Americans are searching for Cuba again, and the question behind the searches is practical, not academic: with sanctions back in the headlines and talk of blockades and shortages on the island, can a United States citizen still travel to Cuba, spend money there, and come home without breaking federal law? The short answer is that the door is narrow but open. Pure tourist travel remains prohibited, while twelve defined categories of travel can proceed under federal general or specific licenses. The longer answer is where travelers get into trouble, because a lawful trip can still create liability if money flows to the wrong entities or if a business deal touches property the Cuban government confiscated after January 1, 1959. In May 2026 the Supreme Court decided a case that makes that second risk concrete for anyone doing business connected to the island. The discussion that follows is general in scope: it describes checks useful in comparable situations and makes no findings about any company’s situation. It explains the twelve authorized travel categories, the restricted-entity list every traveler should screen, the trafficking statute that produced nine-figure judgments, and the civil and criminal penalties behind the embargo rules.
I. Can Americans Travel to Cuba? What the Embargo Rules Allow
A. Tourist Travel Is Banned, but Twelve Licensed Categories Are Not
Federal law does not authorize a beach vacation in Cuba. The Cuban Assets Control Regulations provide that the travel-related transactions they list may be authorized either by a general license or on a case-by-case basis by a specific license, and they then name exactly twelve covered activities: family visits, official government business, journalistic activity, professional research and meetings, educational activities, religious activities, public performances and competitions, support for the Cuban people, humanitarian projects, private foundation work, informational materials, and certain export transactions. That list appears in 31 CFR 515.560, current through the November 5, 2026 update of the electronic Code of Federal Regulations. The same section closes the door plainly: “Nothing in this section authorizes transactions in connection with tourist travel to Cuba.” The Treasury Department office that administers the embargo gives the same answer as guidance, not as a substitute for the regulation. Citing the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act of 2000, OFAC states: “travel-related transactions involving Cuba are only permitted for the 12 categories of activities identified in the CACR. Travel-related transactions for other purposes remain prohibited.” That passage is OFAC’s Cuba frequently asked questions, answer 698, part of a set OFAC refreshed on September 29, 2026. The practical consequence is a paperwork question every traveler must answer before booking: which of the twelve categories covers this trip, and do its published conditions fit without stretching them? A traveler who cannot fit any category needs a specific license from OFAC before spending money connected to the trip, because the general permission in the regulation only reaches transactions ordinarily incident to authorized travel, such as transportation, visas, living expenses in Cuba, and goods bought for personal consumption on the island. A family visit, a journalism assignment, a religious mission, and a program genuinely supporting the Cuban people sit inside the authorized categories when they meet the detailed conditions of their own sections. A resort week booked because the price looked attractive does not, and calling it educational or people-to-people support after the fact does not make it so. Travelers should print or save the category conditions they relied on, keep receipts showing where money went, and confirm that no leg of the trip required a transaction the regulation withholds.
The licensing mechanics matter because they decide what a traveler must do in advance. A general license needs no application: a traveler who meets every published condition of an applicable category may proceed and simply live within those conditions. A specific license requires a written OFAC application and a wait for approval, and the regulation narrows that path sharply, because effective October 28, 2000, no specific licenses will be issued authorizing the travel-related transactions in paragraph (c) in connection with activities other than those referenced in paragraph (a). In practice that means a trip outside the twelve categories cannot be licensed into existence; OFAC will not write a permission slip for tourism under another name. Within an authorized trip, the regulation authorizes the transactions ordinarily incident to getting there and staying there: all transportation-related transactions to, from, and within Cuba including Cuban visas, all transactions ordinarily incident to travel within Cuba including living expenses and goods acquired for personal consumption there, and the purchase and importation as accompanied baggage of merchandise for personal use only. Two limits in that baggage permission deserve attention: it does not apply to Cuban-origin alcohol or tobacco products, while Cuban-origin informational materials remain exempt from the prohibitions entirely. Travelers should therefore separate routine trip spending, which the regulation covers, from the two questions that need independent answers: whether any payee sits on the Restricted List and whether any property involved carries a confiscation history.
B. Screen Every Payee Against the Cuba Restricted List
Even a traveler inside an authorized category can violate federal rules by paying the wrong counterparty. The State Department maintains a Cuba Restricted List of entities and subentities under the control of, or acting for or on behalf of, the Cuban military, intelligence, or security services, with which the Cuban Assets Control Regulations generally prohibit direct financial transactions. The list as published states it is current as of July 14, 2025 and explains that listed entities were added effective February 6, 2025 unless otherwise indicated. It names ministries such as MINFAR, the Revolutionary Armed Forces ministry, alongside hotels, marinas, stores, and service companies tied to the military and security apparatus, and it warns that listed entities owned or controlled by another listed entity are treated as restricted only when specified by name, while parenthetical descriptions of activities are only representative. The screening check this list demands is concrete: before reserving a hotel, booking an excursion, or hiring a local agency, search the current list for each name on the itinerary, including the property operator and not just the booking brand, and keep a dated copy of the search. Where the regulation allows it, ordinary living expenses and personal-consumption purchases remain authorized for licensed travelers, and the importation of Cuban-origin informational materials is exempt from the prohibitions entirely, but those permissions do not override the bar on direct financial transactions with restricted entities. The list changes over time, as the February 2025 additions and the July 2025 revision show, so a screen performed for a trip last year must be repeated for a trip this year. Travelers who discover mid-trip that a hotel or tour operator sits on the list should stop the payment relationship, document what was paid and when, and seek advice before the next transaction rather than treating the remainder of a prepaid package as automatically safe.
The list’s fine print answers two questions travelers often get wrong. First, ownership chains: entities or subentities owned or controlled by another listed entity are not treated as restricted unless also specified by name on the list, so a traveler must match the actual operator name against the list rather than assuming that everything near a military-owned hotel is barred or that everything one step removed is safe. Second, scope of activities: the parenthetical descriptions next to listed names only aid identification and are representative only, which means all activities of a listed entity fall under the prohibition, not just the activity in parentheses. A traveler who books a listed hotel for the rooms but dines elsewhere has still engaged in a direct financial transaction with the listed entity. The State Department page anchors the prohibition in 31 CFR 515.209, the section of the Cuban Assets Control Regulations that generally bars those direct financial transactions. Practically, the screen belongs at three moments: when the itinerary is planned, when any supplier changes, and when the list itself is republished, because additions such as the February 2025 listings instantly change what is lawful for future trips. Keep dated screenshots of each search, keep the names searched alongside the booking confirmations, and treat a supplier that cannot clearly identify its operator as a reason to choose a different supplier.
II. What U.S. Law Punishes When a Trip or Deal Touches Confiscated Property
A. Using Confiscated Property Can Mean Liability, Even Without Owning an Interest in It
In 1928 a United States company acquired a concession to develop and operate docks at the port of Havana, a time-limited interest set to expire in 2004. After Fidel Castro seized power, the Cuban government seized the docks without compensation, and the company later obtained a certified claim of about nine million dollars plus interest from the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission. Congress then enacted the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996, known as the Helms-Burton Act, codified at 22 U.S.C. 6021 and following, whose Title III lets United States nationals who own claims to confiscated property sue those who traffic in it. From 2016 to 2019, four commercial cruise lines, Royal Caribbean Cruises, Norwegian Cruise Line Holdings, Carnival Corporation, and MSC Cruises, transported nearly a million paying passengers to Cuba using the docks that company built, according to the Supreme Court opinion described below. That opinion states that the trial court entered summary judgment against all four lines and awarded the company more than one hundred million dollars from each, before Havana Docks Corp. v. Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd., 119 F.4th 1276 (11th Cir. Oct. 22, 2024), in which the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed on the theory that trafficking required interference with the plaintiff’s own property interest as if no confiscation had occurred. The Eleventh Circuit had required proof that the cruise lines’ conduct interfered with the company’s own property interest as if no confiscation had occurred, and the Supreme Court rejected that counterfactual test as difficult to apply and foreclosing cases the statute covers, so businesses must now measure exposure under the broader use-based rule rather than the reversed test. In Havana Docks Corp. v. Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd., No. 24-983 (U.S. May 21, 2026), argued February 23, 2026 and cited as 608 U.S. ___ (2026), the Supreme Court of the United States reversed the court of appeals and held that the cruise lines’ use of the docks is sufficient to establish that they used property confiscated by the Cuban government, without requiring the company to show trafficking in its own concession interest. The Court reasoned from the statute’s text that property which was confiscated can mean the physical property in which the plaintiff held an interest, not only the interest itself, and it wrote: “Confiscated property is, as it were, tainted—off limits— such that anyone who uses the property can be liable to those who had any interest in the tainted property.” The opinion expressly reverses Havana Docks Corp. v. Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd., 119 F.4th 1276 (11th Cir. Oct. 22, 2024), rejecting the Eleventh Circuit counterfactual trafficking test described above. The application for American readers considering Cuba-related business is direct: a federal court can treat ordinary commercial use of docks, terminals, hotels, or farmland once taken by Havana as trafficking, and the decisive question is whether the property was confiscated, not whether the user’s conduct would have interfered with the original owner’s rights in some imagined world without confiscation. The statute defines trafficking to include knowingly and intentionally managing, using, or acquiring confiscated property, engaging in commercial activity using or benefiting from it, or profiting through another person’s trafficking, all without the authorization of the United States national holding the claim, as set out in 22 U.S.C. 6023(13). The same definition carves out “transactions and uses of property incident to lawful travel to Cuba, to the extent that such transactions and uses of property are necessary to the conduct of such travel.” That exclusion means the traveler inside a genuine authorized category keeps an important statutory shield, while the traveler outside every category cannot borrow it. And the liability provision is blunt: with exceptions stated elsewhere in the section, a person who traffics in covered confiscated property “shall be liable to any United States national who owns the claim to such property for money damages.” The statute measures that recovery as the greatest of the certified claim plus interest, a court-determined amount plus interest, or fair market value, under 22 U.S.C. 6082(a)(1)(A). Anyone structuring a Cuba venture should therefore map every physical asset the venture will use against the confiscation history before signing, obtain the claim holder’s authorization where a claim exists or walk away where it does not, and never assume that an expired concession, a state intermediary, or a booking platform cleanses the underlying property.
The damages structure explains why these cases draw nine-figure awards and why authorization matters so much. Title III measures recovery as the greatest of three figures: the amount certified to the claimant by the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission plus interest, an amount determined by the court under the statute’s alternative valuation plus interest, or the fair market value of the property calculated as either its current value or its value when confiscated plus interest. The Supreme Court opinion notes that a Commission-certified claim counts as conclusive proof of ownership of the claim, which collapses what would otherwise be the hardest element of the plaintiff’s case. The history of the right of action also matters for timing: Presidents Clinton, Bush, and Obama continuously suspended the Title III right of action from its effective date onward, and President Trump allowed the suspension to expire in May 2019, which is why the cruise-line conduct from 2016 to 2019 and the airport and port cases that followed all arrived in court together. The authorization defense is the one the statute writes in plain terms: trafficking means acting without the authorization of the United States national who holds the claim, so a venture that secures that holder’s permission stands on entirely different ground from one that proceeds without it. For travelers, the parallel shield is the lawful-travel exclusion quoted above: transactions and uses of property incident to lawful travel, to the extent necessary to conduct that travel, are not trafficking at all. The exclusion protects the licensed traveler who sleeps in a non-restricted guesthouse and eats in private restaurants; it does not protect the traveler whose trip fits no category or the investor who builds a business on a confiscated parcel and calls the visits travel.
B. Shareholders Can Sue, and Embargo Violations Carry Federal Penalties
The Supreme Court’s May 2026 decision did not emerge from nowhere; the Eleventh Circuit spent 2024 and 2025 building the Title III doctrine case by case, and two of those cases show how far the private right of action reaches. In Blanco de Fernandez v. Seaboard Marine Ltd., 135 F.4th 939 (11th Cir. Apr. 14, 2025), decided April 14, 2025 by the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit as appeal No. 22-12966 from the Southern District of Florida, members of a family whose companies owned land and port facilities around Mariel Bay alleged that a shipping company trafficked in the confiscated property by delivering goods to a container terminal on the bay’s west side and moving freight across the surrounding land. The court agreed with the trial court that the company had not trafficked in property taken from one family entity, Maritima, but held the evidence sufficient for a jury to find trafficking in property taken from the other, Azucarera, stating: “We agree with the district court that Seaboard did not traffic in any property confiscated from Maritima, but we disagree that Fernandez did not provide sufficient evidence to support a finding that Seaboard trafficked in property confiscated from Azucarera.” The court accordingly affirmed in part and reversed in part, sending the surviving claims forward. The application for American businesses is practical rather than theoretical: routine logistics, using a terminal, crossing a parcel, or storing goods on ground once owned by a confiscation victim, can supply the trafficking element when the evidence ties the ground to a certified claim, so carriers and freight forwarders need parcel-level diligence on Cuban ports, not just a clean contract with the current operator. That treatment of Blanco de Fernandez as live authority is now routine: in Stewart v. City of Bessemer, No. 2:24-cv-122-AMM (N.D. Ala. Mar. 11, 2026), the United States District Court, Northern District of Alabama, relied on Fernandez v. Seaboard Marine Ltd., 135 F.4th 939, 956-57 (11th Cir. 2025), for the rule that a jury cannot infer facts based on speculation and conjecture when deciding summary judgment. Three months later the same court extended the doctrine to shareholders. In Lopez Regueiro v. American Airlines, Inc., No. 23-12568 (11th Cir. July 30, 2025), decided July 30, 2025, an heir who inherited shares in the company that owned Havana’s airport sued airlines whose flights used it, and the airlines argued that a shareholder owns no airport and therefore owns no confiscated property. The court vacated the dismissal and remanded, holding that the heir’s allegations of inherited shares sufficed at the pleading stage, and it closed: “The district court’s order dismissing the case is vacated, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.” That July 2025 opinion expressly applied the April 2025 Blanco de Fernandez decision, noting that the Helms-Burton Act “operates to protect those who had an interest in confiscated property” (135 F.4th at 949), which confirms that shareholders keep that protection even without owning the property itself that Blanco de Fernandez remains live authority for indirect owners pursuing traffickers. Beyond private lawsuits, the government enforces the embargo with its own penalties under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act. It is unlawful to violate, attempt to violate, conspire to violate, or cause a violation of any license, order, regulation, or prohibition issued under that chapter, and a civil penalty may be imposed “in an amount not to exceed the greater of” $250,000 or twice the transaction amount, while willful violations can bring fines up to $1,000,000 and, for a natural person, up to twenty years’ imprisonment, under 50 U.S.C. 1705(a) through (c). A civil enforcement action must be commenced “within 10 years after the latest date” of the violation. That ten-year clock is stated at 50 U.S.C. 1705(d)(1)(A). The Cuba embargo itself still rests partly on the Trading With the Enemy Act, whose authorities the President has continued year by year for Cuba, for example through the September 2024 determination continuing them through September 14, 2025 as implemented by the Cuban Assets Control Regulations, published in the notes to 50 U.S.C. 4305. The compliance checklist that follows from these authorities is short: confirm an authorized travel category and keep its proof, screen every payee against the current Restricted List, research the confiscation history of any property the trip or venture will use, obtain claim-holder authorization or abandon tainted assets, and preserve records for at least the ten-year enforcement window rather than deleting them after the trip.
Two factual details from these cases sharpen the diligence lesson. In the Blanco de Fernandez litigation, the family’s Azucarera company had bought thousands of acres on the west side of Mariel Bay around the Angosta Peninsula, ground the pre-Castro government had partly used for a naval air station, and the dispute turned parcel by parcel on which acres belonged to which family company and what the shipping company actually used. In the Lopez Regueiro case, the confiscated asset was Havana’s airport itself, owned by a company whose shares the plaintiff inherited from his father, and the defendants were airlines whose scheduled flights used that airport. Neither case involved a defendant that seized anything; both involved ordinary commercial users of infrastructure with a 1959 confiscation in its chain of title. That pattern is the warning for American readers: liability under Title III does not require seizing property, conspiring with Havana, or knowing the identity of the claim holder, because the statute reaches anyone who knowingly and intentionally engages in commercial activity using or benefiting from confiscated property without the claim holder’s authorization. On the government-enforcement side, the prohibition reaches attempts, conspiracies, and caused violations, not only completed ones, so a structured transaction designed to skirt a license condition can violate the law even if the final payment never clears. And the recordkeeping lesson runs the full ten years: because civil enforcement can begin up to a decade after the latest violation, itineraries, license analyses, Restricted List screens, and receipts should be archived for at least that long, in a form the traveler can still read years later.
Conclusion
Cuba is not closed to Americans, but it is not open the way an ordinary foreign destination is. Tourist travel stays prohibited while the twelve licensed categories in 31 CFR 515.560, the current Cuba Restricted List, and the State Department and OFAC guidance define the lawful path. The May 2026 Supreme Court trafficking decision, together with the Eleventh Circuit’s 2025 shareholder and shipping cases, shows that using confiscated docks, terminals, land, or airports for commercial purposes can produce private liability even for indirect owners’ claims, while IEEPA supplies civil and criminal penalties with a ten-year civil enforcement window. The traveler who documents an authorized category, screens every payee, avoids tainted property or secures the claim holder’s permission, and keeps records has addressed the risks these sources identify. OFAC refreshes its Cuba guidance, most recently on September 29, 2026, and the Restricted List moves with it, so every Cuba plan should be rechecked against the current federal publications before money changes hands.