In the third week of August 2026, a Croatian investigative judge ordered the detention of a Ukrainian man wanted in Germany in connection with the underwater explosions that severely damaged the Nord Stream 1 and Nord Stream 2 gas pipelines in the Baltic Sea on 26 September 2022. The man had been arrested on a European arrest warrant in the northern Croatian town of Pula, questioned by prosecutors who requested detention pending extradition proceedings, and immediately announced through his lawyer, Matija Milos, that he would appeal the detention order. German prosecutors described the suspect as a trained scuba diver belonging to a group that planted explosives on the pipelines near the Danish island of Bornholm, and identified him only as Vladimir Z. The same office then confirmed the striking detail: this is the same man Poland arrested last year and then released, after the Regional Court in Warsaw refused on 17 October 2025 to extradite him to Germany. Poland identified him as Volodymyr Zhuravlov, photographed in the Warsaw courtroom listening as the judge read the refusal.
For an international reader, the sequence is disorienting. One German warrant, one suspect, two opposite judicial answers within the same European Union: no surrender in Warsaw, detention pending surrender in Pula. And behind those two rulings sits a third story from the same file. In November 2025, Italy did surrender a different Ukrainian suspect, Serhij K., to Germany after its highest court upheld the handover, and in January 2026 the German Federal Court of Justice confirmed his pre-trial detention in Karlsruhe. Three executing courts, three outcomes, one investigation led by the Federal Public Prosecutor General, the Generalbundesanwalt, into a group of seven Ukrainians accused of chartering a yacht, diving to the pipelines, and laying charges that ended gas transport from Russia to Europe. This article explains why European law allows such divergence, what the Croatian court must now decide about a man another Member State already refused to surrender, and, above all, what a French executing court would test if the warrant ever reached Paris. French procedure is among the most rigorous in Europe on this point, and its checkpoints map the entire European arrest warrant system.
I. Why three European courts gave three different answers to the same German warrants
The European arrest warrant is built on mutual recognition: a judicial decision issued in one Member State is in principle executed swiftly in another, with only limited grounds for refusal. That architecture explains the speed of the Croatian arrest in Pula. It does not explain the Polish refusal, the Italian surrender, and now the Croatian detention. To understand the split, one must look at the three pressure points where the Framework Decision lets an executing judge say no, or say yes under conditions: double criminality and the political or military character of the act, jurisdiction of the issuing State, and fundamental rights. Each court in the Nord Stream file pulled a different lever, and each lever exists in French law too, drafted in terms a Paris practitioner uses every week.
A. Can Croatia surrender a man Poland already refused to hand over
The Warsaw refusal of 17 October 2025 rested first on double criminality. The Polish court held that conduct carried out within a just defensive war on behalf of Ukraine was not a crime under Polish law, so the condition of Article 607r section 1 point 1 of the Polish Code of Criminal Procedure was not met. Put in European terms, the Polish judges treated the sabotage as a lawful act of war rather than a criminal offence, which removed the very foundation of surrender. The court added two further lines of reasoning that matter far beyond Poland: Germany, in its view, had no jurisdiction to prosecute a natural person for blowing up pipelines lying outside its territory, a matter for an international tribunal on armed conflict at sea or an ad hoc United Nations tribunal; and surrender would expose the suspect to a real risk of inhuman treatment, with procedural rules for terrorists allegedly applied in the extradition channel. However one judges those findings on the merits, their structure is familiar to any extradition lawyer: no punishable act under the law of the requested State, no jurisdiction for the requesting State, and a bar rooted in fundamental rights.
French law organises exactly the same three questions, and it does so in language worth quoting because it governs every surrender litigated in Paris. The starting definition is set by Article 695-11 of the Code of criminal procedure: “Le mandat d’arrêt européen est une décision judiciaire émise par un Etat membre de l’Union européenne, appelé Etat membre d’émission, en vue de l’arrestation et de la remise par un autre Etat membre, appelé Etat membre d’exécution, d’une personne recherchée pour l’exercice de poursuites pénales ou pour l’exécution d’une peine ou d’une mesure de sûreté privative de liberté.” Everything that follows in the French chapter on surrender is a set of filters applied to that decision. The first mandatory filter includes the European equivalent of the Polish ne bis in idem concern. Article 695-22 of the Code of criminal procedure provides that “L’exécution d’un mandat d’arrêt européen est refusée dans les cas suivants”, and its second paragraph covers the precise situation Croatia now faces: “Si la personne recherchée a fait l’objet, par les autorités judiciaires françaises ou par celles d’un autre Etat membre que l’Etat d’émission, d’une décision définitive pour les mêmes faits que ceux faisant l’objet du mandat d’arrêt européen à condition, en cas de condamnation, que la peine ait été exécutée ou soit en cours d’exécution ou ne puisse plus être ramenée à exécution selon les lois de l’Etat de condamnation”. The wording is careful, and its carefulness decides cases. A refusal of surrender is not an acquittal on the merits; it is a decision on the warrant. Whether the Warsaw order of October 2025 counts as a decision définitive for the same facts, capable of blocking a second surrender in Croatia or anywhere else, is therefore the central legal battle of the coming months. Germany will argue that a Polish refusal based on double criminality and jurisdiction does not finally dispose of criminal liability and cannot paralyse every other executing authority in the Union. The defence will argue the opposite: the same issuing decision, the same facts, the same person already judged non-surrenderable, and the effectiveness of judicial protection demands that the first final refusal carry weight across borders. No honest commentator can present the answer as settled, because the Court of Justice has never had to rule on the cross-border effect of a refusal grounded in the political or military characterisation of the Nord Stream facts. What can be stated firmly is the test the French court would apply, since it is written in the statute: final decision, same facts, and, in the case of a conviction, enforcement or impossibility of enforcement. Each element would be litigated document by document, translation by translation.
The second French filter is double criminality itself, and here the Polish reasoning would receive a cooler reception in Paris than in Warsaw. Article 695-23 of the Code of criminal procedure states that “L’exécution d’un mandat d’arrêt européen peut également être refusée si le fait faisant l’objet dudit mandat d’arrêt ne constitue pas une infraction au regard de la loi française.” The word peut matters: outside the list of thirty-two serious offences punishable by at least three years in the issuing State, for which no verification of double criminality takes place, refusal for lack of double criminality is optional, not automatic, and it turns on French criminal law as applied to the facts described. German prosecutors charge anti-constitutional sabotage concurrently with causing an explosion and destroying structures, under Sections 88, 305 and 308 of the German Criminal Code, with the Federal Public Prosecutor General seised because the acts allegedly undermined the internal security of Germany. Transposed to French categories, underwater demolition of energy infrastructure maps without strain onto serious destruction offences and, depending on the findings about purpose and context, onto terrorism provisions. Article 322-1 of the Criminal Code punishes basic destruction in these terms: “La destruction, la dégradation ou la détérioration d’un bien appartenant à autrui est punie de deux ans d’emprisonnement et de 30 000 euros d’amende, sauf s’il n’en est résulté qu’un dommage léger.” Nobody could describe the Nord Stream blasts as light damage, and aggravated forms of destruction carry far heavier penalties under French law. As for the terrorism characterisation, Article 421-1 of the Criminal Code defines terrorist acts as conduct intentionally connected with an individual or collective enterprise aimed at seriously disturbing public order through intimidation or terror: “Constituent des actes de terrorisme, lorsqu’elles sont intentionnellement en relation avec une entreprise individuelle ou collective ayant pour but de troubler gravement l’ordre public par l’intimidation ou la terreur, les infractions suivantes”. The listed offences that follow include wilful attacks on life and property destruction, so a French prosecutor could readily argue that pipeline sabotage intended to intimidate or coerce falls within the text, while the defence would counter that sabotage of military-relevant energy infrastructure during an armed conflict belongs to the laws of war, not to terrorism. A French chambre de l’instruction would therefore examine the German factual narrative line by line, demand precise translations of the warrant, and decide whether the described acts, taken as stated, constitute an offence under French law. The just-war justification that carried the day in Warsaw would be tested far more severely in Paris, where French courts have historically treated sabotage on or connected to national territory as ordinary serious crime and left the laws-of-war argument to the trial court on the merits, not to the surrender judge.
B. Did Germany have jurisdiction over explosions on the seabed outside its waters
The Polish court’s second ground, lack of German jurisdiction, touches the most technical layer of the file, and the German Federal Court of Justice answered it head-on. When Serhij K., surrendered by Italy on 27 November 2025, challenged his German pre-trial detention, the Federal Court of Justice dismissed the complaint on 15 January 2026, holding that strong suspicion of an offence within the jurisdiction of the Federal Public Prosecutor General and a risk of flight justified the arrest. The Karlsruhe judges rejected immunity and combatant privilege arguments and, crucially, affirmed German territorial jurisdiction on the ground that the result of the offence, the pipelines being rendered unusable, also occurred on German territory where the pipelines end. In doctrinal terms, this is the ubiquity principle: an offence is committed both where the perpetrator acts and where the result occurs, so a seabed explosion near Bornholm that disables infrastructure terminating at Lubmin is partly committed in Germany. Add the protective principle for offences against the constitutional order and the security of the State, which founds the Federal Public Prosecutor General’s jurisdiction over anti-constitutional sabotage, and the German claim becomes coherent even to lawyers trained in other systems.
A French court seised of the same objection would reason from its own jurisdictional grammar, which is strikingly parallel. Article 113-2 of the Criminal Code lays down the territorial rule in two sentences: “La loi pénale française est applicable aux infractions commises sur le territoire de la République.” Then comes the ubiquity clause: “L’infraction est réputée commise sur le territoire de la République dès lors qu’un de ses faits constitutifs a eu lieu sur ce territoire.” French case law reads faits constitutifs broadly, covering preparatory acts, transit, and result elements, so damage suffered by French interests or infrastructure on national territory can anchor jurisdiction even when the explosive charge detonates abroad. Beyond territoriality, French law provides an explicit gateway for extraterritorial prosecution where treaties or European instruments confer jurisdiction. Article 689 of the Code of criminal procedure states: “Les auteurs ou complices d’infractions commises hors du territoire de la République peuvent être poursuivis et jugés par les juridictions françaises soit lorsque, conformément aux dispositions du livre Ier du code pénal ou d’un autre texte législatif, la loi française est applicable, soit lorsqu’une convention internationale ou un acte pris en application du traité instituant les Communautés européennes donne compétence aux juridictions françaises pour connaître de l’infraction.” Applied as a mirror to the German claim, the French test would ask whether at least one constitutive element, including the disabling of infrastructure connected to the issuing State, occurred on German soil, and whether the protective competence for State-security offences supports prosecution. The Polish answer, an international tribunal for armed conflict at sea or an ad hoc United Nations tribunal, would be noted respectfully in Paris and then set aside, because no such tribunal with jurisdiction over these facts exists, and the surrender judge does not invent courts. The Italian answer is the more instructive precedent for France: Bologna and then the Corte di Cassazione treated jurisdiction as a question for the issuing State, reviewable in execution only at the margins, and surrendered. That deference is also the French reflex. The executing judge verifies that the warrant describes facts over which the issuing authority plausibly claims jurisdiction; the full jurisdictional battle belongs to the trial court in the issuing State, with the Court of Justice available by preliminary reference if European law is at stake. Croatia will likely find its way to the same conclusion, but the defence will force it to walk every step, including the law of the sea. The explosions occurred in exclusive economic zones around Bornholm, where the coastal State has sovereign rights over resources and installations but not full sovereignty, and the pipelines themselves lay on the seabed beyond territorial waters. Expect detailed argument about the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, the Danish and Swedish investigations that were closed without prosecution, and the question of which State suffered the result. Germany’s strongest card remains the simplest: the gas was meant for Germany, the pipes ended in Germany, and the economic and energy-security harm materialised there. Whether that card beats a Polish-style denial of jurisdiction in a Croatian courtroom is now the question to watch.
Two further threads from the Italian leg of the saga deserve attention because they will resurface in Croatia and would equally surface in France. First, functional immunity and combatant privilege. The defence of Serhij K. argued that Ukrainian operatives acting for their State enjoy immunity and the combatant’s privilege to take part in hostilities, and both the Italian courts and the German Federal Court of Justice rejected the claim, at least at the surrender and detention stage. The reasoning is practical: privilege under international humanitarian law attaches to members of armed forces in international armed conflict under responsible command, wearing distinctive signs and conducting operations in accordance with the laws of war, and covert sabotage of civilian energy infrastructure by unmarked operatives from a chartered yacht fits that frame poorly. A French court would treat the argument as a defence on the merits, not a bar to surrender, and hand the file to the trial judge. Second, the political offence exception. Classical extradition law refused surrender for political offences, but the Framework Decision deliberately abolished that exception inside the Union, replacing it with a narrow non-discrimination clause. French statute mirrors it. The same Article 695-22 of the Code of criminal procedure that lists mandatory refusal grounds also provides a discrimination bar where the warrant was issued to prosecute on account of sex, race, religion, ethnic origin, nationality, language, political opinions, sexual orientation or gender identity, or where the person’s situation may be worsened on such grounds. Prosecuting pipeline saboteurs because they acted for Ukraine is not prosecuting them because they are Ukrainian; motive and discriminatory purpose are different things, and conflating them would collapse the entire surrender system. The Warsaw court’s just-war reasoning flirts with reintroducing a political justification through the back door of double criminality, which is precisely why the Croatian proceedings, and any future French proceedings, will scrutinise that step with unusual care.
II. What a French court would check before surrendering anyone in this type of case
Suppose the German warrant had been executed in France rather than in Pula: a Ukrainian national stopped at Roissy on a European arrest warrant, placed in extradition detention, and brought before the chambre de l’instruction. What would happen, week by week, and which arguments from Warsaw, Bologna, Rome and Karlsruhe would matter in Paris. French surrender procedure is judicial from start to finish, fast by design, and layered with remedies that defence lawyers know how to use. Its checkpoints also reveal what is at stake in Croatia right now, because every executing court in the Union applies the same European framework through its own procedural lens. The French lens is worth describing precisely, since it combines strict deadlines with searching judicial control.
A. Would the conduct be a crime under French law and which court prosecutes it
The first French checkpoint after arrest is presentation to the prosecution and immediate seisin of the investigating chamber. Article 695-29 of the Code of criminal procedure provides that “La chambre de l’instruction est immédiatement saisie de la procédure.” The wanted person appears before that chamber within five working days of presentation to the prosecutor general, with counsel, an interpreter if needed, and a full copy of the translated warrant. That appearance is not a formality. The chamber verifies identity, nationality, and the conditions of arrest, notifies the person of the right to consent or refuse surrender, and sets the timetable. If the person consents, the statute organises a recorded, irrevocable procedure: Article 695-31 of the Code of criminal procedure explains that “Si la chambre de l’instruction constate que les conditions légales d’exécution du mandat d’arrêt européen sont remplies, elle rend un arrêt par lequel elle donne acte à la personne recherchée de son consentement à être remise”, adding where relevant the waiver of the specialty rule. Consent accelerates everything and closes most avenues of challenge, which is why experienced counsel in Paris almost never consent in a contested file without first seeing the complete translated prosecution file and the exact list of charges. In a Nord Stream type case, with competing characterisations ranging from terrorism to lawful warfare, consent would be out of the question.
On the substance, the French chamber would then work through the refusal grounds in statutory order. Mandatory bars first, under the article quoted above, including amnesty, minority under thirteen, a final decision for the same facts, and discriminatory purpose. None would obviously apply to a pipeline sabotage file, except the ne bis in idem point if a prior final decision for the same facts existed in France or another Member State, which returns the debate to the legal weight of the Warsaw refusal. Optional bars second. Article 695-24 of the Code of criminal procedure allows refusal where French courts are already prosecuting the same facts, where the acts were committed in whole or in part on French territory, summarised in the phrase “Si les faits pour lesquels il a été émis ont été commis, en tout ou en partie, sur le territoire français”, or where the offence was committed outside the issuing State and French law would not allow prosecution for extraterritorial conduct. ANord Stream style file could trigger each of these debates: concurrent French proceedings if Paris had opened its own sabotage or terrorism investigation into damage affecting European energy interests, partial territoriality if any constitutive act touched France, and mirror extraterritoriality if French law could not reach the conduct. Add the double criminality filter already discussed, and the chamber has a complete grid. The specialty protection completes the picture after surrender: Article 695-46 of the Code of criminal procedure provides that “La chambre de l’instruction devant laquelle la personne recherchée a comparu est saisie de toute demande émanant des autorités compétentes de l’Etat membre d’émission en vue de consentir à des poursuites ou à la mise à exécution d’une peine ou d’une mesure de sûreté prononcées pour d’autres infractions que celles ayant motivé la remise et commises antérieurement à celle-ci.” In plain terms, Germany could not surrender a man for sabotage and then try him for unrelated earlier offences without returning to the executing court for consent, a guarantee defence teams invoke to fence the prosecution.
B. How long detention can last and which remedies can stop a surrender from France
Extradition detention is the pressure point of every surrender file, and the Croatian order, with detention pending proceedings and an appeal announced, follows the standard European pattern. French law keeps the arrested person under judicial control from the first hours, with detention ordered or extended by the chambre de l’instruction and release available at any time. Article 695-34 of the Code of criminal procedure states that “La mise en liberté peut être demandée à tout moment à la chambre de l’instruction selon les formes prévues aux articles 148-6 et 148-7.” The chamber rules within short deadlines after hearing the prosecution and the defence, and it may accompany release with supervision measures. In practice, Paris judges weigh flight risk against the seriousness of the charges and the length of foreseeable proceedings, and in a sabotage file with foreign-based suspects and severe potential sentences, detention pending the surrender decision is the likely outcome, though never automatic. Counsel would argue the Polish precedent, the availability of a fixed address, electronic monitoring, and the time already spent in custody across successive arrests, while the prosecution would stress international mobility, the gravity of the alleged pipeline operation, and coordination among several suspects still sought. The same balancing is now under way in Croatia.
Beyond detention, the remedy that truly decides surrender cases in France is the fundamental rights review shaped by Luxembourg and Strasbourg. The Court of Justice, from Aranyosi and Caldararu on detention conditions to LM on judicial independence and E.D.L. on health bars to surrender, requires the executing judge to assess, on the basis of objective, reliable and updated material, whether surrender would expose the person to a real risk of inhuman or degrading treatment or of a flagrant denial of justice, and to request supplementary information or guarantees from the issuing authority before deciding. The Polish court’s reference to terrorist procedural rules and detention conditions is an early, rough version of that analysis; a French chamber would conduct it methodically, demanding specifics about the German custodial regime, the competent court, access to counsel and translators, and the exact charges, then deciding whether assurances dispel the risk or refusal is required. The European Court of Human Rights adds its own layer, since surrender that exposes a person to treatment contrary to Article 3 of the Convention is prohibited, and the Grand Chamber’s forthcoming rulings on whole-life sentences and extradition, in cases concerning the United Kingdom and Italy, are watched closely by Paris practitioners for their effect on surrender conditions. None of this helps a suspect whose file shows ordinary high-security detention in a State governed by the rule of law; Germany clears that bar comfortably. But the procedure forces the issuing State to document its guarantees, and that documentation sometimes reveals genuine gaps, overcrowding, or special regimes that change the outcome. Add the appeal structure, cassation review of the chambre de l’instruction’s order, and the possibility of a preliminary reference to the Court of Justice where a novel point of European law arises, and the French path to surrender typically runs from a few weeks in consented cases to several months in contested ones. Croatia’s timetable will be its own, yet the defence playbook, appeal the detention, challenge the translations, dispute double criminality and jurisdiction, demand rights-based guarantees, and seek a reference to Luxembourg on the cross-border effect of the Polish refusal, is identical in every Member State because the underlying European law is identical.
Conclusion
The Croatian detention order does not contradict the Polish refusal; it continues the same European conversation in a different courtroom. Poland treated the Nord Stream sabotage as justified warfare and Germany as lacking jurisdiction. Italy treated jurisdiction as the issuing State’s business and surrendered. Germany’s highest criminal court treated the result on German soil as sufficient territorial anchor and kept the surrendered suspect in custody. Croatia must now decide whether a Polish refusal for the same facts bars a second surrender, whether the German jurisdictional claim survives adversarial testing, and whether detention remains justified while those questions are litigated. For readers facing a European arrest warrant, whether in this file or any other, the lesson is practical: surrender litigation is won on precise procedural points, complete translations, documented detention conditions, and exact statutory matching between the described facts and the law of the executing State. The French checkpoints described here, immediate judicial seisin, optional double criminality review, territoriality and specialty controls, release at any time, and searching fundamental rights scrutiny, are the standard against which every European surrender file is measured. Anyone arrested on a European warrant in France should have counsel raise each of them in writing, with exhibits, from the first appearance, because the chamber decides quickly and rarely revisits what was conceded. The Nord Stream file, with its yacht, its divers, and its divided judges, is an extreme illustration of an ordinary truth: in European surrender law, the facts travel fast, but the defences travel just as fast, and the courtroom where the person stands matters enormously.