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Cyber Attack: Will Business Insurance Pay If a Foreign Government Is Blamed?

Hassan Kohen is a Paris-based lawyer admitted to the Paris Bar (Avocat au Barreau de Paris). Initial strategic analysis: €80 incl. VAT, personal reply within 24 hours.

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Sources: U.S. court opinions and official U.S. government publications, read for this article

Maître Hassan KOHEN, avocat au Barreau de Paris
Hassan KOHEN
Attorney at the Paris Bar

Cyber Attack: Will Business Insurance Pay If a Foreign Government Is Blamed?

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Searches for “cyber attack” jumped across the United States on November 13, 2026. Google’s Trending Now data showed the term passing 50,000 searches with growth of about 1,000 percent, and the related searches tell the story: “cyber attack today,” “faa cyber attack,” “ground stop cyber attack,” “are we under a cyber attack” and, in the breakdown of the trend, “iran cyber attack.” For most readers the first question is whether this week’s disruptions were attacks at all. For a business owner, a second question matters more to the balance sheet: if a cyber attack shuts down your systems and investigators or officials point to a foreign government, will your insurance pay, or will the insurer call the loss an act of war?

The answer depends on three things you can check today: which policy you actually bought, how its exclusions are worded, and which state’s law governs it. Federal appeals courts applying New York and California law have read traditional war exclusions narrowly, required the insurer to prove that an exclusion applies, and limited “war” to hostilities involving sovereign or quasi-sovereign powers. A New Jersey appellate court applied similar reasoning to a malware attack in 2023. A federal appeals court applying Georgia law held in 2025, however, that commercial general liability policies with an electronic data exclusion did not cover losses from a data breach at all. Below are those decisions, the federal terrorism insurance rules that can come into play, and the checks to make after an attack. The discussion that follows is general in scope: it describes checks useful in comparable situations and makes no findings about any company named in the court decisions discussed.

I. Does your business insurance cover a cyber attack in the first place?

A. The type of policy decides more than the headline does

Before anyone argues about war, the policyholder has to find a policy that responds to the loss. Businesses typically hold several policies at once, and each one asks a different question. A stand-alone cyber policy is written around computer events: it may pay to restore data, to keep the business running while systems are down, to respond to an extortion demand, or to defend claims brought by customers whose information was exposed. A commercial general liability policy is written around bodily injury and damage to tangible property caused by an accident. A commercial property policy, often sold on an “all risks” basis, insures physical assets against loss unless an exclusion applies. A crime or computer fraud policy addresses theft of money or property. A cyber attack can touch all four, but the wording of each policy decides whether it pays, and the policy most people assume will help is not always the one that does.

The clearest recent illustration is Home Depot, Inc. v. Steadfast Ins. Co., No. 23-3720 (6th Cir. Jan. 13, 2025), decided by the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit on January 13, 2025, applying Georgia law. According to the opinion, the company held more than $100 million in separate cyber insurance policies, its cyber insurers paid up to the full $100 million aggregate limit after hackers stole payment card data, and it then sought more under commercial general liability policies after settling claims by card-issuing financial institutions for about $170 million. The court held that the policies’ electronic data exclusion, which removed coverage for “[d]amages arising out of the loss of, loss of use of, damage to, corruption of, inability to access, or inability to manipulate electronic data,” controlled, so the insurers owed neither indemnity nor a defense. For a business reading its own coverage after a cyber attack, Home Depot means that a general liability policy with this kind of electronic data exclusion may pay nothing, so the first document to pull is the stand-alone cyber policy.

The decision is useful for a second reason. The court did not need to decide whether the breach caused a “loss of use” of the physical payment cards, because the exclusion applied even on that assumption. When a policy contains both a narrow definition of covered property and a separate exclusion, the exclusion can end the analysis. A business that hopes to recover cyber losses under a general liability or property policy should therefore read the definitions and the exclusions together, rather than stopping at a coverage grant that seems broad. The opinion also shows the practical value of limits: the cyber program in that case paid to its aggregate limit, and the dispute arose only over the amount that exceeded it. If your cyber limit is low compared with your exposure, that gap is where coverage fights tend to begin.

Federal terrorism insurance rules treat a stand-alone cyber policy as a mainstream commercial line. The Treasury Department’s regulation at 31 C.F.R. § 50.4, shown on eCFR as up to date as of November 12, 2026, defines property and casualty insurance for the federal Terrorism Risk Insurance Program and states that “a stand-alone cyber liability policy falling within Line 17—Other Liability, is property and casualty insurance,” unless it is identified for state reporting purposes as something else, such as professional liability insurance. That matters because the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act, reproduced as a note to 15 U.S.C. § 6701 in the 2023 edition of the U.S. Code, provides in section 103(c) that during each calendar year each covered insurer “shall make available, in all of its property and casualty insurance policies, coverage for insured losses,” on terms that do not differ materially from those for other events. Section 103(b) also conditions federal payments on the insurer’s clear and conspicuous disclosure to the policyholder of the premium charged for losses covered by the program, so a commercial policy file will often contain a terrorism disclosure. Find it: together with any terrorism endorsement, it shows how your program treats a certified act of terrorism.

Within the cyber policy itself, look for five things before you file a claim. First, the insuring agreements: first-party coverage for your own losses and third-party coverage for claims against you are usually separate, with separate limits. Second, the definitions of the events that trigger coverage, often called a security failure, a system failure or a cyber event; some policies cover only malicious intrusions, while others also cover accidental outages. Third, the exclusions, especially any exclusion for war, hostile or warlike acts, state-sponsored operations, or failures of utilities and outside infrastructure. Fourth, the waiting period and retention that apply to business interruption, since a short outage may never exceed them. Fifth, the conditions: notice, cooperation, consent before paying vendors or ransom, and the policy’s own deadline for filing suit. Each of these is a contract term, so the precise words in your policy control, not a general description of what cyber insurance usually does.

B. Who must prove what, and how courts read unclear words

Once a policy is found, the burden of proof shapes the dispute. In Universal Cable Productions v. Atlantic Specialty Insurance, 929 F.3d 1143 (9th Cir. 2019), the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, applying California law in a decision filed July 12, 2019, reviewed an insurer’s refusal to pay the costs of moving a television production out of Jerusalem after Hamas fired rockets from Gaza into Israel in 2014. The insurer relied on exclusions for “war” and “warlike action by a military force.” The court stated the governing rule: “The burden is on the insured to establish that the claim is within the basic scope of coverage and on the insurer to establish that the claim is specifically excluded.” Because the loss was a covered peril, the insurer bore the burden on the exclusions, and the court held that it did not carry it, because the insurance-industry meaning of both terms required hostilities between de jure or de facto sovereigns and Hamas was neither. For a California policyholder whose cyber claim is denied under a war exclusion, Universal Cable puts the burden of proving the exclusion on the insurer and asks whether the attacker was acting as a sovereign, not whether the event felt like war.

The Ninth Circuit has continued to rely on that reasoning. In Schertzer v. Bank of America, NA, No. 23-55104, a published opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit filed July 29, 2024, the court cited Universal Cable, 929 F.3d 1143, while interpreting a bank account agreement under California law. The court cited Universal Cable for the proposition that “industry usage of insurance term applied where insured was a sophisticated party who conducted frequent business related to the insurance trade,” and contrasted ordinary account holders, who the court said are generally not sophisticated parties likely to be familiar with a technical meaning. That later citation does not make Universal Cable a guarantee of how any future cyber case will come out, but it confirms that the Ninth Circuit still treats the decision as a working statement of California contract interpretation.

The statute behind that analysis is short. California Civil Code section 1644, enacted in 1872, provides: “The words of a contract are to be understood in their ordinary and popular sense, rather than according to their strict legal meaning; unless used by the parties in a technical sense, or unless a special meaning is given to them by usage, in which case the latter must be followed.” In Universal Cable, the Ninth Circuit read that last clause to require the trial court to apply the special insurance meaning of “war” rather than a dictionary or newspaper meaning. The court also noted limits on customary usage: the party asking for it would generally be engaged in the relevant trade, and if a party is not, the party offering customary usage must show that the parties had actual or constructive notice of it. The court found that the insured, though not in the insurance trade, was a sophisticated party that frequently engages in business related to that trade and was represented by a broker, and that the notice burden was met. A small business with no insurance department and no broker may be in a different position, which is the contrast the Ninth Circuit drew in 2024.

The practical lesson for the policyholder is to do its own part of the burden well. Under the rule the Ninth Circuit applied, the insured must first show that the loss falls within the basic scope of coverage. That means building a record that matches the policy’s trigger: when the incident began, which systems were affected, how operations were interrupted, what was spent and why. Forensic reports, system logs, vendor invoices and payroll records for overtime are the raw material. Only after that showing does the burden shift to the insurer to prove an exclusion. If the record is thin, the exclusion fight may never be reached, because the claim will fail at the first step.

II. What changes when the attack is blamed on a foreign government?

A. How courts have read “war,” “warlike action” and “insurrection”

The foundational American case is Pan American World Airways, Inc. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 505 F.2d 989 (2d Cir. 1974), decided by the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit on October 15, 1974. According to the opinion, Pan American Flight 083 was hijacked on September 6, 1970 by men acting for the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, and the Boeing 747 was destroyed in Cairo after the passengers were evacuated. The all-risk insurers invoked war and related exclusions. Applying New York law, the court held that “The all risk insurers, if they were to prevail, had the burden of proving that the proximate cause of the loss of the 747 was included within one of the terms of exclusion,” and it explained that “war is a course of hostility engaged in by entities that have at least significant attributes of sovereignty.” The court affirmed the judgment against the all-risk insurers. For a New York policyholder facing a war exclusion after a cyber attack, Pan Am means the insurer must prove that the event was the kind of sovereign hostility the exclusion describes, and ambiguity in that wording counts against the insurer. The Second Circuit still applies Pan Am: in CITGO Petroleum Corp. v. Ascot Underwriting Ltd., No. 24-0227-cv, decided by the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit on October 28, 2025, the court cited Pan Am, 505 F.2d 989, and applied its definition of insurrection as “(1) a violent uprising by a group or movement (2) acting for the specific purpose of overthrowing the constituted government and seizing its powers.”

Pan Am also shows why each excluded term must be examined separately. The court observed that “for there to be a ‘war’ a sovereign or quasi-sovereign must engage in hostilities,” while an insurrection requires an intent to overthrow a lawfully constituted regime and a riot requires several people gathered in the same place. A cyber attack rarely fits the physical images behind these old words. The question for a court is whether the specific facts satisfy the elements of the specific term the insurer invokes, and whether the attack, rather than some other event, was the proximate cause of the loss. Federal courts outside the insurance field still point to Pan Am on that kind of question. In J.G.G. v. Trump, No. 25-766, a memorandum opinion of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia dated March 24, 2025, issued at the temporary restraining order stage of a challenge to removals under the Alien Enemies Act, the court cited Pan Am, 505 F.2d 989, for the observation that courts “regularly decide whether certain conduct qualifies as militaristic or warlike,” while stating that the broader questions before it need not be settled at that early posture. That citation concerns a different statute and a different setting, but it reflects the same premise the insurance cases share: whether events amount to war or warlike conduct is a question courts decide on the record, not a label that settles itself.

Attribution to a foreign government is where cyber claims differ from the hijacking and rocket cases. In Universal Cable, the Ninth Circuit read Pan Am closely and stated that “Pan Am held that a terrorist group was not a de facto government because it was not acting on behalf of the recognized government.” That sentence cuts both ways for cyber claims. If the people behind an attack were acting on behalf of a recognized government, the sovereignty element that defeated the insurers in Pan Am and Universal Cable may be easier for an insurer to argue. But sovereignty is only one element, and the second is the character of the act itself.

That second element decided the most closely watched cyber dispute so far. In Merck & Co. v. ACE American Insurance Co., Nos. A-1879-21 and A-1882-21, the Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division, in an opinion decided May 1, 2023 and approved for publication, addressed property insurance claims for losses caused by the June 2017 malware known as NotPetya. The exclusion stated that the policy did not insure “Loss or damage caused by hostile or warlike action in time of peace or war,” including action by any government or sovereign power. According to the opinion, the insurers’ cyber consultant had concluded “with high confidence, that the NotPetya cyber-attack was very likely orchestrated by actors working for or on behalf of the Russian Federation.” That was the insurers’ position, not a finding by the court. The court held that the insurers did not show the exclusion applied, concluding that “terms similar to ‘hostile or warlike action’ by a sovereign power are intended to relate to actions clearly connected to war or, at least, to a military action or objective.” It is a decision of a New Jersey intermediate appellate court on the particular wording before it; courts in other states are not bound by it, but it is the most detailed appellate treatment of a state-attributed malware loss under a traditional war exclusion.

Two cautions follow. First, these cases interpreted older exclusion language written for armies, navies and air forces. An insurer can draft a newer exclusion that expressly addresses cyber operations attributed to a state, and a court asked to read such language would start from its text, as the Sixth Circuit did with the electronic data exclusion in 2025. The age and wording of your exclusion therefore matter as much as the case law. Second, the outcome in each case turned on the governing state’s rules of interpretation. A policy governed by New York, California, New Jersey or Georgia law may be read differently from one governed by another state’s law, so the choice-of-law clause belongs on your checklist.

B. Terrorism certification, attribution evidence and the checks to make now

The same vocabulary works in reverse when a policy covers war-type risks instead of excluding them. In CITGO Petroleum Corp. v. Ascot Underwriting Ltd., No. 24-0227-cv (2d Cir. Oct. 28, 2025), decided by the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit on October 28, 2025, a marine cargo reinsurance policy governed by New York law covered loss caused by war-type perils including “insurrection.” According to the opinion, the district court had entered judgment of $54,235,187.24 plus interest for a cargo of crude oil seized by Venezuelan authorities, and the Second Circuit affirmed, holding that, “as a matter of law, the Maduro regime constitutes an insurrection within the meaning of the Policy.” The court restated New York’s rule that “ambiguous policy exclusions are to be construed narrowly, while ambiguous policy inclusions are to be construed broadly,” and it explained that “an established definition provided by state law or industry usage will serve as a default rule, and that definition will control unless the parties explicitly indicate, on the face of their agreement, that [a] term is to have some other meaning.” For a New York policyholder, CITGO means that an undefined war-type term in a cyber policy takes the meaning courts and the industry have already given it unless the policy defines it, so the definitions section deserves as much attention as the exclusion itself.

Federal law adds a separate track for terrorism. Under 31 C.F.R. § 50.4(b), an “act of terrorism” for the federal program is an act certified by the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Attorney General and the Secretary of Homeland Security, as an act of terrorism that is violent or dangerous to human life, property or infrastructure, that resulted in damage within the United States (or to certain U.S. air carriers, vessels or missions abroad), and that was committed by an individual or individuals as part of an effort to coerce the civilian population of the United States or to influence the policy or affect the conduct of the United States Government by coercion. The Secretary may not certify an act committed as part of the course of a war declared by the Congress, except for workers’ compensation coverage, or an act whose aggregate property and casualty insurance losses do not exceed $5,000,000. The regulation adds: “The Secretary’s certification of an act of terrorism, or determination not to certify an act as an act of terrorism, is final and is not subject to judicial review.” The same section defines an insured loss as a loss resulting from an act of terrorism that is covered by primary or excess property and casualty insurance, so the federal backstop does not create coverage the policy does not provide. The 2023 edition of the U.S. Code shows the program terminating on December 31, 2027 under section 108(a) of the Act.

For a business, the federal definition is a reason to keep two questions apart. Whether an attack attributed to a foreign state is ever certified as terrorism is a federal decision outside your control. Whether your policy pays depends on its own insuring agreement, its terrorism endorsement and its exclusions. A denial letter that relies on a war exclusion and a terrorism endorsement that covers certified acts can point in opposite directions, and the policyholder should ask the insurer to identify, in writing, which provision it relies on and which facts it says satisfy each element.

Claims against the attackers themselves are a different matter. The federal Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1030, makes many intrusions federal crimes, and subsection (g) allows any person who suffers damage or loss by reason of a violation to bring a civil action against the violator for compensatory damages and injunctive or other equitable relief, if the conduct involves one of the factors listed in the statute. The same subsection states: “No action may be brought under this subsection unless such action is begun within 2 years of the date of the act complained of or the date of the discovery of the damage.” That claim runs against the violator, so it helps only when the people responsible can be identified and brought before a U.S. court. Our earlier analysis of when federal computer crime law applies to an equipment failure under investigation explains how the criminal side of section 1030 works.

If your systems are disrupted and your provider, rather than an attacker, is the immediate cause, your contract with that provider is another source of recovery, often limited to service credits. We discussed that route in our guide to recovering business losses under a cloud service contract after an outage. Insurance and contract claims can run side by side, but the records you keep for one usually serve the other.

The practical checks after an attack follow directly from the cases. Give notice under every policy that might respond, as each policy’s notice clause requires, and keep proof of the date and method. Obtain complete copies of each policy, including declarations, endorsements and terrorism disclosures, because the decisions above turned on exact words. Describe the incident factually in claim submissions and public statements, and avoid adopting speculative labels such as “act of war” or “state-sponsored” before the facts are known, since the war exclusion cases turned on who acted and what kind of act it was. Preserve forensic images, logs and the reports of every outside consultant, and remember that in the New Jersey case a consultant’s attribution was treated as a party’s position rather than as the answer. Separate your losses into categories that track the policy: data restoration, business interruption, extortion demands, and claims by customers or business partners. If coverage is denied, ask the insurer to identify the exclusion, the facts it relies on and the governing law, and read the policy’s own provision on the time to file suit, because that term comes from the contract and the governing state’s law, not from the cases discussed here.

Those checks also protect the business if the attribution question is never resolved. Attribution of an attack may remain uncertain for a long time, and it may never be tested in court. Under the burden rules the Second and Ninth Circuits applied, a policyholder does not have to disprove state involvement to recover under an all-risk or cyber policy; the insurer that invokes the exclusion has to prove it. A careful record of what happened, when, and with what cost puts the business in the best position whichever way the attribution debate goes.

Conclusion

A cyber attack blamed on a foreign government does not automatically end an insurance claim. The first step is to identify the policy that actually responds: a stand-alone cyber policy is designed for these events, while a general liability policy with an electronic data exclusion may provide nothing, as a federal appeals court held under Georgia law in 2025. When an insurer invokes a war or hostile acts exclusion, courts applying New York and California law have placed the burden on the insurer, read “war” as hostilities involving sovereign or quasi-sovereign entities, and construed unclear exclusions narrowly, and a New Jersey appellate court declined to apply a traditional hostile or warlike action exclusion to a malware attack attributed by the insurers’ consultant to a state. Newer exclusion language may be read differently, and the governing state’s law can change the result. Federal terrorism certification is a separate decision that does not create coverage a policy lacks. The business that reads its whole policy, gives notice as each policy requires, keeps a factual record of the incident and its costs, and asks the insurer to identify the exact provision and facts behind any denial will be ready for whichever question the claim turns on.

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