins, and should direct the defence toward the grounds examined in the next section. Readers who want the general method for contesting an arrest on an international alert in France will find it set out in the firm’s analysis of the procedure for challenging an arrest on an Interpol red notice and fighting extradition before the French courts, which follows the same investigation-chamber logic.
B. Which Defences Could Still Block Surrender Before a French Court
Four lines of defence remain genuinely available in Paris, and each maps onto one of the controversies visible in the Polish, Italian and German rulings. The first is the mandatory refusal grounds of Article 695-22 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which opens with the words L’exécution d’un mandat d’arrêt européen est refusée dans les cas suivants and then lists amnesty extinguishing a prosecution that French courts could have conducted, final judgment for the same facts in France or in another Member State with the sentence enforced or no longer enforceable, minority under thirteen years of age at the time of the facts, and the anti-discrimination clause covering prosecution sought on account of sex, race, religion, ethnic origin, nationality, language, political opinions or sexual orientation and gender identity. None of these fits the Nord Stream facts as publicly reported: there is no amnesty, no prior final judgment, no minor, and no indication that the German warrants target the suspects for a protected characteristic. The anti-discrimination ground deserves one sentence of precision, because war-related files sometimes tempt counsel to invoke it: being prosecuted as an alleged saboteur of a given nationality is not the same as being prosecuted because of that nationality, and a French chamber would require concrete material showing discriminatory purpose, not merely a wartime context.
The second line is the optional refusal where France itself is prosecuting the same facts. Article 695-24 of the Code of Criminal Procedure allows refusal, notably Si, pour les faits faisant l’objet du mandat d’arrêt, la personne recherchée fait l’objet de poursuites devant les juridictions françaises ou si celles-ci ont décidé de ne pas engager les poursuites ou d’y mettre fin. On 2 December 2025, the Criminal Chamber gave this ground its most detailed recent interpretation in case 25-87.216, quashing a refusal pronounced by the Chambéry investigation chamber against a Portuguese warrant where a French murder investigation covered the same killings. The Court recalled that the provision transposes Article 4 point 2 of the Framework Decision and that the notion of same facts must be read autonomously, quoting the Court of Justice formula of la seule matérialité des faits et englobant un ensemble de circonstances concrètes indissociablement liées entre elles, indépendamment de la qualification juridique de ces faits ou de l’intérêt juridique protégé, and it held that the relevant test is celui de l’identité des faits matériels faisant l’objet du mandat d’arrêt européen et de ceux pour lesquels la personne recherchée est poursuivie en France, compris comme l’existence d’un ensemble de faits indissociablement liés entre eux, indépendamment de la ou des qualifications pénales retenues dans l’Etat membre d’émission du mandat d’arrêt européen. Transposed to a pipeline case, the lesson is practical: if the French prosecution service had opened its own investigation into the same explosions, for example on the basis that the pipelines supplied or transited through French interests or that suspects residing in France participated in the logistics, the investigation chamber could refuse surrender for the overlapping material facts while ordering it for the rest, but it would have to reason fact by fact and could not issue a blanket refusal. Conversely, where France prosecutes nothing, this ground is simply absent, and the chamber surrenders.
The third line is jurisdiction and the political-offence argument, and here the French answer is the least favourable to the defence among the three countries compared. In classic extradition outside the European Union, Article 696-4 of the Code of Criminal Procedure still bars surrender Lorsque le crime ou le délit à un caractère politique ou lorsqu’il résulte des circonstances que l’extradition est demandée dans un but politique. That political-offence exception does not exist in the European Arrest Warrant chapter. The Framework Decision deliberately removed it in favour of exhaustive listed grounds and mutual confidence, and the French chapter on surrender contains no equivalent. A French chamber could not therefore reproduce the Warsaw reasoning that treats sabotage as a justified act of defensive war; justification and state authorisation belong to the trial court in the issuing state, not to the executing judge. The same applies to the Polish court’s denial of German jurisdiction. French law itself applies the effects doctrine without hesitation: Article 113-2 of the Criminal Code provides that L’infraction est réputée commise sur le territoire de la République dès lors qu’un de ses faits constitutifs a eu lieu sur ce territoire. A French court would find it entirely natural that Germany prosecutes explosions whose result disabled pipelines feeding the German coast, just as France would prosecute an attack whose constituent effects materialised on French soil. Functional immunity and combatant privilege would meet the same reception as in Karlsruhe: a covert diving operation from a chartered yacht, without uniform, insignia or verifiable chain of command, cannot be presented to an executing judge as lawful combatancy, and any residual immunity claim would in any event be for the trial court, with the surrender procedure merely suspending its time limits while a genuine privilege is examined, as Article 695-31 of the Code of Criminal Procedure expressly contemplates when it states that where the requested person enjoys a privilege or immunity in France the procedural time limits only run once the chamber has been informed of its lifting, in the article that also fixes dans les sept jours de la comparution devant elle de la personne recherchée for a consenting person and twenty days with a right of cassation appeal for a person who refuses surrender.
The fourth and only genuinely open line is fundamental rights: inhuman or degrading detention conditions in the issuing state, and disproportionate interference with private and family life. This is the ground the Italian defence raised under Article 3 of the Convention and the ground on which the Bologna court, according to the case reports, did not conduct a substantive second review. A French investigation chamber would examine such pleas with documented evidence, country reports, and where needed assurances from the issuing authority, under the control of the Court of Cassation and ultimately of the European courts. The threshold is deliberately high: abstract criticism of a prison system never suffices, and the defence must show a real, individualised risk for the person concerned. In a German surrender file that threshold would be formidable, given the standards of German detention as documented by European monitoring bodies, and the Article 8 proportionality plea would weigh the gravity of pipeline sabotage carrying multi-year custodial sentences against family ties in France. Formidable does not mean theoretical: it is the one plea that obliges the chamber to look at the person rather than at the warrant, and in files where the issuing state’s detention conditions or the personal circumstances genuinely raise an issue, it is the plea that obtains additional information, delays, and occasionally refusals. Everything else in a Nord Stream type file, double criminality, jurisdiction, political character, immunity, points toward surrender in Paris.
Conclusion
The Croatian ruling of 18 September 2026 does not contradict the Polish refusal of October 2025 and does not copy the Italian surrender of November 2025; it confirms that the European Arrest Warrant leaves each executing judge to apply the same listed grounds to the file before it. Poland tested the merits and jurisdiction and said no. Italy tested procedural regularity and said yes. Germany, once it obtained custody, rejected combatant privilege and asserted jurisdiction through the effects on its territory. A French investigation chamber seized with the same German warrant would most probably follow the Italian rather than the Polish path: sabotage and terrorism sit on the French list of categories exempt from double-criminality review, explosive destruction is plainly an offence under French law in any event, the political-offence exception of classic extradition has no equivalent in surrender law, jurisdiction through effects is familiar rather than shocking, and covert diving operations do not present the outward marks of lawful combatancy. Only a concurrent French prosecution of the same material facts or a documented, individualised fundamental-rights risk could change that outcome, and both would have to be proved with evidence rather than asserted from the wartime context. The appeal now pending in Croatia will test whether a second executing court agrees. For anyone living in France who learns that a European warrant has been issued in their name, the practical consequence is immediate: do not wait for the political narrative to settle, have the warrant, the factual particulars and the personal file examined at once against the French statutory grounds, because the chamber decides within days, and the grounds that dominate the newspapers are rarely the ones that decide the courtroom.